by Неизвестный
March 25
The day passed uneventfully. León, Urbano, and Arturo were sent to a point from which to observe access to the river from both sides. At 12:00 Marcos withdrew from his ambush position and the rest remained concentrated at the main ambush site. At 18:30 with nearly all personnel present, I made an analysis of our expedition and its significance, reviewing Marcos’s errors and demoting him, and then named Miguel as head of the vanguard. At the same time I announced the discharge of Paco, Pepe, Chingolo, and Eusebio, telling them that they would not eat if they do not work; I suspended their tobacco ration and redistributed their personal things among other compañeros more in need. I referred to Kolle’s plan to come here and hold discussions at the same time as those members of the youth organization who are here with us are being expelled, saying that we are interested in action—words are of no importance. I announced we would look for a cow and that study classes would be resumed.14
I informed Pedro and El Médico [Ernesto] they have almost achieved full status as guerrilla fighters, and gave Apolinar some encouragement. I criticized Wálter for being too soft during the trip, for his attitude in combat, and for the fear he showed of the planes; he did not react well. I went over some details with Chino and Pelado, and gave the Frenchman a long oral report on the situation. In the course of the meeting, the group adopted the name National Liberation Army of Bolivia, and a public statement about the meeting will be made.
March 26
Inti set off early with Antonio, Raúl, and Pedro to look for a cow near Ticucha, but saw troops about three hours from here so they turned back, apparently without being seen. They reported that the soldiers had a sentry in a clearing and something like a house with a shiny roof from which they saw eight men leave. They were close to the river we used to call the Yaqui. I spoke with Marcos and sent him to the rear guard—but I do not expect his conduct to improve much.
We ran a small góndola and placed lookouts at the usual posts; from the observation point at Algarañaz’s house, 30 to 40 soldiers were seen, as well as a helicopter landing.
March 27
Today there was a spate of broadcasts filling the airwaves, producing a flurry of press announcements, including a press conference with Barrientos.15 The official report includes one more death than we account for and states that men were wounded and later shot. They said that we suffered 15 dead and four prisoners, two of them foreigners; they also mention a foreigner who shot himself and discuss the composition of the guerrilla force. It is obvious that either the deserters or the prisoner spoke, but we do not know exactly how much they said and how they said it. Everything seems to indicate that Tania has been identified, which means we have lost two years of good and patient work. The departure of the people is very difficult now, and when I told Dantón this, he did not seem very amused. We will see in the future.
Benigno, Loro, and Julio set out to find a trail to Pirirenda; this should take them two or three days, and their instructions are to get there without being seen and then to move on to Gutiérrez. The reconnaissance plane dropped some paratroopers that the sentry reported had landed in our hunting ground; Antonio and two others were sent to investigate and to try to take prisoners, but there was nothing.
We had a meeting of the general command during the evening where we worked out plans for the days ahead. Tomorrow we will send a góndola to the little house to pick up some corn, and then another to buy supplies in Gutiérrez; then we will stage a small diversionary attack, possibly in the woods against vehicles traveling between Pincal and Lagunillas.
Communiqué No. 1 was drafted, which we will try to send to journalists in Camiri (D XVII).
March 28
The radio continues to be saturated with news about the guerrillas; it is reported that we are surrounded by 2,000 men in a radius of 120 kilometers and that they are closing in and bombing us with napalm; we supposedly have had 10 to 15 casualties.
I sent Braulio with nine men to try to look for some corn. They returned at night with a bunch of crazy reports:
1)Coco, who had left earlier to warn us, disappeared.
2)At 16:00 they arrived at the farm, where they had discovered the cave had been ransacked; they had spread out to gather things when seven men from the Red Cross appeared, along with two doctors and several unarmed soldiers, who were all taken prisoner and told that the truce had expired, but then allowed to continue their work.
3)A truckload of soldiers turned up and instead of shooting them, our troops made them promise to withdraw.
