From this block, which was around 150 yards deep north to south, ‘it was felt we could put up a stiff defence and from which we could inflict considerable casualties on any enemy,’ although only half- a-dozen houses could be actually occupied in each row because by this point the Battalion’s strength had been reduced to just seven Officers and under a hundred Other Ranks.75 The Glider Pilots’ withdrawal from the woods back to the Oranjeweg at 17:00 exposed the left flank of the 7th KOSB’s new position and ceded the enemy a concealed forming-up point just fifty yards or so from the KOSB line. The KOSB’s 3-Inch mortars attempted to head off German attack preparations by bombarding likely points but with limited success. They began to lay a smokescreen in preparation for an attack an hour or so after the Glider Pilots’ withdrawal. The day was saved by Captain John Walker from the 1st Airlanding Light Regiment, who was acting as Forward Observer for the Battalion, although his effectiveness had been reduced by the fighting on much of the perimeter being too close for the 1st Airlanding Light Regiment’s 75mm Pack Howitzers to bring fire to bear.76 Captain Taylor called in concentrations from the medium guns of the 64th Medium Regiment RA at 18:11 and 18:20.77 This had the desired effect: ‘The Bn stood to until after dark awaiting it [the attack], but, although there were signs of activity, it did not materialise.’78
Captain David Allsop’s 1st Airborne Reconnaissance Squadron was holding the north-eastern sector of the perimeter and came under heavy and sustained mortar and artillery fire from around 06:30. The Squadron HQ, located at the junction of the Utrechtseweg and Oranjeweg 200 yards or so west of the Hotel Hartenstein, reported the bombardment as having ‘no comparison with anything which has come our way previously’.79 It also claimed a noteworthy scalp from outwith the Reconnaissance Squadron. Brigadier John Hackett had paid another early morning visit to Captain Allsop, in this instance to arrange guides to bring in the Polish paratroopers assigned to HACKETT Force, as the eastern face of the perimeter was sometimes called; he was hit in the stomach and thigh by mortar fragments at 07:40 whilst making his way back to his own HQ at the height of the bombardment.80 The commander of No. 1 Wing GPR, Lieutenant-Colonel Iain Murray, was immediately elevated in Hackett’s stead within the hour, while Major Ian Toler from B Squadron took command of No. 1 Wing at 09:55. Hackett officially handed over command to Lieutenant-Colonel Murray in the Division RAP at around 14:00, where he was visited by Major-General Urquhart before being evacuated to the MDS at the Hotel Schoonoord for treatment.81 Back at the Utrechtseweg‒Oranjeweg junction, the barrage lulled at 09:30 before resuming at 10:15, and was reportedly ‘even more fierce than the previous plastering’.82 The enemy fire originated from the west with the orders and the sound of bombs leaving mortar tubes being clearly audible emanating from the woods near the Sonnenberg. The bombardment continued until around 14:00, when the appearance of Hawker Typhoon fighter-bombers from the 2nd Tactical Air Force’s No. 83 Group forced another pause; the Group flew twenty-two sorties to the Oosterbeek pocket on 24 September and was able to access the pocket because there were no resupply flights scheduled for the day.83 The bombardment resumed at 15:30 with the departure of the RAF aircraft and was replaced fifteen minutes later with direct fire from what was reported as a self-propelled gun firing from the woods near the Sonnenberglaan in support of a German infantry attack on the perimeter there; when the enemy withdrew into the woods the HQ was then subjected to alternating mortaring and heavy machine-gun fire until the onset of darkness at 19:30, the source of which could not be ascertained. By this time Captain Allsop and his men were out of contact with A and D Troops as well as Division HQ, just 200 yards or so away across the Utrechtseweg. Four HQ personnel became casualties in the course of the day, at least one of whom was killed. Trooper Alfred Odd was sharing a slit trench with Trooper Michael Gassett and was killed by a single gunshot to the head while searching for a sniper with binoculars.84
