by M K Gandhi
In the meantime the Hunter Committee was announced to hold an inquiry in connection with the Punjab Government’s doings under the martial law. Mr. C.F. Andrews516 had now reached the Punjab. His letters gave a heart-rending description of the state of things there, and I formed the impressionM3 that the martial law atrocities were in fact even worse than the Press reports had showed. He pressed me urgently to come and join him. At the same time Malaviyaji sent telegrams asking me to proceed to the Punjab at once. I once more telegraphed to the Viceroy asking whether I could now go to the Punjab. He wired back in reply that I could go there after a certain date. I cannot exactly recollect now, but I think it was 17th of October.517
The scene that I witnessed on my arrival at Lahore can never be effaced from my memory. The railway station was from end to end one seething mass of humanity. The entire populace had turned out of doors in eager expectation, as if to meet a dear relation after a long separation, and was delirious with joy. I was put up at the late Pandit Rambhaj Dutt’s bungalow, and the burden of entertaining me fell on the shoulders of Shrimati Sarala Devi.518 A burden it truly was, for even then, as now, the place where I was accommodated became a veritable caravanserai.
Owing to the principal Punjab leaders being in jail, their place, I found, had been properly519 taken up by Pandit Malaviyaji, Pandit Motilalji520 and the late Swami Shraddhanandji. Malaviyaji and Shraddhanandji I had known intimately before, but this was the first occasion on which I came in close personal contact with Motilalji. All these leaders, as also such local leaders as had escaped the privilege of going to jail, at once made me feel perfectly at home amongst them, so that I never felt like a stranger in their midst.
How521 we unanimously decided not to lead evidence before the Hunter Committee522 is now a matter of history.523 The reasons for that decision were published at that time, and need not be recapitulated here. Suffice it to say that, looking back upon these events from this distance of time,524 I still feel that our decision to boycott the Committee was absolutely correct and proper.525
As a logical consequence of the boycott of the Hunter Committee, it was decided to appoint a non-official Inquiry Committee, to hold almost a parallel inquiry on behalf of the Congress.M4 Pandit Motilal Nehru, the late Deshbandhu C.R. Das,526 Sjt. Abbas Tyabji,527 Sjt. M.R. Jayakar528 and myself were appointed to this Committee, virtually529 by Pandit Malaviyaji. We distributed ourselves over various places for purposes of inquiry. The responsibility for organizing the work of the Committee devolved on me, and as the privilege of conducting the inquiry in the largest number of places fell to my lot, I got a rare opportunity of observing at close quarters the people of the Punjab and the Punjab villages.530
In the course of my inquiry I made acquaintance with the women of the Punjab also. It was as if we had known one another for ages. Wherever I went they came flocking, and laid before me their531 heaps of yarn.532 My work in connection with the inquiry brought home to me the fact that the Punjab could become a great field for khadi work.
As I proceeded further and further with my inquiry into the atrocities that had been committed on the people, I came across tales of Government’s tyranny533 and the arbitrary despotism of its officers such as I was hardly prepared for, and they filled me with deep pain. What surprised me then, and what still continues to fill me with surprise, was the fact that a province that had furnished the largest number of soldiers to the British Government during the War,534 should have taken all these brutal excesses lying down.
The task of drafting the report of this Committee was also entrusted to me. I would recommend a perusal of this report to anyone who wants to have an idea of the kind of atrocities that were perpetrated on the Punjab people.535 All that I wish to say here about it is that there is not a single conscious exaggeration in it anywhere, and every statement made in it is substantiated by evidence. Moreover, the evidence published was only a fraction of what was in the Committee’s possession. Not a single statement, regarding the validity of which there was the slightest room for doubt, was permitted to appear in the report. This report, prepared as it was solely with a view to bringing out the truth and nothing but the truth, will enable the reader to see to what lengths the British Government is capable of going, and what inhumanities and barbarities it is capable of perpetrating in order to maintain its power. So far as I am aware, not a single statement made in this report has ever been disproved.
XXXVI
THE KHILAFAT AGAINST COW-PROTECTION?
We must now leave for the time being these dark happenings inM1 the Punjab.
