by Rob Harper
While the rebel flanks did indeed flee Charette and his cavalry, gunners, and some of his infantry remained. Charette attempted to charge the enemy in the vain hope his other troops might return, but his horse was killed beneath him just as the republican infantry were forming up in column of attack. The few troops left to him now fled and Charette was only saved by riding pillion behind one of his cavalrymen.70
Beysser claimed he suffered no casualties, rounded up a great number of prisoners in his pursuit, and captured the rebel cannon.71 One of the prisoners was Souchu, the man responsible for the massacre of republicans in Machecoul. He was swiftly beheaded by a sapper.72
Charette rushed to Legé hoping to gather men to slow the republican advance but discovered that many had left to join Joly in pursuit of Boulard. He then headed east with his few remaining cavalry, hoping for support from the Army of the Centre. Some accounts suggest that he received a humiliating reception from Royrand who publicly reproached him for abandoning Machecoul.73 As men had started to drift back to him Charette decided to return to Legé.
On the day after the battle Beysser sent out two detachments of 300 men to sweep the country for rebels.74 On 26 April he informed Boulard of his dispositions but was unaware just how reduced in numbers this general was, or of the difficulties he was facing. Beysser’s easy march to Machecoul led him to believe the troubles were nearly over. He soon had 100 men in both Port-Saint-Père and Bourgneuf, and 850 at St-Philbert, while the rest remained with him in Machecoul. He now asked Boulard to move north to Legé.
’By marching thus, your column will be able to leave a detachment in each of these posts, send 300 men to St-Étienne-de-Corcoué [8km north of Legé], and you can fall back on me with at least 1,200 men. Once united … we will be able to undertake the great expedition of Noirmoutier’.75
Boulard was astonished by this letter and even more surprised when he received another from Boisguyon (then in Challans) advising him that Beysser believed it was only a question of ‘pushing at an open door’.76
On 27 April Representative Goupilleau arrived at Boulard’s headquarters in La Mothe-Achard and two days later, in spite of all his difficulties, his small column set out for Beaulieu in torrential rain.77 He repulsed Joly at Palluau but then received a letter from Gaudin in Les Sables, reporting large numbers of rebels gathered around La Roche-sur-Yon, Clouzeaux and Aubigny. With only 500 men in Les Sables, the risk to the port was great.
The Recapture of Noirmoutier 28 April
Beysser, however, was still intent on seizing Noirmoutier, but when he reached Bourgneuf he heard that the island had in fact been captured by the navy.
The assault had been planned by Admiral Villaret-Joyeuse who was responsible for the coast of Morbihan and the Vendée. He deployed the frigates Achille and Superbe near the island and Captain Boisauveur of the Achille launched a surprise landing with 200 men at 1.30am on 28 April. The rebel response was to flee to the mainland and Beysser subsequently garrisoned the island with 700 men.78
Legé 30 April
On his return to Legé, Charette managed to assemble 5-600 men and Vrignault brought a further 1,000 from Vieillevigne.79 Beysser, hearing of this assembly from his base in Machecoul, dispatched Adjudant General Boisguyon with 600 infantry, 40 cavalry and two guns to seize the town. Beysser, however, failed to coordinate this attack with Boulard who was then in Palluau with 1,500 men.
Vrignault seemed happy to defer command to Charette, and the rebels deployed behind trees and bushes on high ground west of the River Logne.
Around 2pm, having marched 20km in terrible weather, the republican advance guard came up against well sustained fire from the royalists.80 Boisguyon had not expected to meet many rebels so continued his advance, jostling Charette’s troops back on Legé. Boisguyon’s artillery, cavalry and a company of infantry remained in column on the tortuous and muddy road while a half-battalion deployed facing Richebonne Château and wood (believed to be in enemy occupation).81 With his other battalion he bypassed the area where Charette had deployed and marched towards the right of the Vendéens. This move obliged the rebels to pull back across the river before rallying on high ground near a small chapel.
