As ever, for those who were there and especially those who did not come back
First published 2019
Amberley Publishing
The Hill, Stroud
Gloucestershire, GL5 4EP
www.amberley-books.com
Copyright © William F. Buckingham, 2019
The right of William F. Buckingham to be identified as the Author of this work has been asserted in accordance with the Copyrights, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without the permission in writing from the Publishers.
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data.
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.
ISBN 9781848681095 (PRINT)
ISBN 9781445637167 (eBOOK)
Origination by Amberley Publishing.
Printed in the UK.
Contents
Foreword
Introduction
1 - The Means and a Template for Imitation: Early Developments and German Airborne Operations in Scandinavia and the Low Countries to 1940
2 - Framing the Battlefield and Marshalling the Players: II SS Panzerkorps, 30 Corps and the 1st Allied Airborne Army 16 August – 8 September 1944
3 - COMET to MARKET: The Evolution of Operation MARKET 10 September – 11 September 1944
4 - Up to the Brink: II SS Panzerkorps, 30 Corps and the 1st Allied Airborne Army 11 September – 16 September 1944
5 - D-Day 00:01 to 14:30 Sunday 17 September 1944
6 - D-Day 14:00 to 19:00 Sunday 17 September 1944
7 - D-Day to D Plus 1 19:00 Sunday 17 September to 07:00 Monday 18 September 1944
8 - D Plus 1 07:00 to 14:00 Monday 18 September 1944
9 - D Plus 1 14:00 to 16:00 Monday 18 September 1944
10 - D Plus 1 16:00 to 23:59 Monday 18 September 1944
11 - D Plus 2 00:01 to 12:00 Tuesday 19 September 1944
12 - D Plus 2 12:00 to 23:59 Tuesday 19 September 1944
13 - D Plus 3 00:01 to 12:00 Wednesday 20 September 1944
14 - D Plus 3 12:00 to 23:59 Wednesday 20 September 1944
15 - D Plus 4 00:01 to 16:00 Thursday 21 September 1944
16 - D Plus 4 16:00 to 23:59 Thursday 21 September 1944
17 - D Plus 5 00:01 to 23:59 Friday 22 September 1944
18 - D Plus 6 00:01 to 23:59 Saturday 23 September 1944
19 - D Plus 7 00:01 to 23:59 Sunday 24 September 1944
20 - D Plus 8 00:01 to 18:00 Monday 25 September 1944
21 - Evacuation D Plus 8 to D Plus 9 18:00 Monday 25 September 1944 to 06:00 Tuesday 26 September 1944
22 - Aftermath and Reflections
Plates
Notes
Bibliography
Foreword
On Sunday 17 September 1944, two thousand and twenty-three transport aircraft and four hundred and seventy-eight gliders lifted off from airfields across southern and eastern England carrying troops from the US 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions and the British 1st Airborne Division. They were the first lift of the largest Airborne operation in history, Operation MARKET, which was intended to open a sixty-mile corridor across five major water obstacles for Allied ground forces, codenamed GARDEN, running from the Belgian border to the Dutch city of Arnhem on the Lower Rhine. The equivalent of a Battalion managed to secure the north end of the road bridge in Arnhem, where they were cut off and overrun after fighting for three days and four nights against overwhelming odds; the remainder of the 1st Airborne Division was all but destroyed in futile attempts to reach them and then holding on for nine days at Oosterbeek. The GARDEN ground force took six days rather than the scheduled forty-eight hours to reach the south bank of the Lower Rhine west of Arnhem and after a token attempt at reinforcement assisted in evacuating approximately 2,500 of the 1st Airborne Division’s survivors across the river on the night of 25-26 September 1944. They left behind well over a thousand Airborne dead and over six thousand wounded and Prisoners of War in addition to the similar numbers of dead and wounded sustained by the 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions in forcing the Airborne Corridor and keeping it open.