Out at the north-eastern sector of the perimeter Captain John Park’s D Troop had been reduced to two officers and thirteen Other Ranks by the previous day’s fighting, which was why the Germans were able to infiltrate into the 7th KOSB’s right flank. D Troop lost two more casualties early on when a patrol to draw water from a nearby well came under intense machine-gun fire at 07:00; the gun was registered on the well and had killed a number of earlier would-be users.85 German patrols then began to push into the perimeter around D Troop’s location from 10:00 and ninety minutes later launched a heavy attack under cover of a ‘terrific’ mortar barrage. The attackers were held, although Captain Park, Lieutenant Alan Pascal and Trooper Thomas Walker were all killed during the fighting; according to Sergeant James Pyper the three were occupying the same slit trench and were decapitated by the blast and shrapnel from a mortar bomb.86 The appearance of the Typhoons in the afternoon prompted the attackers to cease their activities temporarily to avoid being targeted and also provided the beleaguered Airborne soldiers with a welcome morale boost, as noted by Sergeant William Bentnall: ‘We were treated to an attack by rocket firing Typhoons…fearsome things, with a shark’s head and teeth painted on the undernose, and rockets screaming.’87 The German attack inevitably resumed once the fighters withdrew and the remaining D Troop men fought on until their ammunition ran out; the position was finally overrun at around 18:00. Sergeants Pyper and Bentnall were taken prisoner along with four other unnamed men; it is unclear what became of the other four members of the Troop. This was not the end of the story for the Sergeants and their party, however. Quickly escaping from incarceration in a nearby house on the Steijnweg, the six took refuge from the rain and patrolling Germans in a wrecked shop farther down the street where they discovered a cellar stacked with potatoes. After all had attacked the raw vegetables (not recommended in normal circumstances), Sergeants Bentnall and Pyper left the four with the potato pile and moved into an upstairs room. Pyper took shelter behind an overturned table and Bentnall crawled beneath a settee. They were joined by a party of Germans also seeking a comfortable spot to spend the night. The darkness saved the Reconnaissance NCOs from detection, although Sergeant Bentnall spent the remainder of the night with his nose ground into the floor and a spring digging into his spine thanks to the German occupying the settee above him; he crammed a rag into his mouth to stifle a cough.88
Just a hundred yards or so to the east, A Troop had spent the early hours digging trenches in the rain around the houses it now occupied on De la Reijweg, sited and supervised by Lieutenant Douglas Galbraith; the latter also appears to have taken command of the Troop at some point during the morning after Captain Michael Grubb, who had been badly wound in the foot the previous day during the withdrawal from its position on the Paul Krugerstraat, finally agreed to be evacuated to the MDS.89 Although the sound of armoured vehicles was noted first thing, German activity during the morning appears to have been restricted to intense mortaring, sniping and machine-gun fire alternating with aggressive probing, presumably intended to pinpoint A Troop’s new positions. Trooper William Fraser recalled it was ‘difficult to know where to go to be safe, because the Germans were firing all the time, in through the windows or any holes in the walls’ and that the enemy tracer ammunition looked like ‘firework sparklers’, while out in the garden of the same house Troopers Kenneth Hope and Ronald Spicer were pinned down for a considerable period by very accurate rifle fire, the source of which they were unable to locate. The early afternoon respite created by the RAF Typhoons also applied to A Troop, with Corporal James Taylor witnessing the rocket attack on the German-held house as enjoyed by D Troop, albeit from closer quarters, given that he reported the blast effect made him feel ‘as if my head were freewheeling’.90 The Germans launched a full-scale assault once the fighter-bombers departed at around 15:30 and while Lieutenant Galbraith and his men managed to maintain their positions and repulse the attackers, it was a close-run thing. One of the A Troop houses was hit by a large-calibre projectile, possibly a 105mm shell from a Sturmhaubitze 42, which blew a four-foot-wide ho
le in the wall, stunning Trooper Stanley Sutherby who was standing in the doorway and prompting a stampede to escape the building. Trooper Fraser was standing near the bottom of the stairs: the next thing that happened was a terrific bang, and I was hit…I staggered up and tried to make for the door, but it was difficult, because I couldn’t see properly.’ Badly wounded in the head and bleeding profusely, Trooper Fraser staggered outside and tried to enter the slit trench occupied by understandably alarmed Troopers Hope and Spicer; at that point Lieutenant Galbraith appeared and calmly enquired ‘Where the bloody hell do you think you’re all going – now just bloody well settle down,’ thereby quelling a potential panic before it could take hold. With the German attack repulsed A Troop was obliged to consolidate into a more concentrated location at the southern end of the De la Reijweg, where they became intermingled with men from the similarly compressed 7th KOSB.91
