Command of the shorter eastern sector was allotted to Brigadier Hackett’s 4th Parachute Brigade HQ, manned by the 10th Parachute Battalion, 156 Parachute Battalion, THOMPSON Force consisting of the Airlanding Light Regiment, the remnants of the 2nd South Staffords and 3 Flight from B Squadron The Glider Pilot Regiment, LONSDALE Force consisting of the 1st, 3rd and 11th Parachute Battalions, and D Squadron The Glider Pilot Regiment.28 According to Hackett’s War Diary account, the units deployed on the eastern sector totalled approximately 500 men; the total for the western sector is unclear.29
In addition to establishing his Brigade HQ on the Pietersbergseweg, Hackett requested and was assigned Major David Madden from the Division Staff to replace Brigade Major Bruce Dawson, who had been killed the previous day during the 4th Parachute Brigade’s fight to regain the Divisional perimeter. The appointment did not last long; Major Madden was killed by mortar fire at 10:00 near the Oosterbeek Old Church while accompanying Hackett on a visit to the southern end of his new command immediately after the Divisional O Group. Lieutenant-Colonel Thompson, commander of the Airlanding Light Regiment and THOMPSON Force, was wounded in the stomach in the same incident and Madden was attempting to render assistance when hit. Thompson’s responsibilities were inherited by Major Lonsdale and his units were incorporated into LONSDALE Force.30
While Urquhart’s O Group was underway, the 1st Airborne Division began receiving its first specifically targeted external artillery support, although guns from the 84th Medium Regiment RA had reportedly been firing general harassing missions north of the Lower Rhine from just after midnight.31 At 09:00 Captain Christopher MacMillen from 1 Forward (Airborne) Observation Unit RA attached to 1st Airlanding Brigade HQ established contact with the 64th Medium Regiment RA as it was relocating to a new firing position near Nijmegen.32 It is unclear whether MacMillen was located at 1st Airlanding Brigade HQ or the 1st Airlanding Light Regiment’s 1 Battery Command Post, but he lost no time fine-tuning the connection using the HQ Royal Artillery’s No. 19 HP set. Coming up on the 64th Medium Regiment’s net using the call sign ‘PCS’ at 09:35, MacMillen requested urgent artillery support after introducing himself as ‘the people you are trying to meet’ and being identified as part of the 1st Airborne’s Royal Artillery establishment by the Regimental Adjutant, Captain D. W. Scrimgeour.33 He then ordered ranging from 211 Battery’s 4.5-inch guns as soon as they came on line at 10:35, targeted just west of the Westerbouwing Heights; but there was a further delay at 11:00 when 43rd Division HQ interceded to demand additional proof of MacMillen’s identity.34 The situation was resolved by the serendipitous presence of Major-General Urquhart and Lieutenant-Colonel Robert Loder-Symonds, the Division CRA, at MacMillen’s location. Their presence appears to have been prompted by the contact with the Medium Regiment being reported to Division HQ at 09:45; Urquhart and Loder-Symonds arrived at 1st Airlanding Brigade HQ forty-five minutes later with a list of suggested targets.35 Loder-Symons was personally acquainted with Captain Scrimgeour and was able to authenticate MacMillen’s transmissions were indeed originating from the 1st Airborne Division by confirming his wife’s forename ‒ Merlin ‒ and favourite sport ‒ falconry.36 By 11:30 MacMillen had transmitted a list of ten targets south and west of the Westerbouwing Heights to be engaged in rotation, although numbers seven through ten proved to be out of range.37 Urquhart described what followed as ‘one of the most exciting and remarkable artillery shoots I have ever experienced. From a range of about eleven miles, these gunners proceeded to answer our calls with a series of shoots on targets…some of which were no more than a hundred yards out from our perimeter line.’38 211 Battery addressed the range problem by moving its guns forward 4,000 yards to hastily scouted new firing positions, and the available firepower was augmented by 212 Battery’s 5.5-inch guns from 13:00 and three hours later by 155mm guns belonging to 419 Battery attached from 52 (Bedfordshire Yeomanry) Heavy Regiment RA.39