The deserved elevation of the Battle of Arnhem to legendary status began virtually as soon as 1st Airborne Division’s survivors had been evacuated across the Lower Rhine. Within two years the feature film Theirs is the Glory had been shot in the ruins of Oosterbeek starring men who had participated in the battle, and in the seventy-two years since then another Hollywood feature film, dozens of books and several television documentaries dealing with the battle have appeared; viewing A Bridge Too Far during a family holiday on the Isle of Wight in the year it was released was the present author’s introduction to the Battle of Arnhem. As one would expect with this degree of coverage, the course of events that led up to MARKET GARDEN and during the fighting at Arnhem and Oosterbeek have been largely established, and most of the factors that contributed to the failure of MARKET GARDEN have been at least identified, along with a few canards and red herrings; the latter include the enduring myth that the 1st Airborne Division descended upon two fully equipped and functioning SS Panzer Divisions, for example. The present author was still working on his PhD on the establishment and initial development of British Airborne Forces when invited to write his first book on Arnhem in 2000, but research soon revealed clear similarities between the two, insofar as popular perceptions were somewhat at variance with the verifiable reality. Thus while the spectacular bare bones of what happened in Holland in September 1944 had been fairly clearly established, a great deal more was missing or had gone unremarked. As with any undertaking on the scale of MARKET GARDEN there were a myriad of factors that contributed to failure but while most have been acknowledged, in some instances they have been slanted subtly for camouflage and in others simply hidden in plain sight. It is popularly assumed the 1st Airborne Division failed to reach its objectives because of enemy action for example, whereas the root of the problem was actually poor leadership and planning at the Division and Brigade level; similarly the tardiness of 30 Corps’ advance, and specifically that of the Guards Armoured Division, is routinely excused on the grounds of enemy resistance and poor terrain, but were actually proven to be due to lack of application, rigid and inappropriate operating procedures and contradictory operational instructions from Corps level. All this was apparent from a relatively superficial analysis of official accounts and secondary sources, but subsequent in-depth research in primary source material and especially the operational records across the last nine years not only conclusively proved this was the case, but also revealed that the litany of poor planning, leadership and decision making was actually much worse than suspected.
This work therefore builds upon the foundation of the present author’s 2001 work on the Battle of Arnhem by providing a more in-depth account of not just the nine days of the battle but of the events and strategic developments that led to Operation MARKET GARDEN, and the planning and other decisions that resulted in it being executed in the way it was. In addition, the extensive use of primary source material, specifically unit War Diaries, permits the construction of a much more detailed narrative from Platoon to Corps level than has been provided hitherto, leavened with participant accounts for additional detail. This in turn permits focussed analysis that explains why events unfolded as they did, and in the process reveals who and what was responsible for key decisions and the ramifications thereof and not just to allow the superficial assigning of responsibility; this also reveals a host of extraordinary men at all leve
ls doing extraordinary things as if they were merely routine, many of them at the cost of their lives. In addition, the narrative is augmented with material from the German side for clarity and balance along with detailed examination of the activities of the two US Airborne Divisions up to the point where they put the GARDEN force across the River Waal at Nijmegen. Although the US contribution was absolutely vital in both the front-line fighting and the transport spheres, it does not always receive the acclaim it merits from the British perspective; while the 1st Airborne Division was tasked to secure two permanent crossings over a single watercourse, its US equivalents were tasked to secure twelve crossings over seven watercourses and succeeded in securing and holding the majority of them, for example. In short, the aim is to show what happened, when it happened and why it happened as it did.
In closing I should like to thank Mr Henk Capelle from Oosterbeek for providing me with a copy of his wartime memoir, other local material and correcting some of my misunderstandings; Richard Anderson of the TankNet Internet Military Forum for providing the US Army Advanced Officer Course monographs; George F. Cholewczynski for kindly providing me with a copy of his work and permission to quote therefrom; Stephen King for the always stimulating discussion on the Arnhem landing zones and providing me with numerous items of material; Mr William J. Stone, formerly of the 321st Glider Field Artillery Battalion 101st Airborne Division, for providing me with a copy of his unpublished memoir; William McVean for keeping me informed of matters connected to the 23rd Field Company RCE and Russell Kennedy for kindly providing me with a copy of his work on that unit; Jonathan Reeve and his successors at Amberley for their forbearance with my somewhat elastic approach to deadlines; and last but not least my wife Aileen once again for her patience, forbearance in putting up with it all and her toleration of research diversions whilst supposedly on holiday. Finally, all opinions, conclusions, errors, misconceptions and mistakes are entirely my own.
