Pilot Officer Pring had put the Dakota down on the polder close to the railway bridge, and all three men were hit by German small-arms fire after escaping from the burning wreck. Warrant Officer Springsteele was killed instantly, Flight-Sergeant Gleave was shot twice in the stomach and Sergeant Colman was hit multiple times. Eventually the two survivors were attended by German medical personnel who, after a shouted argument with the shooters, evacuated them to the St Elizabeth Hospital. Sergeant Colman died the following day.117
Most of No. 38 Group’s six Squadrons benefitted from the close fighter support. All seven of No. 190 Squadron’s Stirlings returned to Fairford unscathed apart from minor damage, while eleven of No. 196 Squadron’s thirteen-strong contingent landed safely at Keevil. Flying Officer W. A. Sparks’ aircraft was damaged by anti-aircraft fire near Oosterbeek and crash-landed sixty miles to the south near Valkenswaard; Flying Officer Sparks was injured along with his wireless operator, Flight-Sergeant J. E. Herring. The Stirling piloted by Flying Officer J. A. Norton was struck by flak over the drop zone that injured flight engineer Sergeant F. Gill and blew off part of the port outer propeller, obliging Norton to land the damaged machine at Manston in Kent. Five of the remainder sustained varying degrees of light damage to nose, fuselage and in one instance the bomb bay, while Flying Officer F. T. Powell’s aircraft suffered a punctured port tyre but landed safely.118 Flight Lieutenant E. P. Byrom’s machine from No. 295 Squadron also suffered damage to one of its inner engines, which obliged a forced landing at Ghent from which all the crew emerged unhurt.119 Several of No. 299 Squadron’s crews referred to not seeing any anti-aircraft fire at all, although there were complaints about aircraft releasing their loads too high and obliging those flying behind at the correct altitude to take evasive action to avoid being struck by the falling panniers and containers. Nonetheless, four machines suffered minor flak damage and Pilot Officer I. T. Rowell’s aircraft was shot down after dropping its load; Rowell and two members of his crew were wounded, one seriously, but all were safely evacuated to the UK.120
By this point FlaK Brigade Svoboda possessed in excess of thirty-three 88mm pieces supported by at least eight 37mm and twenty-nine 20mm automatic flak guns, operating under a new centralised tactic of throwing up a concentrated barrage across the transport’s line of approach, rather than permitting gun commanders to engage individual aircraft as they saw fit.121 The guns were unable to fully engage whilst the escorting Allied fighter-bombers were in the vicinity, but once the fighters moved on, the transports toward the tail end of the stream were increasingly exposed to their fire. The resultant upsurge in anti-aircraft fire appears to have hit No. 620 Squadron first, which noted that ‘shortly before reaching the dropping zone, the stream of aircraft ran into severe A.A. fire’, badly damaging a number of aircraft. All returned safely to Fairford apart from the Squadron commander, Wing-Commander D. H. Lee DFC, who crash-landed near Ussen, just south of the River Maas twenty-five miles south-west of Oosterbeek; Lee and his entire crew emerged unscathed and were back with their Squadron within forty-eight hours.122 By the time No. 570 Squadron’s aircraft at the rear of the stream approached the dropping area the German blocking barrage was fully established and the Stirlings flew into a wall of shell bursts and tracer that claimed four Stirlings in quick succession. Pilot Officer William Kirkham’s machine was hit over the drop zone and crashed near the Planken Wambuis on the Arnhem‒Ede road just north of LZ S, killing all on board apart from Air Gunner Flight-Sergeant G. Wood and one of the RASC despatchers, Driver S. Badham.123 Flying Officer William Baker RCAF’s Stirling crashed at Panoramahoeve, just south of the Arnhem‒Ede railway six miles west of Oosterbeek, killing everyone on board.124 Flying Officer C. M. Beck RCAF’s machine was severely damaged and crashed on the south bank of the Lower Rhine at Heteren, three miles west of Driel; Beck and his Wireless Operator, Sergeant S. Wheatley, survived the crash and evaded capture but the remaining five members of the crew were killed.125 Flak damage that wounded the two RASC despatchers also obliged Squadron Leader R. W. F. Cleaver to crash-land on the south bank of the Lower Rhine but without injury or loss of life, and the whole crew subsequently returned to the UK. Two more machines failed to make it back to Harwell. Flying Officer B. S. Murphy’s Stirling was severely damaged but managed to limp 130 miles before crash-landing at Ghent in Belgium while Flying Officer G. J. H. Burkby made it across the English Channel to force-land at Manston; neither crew suffered any casualties. Three of the eight Stirlings that made it back to Fairford were also damaged, one badly and another to the point it appears to have been written off; an Air Gunner and Wireless Operator from two separate machines were also wounded.
