Low levels of state power severely limited the scale of military ventures: a few thousand armored cavalry formed the nucleus of the Frankish forces, supported by a penumbra of more lightly equipped men. Growing emphasis on horses and armor reduced and devalued the contribution of the less affluent, thereby narrowing the social base of warfare—the exact opposite of what had happened in the Roman Republic, when a voracious conscription system ensnared an ever-larger share of the citizenry. Logistical capabilities were likewise modest: armies of more than a few thousand men were rare and had to be split up into detachments in order to manage provisioning. Status priorities and logistical constraints thus converged in favoring relatively small forces, sufficient to overcome even weaker opponents but not enough to secure a larger empire.52
Fiscal atrophy, military weakness, aristocratic autonomy, and the exploitation of royal fraternal divisions by powerful factions were among the key causes of the Carolingians’ failure to re-create anything even remotely resembling the Roman empire in Europe. Other constraints of arguably lesser significance further reinforced this outcome. For instance, environmental conditions may have contributed both to Charlemagne’s successes and the misfortunes of his successors. Exceptionally harsh winters that were frequently linked to volcanic activity became more common after Charlemagne’s reign, and associated famines appear to have been more severe.53
In the ideological sphere, the vision of “Roma renascens,” of a putative rebirth of the Roman empire, was primarily aimed at elites and was of modest impact, however overrated it might have been by modern scholarship: it worked best as long as it was accompanied by tangible material benefits such as plunder and land grants. Rather than being driven by a desire to rebuild Roman power, Carolingian expansion sought to recover (and where possible augment) the Merovingian domain.54
In any case, Charlemagne’s realm, with its poor infrastructure, primitive communications network, feeble urbanism, part-time military, ethnic divisions, and highly personalized rule bore little resemblance to the ancient empire that had once held sway over most of his lands. State formation under the Merovingian and Carolingian Franks is best viewed as a waxing and waning of state (and royal) power, marked by relative highs in the early sixth and the second half of the eighth centuries, which were separated and then followed by much longer stretches of infighting, aristocratic dominance, and disunity that weakened the center(s).
What is most remarkable in all of this is that the Merovingian kingdom avoided complete collapse in the seventh century, and that a trio of eighth-century rulers temporarily managed to reverse this decline and harness sufficient elite support to defeat and absorb (even) less well-organized external competitors, inflating Francia into the largest polity in Europe and advancing far enough into Italy to reclaim the mantle of emperorship. Any more than that—a rebuilding of state structures more akin to those of the Roman empire, or the creation of a differently organized (perhaps more confederated) but similarly durable entity on Latin European soil—remained well beyond the reach even of the most fortunate rulers and their shaky coalitions of supporters.55
That success itself added to the state’s weakness—by empowering the nobility that benefited from royal campaigns—is a telling sign of deep-seated systemic flaws that could not readily be overcome by top-down reform or good luck. In order to prime the Frankish empire for more broadly-based and longer-lasting European unification, we would need to rewrite its history from the bottom up, starting with the land allocations that commenced at the end of the Roman period and continuing with the resultant erosion of direct taxation, the gradual reinforcement of divisive Frankish ethnic supremacy, and the development of the vassalage system that came to define to social order—and, for good measure, royal succession practices and perhaps even the climate. This is a brief that far transcends any meaningful counterfactual thought experiment.
FROM THE TENTH THROUGH THE THIRTEENTH CENTURIES: THE GERMAN EMPIRE
As centralized state power in West Francia (henceforth “France”) unraveled, the eastern kingdom that emerged from the serial partitions of the Carolingian empire was the only one large enough to aim for a leadership role in Christian Europe. Yet the same problem that beset its western twin—growing aristocratic autonomy and resistance to royal rule—initially took it to the brink of disintegration. Conrad I, originally the duke of Franconia and the first non-Carolingian king of that eastern realm (henceforth, for simplicity’s sake, “Germany”) from 911 to 918, was locked in near-continuous conflict with his rebellious fellow dukes and was eventually killed in battle against one of them. At the same time, the Magyars, a confederation of steppe warriors that had recently taken over the Hungarian plains, stepped up their raiding into Germany and beyond. Conrad’s successor Henry (r. 919–936) was more successful in containing open resistance among his nobles, heading a confederation of powerful dukes that was held together in no small measure by the Magyar threat.
Otto I (r. 936–973) further consolidated royal power by suppressing aristocratic dissent, decisively defeating the Magyars and recovering northern and central Italy, a feat for which the pope bestowed on him the title of “Roman” emperor in 962. For the first time, a German ruler claimed the same position as the earlier Carolingian rulers had. Yet he faced much stronger domestic constraints on his exercise of power and operated on a smaller geographical scale: successful military leadership had arguably been crucial in averting French-style partition.56
Yet this shift toward territorial expansion and (modest) centralization did not continue. In short order (977–983), Otto II had to put down yet another noble rebellion. He launched an intervention in France that failed to take Paris, was defeated in his attempt to gain southern Italy, and was wrong-footed by a Slav uprising that cut into the eastern borderlands of the empire. His son Otto III likewise enjoyed little success against the Slavs and died shortly after having been ignominiously evicted from Rome by a local popular rising. Upon coming to power, Henry II (r. 1002–1024) had to deal with renewed noble risings and reverse the defection of his Italian possessions.