William F. Buckingham
Hamilton, South Lanarkshire
Introduction
The patrol left friendly lines near the Dutch village of Zetten before midnight on the night of Sunday 22 October 1944. Shiny surfaces had been dulled, anything that might rattle or make noise had been taped down or discarded, and the men were carrying only weapons and ammunition. The patrol was drawn from Company E, 2nd Battalion 506th Parachute Infantry Regiment and was led by the Company commander, 1st Lieutenant Frederick Heyliger. Other members included 2nd Lieutenants Harry Welsh and Edward Shames, Corporals Walter Gordon and Francis Mellett, and Private Ralph Stafford.1 The file of men moved stealthily through the murky, drizzle-filled darkness following a strip of white engineer tape leading to the south bank of the Lower Rhine, where a number of British wood and canvas assault boats had been cached among a stand of trees the previous night. There they settled down to wait for the signal to cross to the German-held side of the river. Company E had parachuted onto Drop Zone C north-west of Son with the rest of the 2nd Battalion in the afternoon of Sunday 17 September 1944. The drop was part of Operation MARKET GARDEN, which was intended to sidestep the fixed defences along the German border and open the way into northern Germany. MARKET involved securing a series of water crossings along a line of advance that projected sixty miles into enemy-held territory. The 101st Airborne Division was to secure the city of Eindhoven and bridges over the Wilhelmina and Zuid Willems Canal and rivers Aa and Dommel to the north of the city; the 82nd Airborne Division was tasked to seize crossings over the rivers Maas and Waal and canal linking the two in and near Nijmegen; and most northerly of all the British 1st Airborne Division was to secure a series of bridges across the Lower Rhine in the vicinity of Arnhem. GARDEN referred to the ground aspect of the plan, which was for the British 30 Corps to advance north from an existing bridgehead over the Meuse-Escaut Canal at Neerpelt and relieve each airborne formation in turn within forty-eight hours.
In the event, matters did not unfold as planned. The ground advance was delayed by a destroyed bridge at Son, and dogged German resistance at Nijmegen held the ground advance up until an assault river crossing could be arranged. Things went most awry at Arnhem. Only a relatively small party succeeded in securing the northern end of one bridge, where they held on for over three days until overwhelmed. After battling unsuccessfully to reach the bridge, the remainder of the 1st Airborne Division formed a defensive perimeter in the nearby town of Oosterbeek, which it defended doggedly until the survivors were finally evacuated to the Allied-held south bank of the Lower Rhine on the night of 25-26 September. Easy Company spent that period battling numerous German attempts to cut the airborne corridor near Eindhoven, before moving up to take over its positions on the south bank of the Lower Rhine from the British 43rd Division on 2 October 1944.
Lieutenant Heyliger’s patrol was prompted by the arrival of Lieutenant-Colonel David Dobie on the Allied-held bank of the Lower Rhine a week or so previously.2 Dobie had commanded the British 1st Parachute Battalion during MARKET and was wounded and captured when his Battalion fought itself to destruction in the western suburbs of Arnhem in an abortive attempt to reach the British force holding the north end of the Arnhem road bridge on Tuesday 19 September.3 After escaping from the Dutch hospital where he was to undergo treatment for grenade shrapnel wounds in his head, eye and arm later in the day, he made contact with the Dutch Resistance which eventually ended up sheltering several hundred British and other personnel, including several senior Airborne officers; Dobie was therefore despatched across the river to organise arrangements for their evacuation to friendly territory. The chosen concentration site for the evaders was the village of Renkum, adjacent to the drop and landing zones employed by the British 1st Airborne Division on 17 September. As the village was opposite the section of the Lower Rhine covered by the 506th Parachute Infantry Regiment, its commander, Lieutenant-Colonel Robert F. Sink, was asked to assist with what became codenamed Operation PEGASUS, to be carried out on the night of 23-24 October 1944; he duly delegated the task to Lieutenant Heyliger and Company E.
