12. Alain Boyer, Hors du temps : Un essai sur Kant, Paris : Vrin, 2001, p. 63. My translation.
13. Cf. Christian Godin, “La figure et le moment du scepticisme chez Hegel,” Les Études philosophiques, vol. 3, no. 70, 2004, pp. 341–56, p. 342. My translation.
14. Gérard Lebrun, Kant et la fin de la métaphysique, Paris: Armand Colin, 1970. All translations from this work are mine.
15. “What Is Enlightenment?,” in Paul Rabinow, ed., The Foucault Reader, amended trans. Catherine Porter, New York: Pantheon Books, 1984, pp. 32–50.
16. Jacques Bouveresse, “Le problème de l’a priori et la conception évolutionniste des lois de la pensée,” Revue de théologie et de philosophie, vol. 123, 1991, pp. 353–68. My translation here and below.
3
THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN GENESIS AND EPIGENESIS
Why such insistence on the aporetic nature of readings of §27? To answer this question, we must examine the general meaning of the concept of epigenesis more closely.
As previously mentioned, the prefix “epi” means “above.” “Epigenesis” therefore means literally “above genesis” or “over genesis.” This literal meaning is initially very difficult to understand: just what does this “over genesis” mean? To explain it, we often transform “above” into “after.” Isn’t epigenesis just a development that follows a first genesis, a first source, one that takes off from it? The embryo does form starting from the seed, after it. Epigenesis thus appears commonly as a second genesis, one that takes place after engendering. According to an order of priority that is at once logical and ontological, paradoxically the “above” therefore appears to situate it below genesis.
Epigenesis and Epicenter
But let’s examine this “above” a little more closely. The geological meaning of the prefix “epi” is very illuminating and comes to our rescue. It helps us understand “above” not as an extension that comes “over” something else, but as a surface effect.
In geology, the “epicenter” is the point of projection of the “hypocenter,” the underground site where an upheaval emerges on the surface of the earth. The hypocenter is the underground “focus” of an earthquake, while the epicenter is its surface event. The epicenter lies exactly on a vertical line extending upwards from the underground focus.1 The task of determining the position of the epicenter, the place where destruction is the greatest, is called “localization.”
This meaning of “surface” is not excluded from the semantics of epigenesis. Indeed, contemporary epigenetics actually studies the transformation mechanisms at work on the surface of DNA molecules during transcription. We shall return later to a more detailed discussion of the importance of these mechanisms.
For the moment, suffice it to say that all epigenesis also necessarily comes to light starting from a focus that corresponds to a hypocenter. The philosophical question, then, is that of knowing how to read epigenesis. Should it be related systematically to its focus, explained by its before, its “underground,” which would then be viewed as its foundations? And should it be made secondary through this, turned into an “epiphenomenon” that minimizes its radical potential? Does recognizing epigenesis mean penetrating its underground? If so, the problem is that the reading proposed is a genetic reading, and is no longer strictly epigenetic.
But the point is that epigenesis is not genesis. To grant its own logic, we must remain on the surface in some way – which does not mean being superficial, but rather working where it occurs, at the contact point between underground and ground. We have to be able to locate the epicenter and remain at the impact point. In this way, of course, it would be possible to look below later on, but only after and without this changing anything that has occurred. In the case of an earthquake, in many ways the epicenter becomes primary vis-à-vis the hypocenter.
If we follow the epicentric logic, as we must, we then conclude that the seat of the “system of the epigenesis of pure reason” should not be sought below, in the shadows of a burying as if the circularity of the a priori and the transcendental needed to explain something more ancient and deeper than itself. The spontaneity defined by Kant refers precisely, and conversely, to the idea of a founding by the epicenter. I suggest here that this founding at the point of contact – unlike the founding by the root or focus – corresponds exactly to the Kantian conception of the origin.
This means that questions about the stability of the transcendental should not be questions that sound, questions that seek to determine the innate nature of the cognitive power or, conversely, its mysterious makeup. Stability cannot be traced back to the focus. In Kant the transcendental is a surface structure.
It is striking to note that, by contrast, the readings of Kant that we shall examine all follow a genetic order. It is only from this genetic order that they draw conclusions about the instability or facticity of the transcendental foundation. By pointing to the necessary inadequacy of these readings – a genesis simply cannot account for an epigenesis – I seek to gradually reveal the possibility of an epigenetic reading of Kantian epigenesis, one that does not sacrifice epigenesis to that which supposedly remains hidden beneath it.
Kant is actually very clear on this point: reason is a ground (Boden) whose solidity must be ensured without digging. Thus, when he speaks about morals in the Transcendental Dialectic, he says:
[W]e now concern ourselves with a labor less spectacular but nevertheless not unrewarding: that of making the terrain for these majestic moral edifices level and firm enough to be built upon; for under this ground there are all sorts of passageways, such as moles might have dug, left over from reason’s vain but confident treasure hunting, that make every building insecure.2
Should we point out that ground without treasure is nothing? Should we object that the lack of underground depth reveals the principled uprooting of the transcendental that can hold up only via artificial means? This is what is at stake in the discussion; the challenge is to understand how a surface can be foundational and to what extent epigenesis can prove to be more fruitful than genesis.