The Salian dynasty (r. 1027–1125) encountered more of the same problems, most notably repeated aristocratic rebellions and growing unrest and resistance south of the Alps. The peaceful incorporation by inheritance of Burgundy into the empire in 1034 merely added another highly autonomous entity to the mix. The German emperors proved unable to project power beyond the existing borders: sporadic campaigns to establish control over southern Italy and Sicily had already commenced in the 960s but consistently failed. By far the biggest challenge to state formation emanated from power struggles within, between the emperor-kings and their dukes, margraves, and powerful cities. Uprisings by individual nobles or alliances among them occurred with some frequency, most notably in 1025–1027, 1077–1090, 1104–1115, 1114–1115, and 1138–1142.
Alternative strategies to tighten the rulers’ grip on power also failed to bear fruit. The Ottonians had sought to counterbalance aristocratic dominance by handing over more land and authority to bishops and abbots, seeking to co-opt them by turning church leaders into enfeoffed vassals. However, by the 1070s, this approach opened up new tensions as a revived papacy asserted increasingly more prerogatives. When Pope Gregory VII barred secular rulers from appointing clergy, an escalating conflict between him and the emperor Henry IV resulted in the latter’s excommunication and forced him to give in as his restless nobles exploited this rift to their own advantage. Half a century later, Henry V renounced claims to the investiture of clergy.57
The ascent of the Hohenstaufen dynasty (r. 1138–1254) changed little of substance as princely, papal, and local urban power continued to expand. Under Frederick I, Austria’s status was raised to that of a duchy (1156), creating yet another autonomous entity at the margins of the empire. Later the same ruler was soundly defeated in northern Italy, had to acknowledge the pope as a sovereign ruler of the papal territories, and grant Italian cities the right to elect their own officia
ls. His successor, Henry V, scored a rare success by conquering south Italy and Sicily in 1194—after more than 200 years of trying. Yet, although the crown benefited from the revenue generated by this more centralized domain, he was unable to have it formally incorporated into the empire proper.
At least Sicily provided a power base for his three-year-old son, Frederick II, when Henry V died in 1197 and two rival German kings were elected—the dukes of Aquitaine and Swabia—which ushered in an extended period of internal power struggle (1198–1215). And although Frederick II did eventually take over, he was forced to cede important royal privileges to his princes (1231–1232). Renewed conflict with the papacy during a period of intense campaigning in northern Italy saw him excommunicated in 1239, and he was unable to take Rome by force. In 1246, the church stepped up the pressure: the archbishops of Mainz and Cologne declared him deposed and crowned two consecutive anti-kings.
Frederick II survived a massive military defeat in Italy in 1248 by just two years, and his short-lived son Conrad II likewise failed to subdue this region. The latter’s death in 1254 led to a prolonged interregnum without any emperor at all. During this period, a member of France’s ruling family seized Sicily and southern Italy with papal support. When the Habsburg Rudolf I of Austria claimed the imperial mantle in 1273, he did so in return for renouncing any claims to the Papal States and Sicily (figure 5.6).
Even this bare-bones overview shows that the German empire did not succeed in expanding its reach or centralizing state control. Lasting additions were rare, limited to Burgundy in the eleventh century and parts of the Elbe-Oder region, most notably Brandenburg and Pomerania, in the thirteenth century. Control over southern Italy and Sicily proved short-lived (about two generations), and the full sovereignty of the Papal States in the mid-thirteenth century entailed the loss of territories that had been part of the empire for three centuries. Under these conditions, sustained imperial expansion was never a realistic option.
FIGURE 5.6 The German (“Roman”) Empire, c. 1200 CE.
The most obvious target, France, was largely left alone after Otto II’s intervention in the late 970s to install a friendly king on the French throne had failed. Military conflict remained highly regionalized for much of the Middle Ages, centering on two axes, England/France and Germany/Italy (plus Germany’s Slavic periphery), with virtually no overlap between the two. The absence of challenges from major external powers—Byzantium was relatively distant, with conflicts confined to southern Italy, and France was long held back by internal weakness—may well have played a major role in impeding imperial state formation. Between the defeat of the Magyars in 955 and the appearance of the Mongols in 1241, the German empire did not face any serious threats that might have precipitated centralization.
Armed conflict was largely concentrated in two zones: in northern and central Italy, where a long line of emperors waged war against city-states and leagues that were nominally subordinate to them, and within Germany itself, pitting princes (and occasional anti-kings) against their overlords (as well as against each other). Both of these processes are emblematic of the profound structural weakness of the empire.
