by Plato
‘Oh, well, anyone could answer that one easily, Socrates: being good is a single quality, and the things you're asking about are parts of it.’
‘Do you mean in the way parts of the face are parts – the mouth, and the nose, and the eyes, and the ears – or more like parts of gold, where the parts don't differ in any way either from one another or from the whole chunk, except by being bigger or smaller parts?’
‘I'd say in the first way, Socrates; same as the relation between the parts of the face and the whole face.’ [e]
‘So does that mean,’ I said, ‘that people can get these parts of being a good person separately, with some people having one part and some people having another, or is the idea that if you've got one part, you're bound to have all of them?’
‘No, not at all,’ he said. ‘After all, there are plenty of people who are brave but don't care about what's right, and then again plenty of people who care about what's right but lack knowledge.’
[330a] ‘Oh – so are those parts of being good as well, having knowledge, 50 and being brave?’
‘Absolutely. In fact having knowledge is the most important part of all.’
‘And each one of them is something quite distinct from the others?’
‘Yes.’
‘Does each of them also have its own particular role? I mean, like the way it is with the parts of the face: the eyes aren't like the ears, and their role isn't the same either; in fact none of the parts of the face resembles any other, either in terms of its role or in other respects. Is that how it is with the different parts of being good, too? Does no part of it resemble any other part, [b] either considered in itself or in terms of its role? Or is it obvious that that's the way it is – if our “parts of the face” analogy is a good one?’
‘Yes, that's how it is, Socrates.’
And I said, ‘So that means no other part of being good is like knowledge, and no other part is like respect for what's right, and no other part is like bravery, and no other part is like being sensible, and no other part is like being religious?’
‘Yes, that's right.’
‘All right then,’ I said. ‘Let's both of us think a bit about what each of the parts is like. First I want us to think about [c] this: respect for what's right, is that a thing, or is there no such thing? I think it's a thing.51 How about you?’
‘I think so, too,’ he said.
‘Right. So what if someone said to you and me, “All right, Protagoras and Socrates, in that case tell me this; this thing you've just called “respect for what's right”, is it itself something right or wrong?” My answer would be that it's right. What would your vote be? The same as mine, or not?’
‘Same as yours,’ he said.
‘So respect for what's right is, typically, something that's right; that's what I'd say in response to the man asking the [d] question. You'd say the same?’
‘Yes.’
‘Right. Now suppose after that he asked, “And you also talk about religiousness?” Presumably we'd say we did.Right?’
‘Yes.’
‘“And do you claim that that's a thing as well?” We'd say we did. Riht?’
He agreed.
‘“And this thing, itself, do you think of it as being, typically, something that's against religion or something that's required by religion?” I'd be pretty annoyed by that question. I'd say, “What a shocking thing to ask, man! It'd be pretty hard to find anything else that was required by religion, if even religiousness itself turned out not to be required by religion!” How about [e] you? Wouldn't you answer like that?’
‘Absolutely.’
‘All right, now suppose after that he kept on at us and said, “So what was it you were saying just a moment ago? Maybe I didn't hear you properly. I thought you said that the relationship between the various parts of being good were such that no part was like any other.” I'd say, “Well, you heard everything else right, but if you think it was me who said that, you heard wrong. That's something Protagoras here said in his replies; I [331a] was just asking the questions.” So then suppose he said, “Is what this man here says true, Protagoras? Is it you who say that no part of being good is like any other part? Is that your claim?” How would you answer?’
‘Well, I'd have to admit it, Socrates,’ he said.
‘In that case, Protagoras, how are we going to answer the man, now that we've agreed on all of that, if he follows up with this: “So that means you're saying that being religious is not, typically, right; and doing what's right52 is not, typically, something required by religion; in fact it's typically not required by religion; and being religious is, typically, not right – so in fact it's wrong, and doing what's right is against religion! Is that what you're saying?”53 How are we going to respond? I [b] mean, speaking for myself, I'd say that doing what's right is required by religion, and that being religious is something right. And if I had to speak for you I'd give exactly the same answer, if you let me – i.e. that either righteousness and religiousness are the same thing, or they're about as similar as any two things can be, and that it's certainly the case that respect for what's right is something like religiousness, and religiousness is something like respect for what's right. So you'd better decide if you want to veto that reply, or if you think the same way as me.’
‘I'm not at all convinced the question's so straightforward, [c] Socrates, that I can just agree that respect for what's right is something religious and religiousness something right. I think there's a difference between them.* But what does it matter? If you like, let's say respect for what's right is required by religion, and that being religious is something right.’
‘No, hold on,’ I said. ‘I've got no interest in investigating in this “if you like” and “if that's what you want” kind of way; it's the real you and me I want to test. And what I mean by “the real you and me” is that I think the best way of testing out [d] your claim would be if we left this “if you like” business out of it entirely.’
