The withdrawal of the Tigers brought the German attacks on the bridge perimeter to a close for the day, although the effects of the fighting lingered. By 21:00 the fire in the buildings along the Eusebiusbuitensingel was burning out of control and Lieutenant Hindley was obliged to evacuate the survivors of the 1st Parachute Squadron’s HQ element to the British-held buildings on the other side of the bridge ramp. It is unclear if any of Hindley’s party had been killed, but the Parachute Squadron contingent in the Van Limburg School had lost a dozen wounded in addition to the two dead and twelve wounded from the previous day.196
Overall, the day’s fighting cost the bridge garrison an estimated nineteen killed and up to 150 wounded including Major Tatham-Warter for the second time, Captain Frank, who handed command of A Company to Lieutenant John Grayburn, and the 2nd Battalion’s Padre Captain Bernard Egan.197 The German mortar fire and shelling abated with the onset of darkness and the Airborne soldiers settled down for their second night at the bridge. The scene was graphically described by Sapper Tom Carpenter from his position on the Weertjesstraat: ‘The area around the bridge was becoming a sea of flame. The roar and crackle of flaming buildings and dancing shadows cast by the flames was like looking into Dante’s inferno.’198 The fires had also spread to the two major churches near the British positions and the passing of the night was marked at irregular intervals by the tolling of one of the church bells as it swung freely in the draught generated by the flames.199
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While the 1st Parachute Brigade was being driven out of the western outskirts of Arnhem toward Oosterbeek and the 4th Parachute Brigade was retiring across LZ L through the gliders from the 1st Airborne Division’s third lift, Major-General Gavin was launching his first properly configured and officially sanctioned attempt to reach and secure the road and rail bridges over the River Waal in Nijmegen, employing Lieutenant-Colonel Benjamin Vandervoort’s 2nd Battalion 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment and part of the Grenadier Guards Group. Gavin’s plan involved dividing this force in two, with each group responsible for one of the bridges. The smaller West Force commanded by Grenadier Guards’ Captain John Neville was made up of Captain Taylor G. Smith’s Company D from the 505th Regiment, augmented by a Troop of four Sherman tanks from the 2nd Grenadier Guards No. 3 Squadron and an infantry platoon from the 1st Grenadier Guards No. 2 Company. They were tasked to secure the railway bridge. The larger East Group was allotted the primary task of seizing the road bridge and appears to have been jointly commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Vandervoort and the commander of the 1st Grenadier Guards, Lieutenant-Colonel Edward Goulbourn. The Force was made up of the 505th Regiment’s Company E commanded by Lieutenant James E. Smith and Captain Robert H. Rosen’s Company F, supplemented by the remainder of No. 3 Squadron and No. 2 Company, numbering three Troops of Shermans and three infantry platoons. The Force was to rendezvous at the Hotel Sionshof around four miles south of Nijmegen, divide up into its respective Force columns and proceed to a small traffic island on the Groenestraat on the outskirts of Nijmegen. From there the West Force would peel off and take a circuitous route around the edge of the city to approach the railway bridge from the south-west, while the East force moved north and east through the city toward the road bridge. The attack was scheduled to begin at 15:30.200
Each Force was to be accompanied by a dozen members of the Dutch Resistance to guide the tanks and paratroopers through Nijmegen’s streets to their objectives, and their reports regarding German strength and determination vary according to source, with one referring to warnings of strong positions around the road bridge backed by anti-tank guns while another claims the Dutch reported that Nijmegen was not strongly garrisoned and that the defenders would likely withdraw at the sight of the Grenadier Guards’ tanks.201 In fact, the former was more accurate, as discussion with the various elements of the 508th Parachute Infantry Regiment that had pushed into Nijmegen from 17 September would have revealed. By 19 September, overall responsibility for the defence of the Nijmegen bridges was still vested in Sturmbannführer Leo Reinhold, but he had moved Luftwaffe Oberst Henke east to command the railway bridge, leaving Hauptsturmführer Karl-Heinz Euling in charge of the road bridge. Deployed to cover the railway bridge