More Airborne troops trickled into the Arnhem bridge perimeter through the remainder of the night. Captain O’Callaghan’s 2 Platoon from the 9th (Airborne) Field Company RE, which had been attached to C Company, arrived unscathed and expanded Frost’s little band by around thirty men. Major Peter Lewis’ C Company from the 3rd Parachute Battalion reached the bridge perimeter at around 03:00 after quite an odyssey. The Company left the remainder of the 3rd Battalion at 18:00, moving along a minor road leading north through the woods to the Arnhem–Ede railway with a Sergeant Mason from Lieutenant Len Wright’s 9 Platoon in the lead and Lieutenant Peter Hibburt’s 7 Platoon bringing up the rear. Sergeant Mason and his Section captured a German despatch rider and killed two more Germans travelling on another motorcycle before becoming separated from the rest of the Company at some point before reaching the railway. Following a track running parallel to the rail line, 9 Platoon was engaged by a Kübelwagen loaded with Germans, losing Private Tindle wounded in exchange for a German POW. The Kübelwagen and the rest of its German passengers escaped. A German truck loaded with ammunition which approached from the rear was then ambushed and set ablaze; the driver appears to have been wounded and captured while a single passenger was killed in an exchange of fire that badly wounded Sergeant Thomas Graham, who died later.81 Meanwhile 7 Platoon had also destroyed an ammunition truck, killing all four passengers and knocked out a half-track also approached from the rear, losing five casualties in the process. At around dusk the Company was reunited and after allowing his men a short rest Major Lewis set his Company off down the railway line toward Arnhem.
Lewis and his men reached the main railway station in the centre of Arnhem at around midnight without incident and then pushed on toward the main square, capturing two Germans on the way. The square was full of German troops and transport but Lewis gambled on the darkness concealing their identity and boldly marched his entire Company openly down the main road leading to the bridge after ordering Lieutenant Gerald Infield’s 8 Platoon at the head of the column not to ‘engage the enemy or make any hostile moves’. According to Sergeant Mason they were, however, recognised en route by two Dutch policemen, who gave them ‘a great welcome’. The bluff carried the paratroopers almost to the bridge before they ran into a German armoured car, which Lieutenant Infield’s men knocked out with a Gammon bomb. On reaching the approaches to the bridge Major Lewis concealed his men in roadside shrubbery, 7 and 8 Platoons on the right and 9 Platoon and Company HQ on the left, before going forward with his Platoon commanders to arrange entry into the 2nd Battalion’s perimeter. After liaising with Lieutenant Boiteux-Buchanan, Lewis sent his platoon commanders back to bring in their men, and at that point it all went wrong. Lieutenant Infield and 8 Platoon moved without incident but 7 Platoon were surprised and captured by German troops moving to attack the bridge and the Platoon commander, Lieutenant Peter Hibburt, was killed along with one of his sergeants.82 One of the attackers, who may have been from Kampfgruppe Euling, then moved onto the road and called on 9 Platoon to surrender as Lieutenant Wright was holding an O Group prior to moving. When the paratroopers responded with a burst of fire the German’s companions raked the shrubbery with a machine-gun, causing several casualties and obliging Lieutenant Wright to order his men to make their way into the perimeter independently; approximately half of them made it safely.83
Major Crawley and the 2nd Battalion’s B Company broke contact with SS Panzer Pionier Abteilung 9 atop Den Brink at around midnight and met Lieutenant Patrick Barnett’s Brigade HQ Defence Platoon and some Sappers from the 1st Parachute Squadron RE at the pontoon bridge site. Frost had sent Barnett’s party back after the second abortive attempt to secure the road bridge to try and locate some means of getting B Company across to the south bank, but the effort was abandoned when no boats or other means could be located. All made it safely back into the bridge perimeter at around 05:00 apart from the B Company rearguard, Lieutenant Hugh Levien’s 4 Platoon, which was caught moving after first light approximately a mile from the bridge. Sergeant Frank Kemp and another man were wounded, the former seriously in the groin and while Sergeant Herbert Carrier led a small group in a successful dash to the safety of the road bridge perimeter, the remainder of the Platoon were driven back by the weight of enemy fire and became split up in the process. Lieutenant Levien and eleven men took shelter in the house of a Miss Mieke Engelsman on Bakkerstraat with the assistance of a patriotic Dutchman named Jan Brouwer, from where Levien was able to contact Major Crawley via the civilian telephone network.
