BOOK X
1. Many have raised the question whether in the inflections of words the art of speaking ought to follow the principle of unlikeness or that of likeness. This is important, since from these develop the two systems of relationship: that which develops from likeness is called Regularity, and its counterpart is called Anomaly. Of this, in the first book, I gave the arguments which are advanced in favour of considering unlikeness as the proper guide; in the second, those advanced to show that it is proper rather to prefer likeness. Therefore, as their foundations have not been laid by anyone, as should have been done, nor have their order and nature been set forth as the matter demands, I shall myself sketch an outline of the subject.
2. I shall speak of four factors which limit the inflections of words: what likeness and unlikeness are; what the relationship is which they call logos; what “by comparative likeness” is, which they call “according to logos”; what usage is. The explanation of these matters will make clear the problems connected with Regularity and Anomaly: whence they come, what they are, of what sort they are.
3. The first topic to be discussed must be likeness and unlikeness, because this matter is the foundation of all inflections and set limits to the relationship of words. That is like which is seen to have several features identical with those of that which is like it, in each case: that is unlike, which is seen to be the opposite of what has just been said. Every like or unlike consists of two units at least, because nothing can be like without being like something else, and nothing can be unlike without association with something to which it is unlike.
4. Thus a human being is said to be like a human being, and a horse to be like a horse, and a human being to be unlike a horse; for a human being is like a human being because they have limbs of the same shape, which separate human beings from the category of the other animals. Among human beings themselves, for a like reason a man is more like a man than a man is like a woman, because men have more physical parts the same; and so an elderly man is more like an old man than he is like a boy. Further, they are more like who are of almost the same features, the same bearing of person, the same shape of body; therefore those who have more points of identity, are said to be more like; and those who come nearest to having them all alike, are called most like, as it were, twins.
5. There are those who think that things have three natures, like, unlike, and neutral, which last they sometimes call the not like, and sometimes the not unlike; but although there are the three, like, unlike, neutral, there can also be a division into two parts only, in such a way that whatever you compare with something else either is like or is not. They think that a thing is like and is unlike if it is seen to be of such a kind as I have described, and neutral, if it does not have greater weight on one side than on the other; as if the two things which are being compared have twenty parts each, and among these should have ten to be noted as identical and ten likewise to be noted as different, in respect to likeness and unlikeness. This nature most scholars include under the name of unlikeness.
6. Therefore since it happens that the question in dispute seems rather to be about the name than about the thing, attention must rather be directed, when something is said to be like, to the problem to what part it is said to be like; for it is in this that any mistake ordinarily rests. This must be noted, I say, because it can happen that a man may not be like another man even though he has many parts like the other’s, and can be said therefore to have like eyes, hands, feet, and other physical features in considerable number, separately and taken together, like the other man’s.
7. Therefore because careful watch must be kept in words to see what parts those words which are said to show likeness ought to have alike, and in what ways, the inquirer is on this topic especially likely to slip into error, as will appear below. For to the careless person what can seem more alike than the two words suis and suis? But they are not alike, because one is from suere ‘to sew’ and means ‘thou sewest,’ and the other is from sus and means ‘of a swine.’ Therefore we admit that they are alike as spoken words and in their separate syllables, but we see that they are unlike in their parts of speech, because one has tenses and the other has cases; and tenses and cases are the two features which in the highest degree serve to distinguish the different systems of Regularity.
8. Likewise, words that are even nearer alike in kind often cause a similar mistake, as in the fact that nemus ‘grove’ and lepus ‘hare’ seem to be alike since both have the same nominative; but it is not an instance of likeness, because they stand in need of certain factors of likeness, among which is that they should be in the same noun-gender. But these two words are not, for lepus is masculine and nemus is neuter; for we say hic ‘this’ with lepus and hoc with nemus. If they were of the same gender, the same form would be set before both, and we should say either hic lepus and hic nemus, or hoc nemus and hoc lepus.
9. Therefore he who asks whether the inflections of words stand in a regular relation, must examine to see what kinds of likenesses there are and of what sort they are, which pertain to this matter. And just because this topic is difficult, those who have written of these subjects either have avoided it or have begun it without being able to complete their treatment of it.
10. Therefore in this there is seen a lack of agreement, and not merely of one kind. For some have fixed the number of all the distinctions as a whole, as did Dionysius of Sidon, who wrote that there were seventy-one of them; and others set the number of those distinctions which apply to the words which have cases: the same writer says that of these there are forty-seven, Aristocles reduced them to fourteen headings, Parmeniscus to eight, and others made the number smaller or larger.
11. If the origin of these likenesses had been correctly grasped and their logical explanation had proceeded from that as a beginning, there would be less error in regard to the inflections of words. Of these likenesses there are, I think, first principles of two kinds only, by which the likenesses ought to be tested; of which one lies in the substance of the words, the other lies, so to speak, in the form of that substance, which comes from inflection.