‘Well, all right,’ he said, ‘yes, there's some similarity between respect for what's right and religiousness. I mean, for that matter, just about anything is similar to anything in some respect or other. I mean, there's even a sense in which black is like white, and a sense in which soft is like hard – some respect in which all the things we take to be total opposites of one another are alike. Even the parts of the face, which a moment ago we stated had different roles, and which we said were all unlike one another – there are certainly some respects in which they resemble one another, a sense in which each one is like the [e] others. So on that basis you could argue, if you wanted to, that they're all “like” one another as well. But you really shouldn't call things “alike” just because they've got some point of similarity (or “different” just because they differ in some respect), even when the point of similarity is a minor one.’
I was pretty surprised by that, and said, ‘Is that really how you see the relation between what's right and what's required by religion? You think there's only a minor point of similarity between the two?’54
‘No. No, not at all,’ he said. ‘But then I don't think what you [332a] seem to believe, either.’
‘Well, look,’ I said, ‘since you seem a bit uneasy with that particular question, we can just drop it. Here's something else you talked about that I'd like us to look into. Do you think there's such a thing as being stupid?’
‘Yes.’
‘And isn't having knowledge its exact opposite?’
‘Yes, I'd say so.’
‘And would you say that when people do things the right way, so that what they're doing benefits them, they're acting sensibly in acting that way? Or the opposite of sensibly?’
‘Sensibly.’
‘And they're acting sensibly because of their good sense, right?’ [b]
‘Obviously.’
‘And people who do things the wrong way are thereby acting stupidly, and not being sensible?’
‘Yes, I agree,
’ he said.
‘So in other words, acting stupidly is the opposite of acting sensibly?’
‘Yes.’
‘Right; and when people do things stupidly, they do so out of stupidity, and when they do things sensibly, they do so because of their good sense, yes?’
He agreed. ‘All right; and if you do something with strength, you're acting strongly; and if you do something out of weakness, you're acting weakly. Yes?’
‘Yes.’
‘And if you do something with speed, you're doing it fast; and if you do something with slowness, you're doing it slowly, right?’
‘Yes.’
‘And in general, actions performed in the same way are [c] actions caused by the same quality; and actions performed in opposite ways are actions caused by opposite qualities, right?’
‘That's right.’
‘Now how about this,’ I said. ‘Do we call some things beautiful?’
‘Of course.
‘And is there any opposite of what's beautiful besides what's ugly?’
‘No.’
‘What about good? Are some things good?’
‘Yes.’
‘And does what's good have any opposite besides what's bad?’
‘No, it doesn't.’
‘And is there such a thing, in sound, as high pitch?’
‘Of course.’
‘And that doesn't have any opposite besides low pitch, does it?’
‘No.’
‘So it looks like each thing that has an opposite has only one opposite and no more than one. Right?’
He agreed.
[d] ‘All right then,’ I said, ‘let's just run back over what we've agreed so far. We've agreed that any one thing has no more than one opposite.’
‘Yes.’
‘And that two actions performed in opposite ways are actions caused by opposite qualities. Right?’
‘Yes.’
‘And we've also agreed that if you do something stupidly, you're acting in the opposite way to acting sensibly.’
‘That's right.’
‘And that if you do something sensibly, your action is a result of good sense, while if you do something stupidly, your action is caused by stupidity.’
He went along with that.
[e] ‘So if you're acting in the opposite way, your action would have to be being caused by an opposite quality. Right?’
‘Yes.’
‘And one action is caused by stupidity, the other by good sense?’
‘Yes’
‘Opposite kinds of action?’
‘Absolutely.’
‘So, caused by opposite qualities?’
‘Yes.’
‘So stupidity is the opposite of good sense?’
‘Looks like it.’
‘Now, do you remember we agreed before that being stupid was the opposite of having knowledge?’
He admitted it.
‘And that each thing had only one opposite?’
‘Yes, I remember.’
‘So which claim are we going to give up, Protagoras? The [333a] claim that each thing has only one opposite or the earlier claim, according to which having knowledge and being sensible are two distinct things, and each is a separate part of being good, and that as well as being two distinct things they're not even like one another, either in themselves or in terms of their role – like the parts of the face? What do you think? Which claim do we let go? After all, we certainly can't make both claims together very harmoniously; they're not really singing in unison, or “in tune” with one another, are they? How could they be, if we're sure that any given thing can have only one opposite and no more, and yet stupidity, which is one thing, seems to [b] have two opposites – knowledge and good sense? Is that right, Protagoras? Or have I missed something?’
He agreed – very grudgingly.
