by Mark Urban
In 1963 he had become the first RUC officer to be sent to the police staff college at Bramshill in Surrey. After returning he was involved in the policing of a tense sectarian period in west Belfast. During this posting he was involved in a riot when constables were ordered to remove an Irish tricolour from the window of a Sinn Fein election candidate’s shop. He was convinced the police should have stayed away and not done the work of local unionists, who considered the flag’s presence an offence. Coincidentally, the incident was regarded as something of a watershed by the young Gerry Adams.
As a Chief Superintendent, Hermon was put in charge of retraining the force after its twin maulings of 1969 – first from the Bogside rioters and then from the Whitehall inquiry which had followed. He later served in Britain, broadening his perspective.
During the years that followed his appointment, Chief Constable Hermon and the RUC were to become virtually synonymous. A strong-willed man, he moulded the organization in his own image, as had John Reith at the BBC or J. Edgar Hoover at the FBI. His style was appreciated by many who felt the force needed strong leadership able to withstand the assaults of local politicians. He won considerable independence for both the RUC and the Army in operational matters, something for which many senior officers were grateful. But like any forceful leader he was not without his critics: some officers felt he had a tendency to meddle, and was a poor delegator who became increasingly set in his views and intolerant of the opinions of outsiders.
At the outset Hermon was perceived as a moderate in some ways. He was considered sincere in his desire to boost the number of Catholics serving in the force. A senior Army officer who worked with him says, ‘He may have faults, but bigotry is not one of them.’ After taking charge he gave a speech to RUC cadets at a passing-out parade in Enniskillen. He told them that he expected the highest personal standards from them. But parts of his message were considered by some police officers to be naive: ‘I have been fortunate enough in my career to walk down a street on my own, meeting and talking to people, without a flak jacket, without a gun. I want to see the day when you too can do the same.’
Experience led Hermon to set the preservation of morale in the RUC as one of his main objectives. He became deeply suspicious of attempts at outside scrutiny: he had seen the problems which outsiders could cause – from the Hunt Report (into RUC handling of the 1969 riots) to the Bennett Report in 1979 (into interrogation practices at Castlereagh). He held many politicians, particularly those unionists who expected the RUC to act as the strong arm of loyalism, in contempt. Hermon was subsequently seen as a ruthless street-fighter in seeing off outside scrutiny of his force and as a man who could be dictatorial in attempts to impose his personal beliefs on others. He tried, for instance, to remove women from active positions in the RUC and brushed aside officers who he thought drank or gambled too much.
Like Kenneth Newman, Hermon wanted to rein in offensive operations by Army special forces, according to senior Army officers. But like his predecessor, Hermon was also motivated in part by simple, institutional self-interest rather than repugnance for those types of operation. He was keen to continue the development of RUC special units. He well understood that his predecessor had fought the tough battles necessary to establish Police Primacy and that he would enjoy its fruits, in terms of real operational power and control of an intelligence establishment which was in the process of integration.
Lieutenant General Creasey was also about to depart. His failed attempt to roll back Police Primacy in the wake of Warrenpoint, despite Whitehall’s polite unwillingness to label it publicly for what it was, had in any case made his position very difficult. He was to be replaced in 1979 by Lieutenant General Richard Lawson. In one sense Lieutenant General Lawson did not, at first sight, seem like ideal material for the role of GOC. He was not an infantry officer but came from the Royal Tank Regiment and, short of embracing the measures demanded by the loyalist lunatic fringe, there seemed little scope for the use of armour in Ulster. However, his cool, self-effacing manner allowed him to establish a good working relationship with Chief Constable Hermon. Both men had been left in little doubt by Whitehall that any further disagreements would be unacceptable. In the uncharacteristically direct words of one mandarin, ‘Lawson and Hermon had been given firm instructions that they had to work together and there should be no frigging about.’
