by Rob Harper
Coron 18 September
When Santerre’s 16,500 strong column subsequently advanced, its 6,500 more experienced troops comprised an advance guard under Turreau and brigades under Chabot and Joly accompanied by around twenty-four guns and a modest cavalry force. Under Ronsin’s direction they marched in a single column. It is not clear whether the new levies were interspersed with these brigades or formed a separate mass of troops.
They were in Vihiers on 17 September and on the following morning continued their march on Cholet. Around noon, on reaching Château des Hommes, Turreau could hear cannon fire coming from Coron. When he asked for orders he claimed he received none and when he insisted they should stop and scout before advancing further he claimed Ronsin ignored this advice and ordered him to march on.
Coron is located at the bottom of a valley, through which ran a single narrow road hemmed in by buildings and streams, and Turreau now marched through this deserted town. Scouts warned him that the enemy were marching towards them in great numbers and at speed. Turreau claimed that he seized some high ground above Coron and advised Santerre of his movements and those of the enemy. Santerre makes no mention of this indicating that he was at the head of the column with Ronsin, Turreau and Representatives Bourbotte and Choudieu where, he claimed, the front of the column halted in a bad position at a dip in the road through Coron.38
With the main Vendéen leaders facing Canclaux, Piron found himself once again in command; although this time he was supported by Laugrenière. They assembled around 15,000 men and deployed in a crescent largely concealed by the terrain. Their centre was supported by three 8pdrs deployed on the Cholet road. Turreau claimed he deployed two 12pdrs and two howitzers to oppose this artillery and told Ronsin he must deploy immediately.
The bulk of the republican army was congested on the main road with their infantry interspersed with their artillery. Santerre endeavoured to turn eight guns to move them to high ground a short distance east of Coron only to have this order overruled by Ronsin. The Vendéen tirailleurs came right up to the cannon to shoot the gunners, and the republicans found their line of retreat blocked by caissons attempting to turn on the narrow road. Piron may have led some parishes in a charge to cut the enemy line and the battle soon turned into a massacre as the Vendéen forces converged on the trapped republicans.39
Turreau was wounded and fell from his horse, Ronsin disappeared into the mass of troops, and General Dembarrère had his coat riddled with bullets. The republicans were routed after no more than an hour of combat. The talentless Santerre had suffered another disastrous defeat.
The Vendéens seized nearly all the republican artillery and a large number of pikes but, due to the nature of the terrain, losses were focused on the advance guard and were therefore limited.
The assault on Coron.
On news of this defeat Rossignol ordered Salomon to hold a position in advance of Doué with four battalions and refuse passage to the fleeing troops.40
In their official bulletin the Vendéens claimed nine cannon, three howitzers, nineteen caissons and three thousand killed.41 Whatever the actual cost this was yet another blow to the Republic.
Duhoux’s Angers Column
As Santerre left Saumur, Duhoux’s division, conforming to the 3 September Plan, set out from Angers heading for the Layon. He led 11-15,000 men of whom at least 8,000 were new levies mostly armed with pikes.42 The rest of his forces included the Angers National Guard and a handful of volunteer battalions, supported by at least nine guns and a small body of cavalry.
By the evening of 17 September Duhoux had crossed the Layon and was in St-Lambert preparatory to marching on Chemillé and La Jumellière the following day.43 However, Duhoux was now informed of the disaster at Coron and re-crossed the Layon to deploy on its eastern bank.
Pont-Barré 19 September
The Vendéen forces were led by the Chevalier Duhoux d’Hauterive, nephew of the republican general he was now about to fight. His contingent from the Chemillé Division was joined by others under Cady, La Sorinières and Piron (who sent cavalry and a few thousand infantry from his victory at Coron). In total he appears to have mustered 9,000 men, including a few hundred horse and some cannon.
