26. But in the sea, I suppose, the motions do not have the twofold likenesses — the motions which in twenty-four lunar hours change themselves four times, and when the tides have risen for six hours, and have ebbed for just as many, they likewise rise again, and in the same fashion ebb after this time. Or do they keep this Regularity for a day’s space, and not likewise for a month, since similarly they have another set of motions which agree with one another? Of these I have written in the book which I composed On Tidal Inlets.
27. On the earth, is not Regularity preserved in the case of plantings? Does it not give us to-day fruits of precisely the same kind as it has given us in the past? Does it not regularly return to us a crop of barley when barley has been sown, even as it returns a crop of wheat when wheat has been sown? Does not Asia have rivers and lakes, mountains and plains, even as Europe has?
28. Is not Regularity preserved among the birds, according to their kind? As the progeny of eagles are eagles and the progeny of thrushes are thrushes, are not the progeny of the other birds all of their own proper and special kind?
Does the process go on in another way in the water, than in the air? Are not the shell-fish here all like their own kind, despite their countless number? Are not the fishes? Is a sea-bass or a sea-carp produced of a moray? Is not one head of cattle like another, when compared, and so also the calves which are procreated by them? Even where the offspring is unlike the parents, as the mule born of a he-ass and a mare, even there there is Regularity none the less: the offspring of any ass and mare whatsoever is a mule, male or female, as the offspring of a stallion and a she-ass is a hinny.
29. Are not in this way all the offspring of man and woman alike, in that they are boys and girls? Do these not have all their limbs mutually alike, in such a way that item by item they are pairs in likeness, in their own special kinds? As all are made up of soul and body, are not also the parts of soul and body alike with the same regularity?
30. What then of the fact that the souls of men are divided into eight parts — are these parts not mutually alike with regularity? Five with which we perceive, the sixth with which we think, the seventh with which we procreate, the eighth with which we utter articulate words? Therefore since the word with which we talk is speech, speech also must by nature have its Regularities; and it does.
31. Do you not see that the Greeks have divided speech into four parts, one in which the words have cases, a second in which they have indications of time, a third in which they have neither, a fourth in which they have both — and that in the same way we have all these divisions? Do you not know that among them some words are definite, others not — and that both kinds are present in our language also?
32. For my part I have no doubt that you have observed the countless number of likenesses in speech, such as those of the three tenses of the verb, or its three persons.
Who indeed can have failed to join you in observing that in all speech there are the three tenses lego ‘I read,’ legebam ‘I was reading,’ legam ‘I shall read,’ and similarly the three persons lego ‘I read,’ legis ‘thou readest,’ legit ‘he reads,’ though these same forms may be spoken in such a way that sometimes one only is meant, at other times more? Who is so slow-witted that he has not observed also those likenesses which we use in commands, those which we use in wishes, those in questions, those in the case of matters not completed and those for matters completed, and similarly in other differentiations?
33. Therefore those who say that there is no logical system of Regularity, fail to see the nature not only of speech, but also of the world. Those who see it and say that it ought not to be followed, are fighting against nature, not against the principle of Regularity, and they are fighting with pincers, not with a sword, since out of the great sea of speech they select and offer in evidence a few words not very familiar in popular use, saying that for this reason the Regularities do not exist: just as if one should have seen a dehorned ox or a one-eyed man and a lame horse, and should say that the likenesses do not exist with regularity in the nature of cattle, men, and horses.
34. Those moreover who say that there are two kinds of Regularity, one natural, namely that lentils grow from planted lentils, and so does lupine from lupine, and the other voluntary, as in the workshop, when they see the stage as having an entrance on the right and think that it has for a like reason been made with an entrance on the left; and say further, that of these two kinds the natural Regularity really exists, as in the motions of the heavenly bodies, but the voluntary Regularity is not real, because each craftsman can make the parts of the stage as he pleases: that thus in the parts of men there are Regularities, because nature makes them, but there is none in words, because men shape them each as he wills, and therefore as names for the same things the Greeks have one set of words, the Syrians another, the Latins still another — I firmly think that there are both voluntary and natural derivations of words, voluntary for the things on which men have imposed certain names, as Rome from Romulus and the Tiburtes ‘men of Tibur’ from Tibur, and natural as those which are inflected for tenses or for cases from the imposed names, as genitive Romuli and accusative Romulum from Romulus, and from dico ‘I say’ the imperfect dicebam and the pluperfect dixeram.
35. Therefore in the voluntary derivations there is inconsistency, and in the natural derivations there is consistency. Inasmuch as they ought not to deny the presence of both of these in speech, since they are in all parts of the world, and the derivative forms of words are countless, we must say that in words also the Regularities are present. And yet Regularity does not for this reason have to be followed in all words; for if usage has inflected or derived any words wrongly, so that they cannot be uttered in any other way without giving offence to many persons, the logic of speaking shows us that because of this offence the logic of the words must be set aside.
36. As far as concerns the general cause why likeness is present in speech and ought to be observed, and also to what extent this should be done, enough has now been said. Therefore in the following we shall set forth its several parts item by item, and refute the individual charges which they bring against the Regularities.