The GOC and Chief Constable established a close rapport, trying to shape the overall direction of security policy and leaving the resolution of operational matters to their respective deputies. After the shocks of August, the Prime Minister maintained close contact with both men through frequent phonecalls and occasional meetings. With these new appointments the crisis in Army/police relations had passed.
10
Special Branch in the Ascendant
When the Troubles began in Northern Ireland the RUC’s Special Branch had been small, numbering only around eighty, and somewhat disorganized. The Branch, like that of police forces in Britain, was meant to provide intelligence on terrorism and subversive groups. But at the beginning of the 1970s, at the time of internment, much of the information it provided on republican paramilitary groups had been hopelessly inaccurate. In particular the SB had overestimated the importance of the Official IRA and known little about the emerging power of the Provisionals.
Intelligence, particularly that gained from informers, is the lifeblood of anti-terrorist operations. The SB had the largest network of informers of the various information-gathering agencies in Ulster – that in itself was enough to give it considerable power. But the RUC’s assumption of overall control of operations in 1976 gave the branch a pivotal role in the struggle against the Provisionals.
During the early 1970s the SB had taken a series of blows following inquiries into its interrogation methods. By the mid 1970s many Army officers had a low opinion of it. To one battalion commander the SB were ‘emasculated’; while to the Chief of the General Staff they were a force with poor morale and the taint of association with Protestant terrorist groups.
As a result of the SB’s disgrace, the CID had taken over interrogation at the main centre, Castlereagh near Belfast, and at subsidiary points at Gough Barracks in Armagh and Strand Road police station in Londonderry. The CID had improved the organization of interrogation and the collators of the information thus assumed a highly important role in the campaign of the mid 1970s.
Castlereagh attained a fearsome reputation among republicans. Many police officers, to this day, argue that most prisoners were treated fairly there; however, not all police officers have taken this view. Michael Asher, the SPG man who later wrote about his experiences in Shoot to Kill, remembers the reaction of one suspect: ‘Taggarty blanched when Castlereagh was mentioned. It had a grim reputation. Suspects were held there in windowless cubes for up to one week. They might be denied sleep, stripped, beaten or humiliated. No one wanted to be taken to Castlereagh.’
Just as the CID’s bureaucratic fortunes had been boosted by outside inquiries into their rival, so they would themselves be diminished by them. In 1978 Amnesty International, the independent human rights monitoring group, published a report which was highly critical of the methods employed in police interrogation centres. Following its appearance Kenneth Newman and the government agreed that they should open the doors of Castlereagh to an inquiry headed by Harry Bennett QC, a respected judge. The Bennett Report was published early in 1979 and did not give the clean bill of health for which Newman had hoped.
It stated that most police officers were carrying out their duties correctly but came to the conclusion that some prisoners had injuries which ‘were not self-inflicted and were sustained in police custody’. Following this admission that some prisoners were being beaten up, steps were taken to protect suspects’ rights. Closed circuit TV cameras were fitted in interrogation rooms and prisoners were given medical checks. The RUC took such steps well before most of the British police forces – albeit a change which was forced on t
hem. Subsequently new legislation under the PTA gave detectives three or even seven days to interrogate suspects and elicit information or confessions, reducing the pressure on them to resort to illegal and violent means. Allegations of ill-treatment did not end but there was a recognition – even by many republicans in private – that physical coercion became rarer in the holding centres.
But the benefit that the SB gained from the CID’s reversal of fortunes in the late 1970s was only one of the reasons why it was beginning to inspire new confidence. In 1976 Assistant Chief Constable Mick Slevin took over as Head of Special Branch (HSB). He had served previously as a chief superintendent in charge of plain-clothes work in Belfast. Slevin had become something of a hero among his fellow detectives: during the early days of the Troubles he had personally defused two bombs, receiving a gallantry award and, in 1973, an OBE. He had already been in the force for thirty-one years when he was appointed HSB.