Having assembled in Chemillé they advanced in two columns and brushed aside some republicans in St-Lambert before pressing on towards the Layon.44
They found the enemy deployed along the east bank. The Vendéens sent detachments across unguarded bridges at Bézigon and Les Planches to either flank of the republican positions while Cady and La Sorinière’s troops held their attention at Pont-Barré.45 The Vendéens had deployed their cannon near La Bodière and the republicans at Moulin-Brûle, and towards 11am the cannonade began.46
Planks at Pont Bézigon had been removed so their cavalry swam the river and replaced them, enabling 300 Vendéen infantry to cross. Les Planches was crossed by 100 men and these two groups, who must have been formed from the elite of their army, now attacked the republican flanks. Panic soon took hold of the republican flanks causing them to pull back on their centre which was deployed on high ground facing Pont-Barré. However the rebels had also managed to force Pont-Barré and overpower the enemy gunners, the Jemappes Battalion and the Angers National Guards. When the republican flanks arrived on the high ground east of Pont-Barré they found themselves facing rebel cavalry and a contingent of Duhoux d’Hauterive’s troops who had crossed at Chaume.47 The landscape was soon littered with hundreds of republican dead as their army routed in several directions.
The Battle of Pont-Barré.
Beauvais recalled this being one of the bloodiest battles he had yet experienced. He wrote that the republicans were soon broken and although some of their troops retreated in orderly fashion towards Les Ponts-de-Cé the levies fell to pieces.
The republicans had prematurely removed timbers form the bridge at Les Ponts-de-Cé, cutting off their own routing troops who now faced a massacre as Beauvais recounted ‘we no longer took prisoners’.48
The Vendéen Bulletin of 20 September boasted:
‘In an instant all the enemy were beaten and around 4,000 were ground to dust. Nine cannon, six caissons and three hundred wagons full of wheat and other pillaged effects were the fruit of this victory. No one could count the number of enemy patriots who perished in the Loire.’49
Casualties were certainly in the thousands and on 21 September only 5,500 men from Duhoux’s column could be accounted for in Angers.50 This victory enabled the Vendéens to seize the Érigné Heights once more.
General Duhoux was sent to face the Revolutionary Tribunal and was in prison throughout the Terror, probably only saved from execution due to his heroic defence of Lille in 1792.51
The March of the Army of Mayence
Santerre and Duhoux had been routed, Rey had been stalled, and Chalbos and Beffroy had pulled back as instructed. Yet Canclaux was completely unaware of these unfolding disasters as he fought the Vendéens to the west and advanced in accordance with the Nantes Plan.
At long last a large force of veteran troops, the heroes of the long Siege of Mayence, would face the Vendéens and, it was assumed, would quickly put an end to the war.
As the Mayenҫais and part of the Army of the Brest Coast advanced through the coastal Vendée, leaving death and destruction in their wake, the men under La Cathelinière fell back from St-Philbert-de-Grandlieu on Legé. The republicans pressed forwards at speed and it did not take long for Pornic, Bourgneuf, Vertou, Aizenay and Chapelle-Palluau to fall into their hands.
After the victory of Chantonnay the leaders of the Grand Army held a council of war at Les Herbiers. D’Élbée divided the region into four areas under the overall command of Bonchamps (northern Anjou and banks of the Loire); La Rochejaquelein (southern Anjou); Lescure (Haut-Poitou); and Charette (south of Nantes and Bas-Poitou). Independent leaders in the coastal Vendée (notably La Cathelinière, Joly and Savin) reluctantly accepted Charette’s command at this time of crisis.
; Charette was soon forced to abandon Legé and cover the withdrawal of refugees as everyone moved eastward.52 He personally commanded his rearguard and withdrew shortly before Kléber and Beysser linked up in Legé.
Joly, Couëtus, Savin and La Cathelinière had all joined Charette and increased his numbers to around 5,000 men. They marched through Rocheservière and gathered in Montaigu on 14 September. Some troops were deployed in St-Georges-de-Montaigu and others placed on the Nantes road to the north.
On that same day Beysser was ordered to Vieillevigne and sent a demi-brigade south to Mormaison. Kléber camped that night at La Grolle, 3km east of Rochservière. Persistent rain, however, slowed the pursuit and left republican troops scattered and exhausted.