37. In this matter, you should take notice that by nature there are four elements in the basic situation to which words must be adjusted in inflection: there must be an underlying object or idea to be designated; this object or idea must be in use; the nature of the utterance which has designated it, must be such that it can be inflected; and the resemblance of the word’s form to other words must be such that of itself it can reveal a definite class in respect to inflection.
38. Therefore it is not to be demanded that from terra ‘earth’ there should be also a terrus, because there is no natural basis that in this object there ought to be one word for the male and another for the female. Similarly, with respect to usage, while Terentius designates one person of the name and Terentii designates several, it is not to be demanded that in this way we should say faba ‘bean’ and fabae ‘beans,’ for the two are not subject to the same use. Nor is it to be demanded that as we say acc. Terentium from nom. Terentius, we should make case-forms from A and B, because not every utterance is naturally fitted for declensional forms.
39. The likeness which the word has in its shape must be investigated not in the comparison of the basis merely, but also sometimes in the effect which it has. For thus the Gallic wool and the Apulian wool seem alike to the inexperienced on account of their appearance, though the expert buys the Apulian at a higher price because in use it lasts better. These matters, which have been touched upon hastily here, will become clearer in a later discussion. Now I shall start.
40. To their question in what respect a word ought to be similar, sound or meaning, we answer that it should be so in sound. But yet sometimes we ask whether the objects designated are like in kind, and compare a man’s name with a man’s, a woman’s name with a woman’s: not because that which they designate affects the word, but because sometimes in case of
an unlike thing they set upon it forms of an equivalent appearance, and on a like thing they set unequal forms, as we call shoes women’s shoes or men’s shoes by the likeness of the shape, although we know that sometimes a woman wears men’s shoes and a man wears women’s shoes.
41. In like fashion, we say, a man is called Perpenna, like Alfena, with a feminine forma; and on the other hand paries’ house-wall’ is like abies ‘fir-tree’ in form, although the former word is used as a masculine, the latter as a feminine, and both are naturally neuter. Therefore those which we use as masculines are not those which denote a male being, but those before which we employ hic and hi, and those are feminines with reference to which we can say haec or hae.
42. For this reason it amounts to nothing, that on the premise that Regularity adopts the unlikenesses of the objects as a criterion for difference in the forms of the spoken word, they say that Theon and Dion are not alike if the one is an Ethiopian and the other is a white man.
43. As to what they say, that Aristarchus was shameless in his instructions that to see whether one name was like another you should view it not only from the nominative, but also from the vocative — for the same persons say that it is absurd to judge from the children whether the parents are alike: those who say this are mistaken, for it does not come about from their oblique cases that the nominatives are shown to be of like appearance, but through the oblique cases can be more easily seen what evidential force lies in the likeness of the nominatives — even as a lamp in the dark, when brought, does not cause that the things which are there should be alike, but that they should be seen in their real character.
44. What seems more closely alike than the last letter in the words crux ‘cross’ and Phryx ‘Phrygian’? No one who hears the spoken words can by his ears distinguish the letters, although we know from the declined forms of the words that though alike they are not identical; because when the plurals cruces and Phryges are taken and E is removed from the last syllables, from the one there results crux, with X from C and S, and from the other comes Phryx, from G and S. And the difference is likewise clear, when S is removed; for the one becomes cruce, the other Phryge.
45. As to what they say, that since likeness does not exist in the greater part of speech, Regularity does not exist, they speak foolishly in two ways, because Regularity is present in the greater part of speech, and even if it should exist only in the smaller part, still it is there: unless they will say that we do not wear any shoes, because on the greater part of our body we do not wear any.
46. As to what they say, that we find unlikeness pleasing and acceptable rather than likeness, and therefore in clothing and in furniture we take pleasure in variety, and not in having our wives’ undertunics all identical: I answer, that if variety is pleasure, then there is greater variety in that in which some things are alike and others are not; and just as a side-table is adorned with silver in such a way that some ornaments are alike and others are unlike, so also is speech adorned.
47. They ask why, if likeness is to be followed, we prefer to have some couches inlaid with ivory, others with tortoise-shell, and so on with some other kind of material. To which I say that unlikenesses are not the only thing which we follow, but often we follow likenesses. And this may be seen from the same piece of furniture; for no one makes the three couches of the dining-room other than alike in material and in height and in shape. Who makes the table-napkins not like each other? Or the cushions? And finally the other things which are several in number but of one sort?
48. Since speech, they say, was introduced for the sake of utility, we should follow not that kind of speech which has likeness, but that which has utility. I grant that speech has been produced for utility’s sake, but in the same way as garments have: therefore as in the latter we follow the likenesses, so that a man’s tunic is like a man’s, and a toga like a toga, and a woman’s dress is like a dress regularly and a cloak like a cloak, so also, as words that are names of persons exist for the purpose of utility, we ought still to employ men’s names that are like one another, and women’s names that also have mutual resemblances.
