The MDS had also been a matter of discussion higher up the British chain of command. At around midday Brigadier Hackett was summoned to parley with a German officer, accompanied by a StuG or half-track. The German announced that a major attack was about to be launched and requested Hackett withdraw his forward positions 600 yards in order to avoid the German preparatory bombardment falling on the MDS; Hackett responded by arranging another meeting at 15:00 before relaying the German request to the Hotel Hartenstein in person.67 Granting the German request was simply not possible as Hackett’s HQ was only eighty yards west of the Utrechtseweg–Stationsweg crossroads, 1st Airborne Division HQ was around 250 yards further on, and the embattled western side of the perimeter only a half mile beyond that. Consequently, ceding any ground to the Germans along the Utrechtseweg ran the risk of splitting the Divisional perimeter in two.
If Hackett was looking for guidance or advice from his superior on the matter he was to be disappointed. Urquhart told him, ‘You will have to do as you think best, I am not going to influence you.’ After some thought Hackett acknowledged that the MDS would ‘have to take its chances’, to which Urquhart replied ‘That is the conclusion I would have come to.’68 This lack of support from his commander bothered Hackett for many years after the event, although he eventually came to the view that Urquhart was ‘displaying his trust in the judgement of a subordinate rather than avoiding an awkward issue’.69 Hackett returned to the arranged 15:00 meeting with the German officer and politely declined his request, and despite the German threat no bombardment of the MDS sector was forthcoming.
The fact that Hackett’s rejection of the German proposal did not trigger the threatened bombardment was likely down to Lieutenant-Colonel Marrable’s continuing quiet diplomacy inside the Hotel Schoonoord, but as we have seen co-operation there ceased abruptly when the SS troops were fired upon at around 17:00. The upshot was a new ultimatum demanding that the British evacuate a number of positions on the Utrechtseweg west of the crossroads up to and including a small building being used as an RAP by 19:30; failure to do so would see the entire area ‒ including the MDS ‒ subjected to concentrated mortar fire. According to the 4th Parachute Brigade War Diary the MDS promptly relayed news of the ultimatum to Brigadier Hackett, who this time changed tack. Presumably due at least in part to the German demand being more realistic, Hackett exercised his judgement in favour of the approximately 600 casualties and ordered the positions immediately adjacent to the MDS, held by the 21st Independent Parachute Company and the unidentified group from the 1st Polish Independent Parachute Brigade, to be evacuated; this was complete by 19:00.70 Given his hands-on command style and past precedent, one would have expected Hackett to have relayed his withdrawal instruction to Major Wilson, the Poles and the MDS in person, but there is no reference to any such instructions or withdrawal in the 21st Independent Company War Diary or semi-official account, or in Mawson’s MDS account. Nor does Hackett appear to have informed Division HQ of his decision, even though he attended a meeting with Urquhart, Brigadier Philip Hicks and Lieutenant-Colonel Robert Loder-Symons at the Hotel Hartenstein at some point between 19:00 and 20:00.71 There is no reference to the 17:00 German ultimatum in the Division HQ War Diary or Urquhart’s account of the battle; the only mention of the MDS in the War Diary for Saturday 23 September refers to the initial German ultimatum at 13:00, although curiously the entry for 15:27 the following day ends with an order from Major-General Urquhart for the then commander of the 4th Parachute Brigade to ‘stand fast’ in the face of renewed German threats to bombard the Hotels Schoonoord and Vreewijk.72