Not all the traffic ran into the solidifying bridge perimeter. After accompanying the Brigade HQ column into the perimeter, Major Dennis Munford’s party was reportedly unable to make contact with the remainder of 3 Battery back at the landing area with their own radios or those of nearby units.84 Munford then allegedly resorted to making the round journey from the bridge to the landing area and back in two Jeeps, in order to have his radio sets retuned and inform Division HQ that the bridge had been secured.85 However, another participant’s account suggests that this was not actually the case. Bombardier Leo Hall, who served at Arnhem as a signaller with Captain Anthony Harrison’s Observation Post (OP) party from E Troop, succeeded in establishing contact with the Battery Command Post at the landing area using a No. 22 set to transmit and a No. 68 back-pack radio set to receive from the attic of the building occupied by Brigade HQ; although he neglected to inform Munford or Harrison of the contact immediately, the former became aware of it and subsequently used the link to register his guns at first light.86 According to Hall, Munford never left the bridge perimeter on the night of 17-18 September, and he is supported in this by another participant account and the fact that there is no reference to Munford’s epic journey in the unit War Diary, as one would expect. The latter does refer to Munford despatching Captain Harrison to contact the Battery and inform Division HQ of developments in person, however.87 In fact, Harrison appears to have left the bridge perimeter twice, the first time at some point after 22:00, given that Hall refers to hearing ammunition cooking off in the burning store on the bridge in the background. The object of the excursion is unclear, although it may have been in search of Lathbury. Harrison was driven by Bombardier Michael Ogle and accompanied by Hall and Gunners Jock Chrystal and Jock Morrison; all returned safely to the perimeter.88
On the second occasion, at some point after 04:00, Harrison was despatched by Munford to carry a situation report to Division HQ and more importantly, to order 3 Battery to move forward into Oosterbeek to place it within range of the bridge.89 Again driven by Bombardier Ogle, Harrison left the perimeter intending to follow the riverside LION route. However, the pair took a wrong turning in the darkness and ended up on the Utrechtseweg/TIGER route instead and ran into Lieutenant-Colonel Dobie and the 1st Parachute Battalion in the midst of their fight at the railway embankment at around 05:00.90 After apprising Dobie of the situation Harrison then made his way to the landing area, presumably by following the Utrechtseweg through the 3rd Parachute Battalion’s perimeter in the western outskirts of Oosterbeek, although the latter’s War Diary makes no mention of his passage. Whatever his route, Harrison reached the landing area without incident. On arrival he left the report on the seizure of the north end of the Arnhem road bridge at Urquhart’s vacant HQ, which was spending the night in four abandoned Horsas on LZ Z along with a group of war correspondents, and set 3 Battery’s move to Oosterbeek into motion.91
Captain Harrison’s passage back to the Divisional area was eased by the fact that the units defending the eastern edge of the landing area remained untroubled by German activity. The understrength 2nd Battalion South Staffordshire Regiment, dug in near Reijers-Camp Farm to protect 1st Airlanding Brigade HQ and 181 Airlanding Field Ambulance in the outskirts of Wolfheze, reported that ‘no opposition developed in the bn area and all ranks spent a quiet night’, and the 9th (Airborne) Field Company RE also referred to passing a ‘relatively quiet night’ on the eastern edge of LZ Z.9
2 The same appears to have been the case with the 1st Border’s A Company manning the eastern perimeter to the south of the Field Company and the remainder of the Battalion protecting the western side of the landing area. The exception was B Company, the most far-flung of the 1st Border’s units, which was dug in on the outskirts of Renkum at the far south-western corner of DZ X. At some point during the night a group of German troops approached the perimeter of Sergeant Thomas Watson’s 14 Platoon, located in the grounds of the local brickworks. Private Edward Peters, who was at that point sharing a slit trench with aptly named fellow sniper Private Eric Borders, recalled hearing foreign voices and the sound of men crossing a barbed wire fence to their front in the darkness. Sergeant Watson ordered his men to open fire after a Very flare revealed a number of German troops to the Platoon’s front, and no further German activity was detected for the remainder of the night.93 Dutch Resistance reports of a sixty-strong German force moving toward Renkum led to Lance-Corporal Albert Wilson’s Section from 11 Platoon being despatched to lay an ambush at 21:00. Wilson occupied a house overlooking a promising section of road after rousing two elderly Dutchmen and persuading them into their cellar, but was recalled to the Platoon perimeter at 23:00 after further reports claimed the German force had taken a different road.94