On 15 September the bulk of the Mayence column joined Kléber at La Grolle and he was ordered on to Remouillé, 15km to the north. Here he came into contact with a Vendéen post which fell back on Montaigu. Beaupuy was sent to Vieillevigne that day and plans for a three pronged attack on Montaigu – from the north, west and south – were agreed for the following day.
Montaigu 16 September
On the morning of 16 September the republican army approaching Montaigu comprised Kléber and the advance guard, formed from two demi-brigades supported by cavalry and totalling around 2,500 men; Aubert-Dubayet with Vimeux’s division of two brigades, totalling 3,700 men; and Beaupuy’s division formed from a single brigade of 1,400 men. The cavalry comprised companies formed from several chasseur regiments, totalling 280 men, along with small detachments of volunteer light cavalry. The Mayence artillery numbered twenty-four guns.
General Beysser’s detachment from the Army of the Brest Coast was formed into an advance guard and three demi-brigades, along with two squadrons of the 15th Chasseurs and detachments of mounted gendarmes, volunteer dragoons and a company of the Hussards-Américains. In total Beysser commanded 5,800 infantry, 380 cavalry, eighteen 4pdrs, two 12pdrs and two howitzers.
To face these troops Charette commanded a mere 5,000 infantry, 230 cavalry and a handful of guns (mostly of small calibre but including an 18pdr and 36pdr).
Although 17,000 republicans were close by it would be Kléber and Beysser’s 8,500 men who would be ordered to advance on Montaigu: Kléber from the north and Beysser from the south. Both columns received orders at 7am and were soon on the march.
Cambray commanded Beysser’s advance guard, largely formed from combined grenadier companies led by Blosse. They overcame obstacles strewn along the road as they marched in column on Montaigu, supported by two cannon. La Cathelinière had orders to defend St-Georges-de-Montaigu, but after a short firefight his men pulled back towards Montaigu.
Kléber’s column was bearing down from the north but was delayed when part of his artillery train broke down en route. Marigny, commanding his advance guard, first came into enemy contact a few kilometres north of Montaigu. Kléber soon joined him and urged him to advance rapidly with his cavalry in a south-easterly direction, to threaten the enemy’s line of retreat or assault their right flank. Kléber marched eight companies of light infantry on his left ‘obliquely and in echelon’ in support of Marigny.53 He sent a second battalion to his right to clear farms and a château occupied by some rebels.
The Vendéen troops defending the outskirts of Montaigu were unable to resist Kléber’s advance and he entered the north of the town just as Beysser entered from the south.
Beysser had used his cavalry to good effect on the southern approach to the town, but in the lower part of Montaigu a large body of the enemy supported by two 4pdrs stopped his advance. Cambray’s grenadiers outflanked the enemy position via the St-Jacques Suburb, compelling the Vendéens to withdraw on the Tiffauges road.
In a limited pursuit republican cavalry cut down some fugitives and captured three cannon, although most rebels withdrew unmolested and casualties were light. They reached Tiffauges that same evening.
Beysser’s troops now pillaged Montaigu and instead of placing outposts Kléber noted that he was more intent ‘on the pleasures of the table and those of women’.54 Unable to stop the pillaging Kléber withdrew on the Remouillé road only to witness a bizarre caravan of Beysser’s troops marching by encumbered with booty.
First Battle of Montaigu.
Aubert-Dubayet’s main column camped outside of the town.
Little was achieved on 17 September as the republicans endeavoured to identify the enemy’s movements. Canclaux’s next target was Clisson, and Kléber marched there on 18 September. On route he faced dreadful roads in very difficult country and found Clisson evacuated.
News however now reached them of the first defeats sustained by the Army of the La Rochelle Coast. Canclaux had to now carefully consider his next moves and decided to continue with his advance. He ordered Beysser to march on Tiffauges, while Kléber was instructed to cross the Sèvres and advance to Torfou from where he would be able to keep in touch with Beysser’s column south of that river.