The Vendéen left flank covered their retreat and Boisguyon, without waiting for the rest of his column, continued his advance. Charette urged his men to defend the chapel and encouraged them to charge the Republicans, pouring down fire and threatening their flanks. Boisguyon’s battalion was unable to deploy under this fusillade so he now attempted to use his remaining forces to cover his withdrawal. He was forced to back-track along the steep road down to the ford, but his artillery had deployed and blocked the way, and the rest of his infantry were hampered from deploying by his cavalry who were trying to escape enemy fire coming from the direction of the Richebonne road.
The Battle of Legé.
Boisguyon wrote that his infantry, in complete panic, ‘fired when nothing was before them and used up their ammunition’.82 His artillery, caissons, supplies and many fusils fell into enemy hands and, finding themselves being enveloped by ‘a dense swarm of rebels’, his column fled towards Falleron. The Vendéens raced behind hedgerows to either side of the road, firing at their enemy and rounding up prisoners. Some of the 4th Line deserted to join Charette’s ranks.
Boisguyon claimed that if his men had shown more skill in deploying they could have beaten the Vendéens, but lamented that many in his ranks had never previously seen action.83
By the end of April the republicans had seized Noirmoutier, Machecoul, La Mothe-Achard and Palluau and had demoralised many of the rebels. Yet Charette’s victory at Legé offered them a glimmer of hope and news was coming in of the complete defeat of republican columns beyond Cholet.
Chapter 6
The Rise of the Grand Army
Mareuil-sur-Lay 3 May
While events were going badly in the north and north-east the garrisons in Les Sables, Ste-Hermine, La Châtaigneraie, Luçon and Fontenay were all on high alert.
The Army of the Centre had limited involvement in the battles to their north. A Vendéen post under St-Pal and De Chouppes, perhaps 1,200 strong, was using the strategically located town of Mareuil-sur-Lay, 9km north of Luçon, as a base from which to harass the republicans.1 D’Ayat retaliated on 3 May by dispatching columns from Luçon and Ste-Hermine in a surprise attack.
St-Pal had set up tree trunks to appear like cannon served by dummy gunners and fooled the republicans into thinking the post was more powerful than it actually was.2
D’Ayat’s orders, if carried out correctly, would result in three columns simultaneously attacking around 3am. Two columns set out from Luçon. The first, under his personal command, headed for the Beaulieu heights south of Mareuil and would signal their attack by firing a cannon. The second column, under Lieutenant Colonel Ramond, made a long detour to the west then north to appear at St André, west of Mareuil, and then split into three parts.
The third column, under Canier, comprised the Ste-Hermine garrison and eighty cavalry and marched via the Moutiers Bridge to the woods of La Nicolière, north-east of Marueil. Around ninety men from the second column would be sent into these same woods and the officer in charge was ordered to keep in communication with the third column when it arrived in position. Canier’s column would announce its presence by firing its 4pdr cannon.3 Pioneers were attached to all three columns.
D’Ayat’s column deployed on the heights of Beaulieu and could see rebels in front of the church and château and in an observation post on top of a hill.
The rebels immediately started to flee, fired on by cannon as they did so, and Canier’s column killed some attempting to escape to the north-east. Due to the swollen river and the rebel precaution of felling trees to block the roads the second column was delayed and many Vendéens escaped on the La Roche-sur-Yon road to the north-west. In his flight St-Pal left behind his valise and a number of pewter balls, and interrogated prisoners indicated that they had virtually no ammu
nition.4
Mareuil-sur-Lay.
The March of the Grand Army
While the republicans were desperately trying to contain the revolt and gather troops, Bonchamps, D’Élbée, Sapinaud-de-la-Verrie, Stofflet and Cathelineau had been considering how to expand the Rising.5 A council of war in Cholet, influenced by La Rochejaquelein, concluded with a plan to march south-east against Quétineau and raise recruits in that area.
On Sunday, 28 April, the tocsin could be heard across the region and within two days 25-27,000 men had gathered in Cholet accompanied by 750 horse and about fourteen guns of varying calibre.6 Heading for Bressuire they camped at Vihiers that same evening and reinforcements raised their strength to around 30,000.7 On 1 May they launched an assault on the 800 national guards defending Argenton-Château and captured this post after a short combat, securing more munitions.8
From his headquarters in Bressuire, Quétineau was relatively inactive in late April and was busy trying to control insubordination in his ranks. On 1 May he was informed by Leygonier of the attack on Argenton-Château and at 8am on the following day he abandoned Bressuire and retreated to Thouars. On route around 500 troops left his ranks, refusing to serve under a general they considered ‘suspect’.