Directing fire from the 64th Regiment onto the vicinity of the Westerbouwing Heights was not driven solely by that sector of the 1st Airborne Divisional perimeter being within range of the guns. German troops had been preparing to move against the 1st Border’s A, C, D and HQ Companies on and north of the Utrechtseweg from shortly after first light on 21 September, but the attack appears to have been delayed by fire from the 1st Airlanding Light Regiment.40 However, the Germans then refocused their attacks on the southern half of the British line starting with Major Thomas Armstrong’s B Company at the southern end of the 1st Border’s line overlooking the Heveadorp ferry from the Westerbouwing Heights. This switch is sometimes assumed to have been a deliberate attempt to prise the 1st Airborne Division away from the Heveadorp ferry and the Lower Rhine generally, but in reality the action was not thought through in that way. Oberleutnant Artur Worrowski’s 600-strong Bataillon from Luftwaffe Ausbildungs und Ersatz Regiment ‘Hermann Göring’ had only arrived from Katwijk-am-Zee during the night of 19-20 September and spent 20 September searching for non-existent ‘paratrooper stragglers’ near Ginkel Heath before moving up to the 1st Airborne Division’s western face during the night of 20-21 September. The fruitless hunt for stragglers was presumably responsible for B Company remaining relatively unmolested the previous day.41 Bataillon Worrowski’s attack, under the overall command of an Oberst Schramm and supported by four of Panzer Kompanie 224’s former French vehicles, went in on schedule at 08:00 German time on 21 September, albeit with no briefing or objectives save the order to move in the general direction of the unlocated British positions. As a result, Worrowski’s men did not so much attack B Company as stumble across it while moving east along the Van der Molenallee, as recalled by an NCO named Herbert Kessler: ‘[They]…turned off the road to the right on to a forest trail, where they halted, packed closely together. So far as they could see there was no trace of the enemy. But this was to change rather soon. The soldiers were sitting on their bicycles without a care in the world when they were surprised by a murderous machine gun fire from the flank. Some of them did not have enough time to take cover somewhere on the ground…After the initial shock was overcome, the inevitable order came, “company attack!”’42
Three of B Company’s rifle Platoons were dug in around the Westerbouwing Restaurant just south of the point where the Van der Molenallee became the Benedendorpsweg, with 11, 13, and 14 Platoons covering the north, west and southern aspects respectively. 12 Platoon was dug into an orchard a hundred yards or so down a slope to the east as Company reserve, where Major Armstrong had established his HQ in an adjacent farmhouse. The Germans appear to have chosen to halt directly in front of and downhill from Lieutenant Stanley Barnes’ 11 Platoon, and the source of the machine-gun fire reported by Kessler was probably an outpost manned by Lieutenant Barnes and a Bren team consisting of Lance-Corporal Albert Wilson and Privates Harry Bragg and Davidson. The outpost held until the Bren jammed and resisted all attempts to clear it, including using the baseplate of a No.36 grenade as a makeshift hammer against the Gun’s cocking-handle. Private Bragg was killed and the three survivors withdrew up the hill toward 11 Platoon, passing an unidentified artillery Forward Observer Officer calling down fire on the advancing Germans on the way; Lance-Corporal Albert Wilson from 11 Platoon recalled the latter ‘coming through the trees like a crowd at a football match’.43
With the brake provided by the British machine-gun fire removed, the German advance overwhelmed 11 Platoon by sheer weight of numbers and overran a 6-Pounder gun before it could engage the Panzer B2 (f) tanks accompanying the attack. Some of Lieutenant Barnes’ men fell back down the slope toward 12 Platoon and Company HQ pursued by the tanks, while the German infantry pushed south into the restaurant perimeter, taking 13 Platoon in the right flank and 14 Platoon from the rear. The commander of 13 Platoon, CanLoan Lieutenant John Wellbelove, was killed alongside Private Francis Jarvis in the confused fighting, along with the commander of 14 Platoon, Sergeant Thomas Watson.44 A number of glider soldiers were captured when the restaurant was
secured and Kessler witnessed them being marched to the rear: ‘Even a cursory glance at the first enemy soldiers revealed that these indeed belonged to a select unit. The lads were tall as trees, well fed and well equipped.’45
