Lieutenant Wilson appears to have been the point Platoon for the entire Guards Armoured Division by the time the Irish Guards column reached the blown bridge at Son, where the guard detail from the 506th Parachute Infantry Regiment also appears to have entered into the celebratory mood; on reaching the bank of the Wilhelmina Canal Wilson was greeted by a group of paratroopers on the other bank ‘with their arms full of children’, before being tasked to cover the right flank of the crossing point with the rest of his No.2 Company.115 The Bailey bridging unit had been ordered forward over the twenty miles from Bourg Leopold to Valkenswaard after the 2nd Household Cavalry made first contact at Son at midday, and was then ‘rushed forward’ a further twelve miles up the newly opened road to Son; construction began at 21:00. By nightfall the Irish Guards Group was at Son, the Grenadier Guards Group was en route and the remainder of the Guards Armoured Division was stretched out behind them. The Welsh Guards Group had branched eight miles north-east of Valkenswaard to Geldrop in the suburbs of Eindhoven while the Coldstream Guards Group had moved into Valkenswaard in the afternoon, where it remained while Division HQ decided whether to direct it onward through Eindhoven to Son or through the Welsh Guards to Helmond, seven miles beyond Geldrop. Much of the Division’s tail was still in Belgium, and it was estimated that it would take another six hours on 19 September to pass them all across the GARDEN start line near the Meuse-Escaut Canal; the latter provides a graphic illustration of the sheer scale of Operation GARDEN.116
With Eindhoven taken and the spearhead of the Guards Armoured Division at Son, Colonel Robert F. Sink’s 506th Parachute Infantry Regiment had achieved its initial objectives, and its constituent Battalions spent a relatively quiet night. The main threat came from the jubilant Dutch civilians who took every opportunity to show their appreciation to their liberators, cheering, asking for autographs and photographs and pressing food and drink upon the delighted paratroopers. Private 1st Class David Webster from the 2nd Battalion’s Company E later wrote that this was ‘the most sincere thanksgiving demonstration any of us were to see, and it pleased us very much’. His Company commander, Captain Richard Winters, put things more succinctly: ‘It was just unbelievable.’117 North-west of Eindhoven the 1st Battalion, 502nd Parachute infantry Regiment spent a relatively quiet Monday under Division control at St. Oedenrode, apart from the ‘Incident of the Seven Jeeps’, but matters were less benign for the 2nd and 3rd Battalions near Best. Lieutenant Wierzbowski and his little band from the 3rd Battalion remained cut off near the demolished bridge over the Wilhelmina Canal and the remainder of the 3rd Battalion, commanded by Major John P. Stopka after Lieutenant-Colonel Robert G. Cole had been killed by a sniper earlier in the day, managed to push west in the face of heavy fire from German units in and around Best and establish a roadblock on the Eindhoven-Boxtel road. Lieutenant-Colonel Steve A. Chappuis’ badly depleted 2nd Battalion launched a further attack south-west from the Zonsche Forest at 17:00 intended to secure the Canal bridge and relieve Lieutenant Wierzbowski. Chappuis was unaware the Germans had demolished the bridge six hours earlier. The 2nd Battalion covered around 1,000 yards before coming under heavy fire from 88mm guns emplaced on the canal, which obliged the paratroopers to withdraw back into the woods to reorganise in readiness to resume the attack at dawn the following day; on the upside the attack may have assisted the 3rd Battalion’s push to the Eindhoven‒Boxtel road by distracting the Germans at Best.118
Lieutenant Wierzbowski’s Platoon therefore spent another isolated night on the bank of the Wilhelmina Canal broken up by three brief contacts with friendly forces. A British armoured car, presumably from the 2nd Household Cavalry, appeared on the south bank of the canal, followed by a disoriented patrol from Company E in the early evening and then by Lieutenant Nicholas D. Mottola’s Platoon from Company D, which had become separated in the fighting near Best. The patrol departed but did not regain the main US line until the following morning while the British armoured car, which had been providing Wierzbowski with fire support, also departed with the arrival of Lieutenant Mottola’s Platoon. Although it had declared its intent to remain at the bridge site the latter departed in some disorder across the canal when attacked during the night and did not rejoin the 2nd Battalion until two days later, leaving Lieutenat Wierzbowski and his depleted band to continue their lonely vigil without support.119 The 101st Airborne Division’s most northerly unit, Colonel Howard R. Johnson’s 501st Parachute Infantry Regiment, was set in around Eerde and Veghel straddling the Zuid Willems Canal and appears to have had a quieter night, presumably as a result of roughly handling several determined German attacks through the previous night and morning. Johnson was concerned that his 3rd Battalion was too isolated at Eerde on the western edge of the Regiment’s area and thus ordered Lieutenant-Colonel Julian Ewell to withdraw the three miles or so into Veghel, where the 3rd Battalion became the Regimental reserve.120