To start, it would be best to explore blockages in genetic readings so as to gradually illuminate the fact that the decision to relinquish the transcendental comes directly from a confusion between genesis and epigenesis.
These readings do have some legitimacy. Isn’t the genetic temptation immediately prompted by the problem presented in §27, which is a problem of origin, namely the origin of the categories and their relation to objects? Are we not encouraged by the actual movement of the transcendental deduction to connect this origin, which is the a priori itself, back to a still more originary point that is the innate constitution of our cognitive power? The relation of epigenetic engendering between the a priori and a posteriori really does appear to be inevitably returned, or even reduced, to that which roots it deep down. In this manner, readings of Kant often focus more willingly on accounting for stratification than on determining a point of contact. And yet, it is precisely this contact point that must be located.
Localization and Surface
But where is the contact point? Where is the epicenter? How can epigenesis be located in the transcendental deduction?
Epigenesis takes place exactly at the articulation, which Kant terms an opportunity, between the presence of the categories as they “lie ready” in the understanding and their implementation in experience. We recall the opening paragraph of the Analytic of Concepts, in which the deductive process is announced as follows:
We will therefore pursue the pure concepts into their first seeds [germs] and predispositions in the human understanding, where they lie ready, until with the opportunity of experience they are finally developed and exhibited in their clarity by the very same understanding, liberated from the empirical conditions attaching to them.3
The departure from epigenesis is the meeting place between pure concepts and experience, the trigger point in their relation. It is here, at this delicate juncture, that all the difficulties arise! We
note that Kant distinguishes two moments: first, the development of pure concepts by experience; second, the possibility of presenting these concepts once they are “liberated” from experience.
Of course, on first sight the genetic inquiry is legitimized by the illumination of what these two moments appear to leave in the shadows, the mystery of the shared origin about which Kant says nothing, namely the status of the “germs” and “predispositions” that “lie ready” in the understanding and represent the embryonic state of the categories. In order to understand, first, the development of the categories “with the opportunity” of experience, and then the purity of their manifestation, is it not necessary to examine the nature of their seed and to explore the ground in which they lie virtually ready? Isn’t this ground the pre-transcendental ground where the transcendental takes root? Doesn’t it refer back to an innateness prior to the a priori? As we shall see, the theme of germs and predispositions appears to constantly threaten epigenesis and its spontaneity, condemning it to be nothing but the paradoxical expressions of a hidden preformationism. This threat not only hangs over the Critique of Pure Reason, it is also present every time epigenesis appears in Kant’s work in his writing about human races as much as in the biological discussions of the third Critique. Consequently, it spreads its shadow over “the idea of freedom as a power of absolute spontaneity.”4 Finally, it destines all genetic interpretations to join the same vicious circle, despite their apparent divergence.
Indeed, since they do not situate the epicenter of categorial or practical spontaneity precisely, these interpretations either over- or under-emphasize the importance of the way germs and predispositions lie ready. They thereby accord experience an insufficient or an overly extensive role in the movement of transcendental epigenesis. The springing forth of transcendental epigenesis, which is thus always derived, is never located in a rigorous manner.
To avoid according too great a role to experience in categorial development amounts to postulating that this development occurs according to a preformed or predisposed plan. In that case, what happens to the logic and autonomy of epigenesis? Paradoxically, some readers support the thesis of a certain preformationism in Kant as the only way of saving epigenesis by protecting it from any empirical constitution. Alternatively, minimizing the role of the originary predispositions amounts to leaving too much latitude to experience and unsettling the purity of the transcendental. Faced with these impossibilities, we can only conclude that Kantian philosophy is incapable of reducing both innatism and the empiricism still hidden within it.
Notes
1. Seismic waves follow the shortest route to reach the surface of the earth. In this way they lose less energy because they travel through fewer rocks. Since they have more energy at the epicenter, the destruction caused at this point is greater than elsewhere.
2. CPR, p. 398, A319/B376.
3. CPR, p. 203, A66/B91.
4. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, trans. Werner S. Pluhar, Indianapolis/Cambridge, MA: Hackett Publishing Company, 2002, Analytic, chapter 1, p. 67, AK (V:48).
4
KANT’S “MINIMAL PREFORMATIONISM”
The “Pure” Readings of §27
The role accorded to experience is insufficient. We shall follow the “critical” track defined earlier as we explore this first orientation in the readings, bearing in mind that the critical approach includes interpretations justifying the idea of a priori epigenesis and seeking to protect it from any contradiction or risk of skepticism.
Günter Zöller’s article “Kant on the Generation of Metaphysical Knowledge,” published in 1988 in the volume of collected essays Kant, Analysen – Probleme – Kritik, is the most representative example of this approach. In this finely wrought study, Zöller identifies a “minimal preformationism”1 in Kant. Although this is a common thesis, it is surprising and requires careful presentation.