Assistant Chief Constable Slevin, an Ulsterman, did much to rebuild the department. He increased its resources and brought it to the centre of the intelligence establishment as refashioned in the late 1970s. After several years of bitter conflict with British Army intelligence, the new HSB soothed the atmosphere. A senior figure at Lisburn comments, ‘We had excellent relations with him.’
During the late 1970s and early 1980s the RUC SB, or E Department, was split into its current five divisions. E1, Administration Division, carries out routine administrative functions: it maintains the Department’s cars, vets its personnel and ensures the security of its buildings. E2, Legal Division, is closely involved with the CID in preparing cases against suspects and in overseeing the remaining SB contingent in interrogation centres. E3 is the Intelligence Division, the central organizing and analysis body of the Department. E4, Operations Division, carries out surveillance, runs the Department’s library and collects relevant press cuttings. E5, Collation Division, updates the data on suspects and incidents, and analyses it in an attempt to establish connections between individuals as well as incidents.
Of these divisions E3 and E4 are the most important. The Intelligence Division is subdivided into E3A, E3B and E3C which oversee operations respectively against republican groups, loyalist organizations, and leftist groups which are considered subversive. E4A became well known as the surveillance group within the Branch – the watchers who follow suspects and mount observation posts. It is backed up by E4B which is involved in technical surveillance, installing bugging and tracking equipment. E4C and E4D are believed to be involved in specialist photographic surveillance.
The central organization is augmented by a headquarters in each of three regions and the divisions are grouped under them. The Regional Head of Special Branch (RHSB) is normally a chief superintendent and the divisional one a chief inspector or superintendent. It is the organization at the regional level, with its officers in police stations around Ulster, which is engaged in the SB’s most vital work. These elements control the informers in various communities and paramilitary groups. The Army’s Special Military Intelligence Unit (SMIU) interacts with SB at each level, both with its headquarters at Knock and via a force of about thirty military intelligence officers in the police divisions.
With the success of the three Regional Crime and Intelligence Units founded by Kenneth Newman in improving general police work in the mid 1970s, security chiefs decided to extend the system to cover co-operation between the police and Army by establishing a new integrated intelligence centre called a Tasking and Co-ordination Group (TCG). The setting-up of the TCGs was probably the most important of all the steps taken during the late 1970s towards enhanced information-gathering.
Each Group combined CID, SB and Army specialists; but while the CID had been in charge of the Regional Crime and Intelligence Units, the TCGs were commanded by an SB officer. Despite its imposing title, the TCG was not an extensive nerve-centre with ranks of police and soldiers watching screens and poring over maps, but consisted of a much more basic collection of portakabins or rooms. When it was not organizing any operations the TCG was often staffed by just one person, a duty officer sometimes as lowly as a detective constable. When operations were on, as many as twenty to thirty people may have become involved, according to interviewees with experience of such activity.
The first TCG was created in 1978 at Castlereagh to serve Belfast Region. It was followed in 1979 by one at Gough Barracks to serve South Region, and later by another in Londonderry for North Region. Although there have been some changes in the function of different regions during the last ten years, the centres at Castlereagh, Gough and Londonderry were normally known as TCG Belfast, TCG South and TCG North respectively.
The TCGs attained a critical role in what security chiefs called ‘executive action’ – locking together intelligence from informers with the surveillance and ambushing activities of undercover units. The Army’s TCG Liaison Officer (TCGLO), a captain or major, is almost always a veteran of an SAS or 14 Intelligence Company tour in Ulster, whose duty is to act as go-between and advise senior detectives on the Army’s capabilities. The Army and the SB have people permanently delegated to the TCG, but the Security Service (MI5) does not, according to people who have worked in this field. Security Service personnel may, however, join the TCG for limited periods during operations in which they have a particular interest, for example where one of their agents is involved.