Thouars 5 May 1793
Thouars is a medieval walled town perched high above a loop in the River Thouet. Although the old stone walls were in poor condition it was nevertheless a strong position. To the south, east and west of the town were steep slopes leading down to the river and the royalist army could only attack across a handful of crossings.
The assault on Thouars.
The Vendéens had been joined at Bressuire by more former officers: Lescure, his father-in-law Donnissan, Marigny and Des Essarts. They had been imprisoned in the town and, in their haste to evacuate, the republicans simply left them behind. Along with La Rochejaquelein, Lescure immediately set about raising peasants from parishes in the Bressuire area where they were both notable local figures.
The rebel army set out from Bressuire on 4 May and camped that evening at Coulanges-Thouarsis. Although Leygonier recognised the difficulties faced by Quétineau, his own troops in Doué were in no state to help and he dared not move.9
General Quétineau lamented his lack of staff and ongoing desertions that probably cost him around a third of his strength. Further raw and untrained volunteers had been hastily summoned from the surrounding area but these 2-3,000 men were to prove of little use.10
What armed troops the Vendéens had were probably split among the columns and formed the key fighting force, but ammunition for both the infantry and artillery was limited. The Vendéens had yet to appoint a commander-in-chief so strategy was determined by the elected divisional generals and a handful of other experienced former officers.
In the lead up to the battle most of the royalist army formed into columns as follows∷
• Cathelineau, d’Élbée and Stofflet: perhaps 7,000 and a few cannon.
• Marigny and Donnissan: 2,000 infantry and around half the cannon.
• Lescure and La Rochejaquelein: with an advance guard of around 1,500 with a few cannon, followed at some distance by perhaps 5,000 more.
• Bonchamps: probably in excess of 5,000 men supported by Dommaigné with 750 cavalry.
Quétineau chose to fight a defensive battle with most of his troops in fixed position, almost certainly due to the dubious quality of his forces. He deployed 300 national guards at the Gué-au-Riche and his few cavalry were spread out in open land between the Gué-au-Riches and Vrines. The Pont de Vrines was defended by three cannon and 150 men using an upturned wagon filled with dung to block the crossing (all but a small section in the middle of this bridge had been dismantled). A further 900 troops were in defensive positions in Vrines and adjacent vineyards, formed from a company of the 8th Var and two battalions of national guards.
The Pont St-Jean (also known as the Pont-Neuf) was guarded by a detachment and one cannon, with a similar detachment covering the Pont St-Jacques. Quétineau considered these bridges impracticable to attack as they were barely four metres wide.
The Thouars National Guard deployed at the Pont de Praillon, some distance to the south-east, to secure a line of retreat if that proved necessary. Deployed near some mills between Vrines and Thouars were troops under Quétineau’s personal command ready to act as a mobile reserve.11
Around 1,000 men were in Thouars with at least one cannon deployed in the château. Dispersed along the river and north of Thouars were small detachments deployed to slow any enemy advance and report on their approach.
The first gunfire was heard between 5 and 6am from 1,200 rebels under Lescure and La Rochejaquelein’s command gathered on high ground facing the Pont de Vrines. During the morning the rest of their army slowly moved into position. Facing the Pont St-Jacques was the contingent under D’Élbée, Cathelineau and Stofflet; Donnissan and Marigny headed for the Pont St-Jean, and Dommaigné and Bonchamps moved towards the Gué-au-Riche. The Vendéens bombarded the defenders at the bridges at Vrines and St-Jacques for several hours. They may have been trying to lure the republicans into believing these where the principal points of attack.
Towards 10am, and with powder running low, La Rochejaquelein set out to find more and speed up the march of the rest of their column which had yet to appear. The republicans in Vrines also appealed for reinforcements.