The main body of the army was ordered to Clisson, while the 2nd Division was detached to the west to clear the country along the Clisson to Nantes road in concert with the Reserve. To achieve this they were ordered to move to Pallet and seize rebel positions at Croix-Moriceau, La Louée and Vertou. They were then to return to Pallet, while the Reserve would camp at Le Hallay, keeping posts at La Louée and La Chapelle-Heulin. The Légion-Nantaise and a grenadier battalion were instructed to move on Basse and Haute-Goulaine.
These dispositions would close down rebel activity in the area and ensure units could support each other if attacked.
However, Canclaux’s plans were about to unravel as Kléber came under attack.
Torfou 19 September
Kléber set out early on 19 September to march eastwards along of the north bank of the Sèvre. After crossing the village of Gétigné he detached his chasseurs-à-cheval and Marigny’s light-infantry with orders to advance and report back as soon as they spotted Beysser’s column across the Sèvres.
Around 9am, after two hours’ march, Kléber heard firing up ahead and urged his troops forwards. Marigny, at the head of his two légions, had encountered and defeated 400 Vendéens stationed by Charette in Boussay. These rebels fell back on Torfou.
At the entrance to Boussay the road split and although both led to Torfou the left was more practicable for artillery. Marigny was sent with the Light Advance Guard on the right and the rest of the column moved on the left. Kléber, with Merlin and his staff, was at the front of the main column. They were soon in densely covered countryside, cut into many small fields, and with the road gradually narrowing. Kléber, his staff, and a handful of cavalry had advanced some way ahead of the column when they were warned that enemy scouts were near. They cleared them away with carbine fire and Kléber sent orders to hasten his column forwards. He advanced a few chasseurs-à-cheval and as more troops arrived they were rushed forwards in support. He issued orders to seize the heights at Torfou and hold them while the infantry caught up, and although his cavalry occupied these heights they had to abandon them as the infantry were delayed by the difficult terrain.
The republicans were now in the presence of Charette’s men with some deployed as tirailleurs to cover Torfou and its valley (with perhaps 300 infantry and 200 cavalry) and some locals deployed in Torfou itself.55 Unknown to the republicans Lescure and his men were a short distance to the east and a large contingent of the Grand Army was racing to Charette’s aid down the Cholet road.
The Vendéen forces were initially 5,000 strong and would increase during the battle to upwards of 20,000 including part of the Army of the Centre and divisions under Lescure, D’Élbée and Bonchamps.56
Kléber recalled:
‘Torfou was on quite an elevated height and the holloways leading to it were completely concealed. Ditches, hedges and bushes surrounded each field; the woods that were in front and on its flanks appeared to make this position impregnable’.57
Around 10am Kléber’s infantry finally arrived and he ordered
one battalion to attack the right of Torfou, one the left, and some companies of the Légion-des-Francs the centre. Two battalions were held in reserve to support the assault.58
Lucas Championnière recalled that his troops were deployed on the road east of Torfou when he received orders to race into the battle underway above the town. Unfortunately their bravest men were too prompt: they ended up some way ahead of the rest and were routed before support arrived.59 Kléber’s assault forced Charette’s men out of Torfou around midday and they broke up and retreated on Tiffauges, most ignoring Charette’s attempts to hold them together.60
At this moment the heavily covered country meant the republicans were unaware just how few rebels were ahead of them. The plight of the fugitives in Tiffauges was desperate as defeat could have led to their massacre. With pleas, and even violence, women prevented the men from fleeing beyond the Tiffauges Bridge and forced them to return to the fight. Some women joined the ranks as men moved back towards the Torfou plateau. Around this time Lescure may have made a feint with his cavalry while his infantry stayed to the rear.61
The Battle of Torfou.
Kléber was intent on holding the heights east of Torfou from where he had a reasonable view of the area beyond. He sent two cannon forward: one on the left where Merlin was in command, and one on the right under Marigny.
Lescure and his officers, witnessing Charette’s rout, were determined to hold their ground. Dismounting amongst the 1,700-strong Parish of Échaubrognes, considered ‘the grenadiers of the army’, Lescure would hold firm for around two and a half hours.62
While holding his ground, undoubtedly supported by other parishes and with Charette’s men drifting back into the action, Lescure would eventually receive support from D’Élbée and Bonchamps.