The Friday 23 September resupply effort thus cost two Dakotas and four Stirlings shot down in the vicinity of Oosterbeek, with several more crash or force-landing along the Airborne Corridor, across Belgium and as far away as Kent. Approximately thirty-three RAF and RASC personnel were killed and a smaller number wounded. The pity was that the vast bulk of the supplies delivered at such cost again did not reach the intended recipients, a fact those involved appear to have been fully cognisant of; No. 570 Squadron considered it ‘rather an expensive effort especially in view of the fact that the troops were not getting a great percentage of the supplies’.126 This was not solely due to the slowly shrinking and already relatively tiny Airborne perimeter at Oosterbeek. The precise drop zones the bulk of the Squadrons were aiming for are unclear from the records, although No. 299 Squadron referred to ‘dropping on DZ flashing “A”’ and other signals, while No. 437 Squadron RCAF reported being guided by Verey lights and a ‘drop here’ sign of some description.127 However, Nos. 48 and 271 Squadrons at least were still being briefed to deliver their loads onto DZ V, which had never actually been in British hands and lay over a mile outside the Oosterbeek perimeter to the north-east; this meant that at least 269 panniers and seventeen medical bundles were – if dropped accurately – delivered into German-held territory.128 Only a fraction of the dropped materiel was recovered by its intended recipients, some and possibly all by elements of the 1st Airlanding Brigade, and duly passed on to Division HQ at the Hotel Hartenstein.129 There the materiel remained as there was no practical means of distributing it, not least because the detachment of 250 (Airborne) Light Composite Company RASC responsible for such work had been seconded to 4th Parachute Brigade HQ as infantry reinforcements the previous day.130 Even if that had not been the case the task would not have been achievable as the constant German bombardment and shortage of manpower ruled out manual distribution, while the streets within the perimeter were ‘ so blocked by falling trees, branches and houses that movement in jeeps [was] virtually impossible. Jeeps [were] in any case practically out of action’.131 As we have seen, the beleaguered Airborne troops were being forced to gather and employ captured enemy weapons and ammunition by this point, and to forage for whatever food they could find to eke out the last remnants of their rations. The seriousness of the food situation is well illustrated by an evening entry in the 1st Airlanding Brigade HQ War Diary: ‘A ration distribution, the first at Brigade HQ, worked out at one sardine and some biscuits per man.’132
The Saturday supply drop was preceded by a small piece of unfinished business. As we have seen, after repeated cancellations the 1st Polish Independent Parachute Brigade had finally taken off for Holland at 13:10 aboard 114 C-47s from the US 314th and 315th Troop Carrier Groups on Thursday 21 September, but when worsening weather prompted a recall only forty-one transports aborted the drop owing to a signal mix-up. Two of the returning aircraft carried sticks from the 2nd Battalion, eleven from the 3rd Battalion and the rest from the 1st Battalion, apparently in its entirety; one machine with a faulty radio reportedly overshot its home base in the cloudy murk and ended up in Ireland.133 Major Marian Tonn, commander of the 1st Battalion, took command of the Polish strays and was ordered to have them at their respective airfield at 12:00 the following day in readiness for an afternoon take-off. By that time
Major Tonn had received two rebuffs, the first to his seemingly reasonable request that all the outstanding Polish sticks be concentrated at a single airfield. It is unclear if the refusal originated with the USAAF or British liaison staff, but the latter were reportedly responsible for refusing a Polish request for fresh parachutes, on the grounds that those available had sat for several days in damp and wet conditions and were thus likely to malfunction. The unnamed British liaison officer responded by pointing out that the parachutes were in good order and countered by asking if Tonn was refusing to allow his men to jump; Tonn denied this but announced he would lodge an official protest in case any of his men were killed by parachute malfunction. A third and arguably more serious rebuff occurred thirty minutes after Tonn had arrived at RAF Spanhoe, when he was informed that he and his men were not to be dropped at Driel but at the US DZ O near Grave, around twenty miles distant and on the wrong side of the River Maas from the remainder of their Brigade. Tonn promptly protested to the commander of the 315th Troop Carrier Group, who replied that the matter was out of USAAF hands, after which Tonn was handed written orders and maps by the unnamed British liaison officer, who also informed the Polish commander that he would be met by another British liaison officer on the ground at Grave. Tonn’s concern was understandable, but the German anti-aircraft fire that had greeted the main Polish drop on 21 September ‒ and more importantly that against the British supply drop on 23 September ‒ suggests the decision to deliver the Poles farther south was the correct one. As it turned out, the drop was cancelled at 13:00 and the Polish paratroopers were trucked the weary ten miles or so back to their billets once again.134
