Hollinghurst’s veto was not accepted without complaint. When the latter turned down Urquhart’s plea for the reinstatement of the glider coup-de-main, Chatterton, possibly influenced by Taylor’s refusal to accept the 101st Airborne Division’s landing areas as allotted, took the matter further up the chain of command to Browning; who finally brought the matter to a close by repeating the RAF objections, announcing that the matter was out of the Army’s hands and pointing out that in any case it was now too late because everything had been decided.76 The irony here is that while the RAF planners can be considered culpable for refusing to tailor the air plan to meet the Army’s tactical requirements, they had no control over the decision to deliver the 1st Airborne Division in three lifts and, more importantly, neither did they have any real choice with regard to the landing areas. It was arguably feasible to secure the Arnhem bridges via glider coup-de-main and to deliver parachute units to the area just south of Arnhem, but there was no option but to use the glider landing zones selected in the vicinity of Renkum and Wolfheze because they were the only certifiably suitable terrain within striking distance of the 1st Airborne Division’s objectives, as an examination of contemporary maps clearly shows. Browning’s decision therefore cast the die as far as the 1st Airborne Division’s air plan went, and Urquhart withdrew with his staff to his HQ at Cottesmore to prepare his detailed plans, which were to be presented to another conference on Thursday 14 September.
Although it suited his intention to see MARKET go ahead at all costs, Browning was therefore largely blameless in this particular instance. While he does not appear to have challenged Hollinghurst and his planners directly he did, to his credit, seek an independent second opinion on the matter from Major-General Richard Gale, arguably the only man in the British Army with sufficient operational experience to proffer a valid judgement. Gale, it will be recalled, had been instrumental in converting the original British airborne cadre from a small group of raiders into a conventional parachute brigade, and had planned and led the British 6th Airborne Division’s vital spearhead landing for the Normandy invasion. However, if Browning was seeking reassurance he was sorely disappointed, for Gale endorsed Urquhart’s objections and his insistence that the best option for securing the Arnhem road bridge was a glider landing on the objective followed by a brigade-strength landing in the immediate vicinity. Perhaps unsurprisingly, Browning requested Gale not to mention the matter or his appreciation to Urquhart, ostensibly to avoid damaging the latter’s confidence. Gale appears to have held his peace until the 1970s, when he told Major G. G. Norton, then curator of the Airborne Forces Museum, in confidence that he would have resigned his command rather than execute MARKET as it was foisted upon Urquhart.77 It is unclear if Gale made his views clear to Browning at the time, and it is also interesting to speculate how matters might have developed had they become more widely known at the time.
Browning’s motive in concealing Gale’s appreciation of the Arnhem portion of MARKET may indeed have been to avoid undermining Urquhart’s confidence, but the fact remains that it also accorded equally well with promoting the go-ahead for MARKET at all costs. While this may sound circumstantial or indeed far-fetched, another incident at this time provides much clearer and unambiguous evidence of Browning’s duplicity. On 10 September the Senior Intelligence Officer at British 1st Airborne Corps HQ, Major Brian Urquhart, received an Intelligence Summary from 21st Army Group.78 The summary referred to the presence of 9 and 10 SS Panzer Divisions in the area of Arnhem. Understandably alarmed owing to the 1st Airborne Division’s imminent departure for that locale, Major Urquhart brought the report to the attention of the Corps Operations Officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Charles Mackenzie, Deputy Corps Commander Brigadier Gordon Walch and finally, to Browning himself over the following few days. When all three made light of his concerns Urquhart ordered an aerial reconnaissance to take oblique photographs of wooded areas in the vicinity of Arnhem on his own authority. The results of the reconnaissance flight arrived on Friday 15 September, just forty-eight hours before MARKET was scheduled to commence, and the photographs appeared to confirm the 21st Army Group Summary; according to Urquhart’s subsequent account the photographs showed Panzer III and IV tanks close to Arnhem. Major Urquhart understandably wasted no time presenting this latest evidence to Browning. The latter responded by ordering 1st Airborne Corps’ Senior Medical Officer, Colonel Austin Eagger, to diagnose Major Urquhart as suffering from nervous strain and exhaustion and to send him on sick leave with immediate effect. Eagger complied, albeit with personal reservations, and Urquhart was presented with the choice of accepting the medical diagnosis or facing a