11. In the word-classes in which inflections may develop, the parts of speech are two, unless, following Dion, we divide into three divisions the ideas which are indicated by words: one division which indicates also case, a second which indicates also time, a third which indicates neither. Of these, Aristotle says that there are two parts of speech; nouns, like homo ‘man’ and equus ‘horse,’ and verbs, like legit ‘gathers’ and currit ‘runs.’
12. Of the two kinds, noun and verb, certain words are primary and certain are secondary: primary like homo ‘man’ and scribit ‘writes,’ and secondary like doctus ‘learned’ and docte ‘learnedly,’ for we say homo doctus ‘a learned man’ and scribit docte ‘writes learnedly.’ These ideas are attended by those of place and time, because neither homo nor scribit can be asserted without the presupposition of place and of time — yet in such a way that place is more closely associated with the idea of the noun homo, and time more closely with the act of writing.
13. Since among these the noun is first — for the noun comes ahead of the verb, and the other words stand later relatively to the noun and the verb — the nouns are accordingly first. Therefore I shall speak of the form-variations of nouns before I take up those of verbs.
14. Nouns are varied in form either to show differences in those things of which they are the names, as the woman’s name Terentia from the man’s name Terentius, or to denote those things outside, of which they are not the names, as equiso ‘stable-boy’ from equus ‘horse.’ To show differences in themselves they are varied in form either on account of the nature of the thing itself about which mention is made, or on account of the use to which the speaker puts the word. On account of differences in the thing itself, the variation is made either with reference to the whole thing, or with reference to a part of it. Those forms which concern the whole are derived either on account of plurality or on account of smallness. On account of smallness, homunculus ‘manikin’ is formed from homo ‘man,’ and capitulum ‘little head’ from caput ‘head.’ On account of plurality, homines ‘men’ is made from homo ‘man’; I pass by the fact that others use cervices ‘muscles of the neck and shoulders’ in the plural, and Hortensius in his poems uses it in the singular cervix.
15. Those which are derived from a part, come either from the body, as mammosae ‘big-breasted women’ from mamma ‘breast’ and manubria ‘handles’ from manus ‘hand,’ or from the mind, as prudentes ‘prudent men’ from prudentia ‘prudence’ and ingeniosi ‘men of talent’ from ingenium ‘innate ability.’ The preceding are quite apart from movements; but where there are important motions, the derivatives are similarly from the mind or from the body, as strenui ‘the quick’ and nobiles ‘the noble,’ from strenuitas ‘quickness’ and nobilitas ‘nobility,’ and in this way also pugiles ‘boxers’ and cursores ‘runners’ from pugnare ‘to fight’ and currere ‘to run.’ As some derivations are from the mind and others from the body, so also there are others which refer to external things, as pecuniosi ‘moneyed men’ and agrarii ‘advocates of agrarian laws,’ because pecunia ‘money’ and ager ‘field-land’ are exterior to the men to whom the derivatives are applied.
16. It was for the use of the speakers that the case-forms were derived, that he who spoke of another might be able to make a distinction when he was calling, when he was giving, when he was accusing, and other differences of this same sort, which led us as well as the Greeks to the declension of nouns. The oblique forms which develop from the nominative are without dispute to be called cases; but there are those who question whether the nominative is properly a case. At any rate, we have six forms, and the Greeks five: he who is called, as (nominative) Hercules; how the calling is done, as (vocative) Hercule; whither there is a calling, as to (accusative) Herculem; by whom the calling is done, as by (ablative) Hercule; to or for whom there is a calling, as to or for (dative) Herculi; of whom the calling or called object is, as of (genitive) Herculis.
17. There are certain words which are like added family names, such as Prudens ‘prudent,’ Candidus ‘frank,’ Strenuus ‘brisk,’ and in them differences may be shown by a suffix, since the quality may be present in them to a greater or a smaller degree: therefore to these words a kind of inflection is attached, so that from candidum ‘shining white’ comes the comparative candidius and the superlative candidissimum, formed in the same way as similar forms from longum ‘long,’ dives ‘rich,’ and other words of this kind.
18. The terms which are derived for application to exterior objects, are for example equile ‘horse-stable’ from equus ‘horse,’ ovile ‘sheepfold’ from oves ‘sheep,’ and others in this same way; these are the opposite of those which I mentioned above, such as pecuniosus ‘moneyed man’ from pecunia ‘money,’ urbanus ‘city man’ from urbs ‘city,’ atratus ‘clad in mourning’ from atrum ‘black.’ Thus sometimes a place is named from a man, and then a man from this place, as Rome from Romulus and then Roman from Rome.
19. The nouns which relate to exterior objects are derived in sundry ways: those like Latonius ‘Latona’s child’ and Priamidae ‘Priam’s sons,’ which are derived from the names of their progenitors, are formed in one way, and those which come from an action are made in another way, such as praeda ‘booty’ from praedari ‘to pillage’ and merces ‘wages’ from mereri ‘to earn.’ In the same way there are still others, which can be enumerated without difficulty; but because this category of words is now clear to the understanding and other matters press for attention, I pass them by.