The tanks were tackled single-handedly by PIAT gunner Private George Everington from 12 Platoon, who scored a direct hit on the lead vehicle, setting it ablaze and forcing the crew to bail out via the turret. Everington then reportedly knocked out two more Panzer B2 (f)s using the corpse of a cow for cover, the third after it turned away just short of the British positions; the fourth tank withdrew back up the slope with its accompanying infantry, presumably at the sight of Everington’s handiwork.46 Major Armstrong and Company Sergeant-Major Ernest McGladdery rallied the survivors from the three overrun platoons including 13 Platoon Sergeant Terry and Corporal Cyril Crickett with 13 Platoon’s Scout Section and Corporal Ian Hunter from 14 Platoon. After despatching Lieutenant Arthur Royall’s 12 Platoon back to establish a backstop position east of the municipal gasworks, Major Armstrong led the survivors forward up the slope in a counter-attack that reached the restaurant position before being stopped by heavy German fire. Major Armstrong, Sergeant Terry and Corporal Crickett were taken prisoner, the latter two wounded in the chest and hand respectively. CSM McGladdery was reportedly killed, although he may have died of wounds the following day, and Corporal Hunter was wounded in the back and legs while reloading an abandoned PIAT.47 Some of the survivors fell back to 12 Platoon’s location where they were organised into a composite platoon by Lieutenant Barnes, while others retreated north as far as 1st Airlanding Brigade HQ.48
B Company had no direct communication with Battalion HQ as the woods interfered with radio signals and the telephone line laid during the night by the Battalion Signals Platoon had been cut, presumably by the mortar and artillery fire.49 Consequently, Battalion HQ was informed by the B Company second-in-command, Lieutenant Patrick Stott, that the Company had been overrun, while 1st Airlanding Brigade HQ appears to have been made aware by a number of unarmed stragglers that pitched up there. Lieutenant Stott had been despatched to Battalion HQ on the Utrechtseweg with a situation report at some point before 09:00, with the round trip taking the better part of two hours. He therefore arrived back at 12 Platoon’s deserted orchard location in the lull after Major Armstrong’s ill-fated counter-attack. He only realised what had occurred on seeing a Panzer B2 (f) moving down the slope toward the former Company HQ farmhouse as he made his way to the restaurant in search of his comrades. The vehicle was knocked out by Privates Devlin and Fitzgerald deployed in the woods north of the Benedendorpsweg while Stott took shelter in a convenient slit trench; it is unclear whether Devlin and Fitzgerald were manning a 6-Pounder gun or a PIAT. Stott then made his way back to Battalion HQ to report B Company’s apparent disappearance.50 On receiving the news, temporary Battalion commander Major Cousens promptly organised a fighting patrol tasked to sweep the woods south of D Company’s location to the Benedendorpsweg and then regain B Company’s positions. The patrol was commanded by Major Dennis Morrisey and Captain Robert Reese, OC HQ Company and second-in-command of A company, although its strength is unclear; according to the Battalion War Diary it comprised the reformed stragglers and two platoons from HQ Company, whereas Green’s account refers to it being approximately eighteen strong and including Lieutenant Stott and Lieutenant Joseph Tate, the Battalion Liaison Officer.51
Lieutenant Tate was killed in the initial sweep south to the Benedendorpsweg by a German who appeared to be attempting to surrender, and another three Germans were despatched with a grenade in a subsequent encounter.52 Major Morrisey then led an attack across the road that reached B Company’s former positions but again lacked the strength to push on and the attackers were obliged to withdraw to regroup and evacuate casualties. These included Major Morrisey, who was badly wounded in the back; he was succeeded by Major Richard Stewart from Support Company, who continued to patrol on the north side of the Benedendorpsweg to protect the 1st Border’s left flank with the assistance of an unidentified group of Glider Pilots. Stewart’s little force received a resupply of ammunition courtesy of a Private Knott, who drove a loaded Bren Carrier south from Battalion HQ through the German bombardment. The vehicle was knocked out on the return journey but Knott escaped unscathed and delivered eight German prisoners before volunteering to repeat the run with more ammunition and food.