The adjacent Stationsweg positions, held by Major Geoffrey Powell’s party from 156 Parachute Battalion and the 21st Independent Company straddling the Utrechtseweg junction, appear to have been left unmolested through the morning apart from intense mortaring, machine-gun fire and sniping. The Independent Company reported coming under fire from nebelwerfers, 88mm guns, StuGs and snipers who had apparently infiltrated behind No. 1 Platoon’s positions via the MDS, and also mortar bombs containing phosphorous being used to set fire to the British-held houses.92 Reinforcements were on the way for the beleaguered Pathfinders however, for at 11:00 the initial increment of paratroopers from the Polish Brigade’s 3rd Battalion arrived at the positions occupied by Lieutenant David Eastwood’s No. 1 Platoon, where they were to man the sector of the perimeter on the Stationsweg running north from the Utrechtseweg junction. This included No. 2, a large mansion called the Quatre Bras overlooking the junction and No. 8 belonging to the Kremer family; by this point the Kremer’s cellar was also sheltering thirty-three civilians from adjacent houses that had been destroyed or rendered uninhabitable by the fighting.93 The Poles’ unexpected and somewhat noisy arrival came as a surprise to No. 1 Platoon. Private William Mollett noted them moving into the rear of the house next door occupied by Sergeant Ron Kent’s Section who heard ‘the chatter of many voices, sounding very like German…[which]…sent me scuttling downstairs with my Sten gun at the ready’.94
The Poles’ journey to their new position had not been a smooth one. After being gathered near Division HQ at 09:00, Captain Gazurek and his men were led through the southern portion of Oosterbeek to 4th Parachute Brigade HQ by No. 1 Wing GPR’s Intelligence Officer Lieutenant Brian Bottomley, losing at least one man en route; Lieutenant Bottomley may have been brought in as staff by the newly installed Lieutenant-Colonel Murray, who briefed Captain Gazurek on his role and guided him toward his new positions.95 In order to reach the Stationsweg the Poles had to cross to the north side of the Utrechtseweg, and a point twenty yards west of the Utrechtseweg‒Stationsweg junction was selected, where a rise in the road partially deflected German fire coming down the road. Here Captain Gazurek organised the order of crossing with Lieutenant Mieczyslaw Pudelko’s 7th Company leading, followed by the Battalion HQ elements and 2nd Lieutenant Leon Prochowski’s Platoon from the 9th Company bringing up the rear. The paratroopers were sent across in small numbers in an effort to avoid attracting German attention and Captain Gazurek was one of the first across, moving with elements of 2nd Lieutenant Waclaw Urbanski’s platoon, accompanied by Corporal Jan Towarnicki from the Battalion HQ element armed with a Bren gun. Private Mikolaj Bzowy from Urbanski’s platoon was hit in the stomach while crossing and died later that day.96
Moving behind the buildings Captain Gazurek reached the back garden of the Quatre Bras where he made contact with the Pathfinders within and took shelter from German machine-gun fire with the first of his men; their reportedly noisy arrival was presumably what had alarmed Sergeant Kent, together with the machine-gun fire from German troops involved in the nearby fight with the Reconnaissance Squadron on De la Reijweg. Accompanied by Corporal Towarnicki, Captain Gazurek then led the 7th Company north in person through the back gardens and into and through the Kremer house, where he sent Towarnicki back to guide those following before scaling the six-foot wall dividing the Kremer garden from its neighbour. This took Captain Gazurek close to the line of British occupation, and he was killed by a shot to the head; he had removed his Airborne helmet before beginning the climb, something he had expressly forbidden his men from doing during training.97 The 3rd Battalion men did not take the death of their commander well. According to Sander Kremer, two enraged Poles appeared at the cellar door threatening to kill his father, who had been seen burning personal documents upstairs, which the Poles assumed was a signal to the enemy; they were dissuaded and ordered away by an unnamed Polish officer