In fact, the evidence suggests that credit for the lack of German response to the rejection of the 17:00 ultimatum belongs to Lieutenant-Colonel Marrable, apparently without any involvement or input from Brigadier Hackett. The commander of the MDS perambulating around the open area at the rear of the Hotel Schoonoord only slightly mollified the SS, who threatened to call up tanks to bombard the MDS if a guarantee that they would not be fired on again was not forthcoming. Marrable therefore decided the only way to prevent a recurrence was to ‘make personal contact with these [British] troops and put them in the picture’, and persuaded Captain Mawson to approach one of the identified ‘trouble spots’, while he dealt with the other. The unfortunate Mawson thus found himself approaching the 21st Independent Company’s positions bearing a Red Cross flag attached to a broom handle given to him by a Dutch nurse, and after being held briefly at Sten point by suspicious Pathfinder sentries Mawson was ushered into the presence of the irascible Major Wilson, who greeted him with a terse ‘Who the devil are you?’ The meeting went downhill after Mawson relayed Marrable’s request, to which Wilson responded ‘I’m damn well not budging an inch from here. The boot’s on the other bloody foot. The damned Germans fired on us and that’s why we fired back…What do you doctors think this is, drawing room tea at the vicarage?’ When Mawson continued to argue his point about the agreement with the SS and the order from Division HQ to render the MDS area neutral, Wilson exploded again: ‘That’s enough, I don’t give a damn what the Germans say, and I don’t trust ’em more than I would a rattlesnake. I told you. The circumstances [of the Division HQ order] have changed.’ Wilson eventually partially relented, through a combination of Mawson’s suggestion that they contact the Hotel Hartenstein to clarify the official approach and sympathy for Mawson as a parolee POW. The medical officer was instructed to tell Lieutenant-Colonel Marrable that ‘we will evacuate tonight, provided it can be done without loss. If the Germans so much as fire a pistol, they’ve had it.’ On returning safely to the Hotel Schoonoord with his broom handle and Red Cross flag, Mawson discovered that Colonel Marrable had elicited the same reaction and caveated agreement from the Poles, although it is unclear if the promised evacuations actually took place. Whether or not, the SS troops in the Hotel Schoonoord withdrew without further incident shortly after dark, and the immediate area of the MDS remained relatively quiet for the rest of the night.73
While the MDS staff and the casualties in their care were being used as bargaining chips by Kampfgruppe Möller, the Germans were also maintaining the pressure on the remainder of the Oosterbeek perimeter. On the northern face the 7th KOSB had enjoyed a relatively quiet Friday as their night withdrawal to new positions on the line of the Ommershoflaan had broken contact with Kampfgruppe Bruhn and thus put the attackers on the back foot. However, the Germans spent the night of 22-23 September pinpointing the KOSB’s new positions and Saturday reprised the heavy fighting on the Graaf van Rechterenweg two days earlier. The day began quietly for the glider soldiers with no enemy activity during the two-hour Battalion stand-to from 04:30, during which Lieutenant-Colonel Payton-Reid visited the Battalion positions and ordered all ranks to have a hot meal and a shave, using water drawn from a functioning pump discovered within the Battalion perimeter the previous day.74 The quiet ended at 07:30 when a heavy German artillery, mortar and nebelwerfer barrage descended upon the length of the 7th KOSB’s two-company frontage, augmented with machine-gun and small-arms fire that grew in intensity and rendered movement outside houses and slit trenches hazardous in the extreme. The German ground attack commenced during the bombardment. On the right side of the KOSB line a German tank reportedly accompanied by a self-propelled gun introduced B Company to the new German tactic of standing off and systematically shelling the houses to the point of collapse; in this instance the Company’s attached anti-tank gun was unable to interfere because a falling tree rendered the weapon unserviceable, injuring several of the crew. The KOSBs occupying the houses rapidly employed the counter-tactic of temporarily abandoning their posts for the shelter of the surrounding slit trenches, from where they rebuffed the German infantry moving in to mop up before reoccupying their posts indoors.75
On the left half of the 7th KOSB’s line CanLoan Lieutenant James Taylor and 12 Platoon were occupying a narrow strip of woodland just to the front of C Company’s line and were attacked by infantry supported by