proper, the large rail marshalling yard to its immediate south and the Kronenburgerpark just east of the latter, Kampfgruppe Henke was made up of a kompanie of trainee Fallschirmjäger NCOs from Fallschirmjäger Ausbildungs und Ersatz Regiment ‘Hermann Göring’, three kompanien from 406 z.b.V. Division and a number of combat engineers totalling between 500 and 750 men. Kampfgruppe Euling consisted of the latter’s bataillon from SS Panzergrenadier Regiment 22 and Untersturmführer Werner Baumgärtel’s detachment from SS Panzer Pionier Bataillon 10, elements of SS Panzer Aufklärungs Abteilung 9, augmented with another kompanie of trainee Fallschirmjäger NCOs from Ausbildungs und Ersatz Regiment ‘Hermann Göring’ and four 88mm and eight 20mm flak guns from schwere FlaK Bataillon 572. Artillery support was provided by SS Panzer Artillerie Regiment 10 and SS Artillerie Ausbildungs und Ersatz Regiment 5 ensconced north of the River Waal. Euling’s men were securely entrenched in the Valkhofpark and adjacent Hunnerpark at the south end of the bridge ramp, the latter straddling the Arnhemscheweg running from the Keizer Lodewijkplein and across the bridge. In addition, numerous buildings on the approaches to the road bridge had been turned into strongpoints and the approach roads were covered by anti-tank guns. The area between the bridges was occupied by Kampfgruppe Melitz, made up of a number of internal security and rear echelon units. In all, the bridges were defended by approximately 2,000 German troops.202
Lieutenant-Colonel Vandervoort’s Battalion rendezvoused with the Grenadier Guards detachment at the Hotel Sionshof in the early afternoon and while the East and West Forces were forming up into their columns the Dutch Resistance reported that the main post office in Nijmegen, located just north of the Keizer Karel Plein, contained a German HQ and the control point for demolition charges rigged on the road bridge.203 This had in fact been addressed during the night of 17-18 September by Captain Jonathan E. Adams and a patrol from the 1st Battalion 508th Parachute Infantry Regiment, but the success had gone unacknowledged as Adams and his men had been subsequently cut off and remained in hiding with Dutch civilians until 20 September. A third ad hoc column was therefore formed under Grenadier Major George Thorne, consisting of a Troop of Shermans, two platoons from the No. 2 Company and a platoon of paratroopers; it is unclear which column these elements were drawn from, although the Airborne platoon was reportedly selected by Major-General Gavin by the simple expedient of commandeering the first platoon he came across.204 The advance to Nijmegen commenced thirty minutes behind schedule at 16:00, the delay possibly due to the last-minute reorganisation of the post office group, with the East and West Forces travelling together on one route, possibly along the Heyensdalsweg or Groesbeekseweg, while Major Thorne’s group followed a parallel track a mile or so to the west.205 Travelling on the back of the Grenadier’s Shermans was a welcome novelty for the normally foot-slogging paratroopers, and the move into the outskirts of Nijmegen was again marked by an ecstatic welcome from the local Dutch civilian population, which Lieutenant James J. Coyle from Company E likened to a ‘victory parade’.206
In the event Major Thorne’s column secured the post office after rapidly navigating the warren of narrow streets thanks to the Dutch Resistance guides members, knocking out an anti-tank gun on the way. The post office proved devoid of Germans or demolition apparatus however and Major Thorne then elected to move independently on the road bridge with two Shermans and an infantry platoon; it is unclear if the latter were Grenadiers or paratroopers. This little force reached the approaches to the Keizer Lodewijkplein traffic circle before coming under heavy fire from the SS holding the Hunnerpark and after suffering a number of casualties and lacking room to manoeuvre Thorne withdrew to the post office to await further orders; he was reinforced at some point by Major Harry Stanley and the 1st Grenadier Guards’ No.
4 Company.207 Captain Neville’s Western Force enjoyed less success, although the circuitous route successfully avoided enemy contact until the column reached an underpass carrying the road under the railway marshalling yard around 200 yards from the target bridge. Captain Neville elected to rush tanks and some of Company D through the underpass while Captain Smith passed the remainder of Company D over the underpass and through the marshalling yard, as the yard was bounded by an embankment too steep for the tanks to negotiate. It was at this point that things went awry.