20. Inasmuch as in the class of words which indicate also time-ideas there were these three time-ideas, past, present, and future, there had to be three sets of derived forms, as from the present saluto ‘I salute’ there are the past salutabam and the future salutabo. Since the persons of the verb were likewise of three natures, the one who was speaking, the one to whom the speaking was done, and the one about whom the speaking took place, there are these derivative forms of each and every verb; and these forms will be expounded in the account of the stock of verbs which is in use.
21. Since two points have been discussed, why derivation exists and to what products it eventuates, the remaining third point shall now be spoken of, namely, how and in what manner derivation takes place. There are two kinds of derivation, voluntary and natural. Voluntary derivation is that which is the product of the individual person’s volition, directing itself apart from control by others. So, when three men have bought a slave apiece at Ephesus, sometimes one derives his slave’s name from that of the seller Artemidorus and calls him Artemas; another names his slave Ion, from Ionia the district, because he has bought him there; the third calls his slave Ephesius, because he has bought him at Ephesus. In this way each derives the name from a different source, as he preferred.
22. On the other hand I call that derivation natural, which is based not on the volition of individuals acting singly, but on general agreement. So, when the names have been fixed, they derive the case-forms of them in like fashion, and in one and the same way they all say in the genitive case Artemidori, Ionis, Ephesi; and so on in the other cases.
23. Sometimes both are found together, and in such a way that in the voluntary derivation the processes of nature are noted, and in the natural derivation the effects of volition; of what sort these are, will be recounted below. Since in the two kinds of derivation some things approach likeness and others become unlike, the Greeks and the Latins have written many books on the subject: in some of them certain writers express the idea that in speaking men ought to follow those words and forms which are derived in similar fashion from like starting-points — which they called the products of Analogy; and others are of opinion that this should be disregarded and rather men should follow the dissimilar and irregular, which is found in ordinary habitual speech — which they called the product of Anomaly. But in my opinion we ought to follow both, because in voluntary derivation there is Anomaly, and in the natural derivation there is even more strikingly Regularity.
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bsp; 24. About these two kinds of derivation I shall write two sets of three books each: the first three about the principles of these derivations, and the latter set about the products of these principles. In the former set the first book will contain the views which may be offered against likeness in derivation and declension; the second will contain the arguments against unlikeness; the third will be about the shape and manner of the likenesses. What I have set in order on these topics, I shall write in the three separate books; then on the second set of topics I shall begin to write, with due division into the same number of books.
25. Inasmuch as it is the task of this book to speak against those who follow likeness — which is like the relation of boy to old man in the matter of human life, and like that of girl to old woman, and in verbs is the relation of scribo ‘I write’ and scribam ‘I shall write’ — I shall speak first against Regularity in general, and then thereafter concerning its several subdivisions. I shall begin with the nature of human speech.
26. All speaking ought to be aimed at practical utility, and it attains this only if it is clear and brief: characteristics which we seek, because an obscure and longish speaker is disliked. And since clear speaking causes the utterance to be understood, and brief speaking causes it to be understood quickly, and since also habitual use makes the utterance clear and the speaker’s self-restraint makes it brief, and both these can be present without Regularity, there is no need of this Regularity. For if Regularity should instruct us whether we ought to say Herculi or Herculis for the genitive, as in the phrase ‘the club of Hercules,’ we must not fail to disregard its teaching, since both are in habitual use, and both forms are equally short and clear.
27. Besides, if from a thing one has secured that useful service for which it was invented, it is the act of a person with a great deal of idle time, to examine it further; and since the useful service for which names are set upon things is that the names should designate the things, then if we secure this result by habitual use alone, Regularity adds no gain.
28. There is the additional fact that in those things which are taken into our daily life for use, it is our practice to seek utility and not to seek resemblance; thus in the matter of clothing, although a man’s toga is very unlike his tunic, and a woman’s stola is very unlike a pallium, we make no objection to the difference.
29. In the case of buildings, although we do not see the persistyle bearing resemblance to the atrium nor the sleeping-room bearing resemblance to the horse-stable, still, on account of the utility in them we seek for unlikenesses rather than likenesses; so also we provide winter dining-rooms and summer dining-rooms with a different equipment of doors and windows.
30. Therefore, since difference prevails not only in clothing and in buildings, but also in furniture, in food, and in all the other things which have been taken into our daily life for use, the principle of difference should not be rejected in human speech either, which has been framed for the purpose of use.
31. But if one should think that the sum of those natural goals to which we ought to attain in actual use consists of two items, that of utility and that of refinement, because we wish to be clothed not only to avoid cold but also to appear to be decently clothed; and we wish to have a house not merely that we may be under a roof and in a safe place into which necessity has crowded us together, but also that we may be where we may continue to experience the pleasures of life; and we wish to have table-vessels that are not merely suitable to hold our food, but also beautiful in form and shaped by an artist — for one thing is enough for the human animal, and quite another thing satisfies human refinement: any cup at all is satisfactory to a man parched with thirst, but any cup is inferior to the demands of refinement unless it is artistically beautiful: — but as we have digressed from the matter of utility to that of pleasure, it is a fact that in such a case greater pleasure is often got from difference of appearance than from likeness.