court martial.79 He left Moor Park and the preparations for Operation MARKET shortly thereafter, and the intelligence on 9 and 10 SS Panzer Divisions and German armour being located near Arnhem went with him, for there was no mention of it in subsequent intelligence summaries passed down to the 1st Airborne Division.80 In fact, the intelligence was suppressed so effectively that the Official History of British Airborne Forces published in 1951 specifically stated that ‘there was no previous knowledge of the presence of II SS Panzer Corps, consisting of 9 and 10 SS Panzer Division, which were refitting in the neighbourhood.’81 The Official Campaign History which appeared in 1968 followed largely the same line, referring to II SS Panzerkorps and to its constituent divisions arriving in the area of Arnhem earlier in September with the inference that the information came from prisoners taken by 1st Airborne Division in the early stages of MARKET.82
Much is made of Major Urquhart’s intelligence, which appears to be largely responsible for the enduring but erroneous myth that the 1st Airborne Division landed on top of two fully functioning SS Panzer Divisions. However, in the event his concern was, at least to an extent, misplaced. As we shall see, there were no German troops from II SS Panzerkorps or any other significant unit at all between the 1st Airborne Division’s landing area and Arnhem when MARKET commenced, and only one ad hoc unit was in a position to respond to the landings in a timely manner. The only unit equipped with a significant number of tanks was a bataillon from SS Panzer Regiment 10 billeted at Vorden, twenty miles north-east of Arnhem. It played no part in the fight against the British Airborne formation, being despatched south to block the Allied advance from Nijmegen on the night of 19-20 September. Incidentally, all the tank units employed against the 1st Airborne Division after the landings on 17 September were brought in from outside the Arnhem area, some from as far afield as Germany. The nearest unit to the landing area equipped with armoured vehicles was SS Panzer Aufklärungs Abteilung 9, located at Hoenderloo just over ten miles north of Arnhem and equipped with a total of ten eight-wheel armoured cars, thirty assorted armoured half-tracks and a number of trucks armoured with sand-filled oil drums. Elements of this unit harassed the 1st Parachute Battalion in its vain attempt to secure high ground to the north of Arnhem in the late afternoon and night of 17-18 September, while a larger increment led by the Abteilung commander moved south over the Arnhem road bridge at dusk to block any Allied ground advance from the south; it was destroyed trying to re-cross the bridge during the morning of 18 September by the British Airborne force then holding the north end of the structure. Major Urquhart’s aerial reconnaissance might also have seen armoured vehicles belonging to II SS Panzerkorps that were despatched south to reinforce the front at Neerpelt on or around 13 September, although the transfer did not include any tanks, consisting as it did of armoured half-tracks, ten self-propelled artillery pieces and up to twice that number of Jagdpanzer IV tank destroyers.83
All that lay in the future, however, and the crucial point here is that Browning deliberately withheld potentially vital intelligence from the 1st Airborne Division, for he had no way of knowing that Major Urquhart’s concern was misplaced at that time. In addition, he may therefore also have been responsible for the mysterious disappearance of similar information on German strength and capabilities in the Arnhem area that had been included in the intelligence summaries
for COMET but which also did not appear in those for MARKET.84 This suppression is not a new revelation. Middlebrook, for example, suggests that Browning’s action was prompted by fear for the morale of the 1st Airborne Division, and the potential political repercussions of a British general jeopardising the success of the greatest and largely US airborne operation of the war. Powell, on the other hand, admits to finding Browning’s behaviour inexplicable, while insisting there was no evidence to question his integrity and that it was inconceivable that he would not put the interests of his soldiers first.85 Of the two, Middlebrook’s reference to political factors is nearer the mark, albeit for different reasons, if only because Powell’s characterisation is somewhat at odds with Browning’s proven Machiavellian tendencies; it is difficult to reconcile the requirements of operational efficiency or the best interests of the soldiers with the installation of an inexperienced Montgomery protégé as commander of the 1st Airborne Division, for example. In any event, none of the existing explanations mooted satisfactorily explain Browning’s actions on an individual basis, or in their entirety. The only factor that explains and links them is Browning’s personal ambition and consequent need for MARKET to go ahead at all costs, and suppressing Gale’s appreciation and Major Urquhart’s intelligence was not to be his final act in this regard.