49. As to the fact that they say that Regularity does not exist because there are no perfects periacuit ‘remained lying’ and percubuit ‘remained lying,’ like persedit ‘remained sitting’ and perstitit ‘remained standing,’ in this also they are mistaken: for the two perfects have no presents from which to be inflected, whereas Regularity promises only that from two like words inflected in like manner there will be like forms.
50. Those who say that there are no Regularities because from Romulus there is Roma and not Romula and there is no bovilia ‘cow-stables’ from bos ‘cow’ as there is ovilia ‘sheepfolds’ from ovis ‘sheep,’ are in error; because nobody professes that one word is derived from another word, from nominative singular to nominative singular, but only that from two like words like case-forms develop when they are inflected in like manner.
51. They say that because the words denoting the Latin letters are not inflected into case-forms the Regularities do not exist. Such persons are demanding the declension of those words which by nature cannot be inflected; just as if Regularity were not said to belong merely to those forms which had already been inflected in like fashion from like words. Therefore not only in the names of the letters must this kind of Regularity not be sought, but not even in any syllable, because we say nominative ba, genitive ba, and so on.
52. But if any one should wish to say that in this also there are Regularities in the things, he can maintain it. For as they themselves say that some nouns, because they have five forms, have five cases, and others have four, and others fewer in like manner, they will be able to say that the letters and syllables which have one case-form apiece in sound, have several in connexion with the things; as they will compare only with each other those which have four case-forms for the words, and likewise those which have three apiece, so let them compare with each other those which have only one form each, saying that nominative E, dative E is like nominative A, dative A.
53. As to the fact that they say that there are certain words which have declensional forms, like caput ‘head,’ genitive capitis, and nihil ‘nothing,’ genitive nihili, a match for which cannot be found, and therefore the Regularities do not exist, answer must be made that unquestionably any word which is the only one of its kind is outside the systems of Regularity; there must be at least two words for a likeness to be existent therein. Therefore, in this case, they eliminate the possible existence of the Regularities.
54. But the word nihilum ‘nothing’ is found in the nominative in the following:
The body she’s given Earth doth herself take back, and of loss not a whit does she suffer, which is the same as ‘nor of loss does she suffer anything.’ This same word is found in an oblique case in Plautus:
I see, beside Philolaches you count all men as nothing.
The word is from ne ‘not’ and genitive hili ‘whit’; therefore he has been called nihili ‘of naught’ who was not hili ‘of a whit’ in value. Change is made only in the case-forms of that about which the speaking is done, as about a man; for we say a man nihili ‘of no account’ in nominative, in genitive, in accusative, changing the forms of homo but not changing the form nihili. If we were to make changes in it, then we should say not hic nihili but nihilum as the nominative, like linum ‘flax’ and libum ‘cake,’ and dative not huic nihili but nihilo like lino and libo. The genitive case can however be said with various nouns set before it, like nominative casus ‘mishap’ Terentii ‘of Terence,’ accusative casum Terentii, and nominative miles ‘soldier’ legionis ‘of the legion,’ genitive militis legionis, accusative militem legionis.
55. They say that since every nature is either male or female or neuter, from the individual spoken words there should not fail to be forms of the words in sets of three, like albus, alba, album ‘white’; that now in many things there are only two, like Metellus and Metella, Aemilius and Aemilia, and some with
only one, like tragoedus ‘tragic actor’ and comoedus ‘comic actor’; that there are the names Marcus and Numerius, but no Marca and Numeria; that corvus ‘raven’ and turdus ‘thrush’ are said, but the feminines corva and turda are not said; that on the other hand panthera ‘panther’ and merula ‘blackbird’ are used, but the masculines pantherus and merulus are not; that there is no one of us whose son and daughter are not suitably distinguished as male and female, as Terentius and Terentia; that on the other hand the children of gods and slaves are not distinguished in the same way, as by Iovis and Iova for the son and the daughter of Jupiter; that likewise a great number of common nouns do not in this respect preserve the Regularities.
56. To this we say that although the object is basic for the character of all speech, the words do not succeed in reaching the object if it has not come into our use; therefore equus ‘stallion’ and equa ‘mare’ are said, but not corva beside corvus, because in that case the factor of unlike nature is without use to us. But for this reason some things were formerly named otherwise than they are now: for then all doves, male and female, were called columbae, because they were not in that domestic use in which they are now, and now, on the other hand, because we have come to make a distinction on account of their uses as domestic fowl, the male is called columbus and the female columba.
57. When the nature goes through the three genders and this distinction is made in use, then finally it is seen, as it is in doctus ‘learned man’ and docta ‘learned woman’ and doctum ‘learned thing’; for learning can go across through these three, and use has taught us to differentiate a learned thing from human beings, and among the latter to distinguish the male and the female. But in a male or a female or what is neither, the nature of the male does not shift, nor that of the female, nor the neuter nature, and for this reason there is no saying of feminus, femina, feminum, and so with the rest. Therefore they are called by special and separate words.
Delphi Complete Works of Varro Page 56