a self-propelled gun and what were reported as armoured cars; these may have been the flak half-tracks employed with such deadly effect on the Dreijenseweg on 19 September. Using the trees for cover the German vehicles subjected 12 Platoon to concentrated 20mm fire until they were pushed back to the main C Company line. The Germans then occupied the strip of woodland and established a machine-gun post firing down the street, possibly the Steijnweg, acting as a divider between B and C Companies. The commander of C Company, Captain James Livingstone, ordered 12 Platoon to retake their lost position after organising support from the Battalion’s mortars and MMGs and this was done with heavy casualties being inflicted on the German interlopers; the action cost 12 Platoon an unknown number of dead and half a dozen wounded, including Lieutenant Taylor.76 C Company’s line was re-established by 13:00, although 1st Airlanding Brigade HQ War Diary refers to a heavy German attack beginning just before 15:00 being rebuffed with the assistance of artillery from south of the Lower Rhine; simultaneous German shelling initially led the KOSBs to believe the friendly barrage was falling short.77 The Battalion’s attached anti-tank guns made the Germans keep their distance by reportedly scoring several hits on individual vehicles and using HE projectiles against infantry in the surrounding woods. The work of locating and eliminating German infiltrators continued until dark. Lieutenant-Colonel Payton-Reid and acting RSM Sergeant Russell Tilley from E Squadron the Glider Pilot Regiment managed to escape unscathed after inadvertently walking into a group of German troops occupying British slit trenches, but Battalion Adjutant Captain David Clayhills was not so lucky. He was hit three times by a German machine-gun while conducting a reconnaissance and had to be evacuated to the increasingly overcrowded Battalion RAP run by Captain John Buck RAMC from 156 Parachute Battalion and the Battalion padre, Captain James Morrison. Colonel Payton-Reid had another close shave whilst conferring with Captain George Steer from the Battalion Mortar Group and Drum-Major Andrew Tait when the slit trench they were occupying received almost direct hits from two German shells in quick succession.78 Drum-Major Tait was injured to the extent of requiring evacuation to the RAP, Colonel Payton-Reid received a minor wound and Captain Steer was, perhaps unsurprisingly, reported as being ‘severely shell shocked’. An element of bitterness appears to have begun to creep into the fighting at this point, with the Battalion War Diary referring to the deliberate targeting of three of the Battalion’s stretcher bearers by German snipers; as a result a number of the Battalion’s wounded could not be collected until after dark.79
On the north-western sector of the 1st Airborne’s perimeter Captain John Cormie and the 4th Parachute Squadron RE, along with fellow Sappers from the 9th (Airborne) Field Company RE, 261 (Airborne) Field Park Company and Glider Pilots from No. 2 Wing’s E and F Squadrons, did not come under such sustained attack in their positions near the Sonnenberg. The only formal German attack was an infantry-only affair that began at 13:15 and which was not pressed particularly hard, probably because of the lack of armoured support.80 According to Sapper Arthur Ayers from the 4th Parachute Squadron’s 3 Troop, the Germans ‘would approach to within grenade throwing distance then retreat back into the trees’.81 Once again, the unremitting German bombardment proved to be at least as dangerous as their direct attacks. Lieutenant Norman Thomas was deafened by a mortar bomb that burst on the lip of his slit trench, badly wounding the other occupant, and a Sapper Mackintosh was wounded in the forehead by shrapnel whilst scrambling for cover; Lieutenant Thomas’ hearing was permanently damaged and Sapper Mackintosh subsequently lost the sight in his left eye. As the MDS was no longer able to receive casualties the wounded had to be retained and treated in the cellar of Squadron HQ, as graphically described by Sapper Ayers on visiting the cellar for a rest: ‘I was unprepared for the sight that met my eyes, most of the floor space was covered with wounded men, laying on the cold stone floor. Some, in spite of medical help were dying, others lay unconscious with their white faces staring at the ceiling, wincing even as they slept.’82
Captain James Smith, commanding the 4th Parachute Squadron’s 1 Troop, was knocked unconscious by a ricocheting mortar bomb that struck him square in the chest as he moved through the woods near the Sonnenberg. Remarkably, on regaining consciousness he discovered that while the mortar bomb had not detonated, the impact had punctured the brandy flask carried in a breast pocket; he was furious at the loss of the precious liquid.83 The Squadron War Diary refers to losing between four and eight Other Ranks wounded and five killed during the course of the day.84 The dead included Sapper Bernard Higgins and Sapper Leonard Rawlings, both from 2 Troop.85