4
Up to the Brink: II SS Panzerkorps, 30 Corps and the 1st Allied Airborne Army
11 September – 16 September 1944
While the 1st Allied Airborne Army’s senior commanders were arguing over resources and plans, their opposite numbers were settling into billets near Arnhem. The remnants of II SS Panzerkorps had regrouped at a rendezvous point at Hasselt after their odyssey across northern France and Belgium, with Brigadeführer Heinz Harmel’s 10 SS Panzer Division arriving first at some point between 1 and 3 September, having helped themselves to vehicles, weapons and equipment from abandoned German supply depots en route. The booty included up to twenty self-propelled artillery pieces ‘liberated’ from an unguarded train during an air raid alert.1 On 4 September Harmel was ordered to establish a defensive pocket on the west bank of the Maas-Albert Canal fifteen miles or so east of Hasselt, but the order was countermanded during the night of 5 September and he was directed to a new assembly area to refit and receive replacements near Arnhem, seventy miles to the north; the move took two days. The bulk of Obersturmbannführer Walther Harzer’s 9 SS Panzer Division arrived at Hasselt slightly later, on or around 5 September, having also commandeered supplies from depots en route. After linking up with Harzer’s command group, which had become separated during the withdrawal from Cambrai on the night of 2-3 September, the reunited formation also began to move to Arnhem on Thursday 7 September, using two routes running through Eindhoven and Venlo respectively. It arrived in the Arnhem area the following day.2
The assembly area was actually in the area north and east of Arnhem, with Obergruppenführer Wilhelm Bittrich’s II SS Panzerkorps HQ located at Doetinchen, around seventeen miles east of the city. Harzer established his Division HQ around sixteen miles north of Arnhem at Apeldoorn while Harmel set up his HQ at Ruurlo, to the north-east of and twenty-five miles from Arnhem. In part this dispersal was to avoid the attentions of Allied air power, but billeting units away from major urban areas was also intended to avoid exposing them to attack by Resistance fighters, which became a regular occurrence in France and Belgium after the Normandy invasion. 9 SS Panzer Division’s units were thus spread amongst the villages and small towns along the roads leading north from Arnhem to Apeldoorn, and north-east to Zutphen, while those of 10 SS Panzer Division were located to the north and east in or around Deventer, Ruurlo and Vorden. On arrival, the combined strength of II SS Panzerkorps may already have been as low as 6,000 to 7,000 men, with approximately half that total being service and supply personnel rather than combat troops.3 The latter were also badly under-armed and equipped. SS Panzer Regiment 9 consisted of a composite infantry battalion formed from dismounted tank crew, fitters and logistic personnel reinforced with a draft of Kriegsmarine personnel, for example, while SS Panzerjäger Abteilung 9 was able to muster just two Panzerjäger IV self-propelled guns and a handful of towed 75mm PaK 40 pieces.4 II SS Panzerkorps was thus able to muster half a division in manpower and much less in materiel, and its combat power was soon further reduced. Harmel had been warned that his Division might be required to detach elements to shore up the front on 6 September, and on 10 September 10 SS Panzer Division was duly ordered to form an all-arms group to support 1 Fallschirmjäger Armee in its fight against the British on the Meuse-Escaut Canal at Neerpelt. Dubbed Kampfgruppe Heinke after its commander Sturmbannführer Heinke, the force was built around two Panzergrenadier bataillonen, one drawn from SS Panzergrenadier Regiment 21 commanded by Hauptsturmführer Walther Krause and the other from Hauptsturmführer Dr Karl Segler’s SS Panzergrenadier Regiment 19 from the Hohenstauffen. These units were supported by Hauptsturmführer Franz Roestel’s SS Panzerjäger Abteilung 10 equipped with between fifteen and twenty-one Jagdpanzer IVs and up to a dozen PaK 40 towed pieces; the latter had been despatched to the front while the Division was at Hasselt. Additional support was provided by elements of SS Panzer Aufklärungs Abteilung 10, SS Panzer Pionier Abteilung 10, and a battery of ten self-propelled 105mm guns from SS Panzer Artillerie Regiment 10.5 The Kampfgruppe appears to have been ordered south to Neerpelt on 13 September and spearheaded a counter-attack against the Guards Armoured Division bridgehead there shortly thereafter, although Hauptsturmführer Krause’s unit may also have been despatched earlier; according to one source it had been in the Neerpelt area for a week before 13 September.6