The American paratroopers obtained canvas assault boats from British 30 Corps, which were stealthily cached in readiness near the crossing point. An artillery box barrage was registered to seal off the relevant sector of the German-held bank, machine-guns and mortars were sighted on likely German positions on the north bank and a US anti-aircraft unit was tasked to provide a visual navigation marker for the rescue party by firing red tracer from its Bofors guns along a fixed line; in an effort to allay German suspicion the Bofors fired on the same line for several nights preceding Operation PEGASUS.4 Lieutenant-Colonel Dobie co-ordinated arrangements with the Dutch Resistance via the local civilian telephone system which was still functioning and, surprisingly, free from German monitoring. The operation was brought forward twenty-four hours when the Resistance used the increased road traffic generated by the forced evacuation of Bennekom, a village near Renkum, as cover to concentrate the evaders. By the afternoon of Sunday 22 October between 138 and 150 men were gathered in woods north-west of Bennekom, where they changed back into uniform and were issued weapons. At least 120 were personnel from the 1st Airborne Division, including Brigadier Gerald Lathbury, Major Digby Tatham-Warter and Major Anthony Deane-Drummond, commanders of the 1st Parachute Brigade, A Company 2nd Parachute Battalion and second in command of 1st Airborne Divisional Signals respectively. The remainder included ten Dutch volunteers for Allied service, several aircrew including four USAAF personnel, two escaped Soviet prisoners of war and a solitary soldier from the US 82nd Airborne Division.5
The evaders moved off from their hiding place for the bank of the Lower Rhine at approximately 23:00 on 22 October. Despite the circumstances, their passage was by no means silent; Major Tatham-Warter likened it to a herd of elephants thundering through the woods.6 Despite this they managed to reach the riverbank undetected and flashed a red V for Victory signal. It is unclear if this was the signal for the Bofors to begin firing the red tracer, or whether the l
atter was already firing on a pre-arranged schedule. Whichever, one or the other was the signal for Heyliger’s party to carry the assault boats the last few yards to the river and begin paddling across to the north bank. On arrival 2nd Lieutenant Welsh secured the boats for the return journey, Corporals Gordon and Mellett set up .30 Browning machine-guns up to cover either flank and Private Stafford took point on the advance to the rendezvous point, backed by Heyliger. Contact was made despite a startling encounter with a roosting bird and Heyliger was soon shaking hands with and receiving thanks from Brigadier Lathbury. The trip back to the boats was made similarly unscathed, although not apparently without more needless noise; according to one account the Easy Company men and Lieutenant Welsh in particular became increasingly exasperated by loudly expressed good wishes from their Allies as the latter climbed aboard the boats.7
The precise time the patrol began is unclear, with different sources citing midnight or 01:00 but both rescuers and rescued appear to have been safely back at Zetten drinking coffee by 02:00, before the latter were evacuated back to Nijmegen.8 There were no casualties and the only German reaction was a sprinkling of artillery fire on US positions, some of which fell close to Lieutenant-Colonel Sink’s command post.9 A second large-scale operation on the night of 18-19 November 1944, codenamed Operation PEGASUS II, did not fare so well. One party making for the rendezvous ran into a German patrol, and Major John Coke from the 7th Battalion King’s Own Scots Borderers was killed in the ensuing firefight along with an unnamed Airborne soldier and a Dutch guide; the Germans were apparently on alert due to unsanctioned press publicity for the first Operation PEGASUS. Be that as it may, all the parties were obliged to scatter and only seven men made it across the river to safety. Thereafter such evacuations were carried out on a small group or individual basis, with preference given to doctors, glider pilots, soldiers and airmen in that order.10 Operation PEGASUS thus arguably marked the end of Operation MARKET GARDEN, which had in turn been the largest and most sophisticated Airborne operation ever attempted. Before moving on to analyse the planning and execution of MARKET GARDEN, it may therefore be illuminating to examine the development of airborne warfare, beginning with the evolution of the technical means.
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