cadet.98 Command of the 3rd Battalion contingent should have passed to Lieutenant Pudelko but he deferred to Bereda-Fialkowski, who had been acting as Captain Gazurek’s adjutant, on the grounds that the latter had been briefed and it was thus Bereda-Fialkowski who oversaw the deployment into the houses on the Stationsweg. The Quatre Bras and No. 4 were occupied by 2nd Lieutenants Francisz Kowalczyk and Prochowski’s Platoons from the 9th Company, Lieutenant Bereda-Fialkowski and the Battalion HQ personnel moved into the Hotel Strijland at No. 6, 2nd Lieutenant Jozef Kula’s stray Platoon from the 1st Battalion took over the Kremer house and Lieutenant Pudelko and Lieutenant Urbanski’s Platoon from the 9th Company moved into No. 10. The next two houses were occupied by Glider Pilots from D Squadron, to whom the Poles sent six men equipped with a PIAT as reinforcements, including Lance-Corporals Kuzniar and Karol Matlak who were assigned to the last house in the row held by a party of seven Glider Pilots commanded by an unnamed captain.99
Lieutenant Eastwood and No. 1 Platoon were formally relieved by the Poles at midday, and after regrouping in a downstairs room the Pathfinders moved back across the Utrechtseweg to the Independent Company’s HQ. The Platoon made the crossing in a single group under cover of a smoke grenade and suffered only one casualty, Private Thomas McMahon, who was wounded in the foot.100 The Polish paratroopers then settled in for a relatively uneventful day, apart from the constant fire from machine-guns and mortars, as the intermingled nature and proximity of the German positions spared them the attention of the less precise nebelwerfers and artillery, although there was a continual stream of Polish casualties nonetheless. Lance-Corporal Konstanty Wesolowicz was killed by machine-gun fire in the back garden of Stationsweg No. 6 whilst foraging for water. Private Emil Mentlik was killed by a sniper whilst manning an upstairs window in the Kremer house; the impact of the round reportedly threw the unfortunate paratrooper clear across the room.101 The Poles were shooting back. Corporal Franciszek Wieczorek was narrowly missed by a burst of machine-gun fire that tore up the wall by the attic window he was manning with a Bren gun in the attic of Stationsweg No. 6. Carefully quartering the parkland east of the Stationsweg with binoculars, Corporal Wieczorek spotted wisps of smoke rising from an innocuous clump of bushes and put a full thirty-round magazine into it; he was gratified to see German stretcher bearers removing two bodies from the clump a short while later.102
The bulk of the 21st Independent Company was still occupying the positions on the south side of the Utrechtseweg it had occupied in the early morning of Friday 22 September. No. 3 Platoon, commanded by Lieutenant Hugh Ashmore, was deployed in houses along the Pietersbergseweg running south from the Utrechtseweg facing the MDS in the Hotel Schoonoord, with Lieutenant John Speller’s No. 2 Platoon on their right along the Paasberg, which angled to the south-east and then south to the sector held by two platoons from 250 (Airborne) Light Composite Company RASC. Major Wilson’s Company HQ was located from just after 12:00 in a house on the junction of the Pietersbergseweg and Paasberg between the two Platoons, with Lieutenant Eastwood’s No. 1 Platoon resting nearby.103 At 14:15 Major Wilson reported to 4th Parachute Brigade HQ that German troops were moving up from the south on No. 2 Platoon’s right flank, apparently having
bypassed the RASC contingent. Lieutenant-Colonel Murray responded by requesting LONSDALE Force stand-by to launch a counter-attack in support, which was reportedly ready by 14:30 and asked Major Wilson if a medium artillery shoot was feasible; Wilson responded at 14:45, pointing out his No. 2 Platoon was mixed up with the enemy and suggesting the barrage be brought down 200 yards to the front of the RASC Company’s positions.104 Major Wilson correctly divined that the German objective was the Casualty Clearing Station (CCS) in the Hotel Tafelberg, located to the right rear of No. 2 Platoon. As this would provide the enemy with a covered access into the British perimeter, Wilson cut short No.1 Platoon’s brief rest and deployed Lieutenant Eastwood and his men on the right-hand side of the equally understrength No. 3 Platoon as a potential backstop. No. 3 Platoon was further reinforced by a party of eight Glider Pilots of unknown provenance armed with a number of Bren guns. The Pathfinders were unable to prevent the Germans securing the Hotel Tafelberg, but they then paused and made no effort to press further.105
Arnhem Page 96