This was a significant reduction in II SS Panzerkorps’ strength, which was subsequently compounded by instructions from OKW for 10 SS Panzer Division to refit in place while 9 SS Panzer Division was withdrawn to Siegen in Germany to receive new equipment and replacement personnel. Advance parties drawn from the Hohenstaufen’s support echelon began to depart on 12 September.7 In the meantime, Harzer’s units were ordered to turn over their serviceable weapons, heavy equipment and vehicles to 10 SS Panzer Division and the denuded Hohenstaufen units were then temporarily designated Warnungs Kompanien (Alarm Companies) while awaiting their transport to Germany. There was not a great deal to transfer, but Harzer’s men appear to have been loath to part with the vehicles that had borne them from Normandy across northern France and into Holland. This attitude appears to have emanated from the top, given that Bittrich did not conceal his opposition to the order when passing it on to Harmel and Harzer, and the latter had no intention of parting with his equipment as he distrusted the supply system to provide replacements.8 The Hohenstaufen’s units therefore resorted to some administrative sleight of hand to avoid handing over their vehicles by simply removing and concealing key components and then declaring them unserviceable. In most instances this involved just a handful of vehicles. SS Pionier Abteilung 9 hung onto two half-track personnel carriers for example, while SS FlaK Abteilung 9 managed to keep back one 88mm gun and one half-track-mounted 20mm piece and SS Panzerjäger Abteilung 9 retained two Jagdpanzer IVs. SS Panzer Regiment 9 took things further by retaining three Panzer III command tanks, four Panzer IVs, eight Sturmgeschütz (StuG) assault guns and possibly five Panthers.9 The most prolific practitioners were Hauptsturmführer Viktor Gräbner and his men from SS Panzer Aufklärungs Abteilung 9, who removed weapons, optical equipment, wheels and tracks from thirty armoured half-tracks of various types and ten eight-wheeled armoured cars.10 Most if not all of these vehicles had likely been despatched to Germany by 17 September, and Gräbner’s small fleet had been loaded onto railway flatcars to follow them, in line with Harzer’s personal decision to entrain his best units last; as six trains per day had been made available to move 9 SS Panzer the move was also five days ahead of schedule.11
This clearly shows that German strength in the Arnhem area was far less than is frequently assumed, and nowhere near the level of a fully equipped and
functioning Panzer division. According to one source, by the time MARKET commenced on 17 September both the Hohenstaufen and Frundsberg were equivalent to weak brigades, with a maximum strength of 2,500 to 3,000 men apiece. However, this was still potentially a formidable foe for a lightly armed Airborne force to face. This was perhaps most relevant with regard to SS Panzer Aufklärungs Abteilung 9, given its proximity to Arnhem, for even a modicum of armour plating offered infinitely more protection than a Denison smock. The important point is therefore whether any of 9 SS Panzer Division’s sub-units were in a position to interfere with the 1st Airborne Division’s designated landing area at Wolfheze or subsequent movement to its objectives in and around Arnhem during or immediately after the landings. Interfering in the initial phase of the operation was key because the most effective way of derailing an Airborne operation was to prevent the attackers from reaching and securing their objectives in the first place; once the Airborne troops were ensconced on their objective tackling them became a much more challenging prospect. Arguably the most compelling evidence for this truism lies in the fact that it took the Germans three days to recapture the north end of the Arnhem road bridge from a scratch force hastily assembled around an understrength Parachute Battalion, despite outnumbering the defenders and deploying tanks and self-propelled artillery against them.
Arnhem Page 13