The Congress inquiry into Dyerism in the Punjab had just commenced, when I received a letter of invitation to be present at a joint conference of Hindus and Mussalmans that was to meet at Delhi to deliberate on the Khilafat question. Among the signatories to it were the late Hakim Ajmal Khan Saheb and Mr. Asaf Ali.536 The late Swami Shraddhanandji, it was stated, would be attending and, if I remember aright, he was to be the vice-president of the conference, which, so far as I can recollect, was to be held in the November of that year. The conference was to deliberate on the situation arising out of the Khilafat betrayal, and on the question as to whether the Hindus and Mussalmans should take any part in the peace celebrations.M2 The letter of invitation went on to say, among other things, that not only the Khilafat question but the question of cow-protection as well would be discussed at the conference, and it would, therefore, afford a goldenM3 opportunity for a settlement of the cow question. I did not like this reference to the cow question. In my letter in reply to the invitation, therefore, whilst promising to do my best to attend, I suggested that the two questions should not be mixed up together or considered in the spirit of a bargain, but should be decided on their own merits and treated separately.
With these thoughts filling my mind,537 I went to the conference.538 It was a very well attended gathering, though it did not present the spectacle of later gatherings that were attended by tens of thousands. I discussed the question referred to above with the late Swami Shraddhanandji, who was present at the conference. He appreciated my argument and left it to me to place it before the conference. I likewise discussed it with the late Hakim Saheb.539 Before the conference I contended that,540 if the Khilafat question had a just and legitimate basis, as I believe it had,541 and if the Government had really committed a gross injustice, the Hindus were bound to stand by the Mussalmans in their demand for the redress of the Khilafat wrong. It would ill become them to bring in the cow question in this connection, or to use the occasion to make terms with the Mussalmans, just as it would ill become the Mussalmans to offer to stop cow slaughter as a price for the Hindus’ support on the Khilafat question. But it would be another matter and quite graceful, and reflect great credit on them, if the Mussalmans of their own free will stopped cow-slaughter out of regard for the religious sentiments of the Hindus, and from a sense of duty towards them as neighbours and children of the same soil. To take up such an independent attitude was, I contended, their duty, and would enhance the dignity of their conduct. But if the Mussalmans considered it as their neighbourly duty to stop cow slaughter, they should do so regardless of whether the Hindus helped them in the Khilafat or not. ‘That being so,’ I argued, ‘the two questions should be discussed independently of each other, and the deliberations of the conference should be confined to the question of the Khilafat only.’ My argument appealed to those present and, as a result, the question of cow-protection was not discussed at this conference.542
But in spite of my warning Maulana Abdul Bari Saheb said: ‘No matter whether the Hindus help us or not, the Mussalmans ought, as the countrymen of the Hindus, out of regard for the latter’s susceptibilities, to give up cow slaughter.’543 And at one time it almost looked as if they would really put an end to it.
There was a suggestion from some quarters that the Punjab question should be tacked on to that of the Khilafat wrong. I opposed the proposal. The Punjab question, I said, was a local affair and cou
ld not therefore weigh with us in our decision to participate or not in the peace celebrations.544 If we mixed up the local question with the Khilafat question, which arose directly out of the peace terms,545 we should be guilty of a serious indiscretion. My argument easily carried conviction.546
Maulana Hasrat Mohani547 was present in this meeting. I had known him even before, but it was only here that I discovered what a fighter he was. We differed from each other almost from the very beginning,M4 and in several matters the differences have persisted.
Among the numerous resolutions that were passed at this conference, one called upon both Hindus and Mussalmans to take the Swadeshi vow, and as a natural corollary to it, to boycott foreign goods.M5 Khadi had not as yet found its proper place.M6 This was not a resolution that Hasrat Saheb would accept. His object was to wreak vengeance on the British Empire, in case justice was denied in the matter of the Khilafat. Accordingly, he brought in a counter proposal for the boycott purely of British goods so far as practicable. I opposed it on the score of principle, as also of practicability, adducing for it those arguments that have now become pretty familiar. I also put before the conference my view-point of non-violence. I noticed that my arguments made a deep impression on the audience. Before me, Hasrat Mohani’s speech had been received with such loud acclamations that I was afraid that mine would only be a cry in the wilderness.548 I had made bold to speak only because I felt that it would be a dereliction of duty not to lay my views before the conference. But, to my agreeable surprise,549 my speech was followed with the closest attention by those present, and evoked a full measure of support among those on the platform,550 and speaker after speaker rose to deliver speeches in support of my views. The leaders were able to see that not only would the boycott of British goods fail of its purpose, but would, if adopted, make of them a laughing stock. There was hardly a man present in that assembly but had some article of British manufacture on his person. Many of the audience therefore realized that nothing but harm could result from adopting a resolution that even those who voted for it were unable to carry out.