It is unclear if Major Stewart assumed command of, or indeed was aware of the presence of, the remnants of B Company, Lieutenant Royall’s 12 Platoon near the gasworks and Lieutenant Barnes’ approximately thirty-strong composite platoon dug in near the tennis court of a large house called the Dennenord a few hundred yards east of B Company’s former farmhouse HQ. The composite platoon had suffered a number of casualties in an abortive attempt to evict a German machine-gun post located in a summer house in the gardens.53 By midday on Thursday 21 September the 1st Airborne Division had thus lost control of the Westerbouwing Heights along with access to the Heveadorp ferry and was relying on a relative handful of men scattered across at least three locations to hold the south-western sector of the Divisional perimeter. Fortunately for the 1st Airborne Division, their opponents were in no condition to press their advantage. Bataillon Worrowski had paid a high price at the hands of the glider soldiers and the 64th Medium Regiment including the destruction of at least three of Panzer Kompanie 224’s vehicles, exacerbated by a combination of inept leadership and lack of training. Oberst Fritz Fullriede, commander of Ausbildungs und Ersatz Regiment ‘Hermann Göring’ observed: ‘In the attack on Westerbouwing the Worrowski battalion lost all its officers except a lieutenant, and half its other ranks. These casualties were due to a certain Colonel Schramm who was in command of this operation and had forbidden the use of heavy weapons because he was afraid his own men would be hit. The idiot preferred to let hundreds of them die.’54 The dead appear to have included Oberleutnant Worrowski, and the Bataillon bearing his name needed to regroup and reorganise before it could be fed back into the battle.
The main German attack on the remainder of the 1st Border finally got underway in the afternoon of 21 September. Captain William Hodgson’s D Company, which had enjoyed a relatively quiet time the previous day, was heavily mortared during the morning. A number of men from the south-facing 21 Platoon were killed, including the Platoon Commander, Lieutenant Philip Holt;55 the survivors were withdrawn to the Company HQ location on the east side of the Van Borsselenweg to form a reserve. The remainder of D Company, consisting of Lieutenant Alan Green’s 20 Platoon and Lieutenant George Brown’s 22 Platoon, reinforced with two 6-Pounder guns from Lieutenant Anthony Howe’s 25 Anti-tank Platoon, were deployed on the other side of the Van Borsselenweg facing west into the dense woods. Apart from the mortaring the morning passed relatively quietly, although a precursor of what was to come occurred around midday, when at least two heavy tracked vehicles were heard moving in the woods to the Company’s front. The Division RASC element had only gathered in sufficient rations from the previous day’s resupply drop to allow a one-third issue of Compo rations, which D Company’s cooks stretched into a communal stew; this was the Company’s first hot meal for some time and Lieutenant Brown supervised distribution to the Platoon locations.56
The ration party was moving in the open between positions when they were machine-gunned by a Panzer B2 (f) that emerged from the trees on 22 Platoon’s right flank, killing Lieutenant Brown.57 The tank advanced obliquely behind a hedge bordering a field projecting west into the woods, firing its machine-gun into the British positions as it went, while the second vehicle could be heard moving across the Platoon’s front heading for the dead ground used by the German infiltrators the previous morning. The first tank was engaged by a Bren and then a PIAT manned by a Private Parker, who scored a direct hit but with no discernible effect. The nearest 6-Pounder could not be brought to bear, so Lieutenant Howe led Corporal Thomas Langhorn’s crew to the second gun sited at the rear of 22 Platoon’s po
sition, which was hastily manhandled to face the threat, which by this point had closed to within twenty yards. Corporal Langhorn was killed by small-arms fire while steadying the gun muzzle, and his death so incensed the remainder of the crew that they pumped six armour-piercing shots into the tank as it broke through the hedge before they were manhandled away from the gun. The Panzer B2 (f) was stopped by the first hit and then burst into flames, killing the crew. In the meantime Lieutenant Green was wounded while leading a PIAT team forward to ambush the second tank, possibly by friendly fire from the Battalion’s mortars and a defensive barrage from the Airlanding Light Regiment. The barrage nevertheless had the desired effect and the second tank and its supporting infantry broke off the attack and withdrew. That left D Company with Captain Hodgson as the sole unwounded officer, for while Lieutenant Green was able to continue in the line, Lieutenant Howe was wounded in the latter stages of the action badly enough to require evacuation to the Aid Post in the cellar of the Company HQ building. There he found himself lying under an unexploded mortar bomb lodged in the ceiling.58
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