This may have been the German force encountered in part by the 1st Border’s Signals Officer, Lieutenant Joseph Hardy, who had harassed the two tea-making Privates on LZ S just a few hours earlier. In an effort to alleviate B Company’s communication difficulties Hardy was despatched to establish a field telephone link across the two miles separating Renkum from Battalion HQ at Johannahoeve Farm, using a Jeep driven by his Platoon Sergeant, Jock McClusky. While returning to Battalion HQ in the early hours of Monday 18 September after successfully completing the task, they spotted two figures in the road ahead. Perhaps naively, Hardy assumed the figures were British and the Jeep was virtually on top of them before it became apparent they were in fact both German and armed. Reacting quickly as McClusky brought the Jeep to an emergency stop, Hardy vaulted the bonnet with his Sten gun in hand and confronted them with the immortal words ‘How’s about it chums?’ This had the desired effect and the startled Germans allowed themselves to be disarmed and hustled into the back of the Jeep, which McClusky rapidly turned and raced back to B Company’s location. Subsequent interrogation revealed that Hardy and McClusky had enjoyed a narrow escape, for the prisoners had been the rearguard of an entire German company that had occupied that stretch of road only moments earlier. Given this, Hardy, probably wisely, decided to remain with B Company for the rest of the night. He then found himself pressed into service as temporary Company second-in-command by Major Armstrong.95
Although the 1st Border had no way of knowing it, the appearance and movement of German troops in the vicinity of Renkum was not accidental. The German effort to contain the British landing from the west was assigned to Generalleutnant Hans von Tettau, who headed the German training infrastructure in Holland from his HQ located at Grebbeberg, forty miles west of Arnhem. When MARKET began, von Tettau was responsible for a mixed bag of Heer, Kriegsmarine and SS training units which included Artillerie Regiment 184, Schiffsstammabteilung 6/14, Bataillon Krafft, SS Wacht Bataillon 3 and SS Unterführerschule ‘Arnheim’, a three battalion-strong NCO training unit commanded by Standartenführer Hans Lippert; two of Lippert’s units, commanded by Hauptsturmführer Heinrich Oelkers and Hauptsturmführer Walter Mattusch, were already deployed screening the River Waal.96 Heeresgruppe B appointed von Tettau in the late afternoon of 17 September, and his first task was to ascertain the true extent of the British encroachment, given that Airborne landings had been reported at Dordrecht, Tiel, Utrecht and Veenendaal in addition to those near Arnhem. These reports likely resulted, at least in part, from RAF aircraft scattering dummy parachutists in the area of Utrecht on the night of 16-17 September as a disinformation measure, and it was this remit that despatched Oberscharführer Sakkel and his bandsmen from SS Wacht Bataillon 3 into the 7th KOSB’s ambush near the Zuid Ginkel café just after 17:00.97 With the exception of Bataillon Krafft, which was already engaged on the other side of the British enclave and subsequently transferred to Sturmbannführer Ludwig Spindler’s command, all of von Tettau’s units were thus ordered to redeploy to the wooded area east of Wageningen as the shape of the British landing became clear. The German troops in the vicinity of B Company’s location were therefore likely Kriegsmarine personnel from Schiffsstammabteilung 6/14 or possibly SS from Lippert’s uncommitted bataillon commanded by Hauptsturmführer Günther Schultze, which received orders to move to the area of Wageningen at 19:00; both units deployed just west of Renkum.98
However, von Tettau’s deployments impacted first on the 7th KOSB, the bulk of which reportedly spent the hours of darkness patrolling to the west, south and east of DZ Y, apparently without contact. The most pressing problem was poor communications, particularly between the dispersed Company locations. The surrounding woods interfered with radio transmissions, and attempts to establish field telephone lines were stymied by the distances involved and the delicate nature of the assault cable employed.99 The exception to this was Major Robert Buchanan’s A Company, which was deployed to interdict German traffic on the Amsterdamseweg two miles or so from the remainder of the Battalion. Lieutenant James Strang’s 4 Platoon, which appears to have been allotted the easterly portion of the Company perimeter, was attacked three times in the course of the night by an unidentified German armoured vehicle. The attacks involved the vehicle illuminating the British position with a spotlight before raking it with 20mm and machine-gun fire while accompanying infantry attempted to infiltrate. 4 Platoon successfully withstood the attacks but Lieutenant Strang and his men were reportedly ‘severely shaken by them’.100 It is unclear where the attackers came from, but they may have been elements of SS Panzer Aufklärungs Abteilung 9 exceeding their orders by moving along the Amsterdamseweg west of Wolfheze. Whoever attacked 4 Platoon, matters took a more positive course to the west in the vicinity of the Zuid Ginkel café, where elements of A Company ambushed Hauptsturmführer Ernst Bartsch’s 4 Kompanie from SS Wacht Bataillon 3 as it advanced east along the Amsterdamseweg. Caught in the glaring white magnesium light of trip flares, Bartsch’s men were stopped cold as was Obersturmführer Karl Hink’s 3 Kompanie when it tried to bypass Bartsch’s unit to the south. Buchanan’s men inflicted numerous casualties on the hapless SS, who withdrew in some confusion into the woods north of the Amsterdamseweg to await reinforcement and daylight.101 However, in withdrawing as they did the two SS units inadvertently exploited a serious flaw in the 7th KOSB’s deployment. Offsetting A Company to the east of the main Battalion location left the northern edge of DZ Y unprotected and the SS had unknowingly inserted themselves into this weak point, and thus placed themselves perfectly to threaten the rear of the British screen covering the western edge of the DZ. The consequences of this were not to become apparent until daylight on 18 September.