The advance through the underpass was stopped dead when anti-tank guns knocked out two Shermans in quick succession as they emerged into the open and the supporting paratroopers were similarly blocked by intense fire from machine-guns emplaced to the front and on the flanks, while the movement through the marshalling yard was stymied by a combination of fire from machine-guns, a tank concealed within the yard and the difficult terrain created by the numerous buildings and large numbers of freight cars; the attendant confusion was worsened by the presence of a large number of Dutchmen, some just boys, sporting Orange armbands and weapons abandoned by Allied casualties. With the way ahead blocked, Captain Neville ordered a withdrawal to regroup and then tried to outflank the German defences to the east by moving along a street flanking the Kronenburgerpark, likely the Kronenburgersingel, which initiated a bout of house-to-house fighting, during which the paratroopers were attacked from the rear by a group of Germans with two manhandled 20mm flak guns. The fighting went on into the night at a cost of numerous casualties and another Sherman, which was hit and left burning by an anti-tank gun; when Captain Smith finally withdrew Company D to set in for the night Private First Class Frank Billich and two companions were inadvertently left behind in a house on a side street, where they were obliged to hide in the cellar with the civilian occupants when German troops moved into the upper floors.208
In the meantime the East Force had pushed into Nijmegen toward the road bridge as rapidly as possible, paying no heed to its flanks, and continued until it was slowed by Kampfgruppe Euling’s outpost line occupying key buildings and road junctions south of the Keizer Lodewijkplein. Lieutenant-Colonel Vandervoort then deployed Companies E and F in line abreast and set about clearing a corridor two blocks wide oriented toward the road bridge. The paratroopers methodically cleared each individual block from the inside out by moving through attics and across the rooftops in order to minimise casualties, fighting numerous close-quarter encounters in rooms, stairwells and backyards while the Grenadier Guards tanks dominated the streets and reduced any strongpoint that proved too tough for the paratroopers. Both British and US commanders commented on the seamless nature of the co-operation between the paratroopers and the Grenadier Guards’ tanks despite the former’s lack of experience with tanks and dearth of preparation time; as Vandervoort put it ‘…it was amazing how beautifully the tankers and troopers teamed together…It was testimony to their combat acumen as seasoned veterans – both Yanks and Tommies.’209 After three hours of brutal fighting the paratroopers had reached and cleared some of the buildings overlooking the Keizer Lodewijkplein, although this exposed them to direct fire from the German heavy weapons emplaced north of the traffic circle and artillery fire controlled from the same area. The British official record refers to two infantry platoons, possibly from the 1st Grenadier Guards, having a building blown from under them by 88mm guns after they revealed their position by firing on Germans spotted moving around the road bridge ramp, and Corporal Earl Boling from the 505th Regiment recalled the German guns methodically demolishing the buildings he and his comrades were seeking to use as cover once there were no Shermans to occupy their attention.210 The lack of Sherman targets was due to those first two vehicles the Grenadiers pushed out across the traffic roundabout being immediately knocked out by anti-tank guns located in the Hunnerpark, or possibly sited on the far bank of the River Waal, and two more may have been lost in the subsequent fighting; the dead crewmen included Troop commander Lieutenant John Moller.211
The indirect fire was not all one way, however. An 81mm mortar platoon from the 505th Regiment dug its deep mortar pits in the only open area available, the old Daalseweg cemetery half a mile south of the Keizer Lodewijkplein, from where it was able to bring down heavy fire on the Hunnerpark area, disrupting German passage across the bridge.212 The mortars fired 1,650 rounds over the course of the two-day battle for the road bridge, and the macabre location drew ribald comment from passing British troops, who jocularly accused the mortar crewmen of being ‘fucking Yank grave-robbers’.213