The 9th Field Company RE and No. 2 Wing GPR endured a relatively quiet Saturday because they were coincidentally occupying the eye of the storm that was to engulf the remainder of the western side of the 1st Airborne Division’s perimeter. The 1st Border was still largely holding the positions on the Phase II line it had occupied in the early morning of Tuesday 19 September on moving from LZ Z. On the right of the line Major Thomas Montgomery’s A Company was holding what was now the north-west shoulder of the Division perimeter, with Major William Neill’s C Company to the south straddling the Utrechtseweg near the Koude Herberg crossroads. The wooded section of the frontage between the Companies was occupied by the 9th Parachute Company RE and No. 2 Wing GPR, and C Company’s line extended into the woods southward along the line of the Van Borsselenweg to link up with D Company, oriented along the same line. The remaining section of the perimeter running down to the Lower Rhine had originally been manned by B Company, but Major Armstrong’s unit had been driven off the Westerbouwing Heights by Bataillon Worrowski in the morning of 21 September and was virtually wiped out in the process. The survivors, Lieutenant Arthur Royall’s 12 Platoon and a composite platoon commanded by Lieutenant Stanley Barnes, were dug in east along the riverside Benedendorpsweg near the municipal gasworks and the Dennenord house respectively; another ad hoc force commanded by Major Richard Stewart from Support Company was maintaining a roving patrol along the Benedendorpsweg. The open left flank created by the destruction of B Company was filled by BREESE Force.
The night on the western perimeter passed relatively quietly with the cessation of direct German attacks at around 19:30 on Friday 22 September, which gave way to the by now standard harassing mortar and artillery fire, and at 02:00 A Company received fourteen reinforcements from Division HQ reserve as partial recompense for the two depleted Platoons detached to BREESE Force.86 The German barrage resumed in full force along the entirety of the 1st Border’s frontage at 05:20 and continued throughout the morning, falling particularly heavily upon the remnants of B Company at the southern end of the line.87 The barrage killed Lieutenant Coulston, with command devolving to a Sergeant J. Davidson.88 Infiltrators were mostly kept at bay by British patrols roving between B Company’s locations but even then one enemy group managed to occupy B Company’s RAP on the Dennenord, which was being run by the Dutch occupants of the house. The interlopers were promptly evicted by Corporal Thomas Edgar, who entered the house alone, killed most of them with his Sten gun and drove out the rest; he was killed later in the day by a wounded German officer.89 The remainder of the 1st Border’s line came under direct attack from SS Bataillonen Schulz, Oelkers and Eberwein, supported by self-propelled guns and Panzer Kompanie 224’s flame-throwing tanks. D Company suffered repeated attacks that reduced its strength to just twenty-five by the onset of darkness.They were cut off and surrounded, with radio the only contact with the rest of the Battalion; this ceased as the supply of batteries ran down and several attempts to re-establish contact via patrols after dark were unsuccessful.90 C Company came under direct attack at around midday but managed to maintain its position astride the Utrechtseweg until a further German attack at 17:30, supported by self-propelled guns, pushed deep into the Company’s positions. The interlopers were driven out in a fierce counter-attack organised and led by Company commander Major William Neill despite his being wounded four times in the course of the day�
��s fighting, which restored the Company line by 19:20. Major Neill then led a fighting patrol from 19 Platoon in pursuit of the retreating Germans that attacked and overran a German strong point located in some houses by a crossroads, possibly at the Koude Herberg. Neill provided covering fire for the assault using a Bren gun resting on the shoulder of Private Robert Lee, and was subsequently awarded the Distinguished Service Order for this and his performance across the whole nine-day battle. Lance-Corporal Douglas Payne was badly wounded in the face and left side by a German mortar bomb during the action, severely enough to be left for dead by his withdrawing comrades; he made his own way back to C Company’s lines after regaining consciousness, but was wounded again by machine-gun fire as he reached safety.91
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