After the last-minute clearing of LZ N and T just in time for the arrival of the second lift, the 82nd Airborne Division’s sector of the Airborne Corridor remained active through the night of 18 September, with only the 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment at the western end of the Division’s area having a relatively quiet time. The 505th and 508th Parachute Infantry Regiments nonetheless continued to hold their assorted bridges and maintained their other tasks. The exception to this was the 508th Regiment’s disjointed push toward the Nijmegen bridges, which had to be reduced and then abandoned in order to allow the 2nd Battalion to counter the German encroachment onto the Division’s landing areas just ahead of the arrival of the second lift; Captain Russell C. Wilde’s Company G from the 508th Regiment’s 3rd Battalion had been ordered into Nijmegen to resume the mission at dawn on 18 September, but were again stopped at the Keizer Karel Plein traffic roundabout and after fruitless attempts to get forward were ordered back to Berg-en-Dal to become the 3rd Battalion reserve at some point during the night.121 Perhaps the most serious development in the area was another example of interference, on this occasion alloyed with indecision, from Major-General Browning. Thus far Browning’s contribution to proceedings had consisted of crossing the LZ immediately on landing to urinate on German soil, theatrically unfurling a specially embroidered Pegasus pennant on his jeep and impressing the Americans with his immaculate Guards turnout, as his Forward Corps HQ had proved unable to make contact with any stations except the 82nd Airborne Division’s HQ and his own HQ at Moor Park owing to a shortage of cipher operators.122 However, at 15:30 and thus shortly after the second lift was safely down, Browning took his first and only independent command decision of Operation MARKET GARDEN, by approaching Gavin and requesting him to refocus his efforts from securing the Groesbeek Heights in their entirety to seizing the Nijmegen bridges as quickly as possible.123 As the Guards Armoured Division was due to reach Nijmegen by 18:00 and neither officer appears to have been aware that the GARDEN force was at this point a long way behind schedule, this was not before time and it is interesting to speculate what Gavin made of being ordered to do what he would have done at the outset, left to his own devices.
Gavin responded in his unfailingly correct manner by rapidly drawing up a plan for a three-pronged assault using the 508th Parachute Infantry Regiment, reinforced with a battalion from the 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment. When presented with the plan Browning initially endorsed it but he then vacillated and reverted back to his original flawed preoccupation with holding the Groesbeek Heights in their entirety on the grounds that ‘the retention of the high ground South of Nijmegen was of greater importance’ than securing the crossings over the River Waal.124 While critical of Browning’s decision making, Powell attempts to put the best face on Browning’s action by suggesting that his behaviour was due to him lacking ‘a worthwhile job to perform in Holland [and that] he was also short of the machinery with which to do such a job’.125 This of course overlooks the fact that Browning also lacked the requisite skills and experience for the task, given that platoon command on the West
ern Front during the First World War was hardly an apprenticeship for multi-division corps command, Airborne or otherwise, and that he had deliberately placed himself in that invidious position for reasons of personal ambition. Powell also suggests that Gavin may have been ‘somewhat in awe’ of Browning because of his age and reportedly ‘brilliant’ reputation as a junior officer during the First World War, although this is rather unlikely. Gavin’s memoir clearly concurs with a warning from Ridgway about Browning’s Machiavellian nature when he served briefly at COSSAC HQ in London in November 1943.126 More importantly, Gavin accurately and presciently noted in his diary on 6 September 1944 that Browning lacked the ‘standing, influence and judgement’ that came from operational command experience, that his staff was ‘superficial’ and that British senior Airborne commanders generally lacked ‘know how’ because ‘never do they get down into the dirt and learn the hard way.’127 The obvious exception to this accurate assessment was Richard Nelson Gale, although Gavin may not have had any contact with him whilst serving at COSSAC HQ or after becoming commander of the 82nd Airborne Division.