‘So doesn't it look as if being sensible and having knowledge may just be one and the same thing? And earlier on it looked as if doing what's right and being religious were practically the same thing as well.’
‘Come on, Protagoras,’ I said, ‘let's not give up! Let's carry on and look into the rest of these things as well. Tell me, do you think if you do wrong to someone, you can be acting sensibly in the very fact that you're doing them wrong?’ [c]
‘Personally, Socrates, I'd be ashamed to agree that that was the case, although certainly there are lots of people who think so.’55
‘All right, so shall I direct the discussion at those people or at you?’
‘If you like,’ he said, ‘start off by making that claim the target of your discussion – the claim made by most people.’
‘It doesn't make any difference; as long as you answer the questions, I don't mind whether you actually believe what you're saying or not. It's the idea itself I want to examine – mind you, you and I, questioner and answerer, may also find ourselves being examined in the process.’
[d] Now, at first, Protagoras started making a fuss – he complained that the idea was one he ‘felt uneasy with' – but eventually he agreed to answer the questions.
‘All right,’ I said, ‘let's start again. Do you think that sometimes people are being sensible in doing wrong?’
‘Let's say so,’ he said.
‘And by “being sensible” you mean exercising good sense?’
‘Yes.’
‘And by “exercising good sense” do you mean that in doing something that's wrong, they're making a smart decision?’
‘Let's say so.’
‘And is that if they do well out of their wrongdoing, or if they do badly out of it?’
‘Only if they do well out of it.’
‘All right. Now, you think of some things as being good for us?’
‘Yes.’
‘And could we say,’ I said, ‘that good things are things that are beneficial to people?’56
[e] ‘Well, yes, but there's more to it than that!’ he said. ‘I might call things good even if they aren't of any benefit to people whatsoever.’
I got the sense that Protagoras, by this point, was a bit prickly, and riled-up, and taking the questions in a ready-for-battle kind of way. So when I saw that was the mood he was in, I thought I'd better be careful and ask my next question very gently. ‘How do you mean, Protagoras?’ I said. ‘Do you mean, things that aren't of any benefit to any human being, or even things that [334a] aren't beneficial in any sense at all? Do you call things like that “good” as well?’
‘Well, of course not! Look, what I'm saying is, I can think of plenty of things that aren't beneficial to human beings – certain kinds of food, drinks, drugs, countless other things – and other things that are; and then some things aren't harmful or beneficial to human beings but are beneficial to horses; or only to cows; or to dogs. Then again, there are things that benefit none of those but do benefit trees. And some things are good for the roots of the tree but bad for the leaves. Take dung. Dung is good for any plant if you lay it over the roots, but if you go [b] and pile it over the buds and young shoots, it invariably destroys them. Or olive oil: it's the worst thing possible for all species of plants and extremely damaging to the hair of all animals apart from human hair, but its effect on human hair is healthy, as well as on the rest of the body. Yet even then – so complex, so variable a thing is what's “good” – it's only good for the outside of the human body; the very same thing is extremely [c] bad for the inside of the body; and that's why all doctors tell their patients not to put olive oil in the things they're going to eat, except in the smallest possible amounts – just enough to extinguish the unpleasant effects that foods and sauces can have on the senses of the nose.’
When he'd said all that, the people who were there burst into rowdy applause; they thought it was a great speech. And I said, ‘Protagoras, the fact is, I'm a bit forgetful, and if someone makes long speeches at me I tend to lose track of what it is we're talking about. Now look; imagine I happened to be a bit [d] hard of hearing. If you we
re going to carry on a conversation with me, you'd understand that you had to speak a bit louder than you do to everyone else. It's the same here: you've met someone who's a bit forgetful, so you've got to trim your answers for me, and make them shorter, if you expect me to keep up.’
‘So what exactly do you mean when you say I have to make my answers “short”? Am I supposed to make them shorter than they need to be?’
‘No, of course not,’ I said.
‘So they should be as long as they need to be?’
[e] ‘Yes.’
‘So does that mean as long as I think they need to be, or as long as you think they need to be?’
‘Well, what I've heard people say,’ I said, ‘is that you have the ability – which you can also teach to other people – to take a given subject and talk about it either at great length, if that's what you feel like doing, such that you simply never run out of [335 a] things to say, or in brief, so that nobody could make the same point more neatly. So all I'm saying is, if you're going to carry on a discussion with me, I'd like you to use the second method, please – keeping it short.’
‘Look, Socrates,’ he said, ‘I've entered into contests of speech and argument with a lot of people before now, and if I'd always done what you're telling me to do – conducted the discussion on my opponent's terms – I'd never have been thought any better than the next man, and “Protagoras” would never have become a household name throughout Greece.’