Major Tonn and his 559 men finally got away at 13:45 in the afternoon of Saturday 23 September, carried in forty-one C-47s drawn from the 315th Troop Carrier Group, along with 219 parachute packs of supplies and equipment.135 The flight across the North Sea and up the Airborne Corridor was uneventful and the Poles dropped onto DZ O at 16:43 or 16:47 depending on the account.136 They were preceded by a glider landing carrying reinforcements for the 82nd Airborne Division on the same landing area, which sandwiched the Polish drop with a second increment of a hundred Waco CG4s that commenced landing just seven minutes after the last Polish paratrooper was down. High winds across the DZ caused a number of landing injuries, but the Poles and their containers were clear of the landing area before the gliders started coming in. Within an hour Major Tonn had been met by a British Lieutenant-Colonel from Browning’s Forward Corps HQ accompanied by a US officer, who took him to 82nd Airborne Division HQ where he was ordered to proceed to a wooded area near Malden, seven miles or so to the east, and await further orders. While briefing his men for the move Tonn was approached by another US officer, who informed him a Polish officer was looking for him. This was Captain Kazimierz Dendor, a Polish liaison officer also attached to the Forward Airborne Corps HQ. Dendor was unable to arrange transport for Tonn and his men to reach the rest of the Brigade, but promised to return with more information the following day; he also agreed to get word of the 1st Battalion’s arrival to Sosabowski, although the Brigade War Diary suggests he did not manage to do so.137 New orders came through placing Tonn under command of the 82nd Airborne Division until further notice, and the Poles were provided with US rations and tasked to protect a newly arrived US anti-tank unit for the night.138
***
On the south bank of the Lower Rhine 30 Corps spent Saturday 23 September consolidating and expanding its bridgehead over the River Waal at Nijmegen. As described, by midnight the previous day the 43rd Division had established a solid presence on the north bank of the River Waal with Lieutenant-Colonel George Taylor’s 5th Duke of Cornwall’s Light Infantry (DCLI) safely ensconced in Driel with the 1st Polish Independent Parachute Brigade, following its encounter and successful ambush of the Tiger and Panther tanks from schwere Panzer Kompanie Hummel and SS Panzer Regiment 10 near the De Hoop crossroads. The remainder of Brigadier Hubert Essame’s 214 Infantry Brigade, the 1st Battalion The Worcester Regiment and 7th Battalion Somerset Light Infantry, were occupying Valburg and Oosterhout respectively on the bridgehead perimeter. As the various delays meant that its objectives for Friday had not been achieved, 30 Corps issued a new set of instructions. The 5th Guards Armoured Brigade was to take over the eastern sector of the bridgehead perimeter and keep an armoured regiment on standby to support the 43rd Division, while the the 43rd was to protect the Nijmegen bridges, capture Elst, strengthen the tenuous link with the 1st Airborne Division and reconnoitre westwards between the River Waal and the Lower Rhine.139 The orders may have been issued while Lieutenant-General Horrocks was temporarily cut off from his HQ whilst reporting to the commander of the British 2nd Army, Lieutenant-General Sir Miles Dempsey, at Veghel. A major attack by Panzer Brigade 107 and 59 Infanterie Division on 22 September cut the Nijmegen road between Veghel and Uden and it remained closed until it was reopened by elements of the 101st Airborne Division and the 32nd Guards Brigade Group in the afternoon of the following day; Horrocks appears to have issued a more detailed set of instructions on regaining his HQ.140
Major-General Ivor Thomas had originally intended 214 Brigade to head the 43rd Division’s push north to Driel whilst Brigadier Gerard Mole’s 129 Infantry Brigade advanced up the Arnhem‒Nijmegen highway to secure the Arnhem road bridge, but the fighting on 22 September had left those formations dispersed and needing time to regroup. 214 Brigade were spread across Driel, Oosterhout and Valburg and 129 Infantry Brigade were straddling the River Waal with one battalion bogged down in front of Ressen just north of the Nijmegen bridges. For 23 September Thomas therefore reorganised his unit assignments and ordered Brigadier Ben Walton’s 130 Infantry Brigade, which had recently regrouped south of the Waal after its constituent battalions had been released from guarding the bridges at Grave and Neerbosch and assisting in clearing Nijmegen. Walton was instructed to reach the Lower Rhine by following the 5th DCLI’s route to Driel via Valburg, with his Brigade travelling in DUKW amphibious trucks. It is unclear if the vehicles were provided specifically for the mission or whether they had been in use hitherto. Walton was reinforced with Sherman tanks from the 13th/18th Hussars. These vehicles had been attached to 129 Brigade for the attack toward Ressen but were redeployed because the close country and wide drainage ditches on that axis severely restricted