The Grenadier Guards Group and the 2nd Battalion 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment were shortly to pay a high price for Browning’s operational ineptitude.
11
D Plus 2
00:01 to 12:00 Tuesday 19 September 1944
Constructing the Bailey bridge at Son took around nine hours with the Sappers and co-opted helpers working through the night from 21:00 on 18 September, and the bridge was complete and ready to take traffic just after first light the following morning. The lead elements of the Guards Armoured Division, the armoured cars of the 2nd Household Cavalry Regiment, then crossed to the north bank of the Wilhelmina Canal at sunrise, which occurred at 06:16 on 19 September; it is unclear if the Household Cavalry crossed at the first opportunity or whether they held back for full daylight.1 The reconnaissance elements were followed by the Grenadier Guards Group from the 5th Guards Armoured Brigade consisting of the 1st (Motor) Battalion and 2nd (Armoured) Battalion Grenadier Guards, apparently trailed by the Guards Division Armoured Division’s Tactical HQ accompanied by Corps commander Lieutenant-General Horrocks, while the Irish Guards Group brought up the rear, crossing the Wilhelmina Canal at 10:00.2 With the 101st Airborne Division easing the way the GARDEN force made much swifter progress than the previous two days. The 2nd Household Cavalry covered the twenty-four miles or so to Grave at the edge of the 82nd Airborne Division’s area, where the 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment were holding the bridge over the River Maas, in just over two hours, arriving at 08:25. The Grenadier Guards Group arrived there around ninety minutes later at 10:00 and were in the vicinity of Nijmegen an hour later, despite being diverted to cross the Maas-Waal Canal near Molenhoek; the more direct crossings at Malden and Hatert had been destroyed before the 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment could seize them on 17 September and the 508th Parachute Infantry Regiment was still in the process of securing the most northerly combined road and rail crossing at Honinghutie. The Irish Guards Group came in last at 14:00 and was directed to Malden, just north of the Molenhoek crossing.3 Behind this, the rest of the Guards Armoured Division was on the move along the length of what was to become the Airborne Corridor. The 5th Guards Armoured Brigade was trailed by the Guards Armoured Division Main HQ, which moved off from Valkenswaard at 07:00, followed by the Coldstream Guards Group and Welsh Guards Group from 32 Guards Brigade, the lead elements of which halted at Zeeland, six miles or so short of Grave, at just after midday; the Guards Division Main HQ and 30 Corps Tactical HQ appear to have halted in the same vicinity for four hours. Farthest back and the earliest to start was the 15th/19th Hussars Group. This was a temporary independent formation consisting of the Cromwell-equipped 15th/19th Hussars from the 11th Armoured Division, reinforced with a Squadron of armoured cars and a battery of self-propelled 25-Pounder guns which was to be placed under command of the 101st Airborne Division. The Hussars moved off from a concentration area near Neerpelt in Belgium at 06:00 and reached Eindhoven at 10:00 where part of the Group was detached to assist the 506th Parachute Infantry Regiment, while the remainder continued to Son, arriving an hour later.4
On arrival the 15th/19th Hussars’ Cromwell tanks were divided up and assigned to the 101st Airborne Division’s constituent units and, with contact with the GARDEN force established, Major-General Taylor set about consolidating his hold on the southern stretch of the Airborne Corridor. South of the Wilhelmina Canal Colonel Sink set his 506th Parachute Infantry Brigade to widening the base of the Division’s area at Eindhoven, with Lieutenant-Colonel Oliver M. Horton’s 3rd Battalion being despatched toward Winterle, six miles or so to the west, while Lieutenant-Colonel Robert L. Strayer’s 2nd Battalion moved toward Helmond, eight miles to the east. The former was recalled en route after the British 12 Corps moving up on the west flank of the GARDEN force had taken responsibility for that sector, while the latter was also recalled when Colonel Sink received word that German