12. For there must be one, that the word be like the word from which it is inflected, and two, that in comparison from word to word the inflectional form with which the comparison is made should be of the same kind. For sometimes there are like forms reached by inflection from like words, such as datives ero and fero from erus ‘master’ and ferus ‘wild,’ and sometimes unlike forms, such as genitive eri and accusative forum, from erus and ferus. When both principles are fulfilled and word is like word and inflectional form like inflectional form, then and not before will I pronounce that the word is like, and has a twofold and perfect likeness to the other — which is what Regularity demands.
13. But I wish to avoid the appearance of trickiness in having declared that there are only two kinds of likenesses when both have a number of sub-forms — if I say nothing about these, you may think that I am intentionally leaving myself a place of refuge; I shall therefore go back and start from the origin of the likenesses which must be followed or avoided in the comparison of words and in their inflections.
14. The first division in speech is that some words are not changed into any other form whatsoever, like vix ‘hardly’ and mox ‘soon,’ and others are inflected, like genitive limae from lima ‘file,’ imperfect ferebam from fero ‘I bear’; and since Regularity cannot be present except in words which are inflected, he who says that mox and nox ‘night’ are alike, is mistaken, because the two words are not of the same kind, since nox must come under the system of case-forms, but mox must not and cannot.
15. The second division is that, of the words which can be changed by derivation and inflection, some are changed in accordance with will, and others in accordance with nature. I call it will, when from a name a person sets a name on something else, as Romulus gave a name to Roma; I call it nature, when we all accept a name but do not ask of the one who set it how he wishes it to be
inflected, but ourselves inflect it, as genitive Romae, accusative Romam, ablative Roma. Of these two parts, voluntary derivation goes back to usage, and natural goes back to logical system.
16. For this reason we ought not to compare Romanus ‘Roman’ and Capuanus ‘Capuan’ as alike, and to say that Capuanus ought to be said from Capua just as Romanus is from Roma; for in such there is in actual usage an extreme fluctuation, since those who derive the words set the names on the things with utter lack of skill, and when usage has accepted the words from them, it must of necessity speak confused names variously derived. Therefore neither the followers of Aristarchus nor any others have undertaken to defend the cause of voluntary derivation as among the Regularities; but, as I have said, this kind of derivation of words in common usage is an ill thing, because it springs from the people, which is without uniformity and without skill. Therefore, in speaking, there is in this kind of derivation rather Anomaly than Regularity, 17. There is a third division, the words which are by their nature inflected. These are divided into four subdivisions: one which has cases but not tenses, like docilis ‘docile’ and facilis ‘easy’; a second, which has tenses but not cases, like docet ‘teaches,’ facit ‘makes’; a third which has both, like docens ‘teaching,’ faciens ‘making’; a fourth which has neither, like docte ‘learnedly’ and facete ‘wittily.’ The individual parts of this division are each unlike the three remaining parts. Therefore, unless the words are compared with one another in their own subdivision, even if they do agree the one word will not be so like the other that it ought to make the same inflectional scheme.
18. Since there are several species in each part, I shall speak of them one by one. The first subdivision, characterized by the possession of cases, is divided into two parts, namely into nouns and articles, which latter class is both definite and indefinite, as for example hic ‘this’ and quis ‘who.’ Whichever of these two kinds you have taken, it must not be compared with the other, because they belong to schemes of Regularity which are different from each other.
19. In the articles, Regularity is hardly even a shadow, and more a Regularity of things than of spoken words; in nouns, it comes out better, and consummates itself rather in the spoken words and the likeness of the syllables than in the things named. There is also the additional fact that it is difficult to show that Regularities reside in the articles, because they are single words; but in nouns it is easy, because there is a great abundance of like name-words. Therefore it is not so much a matter of dividing this part from that other part, as of seeing to it that the investigator should be too much ashamed even to call that other part into the same arena to do battle.
20. As there are two groups in the articles, the definite and the indefinite, so there are in the nouns, the common nouns and the proper names; for oppidum ‘town’ and Roma ‘Rome’ are not the same, since oppidum is a common noun, and Roma is a proper name. In their account of the systems, some make this distinction, and others do not; but we shall enter in our account, at the proper place, what this difference is and why it has come to be.
21. That noun may be like noun, it ought to have the qualities of being of the same gender, of the same kind, also in the same case and with the same ending: kind, that if it is a proper name which you are comparing, it be a proper name with which you compare it; gender, that not merely one, but both words be masculine; case, that if one is in the dative, the other likewise be in the dative; ending, that whatever last letters the one has, the other also have the same.
22. To this fourfold spring two sets of lines are drawn up, the ones crosswise and the others vertical, as is the regular arrangement on a board on which they play with movable pieces. Those are crosswise which are the oblique cases formed from a nominative, like albus ‘white,’ genitive albi, dative albo; those are vertical which are inflected from one nominative to other nominatives, as masculine albus, feminine alba, neuter album. Both sets of lines are of six members. Each member of the crosswise lines is called a case; each member of the vertical lines is a gender; that which belongs to both in their crossed arrangement, is a form.