The fact that several centuries (from the 960s—and especially from the 1080s—into the 1250s) witnessed often inconclusive Italian campaigns speaks loudly to the failure of rulers to mobilize the ample manpower and resources of Germany against small-scale opponents that excelled at raising far more resources and commitments in per capita terms. This enabled these city-states and principalities to punch above their weight in military affairs, not least by investing in increasingly sophisticated fortifications that stymied aggressors. Greater German pressure simply generated stronger pushback, most notably in the form of the Lombard League of the 1160s–1240s, which, supported by the papacy, pooled the resources of most northern Italian cities against the emperor.58
In Germany itself, imperial governance was precariously founded on often hesitant elite consensus that was increasingly formalized over time. In the Ottonian period, the dukes enjoyed quasi-regal powers over castles and associated resources, and royals were usually of ducal origin. Under the Salians, the hereditary ducal elite expanded their estates, in part by converting crown lands. Attempts to impose a more command-oriented style of rulership failed: confiscations of aristocratic landholdings triggered resistance, and for a while, in the late eleventh century, the top nobility even took to holding meetings that excluded their emperor.
Cognizant of these risks, the Staufers abandoned earlier efforts to prevent fiefs from becoming fully hereditary. The aristocracy came to be formally stratified: as dukes were recognized as princes, they formed a top elite layer that intermediated between the emperor and lesser nobles. These lordly hierarchies created cascading power relationships that effectively detached rulers from the bulk of the aristocracy. No fewer than seventeen secular princes and forty-seven bishops or archbishops with de facto ducal powers emerged in the process.59
As greater numbers of princes took charge of local jurisdiction and the mobilization of resources, the imperial realm was increasingly segmented into territorialized quasi-polities. Discharging more and more functions without direct participation of their rulers, these dukes and cognate leaders enjoyed growing “political self-sufficiency.” They set up their own chancelleries, building administrative structures that covered their increasingly stable territories.60
During the High Middle Ages, Western Europe filled up with castles. A disproportionate share of the growing wealth generated by the economic expansion of this period ended up in the hands of nobles who used it to shore up their defenses against the central authorities and their peers. While opposed to this trend, kings were often powerless to prevent it. In Germany, castle construction peaked in the late twelfth and the thirteenth centuries. More expensive but sturdier stone fortification replaced timber, and even cities were increasingly protected by stone walls.
Reflecting the elitist social order, warfare centered on knights and castles: military activity was the prerogative of the personal retinues of nobles who controlled strongholds and surrounding territory. For the same reason, progress in defensive capabilities coincided with stagnation in offensive capacities: as long as the “social exclusivity of the aristocracy dominated war,” conservativism slowed technological and tactical innovation. The proliferation of strong defensive positions coupled with low levels of centralized state power that limited army size and quality heavily constrained royal intervention against unruly subordinates.61
Weak central power, in turn, was to no small degree a function of fiscal arrangements that reduced rulers’ ability to exercise power against domestic challengers and external competitors. Most material resources were controlled by vassals, who were expected to answer claims to support by their overlords. De facto hereditary possession of fiefs had become the norm early on, and although forcible reassignments occurred in times of conflict, the overall distributional pattern proved quite durable.
Crown lands under direct ruler control were relatively small and shrank over time due to land grants to allies, especially church leaders, and remaining assets were increasingly pawned off. Sporadic attempts under the Salians to impose direct taxes remained unsuccessful. After Staufer expansion into southern Italy—a more fiscally productive environment—had promised some relief, the loss of these territories after the 1260s left later emperors bereft of funds. From that time onward, rulers increasingly relied on funding from their hereditary dynastic possessions, a practice that only added to the overall segmentation of the empire.62
Taken together, the growth of hereditary fiefs, territorial consolidation of princely domains, the spread and improvement of fortifications, and severe fiscal constraints on rulers ensured that consensual politics was the only viable option. Thus, rather than acting as a king of kings, the emperor was in many ways nothing more than a primus inter pares. Late medieval observers repeatedly likened regional princes to kings or emperors. The nominal empero
r did not exercise outright hegemony—let alone direct rule—over his followers but relied heavily on negotiation and brokerage, resorting to military force only when elite relations broke down, and did so only with decidedly mixed success. These king-emperors fitted somewhat uneasily into a thoroughly fractured system of governance: their degree of detachment is reflected by the absence of an imperial capital and their itinerant lifestyle, which sustained large retinues but produced little by way of tangible governance. Only a trickle of documents are known to have emanated from the imperial court even as literacy recovered during the High Middle Ages.63
Power relations were further complicated by the influence of the church. The new “Roman” empire itself had arisen from an agreement between Charlemagne and the pope in which the latter initially had the weaker hand: the papacy relied on imperial protection, and renegade popes could be deposed. At first it also held little sway over senior church officials, allowing them to cooperate with secular rulers. Bishops in particular became important allies in government, enjoying privileges such as judicial authority and freedom from taxation. Ottonian and Salian emperors, eager to balance obstreperous princely power with that of bishops and abbots, stepped up the transfer of crown lands to the church.
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