their utility. A number of vehicles carrying twelve, fourteen or sixteen collapsible canvas assault boats were also attached to 130 Brigade for the advance to the Lower Rhine; the precise number varies between sources.141 The vessels, which were reportedly the survivors of the US 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment’s epic assault crossing of the River Waal on Wednesday 20 September, were accompanied by 3 Platoon, 204 Field Company RE, which was specially trained in river crossing techniques.142 For its part, 129 Brigade was to continue to push against the German blocking line north of the Nijmegen bridges toward Ressen, while 214 Brigade was to clear the way for 130 Brigade by having the 7th Battalion Somerset Light Infantry vacate Oosterhout no later than 06:30 and then attack Elst in conjunction with the 1st Battalion The Worcestershire Regiment no earlier than 10:00, supported by tanks from the 4th/7th Dragoon Guards. Finally, 43 Reconnaissance Regiment were to probe westward beyond Valburg to assess German strength in the area between the Waal and Lower Rhine.143
130 Brigade crossed the River Waal after first light in heavy rain and mist, with Lieutenant-Colonel Basil Coad’s 5th Battalion Dorsets in the lead followed by Lieutenant-Colonel Dennis Talbot’s 7th Hampshires. Brigadier Walton’s HQ came next, followed by Lieutenant-Colonel Gerald Tilley’s 4th Dorsets Regiment to which were attached the vehicles carrying the assault boats.144 The column passed along the elevated riverside road, through Slijk-Ewijk and into Valburg without incident, apart from some difficulty manoeuvring the DUKWs on the narrow embanked roads. All went well until the column approached a crossroads at Valburg, where German observers called down an artillery barrage intensified with direct fire from German tanks in Elst to the east.
The shellfire hit a number of DUKWs and split the 5th Dorset’s section of the column, with Lieutenant-Colonel Coad and approximately half his Battalion continuing unscathed to arrive at Driel at 11:30 while the rest of the Brigade came to a halt and sought cover. There then followed several hours of delay while the infantry debussed and made their way through the artillery fire via the deep drainage ditches alongside the road, whilst the DUKWs and other vehicles made best speed along the carriageway under covering fire from the Brigade’s organic anti-tank guns and a mortar smokescreen; the latter were likely employed because the 43rd Division’s artillery was fully engaged supporting the attack on Elst. As a result, 130 Brigade did not reach its assigned position on the Lower Rhine near Driel until the late afternoon. The reunited 5th Dorsets deployed on the bank of the Lower Rhine, probably to the east of Driel, the 7th Hampshires occupied Heteren to the west of Driel and Brigadier Walton set up his HQ at Homoet, four miles or so to the south-west, with the 4th Dorsets nearby in Brigade reserve.145
The delay at Valburg adversely affected 214 Brigade’s attack on Elst. The waterlogged ground restricted much of Brigadier Essame’s transport to the roads, and as the only route to the Brigade assembly area ran through Valburg it became entangled in 130 Brigade’s traffic jam. The attack on Elst could not therefore go in as scheduled, although Brigadier Essame had some difficulty in getting Major-General Thomas to understand the situation via radio, prompting the Division commander to go forward to assess the situation in person. He arrived just as Essame was holding a final pre-attack meeting with his commanders over a snooker table in a local hostelry, as the traffic situation had finally been resolved. The area was still under German artillery fire and Thomas’ arrival coincided with a salvo that blew out all the hostelry windows and caused a number of casualties outside the building; Thomas expressed his dissatisfaction with the location of the meeting with his ‘normal brevity and force’ before a second salvo ‘brought the conference to an even speedier conclusion’ than was customary.146 The attack went in at 16:55. Attacking over drier ground from the west, Lieutenant-Colonel Robert Osborne-Smith’s 1st Worcesters led with D Company in front supported by Shermans from C Squadron 4th/7th Dragoon Guards, and by nightfall the Battalion was firmly ensconced in the western outskirts of Elst, having knocked out two Panthers and a Tiger getting there. On the right, the 7th Somerset Light Infantry had more difficulty rendezvousing with its vehicles and tank support after the infantry component had pushed forward on foot owing to the boggy nature of the attack frontage but nonetheless reached its objective, a crossroads south-west of Elst, against ‘slight opposition’. Lieutenant-Colonel Borradaile therefore pushed his D Company on to secure another crossroads on the main Nijmegen‒Arnhem road and thus inadvertently severed the main German line of communication with the units blocking the advance northward from the Nijmegen bridges. The development was of little immediate assistance to 129 Brigade’s continuing push toward Ressen but within an hour D Company had captured or shot up ‘two despatch riders, a 20mm A.A. gun complete with crew, an artillery officer and a ration truck’. Confused fighting continued through the night.
Arnhem Page 92