‘Mere boycott of foreign cloth cannot satisfy us, for who knows how long it will be, before we shall be able to manufacture Swadeshi cloth in sufficient quantity for our needs, and before we can bring about an effective boycott of foreign cloth? We want something that will produce an immediate effect on the British. Let your boycott of foreign cloth stand, we do not mind it, but give us something quicker, and speedier in addition’—so spoke in effect Maulana Hasrat Mohani.551 Even as I was listening to him, I felt that something new, over and above boycott of foreign cloth, would be necessary. An immediate boycott of foreign cloth seemed to me also to be a clear impossibility, at that time. I did not then know that we could, if we liked, produce enough khadi for all our clothing requirements; this was only a later discovery. On the other hand, I knew even then that, if we depended on the mills alone for effecting the boycott of foreign cloth, we should be betrayed. I was still in the middle of this dilemma when the Maulana concluded his speech.
I was handicapped for want of suitable Hindi or Urdu words. This was my first occasion for delivering an argumentative speech before an audience especially composed of Mussalmans of the North.552 I had spoken in Urdu553 at the Muslim League at Calcutta, but it was only for a few minutes, and the speech was intended only to be a feeling appeal to the audience. Here, on the contrary, I was faced with a critical, if not hostile, audience, to whom I had to explain and bring home my view-point.M7 But I had cast aside all shyness. I was not there to deliver an address in the faultless, polished Urdu of the Delhi Muslims, but to place before the gathering my views in such broken Hindi as I could command. And in this I was successful. This meeting afforded me a direct proof of the fact that Hindi–Urdu alone could become the lingua francaM8 of India. Had I spoken in English, I could not have produced the impression that I did on the audience, and the Maulana might not have felt called upon to deliver his challenge. Nor, if he had delivered it, could I have taken it up effectively.
I could not hit upon a suitable Hindi or Urdu word for the new idea, and that put me out somewhat.554 At last I described it by the word ‘non-co-operation’, an expression that I used for the first time at this meeting.M9 As the Maulana was delivering his speech, it seemed to me that it was vain for him to talk about effective resistance to a Government with which he was co-operating in more than one thing. If resort to arms was impossible or undesirable, the only true resistance to the Government, it therefore seemed to me, was to cease to co-operate with it. Thus I arrived at the word non-co-operation.M10 I had not then a clear idea of all its manifold implications. I therefore did not enter into details.555 I simply said:
‘The Mussalmans have adopted a very556 important resolution. If the peace terms are unfavourable to them—which may God forbid—they will stop all co-operation with Government. It is an inalienable right of the people thus to withhold co-operation.557 We are not bound to retain Government titles and honours, or to continue in Government service. If Government should betray us in a great cause558 like the Khilafat, we could not do otherwise than non-co-operate. We are therefore entitled to non-co-operate with Government in case of a betrayal.’559
But months elapsed before the word non-co-operation became current coin. For the time being it was lost in the proceedings of the conference. Indeed560 when I supported the co-operation resolution at the Congress which met at Amritsar a month later, I did so in the hope that the betrayal would never come.561
XXXVII
THE AMRITSAR CONGRESS562
The Punjab Government could not keep in confinement the hundreds of Punjabis who, under the martial law regime, had been clapped into jail563 on the strength of the most meagre evidence by tribunals that were courts only in name. There was such an outcry all round against this flagrant piece of injustice that their further incarceration became impossible. Most of the prisoners were released before the Congress opened. Lala Harkishanlal564 and the other leaders were all released, while the session of the Congress was still in progress.565 The Ali Brothers too arrived there straight from jail. The people’s joy knew no bounds. Pandit Motilal Nehru, who, at the sacrifice ofM1 his splendid practice, had made the Punjab his headquarters and had done great service,566 was the President of the Congress; the late Swami Shraddhanandji was the Chairman of the Reception Committee.