4)The soldiers withdrew in a disciplined way, and our men accompanied the health workers to the rotting corpses, but they were unable to carry them away and said that they would come tomorrow to burn them.
They confiscated two horses from Algarañaz and then they returned, leaving Antonio, Rubio, and Aniceto where the animals could not go on; when they went looking for Coco, he showed up—apparently he had fallen asleep.
Still no news from Benigno.
The Frenchman made a statement, with too much vehemence, about how useful he could be abroad.
March 29
A day of little action but an extraordinary amount of news: the army provides a wide range of information that, if true, could be very valuable. Radio Habana already reported the news, and the Bolivian government announced its support for Venezuela in presenting the case against Cuba before the OAS [Organization of American States]. There is one news item that disturbs me: there was a clash in the Tiraboy ravine in which two guerrillas were killed. That is the way to Pirirenda, where Benigno went to explore and he should have returned by now, but has not. The order was not to go through the ravine, but in recent days my orders have been repeatedly ignored.
Guevara has advanced very slowly in his work; he was given dynamite but all day they could not detonate it. A horse was killed and everyone ate lots of meat, although it has to last us four days; we will try to bring the other one here, but it might be difficult. To judge from the birds of prey, the corpses have not yet been burned. As soon as the cave is finished, we will move out of this camp, which is now uncomfortable and too well known. I informed Alejandro that he should stay here with El Médico [Moro] and Joaquín (probably at Oso Camp). Rolando is also really exhausted.
I spoke with Urbano and Tuma; I could not even get Tuma to understand the basis of my criticism.
March 30
Calm has returned: Benigno and his compañeros turned up mid-morning. They had, in fact, gone through the Tiraboy ravine, but all they encountered were two people’s footprints. They reached their destination, but some peasants saw them, so they came back. They report that it takes about four hours to get to Pirirenda, and that apparently there is no danger. Aircraft are constantly strafing the small house.
I sent Antonio with two others to explore upstream and the report is that the guards are staying put, although there are tracks left by a scouting party along the river. They have dug trenches.
The mare we needed arrived, so in the worst-case scenario, we will have meat for four days. Tomorrow we will rest and the day after the vanguard will start out for the next two operations: to capture Gutiérrez and to set up an ambush along the road from Algarañaz’s house to Lagunillas.
March 31
No major events. Guevara announced that the cave will be finished by tomorrow. Inti and Ricardo reported that the guards had returned to take over our little farm, following an offensive with artillery (mortars), aircraft, etc. This holds up our plans to go to Pirirenda for supplies; nevertheless, I instructed Manuel to advance with his troops toward the little house. If it is vacant, he should occupy it and send two men to let me know so we can mobilize the day after tomorrow. If it is occupied, and we cannot launch a surprise attack, he should return; then we will explore the possibility of flanking Algarañaz’s place in order to set up an ambush between Pincal and Lagunillas. The radio continues its clamor, with commentaries on top of official combat reports. They have fixed our positio
n with absolute precision between the Yaqui and the Ñacahuazú and I fear they will try to make a move to surround us. I spoke with Benigno about his mistake in not coming to find us, and I explained Marcos’s situation; he took it well.
I spoke with Loro and Aniceto during the evening. The conversation went very badly; Loro went so far as to say we were falling apart, and when I asked him to explain, he told me to ask Marcos and Benigno; Aniceto took Loro’s side on a few issues, but later confessed to Coco that he was complicit in stealing some canned food and told Inti that he did not agree with what Loro said about Benigno and Pombo or about the “general disintegration” of the guerrilla force.
Analysis of the month
This month was full of events, but the general panorama is characterized as follows:
•The phase of consolidation and purging of the guerrilla force—fully completed.
•The phase of slow development with the incorporation of some Cuban elements, who do not seem bad, and Guevara’s people, who are generally low level (two deserters, one “talking” prisoner, three cowards, and two quitters.)