By this point it was becoming fully dark and Lieutenant-Colonel Goulbourn was getting close to halting the operation for the night. The semi-official Grenadier Guards history, whilst acknowledging that the 2nd Grenadier Guards had lost a single Sherman and that 1st Grenadier Guards had suffered ‘practically no losses’, a verdict supported by the unit’s War Diary, also declared that ‘at no stage in the battle did the forces directed on the two bridges look like being able to rush them or even seriously disturb the German defences.’214 This was certainly true of the railway bridge but not at the road bridge, where Lieutenant-Colonel Vandervoort took a rather different view. By his own account his internal and external radio communications were functioning perfectly, he had plenty of ammunition apart from 60mm mortar bombs, Companies E and F had suffered minimal casualties and were deployed in readiness on the edge of the Keizer Lodewijkplein, and there was a reserve of a dozen uncommitted Shermans drawn up in cover just behind the traffic circle. The 2nd Battalion 505th Parachute was therefore poised to push on, clear the Hunnerpark and secure the road bridge in its entirety.215 However, this was not to be, for Lieutenant-Colonel Goulbourn advised his superiors that it would be wiser to pause and consolidate the gains thus far, bring up reinforcements and work out a less hasty and more considered plan, which is what happened, to Vandervoort’s disappointment. In isolation the incident merely reflects a disparity in outlook, between aggressive Airborne assault troops and their more conservative conventional counterparts, but by this point the GARDEN force was still significantly behind schedule and circumstances were starting to swing against the 1st Airborne Division just twelve miles or so farther north. The incident therefore provides yet another example of the Guards Armoured Division operating in an unhurried, business-as-usual manner rather than with the urgency the situation clearly required, and it represents yet another missed opportunity.
Major-General Gavin’s preference had always been to secure the Nijmegen bridges from both ends simultaneously, but he had been frustrated in this by the fact his Division lacked the resources and that the Germans had presciently removed all boats from the vicinity. Nonetheless, Gavin had been working assiduously on a scheme to that end even before Vandervoort’s and Goulbourn’s men began their approach to the bridges, and the link up with 30 Corps potentially provided a means of overcoming the lack of boats. Gavin revealed his thinking to Browning, Major-General Adair and Lieutenant-General Horrocks at 30 Corps’ Tactical HQ, which had been set up in a school building near Malden. By this point Gavin must have been feeling the strain because he had been moving virtually non-stop between his various Regimental, Battalion and in some cases Platoon commanders for over fifty hours, advising, cajoling and inspiring by personal example – not forgetting the fact that he had fractured two spinal discs in a hard landing on 17 September. None of this was apparent to his fellow senior commanders, given that Horrocks referred to Gavin as ‘a tall, good looking American General…unlike the popular cartoon conception of the loud-voiced, boastful, cigar chewing American’ when he arrived at the Tactical HQ.216 The precise timing of the meeting is unclear but occurred in the late afternoon or early evening according to one source, and it is thus unclear if Gavin had intended to reveal his scheme as an adjunct to the 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment’s drive to the bridges in any case, or whether it was in response to the decision to halt that drive for the night, although the fact that launching a river cro
ssing was reportedly the rationale for bringing the 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment up from Grave to the Jonkerbosch woods, just three miles from the River Waal, suggests the former.
Gavin broached the subject by asking Horrocks if the 30 Corps column included any boats. After some discussion with his staff Horrocks confirmed there were approximately twenty-eight collapsible assault boats somewhere in the Guards Armoured Division column and Gavin responded by announcing that if he were provided with the boats he would push the 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment across the River Waal to secure the road and rail bridges from the north in conjunction with a renewed effort from the south.217 When Horrocks and Browning concurred, Gavin returned immediately to Groesbeek to finalise his plans and select a crossing place before summoning the commander of the 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment, Colonel Reuben H. Tucker, at 23:00 to discuss the upcoming operation; as Tucker was away from his HQ the summons was answered by the 504th Regiment’s Executive Officer Lieutenant-Colonel Warren R. Williams, who duly relayed the news back to his Regimental commander. At this point there was not much to relay, apart from the fact that the 504th would be carrying out a river crossing operation at some point the following day; the timings were uncertain as no arrival time for the assault boats had been fixed, although Gavin expressed the hope that things might get underway before dawn, ‘if.the boats arrived, and if the Germans were cleared as far as the riverbank, and if everything could be organized’. It was, as Gavin admitted in his memoir, ‘a very iffy situation’.218
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