32. On this account, identical rooms are often ornamented in unlike manner, and couches are not all made the same in size and shape. But if Regularity were to be sought in furniture, we should have all the couches in the house made in one fashion, and either with posts or without them, and when we had a couch suited for use beside the dining-table, we should not fail to have just the same for bedroom use; nor should we rather be delighted with furniture which was decorated with varying figures of ivory or other materials, any more than in camp-beds, which with regularity are almost always made of the same material and in the same shape. Therefore either we must deny that differences give pleasure, or, since we must admit that they do, we must say that the un-likeness in words which is found in habitual usage, is not something to be avoided.
33. But if we must follow Regularity, either we must observe that. Regularity which is present in ordinary usage, or we must observe also that which is not found there. If we must follow that which is present, there is no need of rules, because when we follow usage, Regularity attends us. But if we ought to follow the Regularity which is not present in ordinary usage, then we shall ask, When any one has made two words in four forms according to the same pattern, must we employ them just the same, even though we do not wish to — as for example a dative Iuppitri and an accusative Marspitrem? If any one should persist in using such ‘regular forms,’ he ought to be rebuked as crazy. This kind of Regularity, therefore, is not to be followed.
34. But if the proper thing is that all words that start from similar forms should be inflected similarly, it follows that from dissimilar starting forms dissimilar forms should be made by inflection; and this is not what is found. For from like forms some like forms are made, and other unlike forms, and from unlike forms also come some like forms and some unlike forms. For instance, from likes come likes, as from bonus ‘good’ and malus ‘bad’ come the neuter forms bonum and malum; also from likes come unlikes, as from lupus ‘wolf’ and lepus ‘hare’ come the unlike datives lupo and lepori. On the other hand, from unlikes there are unlikes, as from the nominatives Priamus and Paris come the datives Priamo and Pari; also from unlikes there are likes, as nominatives Iupiter ‘Jupiter,’ ovis ‘sheep,’ and datives Iovi and ovi.
35. So much the more now must it be denied that Regularities exist, because not only are unlikes made from likes, but also from identical words unlikes are made, and not merely likes, but identicals are made from unlikes. From identical names unlikes, it is clear, are made, because while there are two towns named Alba, the people of the one are called Albani and those of the other are called Albenses; while there are three cities named Athens, the people of the one are called Athenaei, those of the second are Athenaiis, those of the third Athenaeopolitae.
36. Similarly, many words made in derivation from different words are found to be identical, as when I say accusative Luam from Saturn’s Lua, and also luam as future of luo ‘loosing.’ Almost all our names of men and women are unlike in the nominative case of the plural, but are identical in the dative: unlike, as the men Terentii, the women Terentiae, but identical in the dative, men Terentiis and women Terentiis. Unlike are Plautus and Plautius, Marcus and Marcius; and yet there is a form common to both, namely the genitive Plauti and Marci.
37. Finally, if Regularity does exist for the reason that in many words there is a likeness of the word-forms, it follows that because there is unlikeness in a greater number of words the principle of Regularity ought not to be followed in actual talking.
38. In the last place, if Regularity does exist in speech, it exists either in all its parts or in some one part; but it does not exist in all, and it is not enough that it exists in some one part, just as the fact that an Ethiopian has white teeth is not enough to justify us in saying that an Ethiopian is white: therefore Regularity does not exist.
39. Since those who declare that Regularities exist, promise that the inflected forms from like words will be alike, and since they then say that a word is like another word only if it can be shown that starting from the same gender and the sam
e inflectional form it passes in like fashion from case to case, those who make these assertions show their ignorance both of that in which the likeness must be found and of how the presence or absence of the likeness is wont to be recognized. Since they are ignorant of these matters, it follows that we ought not to follow them, inasmuch as they are unable to pronounce with authority on the subject of Regularity.
40. For I ask whether by a ‘word’ they mean the spoken word which consists of syllables, that word which we hear, or that which the spoken word indicates, which we understand, or both. If the spoken word must be like another spoken word, it makes no difference whether what it indicates is male or female, and whether it is a proper name or a common noun; and yet the supporters of Regularity say that these factors do make a difference.
41. But if that which is denoted by like words ought to be like, then Dion and Theon, which they themselves say are almost identical, are found to be unlike, if the one is a boy and the other an old man, or one is white and the other an Ethiopian; and likewise if they are unlike in some other respect. But if the word must be like in both directions, there will not quickly be found one that is not defective in one respect or the other, nor will Perpenna and Alfena prove to be alike, because the one name denotes a man and the other a woman. Therefore, since they are unable to show wherein the likeness must exist, those who assert that Regularities exist are utterly shameless.
42. The other matter that I have mentioned, how the likeness is to be recognized, they clearly fail to appreciate in that they set up a precept that only when the passage is made from the nominatives to the vocative forms can it be said whether the nominatives are like or unlike; for this would be as if a man, on seeing the Menaechmus twins, should say that he could not decide whether or not they were alike, unless he should scrutinize their children, to see if they showed any differences from one another.
Delphi Complete Works of Varro Page 53