Von Tettau’s preparations were thus well in hand by the late evening of Sunday 17 September and he was therefore in a position to issue a Warning Order at 23:15 for a dawn assault, after Heeresgruppe B had formally authorised attacks on the British lodgement from the north and west. At 04:00 Heeresgruppe B further informed von Tettau that he was to be reinforced with all or elements of Schiffsstammabteilung 10, Fliegerhorst Bataillon 2 and 3, Ausbildungs und Ersatz Regiment ‘Hermann Göring’, Sicherheits Regiment 26, an SS battalion commanded by Sturmbannführer Eugen Eberwein and Panzer Kompanie 224 equipped with seventeen captured French tanks.102 Not all of these units would be available for the attack; Panzer Kompanie 224 was based eighty miles away at Naaldwijk near Den Haag for example, while Bataillon Eberwein was not scheduled to reach the scene of the action until 10:30 on 18 September.103 All but the armoured unit were however available for integration into the existing attack plan for a general, two-pronged advance into the British landing area. In the north SS Wacht Bataillon 3 wa
s to push forward across the width of Ginkel Heath using the Amsterdamseweg as a left marker and with Bataillon Eberwein pushing along the Arnhem–Ede railway on arrival as a right marker, with the aim of splitting the landing area in two. The southern flank of the attack was to be anchored on the Lower Rhine with Schiffsstammabteilung 6/14 and Schiffsstammabteilung 10 tasked to advance along the river bank and clear Renkum with SS Unterführerschule ‘Arnheim’ on the left tasked to do the same to Heelsum. The Fliegerhorst units were to occupy the centre to provide a link between the two axes of attack, while Artillerie Regiment 184 was designated reserve and tasked to support the southern prong of the attack.104
The process of redeployment was neither straightforward nor tidy. Bicycles were the only transport available to Ausbildungs und Ersatz Regiment ‘Hermann Göring’ to cover the seventy-odd miles from its billets at Katwijk aan Zee on the Dutch coast, and it also had to travel by night with all the disruption that entailed, to avoid Allied air attack. SS Unterführerschule ‘Arnheim’ was also obliged to rely on bicycles, although two Dutch fire engines were commandeered in Leerdam to carry heavy weapons. SS Junker Rudolf Lindemann, an officer candidate with the latter formation, noted a severe shortage of basic items like maps and claimed never to have seen one throughout the battle. This was in stark contrast to the enemy: every man in the 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment was issued with a map of Holland and a larger scale map of their objective and surrounding area, for example.105 Lindemann was also unimpressed with what he witnessed generally during the move: ‘It was really depressing to witness the march to Arnhem – a ridiculous event! More like Napoleon’s retreat from Moscow than a military operation.’106 Lindemann was perhaps being a tad cynical and overly critical, for untidy as it might have been, within eighteen hours of the British landing the Germans were well on the way to sealing off the landing area and thus the bulk of the 1st Airborne Division from its objective. Von Tettau specifically had ascertained the extent and location of the landings, drawn up an attack plan, located and deployed the units to execute it and was poised to launch the equivalent of two brigades along a five-mile front. This was a creditable performance by any standard, and raises some interesting points. First, it showed that the British airborne planners were being optimistic in the extreme when they decided that it was feasible to put two lifts into the same landing area twenty-four hours apart in the face of a first-class enemy. Second, it shows that the Waffen SS did not hold the sole monopoly on fast reactions to the unforeseen, and that the Heer was at least equally capable of reacting with speed, efficiency and aggression when necessary.
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