Up to this time my share in the annual proceedings of the Congress was confined only to the constructive advocacy of Hindi by making my567 speech in the national language,M2 and to presenting in that speech the case of the Indians overseas. Nor did I expect to be called upon to do anything more this year. But, as had happened on many a previous occasion, responsible work came to me all of a sudden.
The King’sM3 announcement on the new reforms568 had just been issued. It was not wholly satisfactory even to me, and was unsatisfactory toM4 everyone else. But I felt at that time that the reforms, though defective, could still be accepted. I felt in the King’s announcementM5 and its language the hand of Lord Sinha,569 and it lent a ray of hope. But experienced stalwarts like the late Lokamanya and Deshbandhu Chittaranjan Das shook their heads. Pandit Malaviyaji was neutral.
Pandit Malaviyaji had harboured me in his own room. I had a glimpse of the simplicity of his life on the occasion of the foundation ceremony of the Hindu University,570 but on this occasion, being in the same room with him, I was able to observe his daily routine in the closest detail, and what I saw filled me with joyful surprise. His room presented the appearance of a free inn for all the poor. You could hardly cross from one end to the other. It was so crowded.M6 It was accessible at all odd hours to chance visitors who had the licence to take as much of his time as they liked. In a corner of this crib lay my charpoy in all its dignity.
But I may not occupy this chapter with a description of Malaviyaji’s mode of living, and must return to my subject.
I was thus enabled to hold daily discussions with Malaviyaji, who used lovingly t
o explain to me, like an elder brother, the various viewpoints of the different parties. I saw that my participation in the deliberations on the resolution on the reforms was inevitable. HavingM7 had my share of responsibility in the drawing-up of the Congress report on the Punjab wrongs, I felt that all that still remained to be done in that connection must claim my attention.571 There had to be dealings with Government in that matter. Then similarly there was the Khilafat question. I further believed at that time that Mr. Montagu would not betray or allow India’s cause to be betrayed.M8 The release of the Ali Brothers and other prisoners too seemed to me to be an auspicious sign. In the circumstances I felt that a resolution not rejecting but572 accepting the reforms was the correct thing. Deshbandhu573 Chittaranjan Das, on the other hand, held firmly to the view that the reforms ought to be rejected as wholly inadequate and unsatisfactory. The late574 Lokamanya was more or less neutral, but had decided to throw in his weight on the side of any resolution that the Deshbandhu might approve.
The idea of having to differ from such seasoned, well-tried and universally revered leaders was unbearable to me. But on the other hand the voice of conscience575 was clear. I tried to run away from the Congress and suggested to Pandit Malaviyaji and Motilalji that it would be in the general interest if I absented myselfM9 from the Congress for the rest of the session.576 It would save me from having to make an exhibition of my difference with such esteemed leaders.
But my suggestion found no favour with these two seniors. The news of my proposal was somehow whispered to Lala Harkishanlal. ‘This will never do. It will very much hurt the feelings of the Punjabis,’ he said. I discussed the matter with Lokamanya, Deshbandhu and Mr. Jinnah, but no way out could be found. Finally I laid bare my distress to Malaviyaji. ‘I see no prospect of a compromise,’ I told him, ‘and if I am to move my resolution, a division will have to be called and votes taken. But I do not find here any arrangements for it. The practice in the open session of the Congress so far has been to take votes by a show of hands with the result that all distinction between visitors and delegates is lost, while, as for taking a count of votes in such vast assemblies, we have no means at all. So it comes to this that, even if I want to call a division, there will be no facility for it, nor meaning in it.’ But Lala Harkishanlal came to the rescue and undertook to make the necessary arrangements. ‘We will not,’ he said, ‘permit visitors in the Congress pandal577 on the day on which voting is to take place. And as for taking the count, well, I shall see to that. But you must not absent yourself from the Congress.’ I capitulated; I framed my resolution, and in heart tremblingM10 undertook to move it. Pandit Malaviyaji and Mr. Jinnah were to support it. I could notice that, although our difference of opinion was free from any trace of bitterness, and although our speeches too contained nothing but cold reasoning, the peopleM11 could not stand the very fact of a difference;578 it pained them. They wanted unanimity.