•The initial phase of the struggle, characterized by a precise and spectacular blow, but marked by gross indecision before and after the fact (the withdrawal of Marcos, Braulio’s action).
The beginning of the enemy’s counteroffensive, characterized to this point by:
a) a tendency to take measures to isolate us,
b) a clamor at a national and an international level,
c) total ineffectiveness, so far, and
d) mobilization of peasants.
Evidently, we will have to hit the road before I expected and move on, leaving a group to recover, saddled with the burden of four possible informers.
The situation is not good, but now begins a new testing phase for the guerrilla force that will be of great benefit once surpassed.
Composition
•Vanguard: Miguel (head), Benigno, Pacho, Loro, Aniceto, Camba, Coco, Darío, Julio, Pablo, Raúl.
•Rear guard: Joaquín (head), Braulio (second in command), Rubio, Marcos, Pedro, El Médico [Ernesto], Polo, Wálter, Víctor, (Pepe, Paco, Eusebio, and Chingolo).
•Center group: Me, Alejandro, Rolando, Inti, Pombo, Ñato, Tuma, Urbano, Moro, Negro, Ricardo, Arturo, Eustaquio, Guevara, Willy, Luis, Antonio, León. (Visitors: Tania, Pelado, Dantón, Chino.) (Refugee: Serapio.)
1.Tapera is a Guaraní term—used to describe an abandoned or derelict house or cabin.
2.Boiled corn kernels, a Quechua dish eaten in some parts of Latin America.
3.A small deer.
4.Restituto José Cabrera Flores (Negro or El Médico), Peruvian doctor.
5.Lucio Edilberto Galván Hidalgo (Eustaquio).
6.Refers to two Bolivians, Vicente Rocabado Terrazas (Orlando) and Pastor Barrera Quintana (Daniel).
7.Jean Paul Sartre, French philosopher and writer who met Che during his first visit to Cuba in 1960.
8.Bertrand Russell, English philosopher and mathematician who presided over the International Tribune on US war crimes in the Vietnam War.
9.María Rosa Oliver, an Argentine writer.
10.This refers to his father.
11.Bolivian Army Major Hernán Plata Ríos.
12.Bolivian Army Captain Augusto Silva Bogado.
13.Che uses the word resaca, literally flotsam, dregs, driftwood.
14.Quechua and French were taught, as were political and cultural classes.
15.General René Barrientos Ortuño, president of Bolivia.
APRIL 1967
April 1
The vanguard set off at 7:00 after a considerable delay. Camba was still missing, not having returned from his trip with Ñato to hide the weapons in the cave at Oso Camp. At 10:00, Tuma came from the lookout to warn us that he had seen three or four soldiers in the small hunting ground. We took up positions; Wálter told me from the lookout he had seen three soldiers and a mule or donkey, and they were setting up something; he tried to show me but I could not see anything. At 16:00, I withdrew, deciding that in any case it was no longer necessary to stay if they were not going to attack us, and, apparently, it was all just Wálter’s imagination.
I decided to evacuate everyone tomorrow and that Rolando will be in charge of the rear guard in Joaquín’s absence. Ñato and Camba arrived at 21:00, after having stored everything away except for food for the six who will stay behind. They are Joaquín, Alejandro, Moro, Serapio, Eustaquio, and Polo. The three Cubans are staying under protest. The other mare was killed to leave some charqui1 for the six men. At 11:00, Antonio showed up with a sack of corn and the news that everything had gone smoothly.
At four in the morning Rolando left, burdened with the four quitters (Chingolo, Eusebio, Paco, and Pepe). Pepe wanted to be given a weapon and to stay. Camba went with him.
At 5:00, Coco arrived with a new message that they had slaughtered a cow and were waiting for us. I told him that we would meet the day after tomorrow at noon by the creek that flowed downhill from the farm.