armour was moving in that area.5 The armoured force was Panzer Brigade 107, commanded by Major Berndt-Joachim Freiherr von Maltzahn, which had originally been destined for service on the Eastern Front before being redirected to Aachen and then to face the new Allied airborne incursion at Eindhoven, detraining at Venlo over the period 16-18 September 1944.6 It was a formidable force consisting of Panzer Abteilung 2107 equipped with thirty-six Panther tanks, Panzergrenadier Bataillon 2107 mounted in Sd.Kfz 251 half-tracks supported by Panzerjäger Kompanie 2107 equipped with eleven Panzerjäger IVs, Panzer Pionier Kompanie 2107, also mounted in half-tracks and FlaK Zug 2107 equipped with four FlaK Panzer IV Wirbelwind self-propelled 37mm guns; the other units may also have included organic light flak vehicles in their organisation.7 The official US accounts suggest that the 2nd Battalion was withdrawn before contact, but Captain Winters’ Company E, reportedly accompanied by half a dozen Cromwell tanks, ran into a German counter-attack just after passing through the town of Nuenen to the usual ecstatic greeting from the local civilian population. After a sharp exchange of fire that knocked out four of the 15th/19th Hussars’ Cromwell tanks, Company E fell back to Nuenen and organised a hasty defence that held the German attack and eventually prompted Panzer Brigade 107 to shift its line of advance to the north, along the line of the Wilhelmina Canal. Company E remained in place until dark and then withdrew to an overnight position in the outskirts of Eindhoven at Tongelre; the day’s fighting cost the Company fifteen casualties.8
On the north bank of the Wilhelmina Canal the fight to seize the bridge near Best from 59 Infanterie Division and Kampfgruppe Rink continued. Colonel Michaelis ordered Lieutenant-Colonel Chappuis’ 2nd Battalion 502nd Regiment to resume the attack toward the bridge at 06:00, which was done despite crossfire from German troops stationed in woods to the north and along the line of the canal to the south. The attack continued until the patrol from Company E that had reached Lieutenant Wierzbowski during the night regained contact with the 2nd Battalion and informed Lieutenant-Colonel Chappuis that the bridge had been destroyed, but not, apparently, that the party from the 3rd Battalion were still holding the north end. Chappuis duly passed the news up to Regimental HQ and was ordered to withdraw to the attack start point and set up a defensive line, which then rebuffed two German counter-attacks in the course of the morning; the 3rd Battalion’s Company G also rebuffed German probes into the eastern face of the Zonsche Forest from the direction of the landing area.9 In the meantime Major-General Taylor had despatched one of the 101st Airborne Division’ deputy commanders, Brigadier-General Gerald J. Higgins, to take command of the effort at Best along with the 2nd and 3rd Battalions from the 327th Glider Infantry Regiment, a Squadron of tanks from the 15th/19th Hussars and a small artillery detachment from that unit’s independent Group. All this came too late for Lieutenant Wierzbowski and his little band however, who had been finally overwhelmed by a German attack at first light that used the low-lying river mist for concealment before shooting Private Lawrence J. Koller in t
he head and launching a flurry of hand-grenades into the paratroopers’ position. Two were thrown clear, one hit the party’s .30 machine-gun before exploding and blinding gunner Private Robert Laino, who nonetheless threw out another grenade that hit his knee while another landed in a trench occupied by several casualties including Private First Class Joe E. Mann. Despite his arms being bandaged due to multiple wounds suffered the previous day, Mann fell back on the grenade to save the other occupants of the trench; he was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor for his self-sacrifice. Virtually out of ammunition, on the verge of being overrun and with only three of his fourteen surviving men unwounded, Lieutenant Wierzbowski ordered Private First Class Anthony M. Waldt to attach a grubby handkerchief to the barrel of his M1 and the stubborn defence of the north end of the Best bridge came to an end.10
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