Zöller’s objective is to justify the legitimacy of the phrase “system of the epigenesis of pure reason” by defending this epigenesis from any risk of empirical contamination. Transcendental epigenesis develops “with the opportunity of experience” but does not receive any of its own structure from it. In order to understand Kant’s analogy, it is therefore important to hold simultaneously the idea of a generative and productive spontaneity and the non-empirical nature of this generating. In Zöller’s view, there is considerable risk of “falsely empiriciz[ing] the transcendental deduction of the categories”2 by granting experience a role, however minimal, in the constitution of the objective reference.
The problem is that the idea of pure epigenesis is never as pure as when it stops being an epigenesis! Zöller’s genetic reading inevitably produces the contradiction that in order to restrict epigenetic freedom so as to better protect it, epigenesis becomes preformation.
The transcendental thus appears as a stable form, closed to any changeability, the invariance of the categories is reaffirmed, and through a series of divisions and reductions of scope, spontaneity is reduced again to innateness.
Does this offer a better foundational assurance? Are rigidity and fixity the guarantors of stability? Do they rid us of the artificial nature of the origin, or do they aggravate it? Let’s trace out the argument step by step.
Zöller’s reading is based on three main points.
First, the genitive in the phrase “system of the epigenesis of pure reason” can only be an objective genitive (“genitivus objectivus”). It should be read as “epigenesis by pure reason”3: reason engenders its forms without forming itself in the process. By contrast, a subjective genitive would suggest that reason engenders itself through the generation of the categories, and that these categories are in some ways its germs and the seeds of the system. Thus, there would be an epigenesis of reason by itself. This possibility, which would imply that reason has a self-formative drive, is unacceptable inasmuch as Zöller claims that it grants far too much initiative to epigenetic spontaneity. This spontaneity must be limited to the products of reason, and even, more specifically, to those of the understanding. Once again, then, we find that epigenesis does not affect the structure of reason and the understanding.
The second main point, which is closely connected to the first, comes from the need to define very carefully the generative production relation between the a priori and the a posteriori. Zöller argues that no commentary of §27 has yet managed this task with sufficient care. In his view, the term “‘epigenesis’ has been unanimously taken to designate a relation of generative production between the a priori and the a posteriori”4 without knowing what exactly is produced by this epigenesis. Is it the categories themselves, or simply the reference of the categories to objects? Zöller opts for the second solution. Let’s not forget that the categories are found to “lie ready” in the understanding. The germs and predispositions hold them, ready to go. Not only does epigenesis not intervene at the level of the structure of the faculties, but it is not involved in the structure of the categories either. It is the relation of the categories to objects, not the categories themselves, or their logical “essence,” that is subject to epigenesis. Brought back to its focus – innate germs and predispositions – epigenesis once again sees its impact potential diminished.
The third main point concerns the extent of Kant’s preformationism: Zöller claims that it is constant throughout his work, in all his texts. In this way it supports not only the dynamic of §27, but also all the other occurrences of the motif of epigenesis, including those in the third Critique that come directly from biology. Zöller’s project is to show that as early as 1764, Kant held a certain concept of epigenesis that was compatible with preformationism, and that while it certainly underwent “modifications,” it nevertheless remained fundamentally the same throughout his work. “Minimal” preformationism thus also prevails in the Critique of the Power of Judgment. The genesis of the motif of epigenesis in Kant’s work thus reveals the transcendental impossibility of transcendental epigenesis
!
The “System of the Epigenesis of Pure Reason”: The Objective Genitive Hypothesis
Let’s return to the first of the three main points. Note 4275, which appears to have been written at the same time as the Critique of Pure Reason, opens the possibility of the two readings of the genitive in the phrase “system of the epigenesis of pure reason.” Kant writes:
Crusius explains the real principle of [pure] reason on the basis of the systemate praeformationis (from subjective principiis); Locke, on the basis of influxu physico like Aristotle; Plato and Malebranche, from intuitu intellectuali; we, on the basis of epigenesis and from the natural laws of reason.5
Again, we see that Kant privileges epigenesis over preformation, empirical genesis (“influxu physico”), or pure intellectual intuition. But there are two ways of understanding the Note. Zöller argues that “natural laws of reason,” a phrase rarely used by Kant, can refer either to the nature of reason itself, or to the activity of the understanding – whose laws, we recall, are the same as the laws of nature. In the first instance, if we believe that the “natural laws of reason” are synonymous with “pure reason,” then the phrase “system of the epigenesis of pure reason” can be read as a subjective genitive. Reason engenders itself.6 If, alternatively, the “natural laws of reason” refer to the understanding, then epigenesis is concerned only with the relation between the laws of thought (categories, judgments, principles) and objects. In this case, it would be an objective genitive: epigenesis is concerned with the productivity of these laws, with what they engender. The difficulty now for the genetic inquiry is to succeed in identifying where epigenesis starts and what exactly it engenders. This brings us to the second idea: the specific determination of the generative relation between a priori and a posteriori.
Before Tomorrow- Epigenesis and Rationality Page 7