23. I shall speak first of the crosswise lines. Scholars have given various sets of names to the cases; we shall call that case which is spoken for the purpose of naming, the case of naming or nominative...
here three leaves are lacking in the model copy 24.... To indicate one ‘broom’ the plural scopae is used, not the singular scopa. For they are different by nature, because the names first mentioned are set upon simple objects, and those mentioned later apply to compounded objects; thus bigae ‘two-horse team’ and quadrigae ‘four-horse team’ are employed in the plural because they denote a union of objects. Therefore we do not say one biga, like one lata ‘broad’ and alba ‘white,’ but one bigae, with the numeral also in the plural; nor do we say duae ‘two’ with reference to bigae and quadrigae, as we say duae ‘two’ with application to the plural forms latae and albae, but we say binae ‘two sets’ of bigae and quadrigae.
25. Likewise the character of the form of a word is important, because in the form of the spoken word a change is sometimes made in the first part of the word, as in sŭit ‘sews’ and sūit ‘sewed’; sometimes in the middle, as in curso ‘I run to and fro,’ and cursito, of the same meaning; sometimes at the end, as in doceo ‘I teach’ and docui ‘I have taught’; sometimes the change is common to two parts, as in lĕgo ‘I read,’ lēgi ‘I have read.’ It is important therefore to observe of what letters each word consists; and the last letter is especially important, because it is changed in the greatest number of instances.
26. Because of this, since the likenesses in these parts also are wont to be used in the comparison of case-forms, and this is done ill by some and well by others, we must see whether this has been done rightly or wrongly. Yet wherever the letters are altered, not only the altered letters must be noted, but also those which are next to them and are not affected; for this proximity has considerable influence in the inflections of words.
27. Among these forms we shall not call those words like which denote like things, but those which are of such a stamp that such forms are in most instances wont by custom to denote like things, as by a man’s tunic or a woman’s tunic we mean not a tunic that a man or a woman is wearing, but one which by custom a man or a woman ought to wear. For a man can wear a woman’s tunic, and a woman can wear a man’s, as we see done on the stage by actors; but we say that that is a woman’s tunic, which is of the kind that women customarily use to dress themselves in. As an actor may wear a woman’s dress, so Perpenna and Caecina and Spurinna are said to have names that are feminine in form; they are not said to have women’s names.
28. The likeness of the inflection also must be watched, because the way which some words take is clear from the very words from which their inflection starts, as how it is proper to use praetor and consul, dative praetori and consuli. Others are properly appreciated only as a result of the change seen in the inflections, as in socer ‘father-in-law’ and macer ‘lean,’ because the one becomes socerum in the accusative, and the other macrum; after making this change, each of them follows its own way in the remaining forms, both in the inflections of the singular and in those of the plural. This method is employed because in the inflections there are two kinds of natures which can be compared with each other, one which can be seen in the word itself, such as homo ‘man’ and equus ‘horse,’ but the second cannot be seen through without bringing in something from outside, as in eques ‘horseman’ and equiso ‘stable-boy’ — for both are derived from equus ‘horse.’
29. By this method, you will, on making a comparison, know that of men observed in person one is or is not like the other; but you could not say that the two are in like fashion taller than their brothers, if you should not know how tall those shorter brothers are with whom they are compared. In this way the likenesses of things broader and higher, and others of the same kind, cannot be examined without bringing in some help from outside. So therefor
e, inasmuch as certain case-forms are of this kind, it is not easy to say that they are like, if you observe the spoken words in one case only; to make a correct judgement, you will have to bring in another case-form to which the spoken word passes as it is inflected.
30. These considerations are what I have thought enough to touch upon, for observing the likenesses of nouns. It remains to speak of the articles, of which some are like nouns and others are different. For of the five classes the first two have the same properties, because they have forms for masculine, feminine, and neuter, they have some forms to denote the singular and others to denote the plural, and they have five cases; the vocative is not indicated by a separate spoken form. They have this of their own, that some are definite, like hic ‘this,’ feminine haec, and others are indefinite, like quis ‘which,’ feminine quae. But since their system of Regularity is shadowy and thin, it is not necessary to speak further of it in this book.
31. The second subdivision consists of those words which have tenses but not cases, and have persons. The categories of their inflections are six: one which is that of the tenses, as legebam ‘I was reading,’ gemebam ‘I was groaning,’ lego ‘I read,’ gemo ‘I groan’; the second is that of the persons, as sero ‘I sow,’ meto ‘I reap,’ seris ‘thou sowest,’ metis ‘thou reapest’; the third is the interrogative, as scribone ‘do I write?’, legone ‘do I read?’, scribisne, legisne; the fourth is that of the answer, as fingo ‘I form,’ pingo ‘I paint,’ fingis, pingis; the fifth that of the wish, as dicerem ‘would I were saying,’ facerem ‘would I were making,’ dicam ‘may I say,’ faciam ‘may I make’; the sixth that of the command, as cape ‘take,’ rape ‘seize,’ capito, rapito.
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