While La Rochejaquelein was away Lescure thought the republican defenders were starting to pull back, so he took up a fusil, shouted to the men to advance and descended to the bridge. He was met by a discharge of musketry and grapeshot that peppered his clothes but left him unharmed. No peasants had followed him. He climbed back onto nearby rocks, appealed to them once more, and again descended to the bridge to be met by a new discharge of musketry and grapeshot; again he was unharmed, but still alone. It is quite possible that although known to many of the peasants Lescure had yet to win their confidence.
During the morning Quétineau had been observing the combat at St-Jacques when he became aware that the Vendéens were reinforcing their troops west of Vrines (almost certainly La Rochejaquelein returning with the bulk of his and Lescure’s troops). He quickly sent notice to the Vrines defenders to retire on Thouars if their position was forced.
Towards 11am Lescure descended to the bridge for a third time, this time followed by a single soldier. Fortunately La Rochejaquelein and Forest now appeared and the four of them rushed the republican defences. Arriving at the entrenchments Lescure rested his fusil on the parapet and began firing at point-blank range. At last the peasants came to their support, overwhelmed their opponents, and captured around 200 men.
Quétineau immediately sent warning to the troops at Gué-au-Riches to pull back to Thouars, but was unaware that this post had also fallen having put up stiff resistance until overwhelmed by numbers. Bonchamps and Dommaigné were now moving south to support La Rochejaquelein and Lescure while the handful of republican cavalry in their way retreated on the Loudun road.
Two columns were now threatening both Quétineau’s flanks: Marigny and Donnissan marching to attack Pont St-Jean and Bonchamps and Dommaigné moving down through Vrines.
The republicans who were retreating from Vrines were tracked nearly all the way to Thouars by around thirty Vendéen horse, including a number of officers. This detachment then dropped back to hasten the army forwards.
Noticing that the rebels seemed to pause near a mill between Vrines and Thouars, Daniaud-Dupeyrat, a Republican soldier and eye-witness, wrote:
‘We immediately had all the battalions deployed in line the Deux-Sèvres in the centre, the Marseillais with their two campaign guns and the Thouars National Guard on the left … and the Volunteers of Poitiers and Châtellerault…on the right.’
They were supported by some mounted gendarmes. The republican officers had spread rumours that the rebels facing them had no cannon, and the troops had convinced themselves that their enemy only knew how to fight shelt
ered by woodland. Quétineau therefore headed towards this mill. The rebels, however, had been biding their time while more troops and cannon were brought up, and the republicans were allowed to draw near before they opened fire with both musketry and artillery. The shock of cannon fire seems to have broken republican resolve and as panic set in they raced towards Thouars and ignored Quetineau’s pleas to deploy in front of the walls and not enter the cramped medieval streets.12
On the St-Jean front Marigny had eventually cleared Porte Maillot with his cannon which gave him access to the St-Jean Bridge, and on the St-Jacques front a Vendéen column had forced the bridge and deployed at the foot of the town. Nevertheless both columns still faced some opposition from troops defending the southern approaches to Thouars.
When the rebels reached the town’s walls they looked for a way to form a breach. Up against the walls near the Paris Gate La Rochejaquelein climbed onto the shoulders of one of his men to fire on the defenders as a succession of loaded fusils were handed up to him. He also joined in attempts to dislodge stones from the dilapidated walls while coming under fire. Republican morale had largely collapsed when troops under La Rochejaquelein, Lescure, Bonchamps, D’Élbée and Cathelineau poured into Thouars from several directions and they faced little resistance. The town was not pillaged and there was little bloodshed when the republicans surrendered en masse around 5pm.
The immediate consequence of this astounding victory was a wealth of military supplies. Sources generally agree that 5-600 republicans were killed and 3-5,000 taken prisoner. They also seized 3-4,000 fusils, 6,000 pairs of pistols, 2,000 sabres, 8-10 cannon, ample munitions and a large treasury.
An old associate of Lescure, Quétineau was offered a rank in the royalist army, but loyal to the republic he refused. He was released on parole and given safe conduct to Saumur, but was subsequently imprisoned and faced a harrowing trial before the Revolutionary Tribunal, ultimately ending at the guillotine. As a friend of the ‘traitor’ Dumouriez his fate was perhaps inevitable.