As a result of this initiative, Regional Heads of Special Branch, operating through their TCG, were able to eliminate duplication of effort by Army and police surveillance squads. They ensured ‘de-confliction’, declaring areas where covert operations were underway out of bounds to prevent accidental confrontations with uniformed patrols. The new arrangement also lessened the chances of the Army or police arresting one another’s informers by mistake.
The founding of the first TCG preceded the examination of intelligence-gathering efforts by Maurice Oldfield and his Planning Staff. They were impressed with the system as a key step in the integration of security forces intelligence activities, and in their report to Whitehall recommended the establishment of a similar system of joint operations and intelligence centres at the RUC division/Army battalion level. These lower level groups had a less formal structure and concentrated on the co-ordination of patrolling activities rather than on the response to sensitive intelligence.
The centralization of activities in the TCGs carried certain risks, however. For example, the TCG commander was permitted to hold back information. An informer might allude to the identity of terrorists who were about to carry out an attack. The TCG commander might pass on to the Army information about the likely target and timing of the attack without referring to the would-be perpetrators, feeling that doing so could put the informer at risk by revealing the small group in which he or she moved. But in omitting this information, the commander might himself be committing a crime because he would leave the soldiers with no option but to confront armed terrorists, when they might have had a chance of arresting them before their attack. Working in the TCG forced SB officers at times to make difficult decisions: should they compromise the security of their source in the interests of making possible preventive action against terrorists, or should they keep their informer’s identity secret and thereby run the risk of endangering the lives of soldiers and possibly bystanders?
Such responsibilities required the officers who ran TCGs to display the utmost judgement and integrity. In fact, as the events which followed the shooting of six people in the Armagh area by RUC undercover units late in 1982 were to show (see chapter sixteen), some of them were incapable of living up to these exalted standards.
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Although the SB developed the most extensive network of informers, other organizations such as the Army and MI5 also used informers – or ‘human sources’ as they were termed. The traditionally close relationship between the Branch and MI5, though not as intimate as in many British forces, provided a further boost to the RUC SB.
The Security Service became more involved in Northern Ireland in 1973. The government had initially favoured the use of the Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) because it was believed to be more adept at running networks of agents in a foreign country, namely the Republic of Ireland. However, after the IRA’s initial bombing campaigns in Britain in 1972, MI5 was able to convince ministers that its efforts to protect the realm from acts of this kind required an expanded presence on the far side of the Irish Sea.
During the mid 1970s, while the Security Service was ‘empire-building’, there was a period of rivalry between MI5 and MI6, and between MI5 and the RUC SB and Army intelligence-gathering organizations too. By the late 1970s SIS liaison officers had been displaced from Lisburn and Knock and most of its agents taken over by MI5 or the SB, although SIS retained a vestigial presence with an office at Stormont.
The Security Service’s expansion, particularly of its agent-running operations, was bound to cause friction. As MI5 had little presence at first in Northern Ireland most of its informers could only be acquired by relieving other organizations of them. Most agents were recruited during questioning by the RUC or the Army – MI5 simply could not get this kind of access to large numbers of people from republican areas.
Security Service agents became known as ‘national assets’ – a phrase which was meant to reflect their importance to national security, as opposed to the local anti-terrorist effort. According to intelligence officers who have served in Ulster, MI5 is in theory concerned with trying to recruit and observe people involved only with the IRA campaign outside Ulster. In practice, it has muscled in and tried to run any good agent it can find.
The Service’s relationship with the RUC SB is apparently different to that between MI5 and the SB contingents of other police forces in the United Kingdom. In some parts of the country SB are still regarded by MI5 as little more than errand boys, carrying out arrests and serving warrants on MI5’s behalf. The Security Service used to be technically unable to carry out such routine activities since it was barely supposed to exist in any legal or constitutional sense. In 1989, however, the government passed legislation – the Security Service Act – which regularized its position. But in Northern Ireland MI5 remains too dependent on the SB, in terms of exploiting its extensive informer network, to treat it with the same disdain.