April 2
We have accumulated such an enormous quantity of things it took us all day to store them in their respective caves, only finishing the transfer at 17:00. Four sentries kept watch, but the day passed in a calma chichi; no planes flew over the area. The broadcasts on the radio speak of the “tightening encirclement” and that the guerrillas are preparing to defend the Ñacahuazú gully; they report that Don Remberto is in prison and explain how he sold the farm to Coco.
Due to the lateness of the hour, we decided not to leave today but at 3:00 in the morning, and gain time by heading straight for the Ñacahuazú, despite the fact that our meeting place is in the other direction. I talked to Moro, explaining that I had not placed him in the group of the best compañeros because he has a weakness concerning food and a tendency to exasperate others with his jokes. We discussed this for a while.
April 3
Our plan went ahead with no hitches: we set off at 3:30 and walked slowly until we passed the bend in the shortcut at 6:30 and made it to the border of the farm at 8:30. When we passed in front of the ambush site, nothing remained of the seven corpses but perfectly clean skeletons, on which the birds of prey had done a good job. I sent two men (Urbano and Ñato) to make contact with Rolando and in the afternoon, we moved on to the Tiraboy ravine where we slept after stuffing ourselves with beef and corn.
I talked to Dantón and Carlos, giving them three alternatives: to continue with us, to leave on their own, or to wait until we could take over Gutiérrez and then leave from there, taking a chance; they chose the third option. We will try our luck tomorrow.
April 4
Almost a total disaster. At 14:30, we reached a place where there were guard tracks and even a paratrooper’s beret and remains of US [Army] individual food rations. I decided to take the first house by force [illegible in the original], which we did at 18:30. Guaraní2 farmhands came out and told us that the army had about 150 men who had withdrawn yesterday, and that the owner of the house had left to take his livestock away. They were charged with making a meal of pork and yucca, while our men went to occupy the second house belonging to [illegible in the original]. Loro, Coco, Aniceto, and later Inti went to the second house accompanied by one of the peasants.
The couple was not there, but when they arrived, the young farmhand escaped in the confusion. In the end, we established that approximately one company of the Second Regiment (the Bolívar) had been there and had left this morning. They had instructions to go down through the Tiraboy ravine, but they chose to leave by another route, so we never ran into them. There are no soldiers in Gutiérrez, but they will return tomorrow, so it is best not to hang around.
In the first house we found military gear, such as plates, canteens, even bullets and equipment; we appropriated everything. After eating well, but not excessively, the rear guard set off at 3:00 and we departed at 3:30. The vanguard should have left when they finished eating their last rations. We ourselves got lost and l
eft farther down from the ambush site, which caused confusion until daylight.
April 5
It was a day of few events but with a certain tension. At 10:00, we were reunited, and a little later Miguel’s group started out with their backpacks to occupy the approach to the ravine; their orders were to send the three men on sentry duty from the rear guard to return for their backpacks. To speed up the process, I gave Urbano, Ñato, and León the task of replacing the three men from the rear guard. At 3:30, I halted the center group to organize an ambush to block any forces that might come down the ravine, so the vanguard and the rear guard could defend both access routes at the mouth of the little creek. At 14:00, I sent Tuma to see what had happened with the three men, and he returned at 17:00 without learning anything; we moved to our previous campsite and I repeated the order. At 18:15, Rolando arrived; because the men had never shown up, they had had to carry the three backpacks between them. Braulio gave me an explanation that raises very serious doubts about Marcos’s actual combat capability.
I had thought we could head downstream at dawn, but soldiers were seen bathing about 300 meters from our position. We decided to cross the river without leaving any tracks and to walk on the other trail back to our creek.
April 6
A day of great tension. We crossed the Ñacahuazú River at 4:00 and waited until daybreak to continue; later Miguel set off to explore but had to return twice because of errors that brought us very close to the soldiers. Rolando informed us at 8:00 that a dozen soldiers were at the entrance to the ravine that we had just left. We went slowly, and by 11:00 we were out of danger, on a ridge. Rolando came with the news that there were more than 100 soldiers stationed in the ravine.