The fortunes of the men from the 4th Dorsets were in many cases dependent upon where they alighted onto the north bank. On the right of the landing frontage and thus closest to Oosterbeek Major Grafton managed to gather a party from A Company including Captain Rose and his signaller, which he successfully led along the riverbank and into the Airborne perimeter via the sector held by BREESE Force. By 06:00 this party and possibly another of unknown provenance was located in the vicinity of the 1st Airlanding Light Regiment’s gun positions near the Oosterbeek Old Church, from where they despatched a Liaison Officer to the Hotel Hartenstein at 08:40.10 After liaising with the Light Regiment Captain Rose and his signallers established a radio link to their parent unit, 112 Field Regiment RA, which relieved some of the pressure upon the sole existing line to 64 Medium Regiment RA and thereby allowed an increase in artillery support for the beleaguered Airborne troops. Captain Rose was badly wounded in the shoulder by German machine-gun fire later in the day whilst observing from the porch of the Oosterbeek Old Church, and died at some point the following day.11 The Dorsets that came ashore on the left of the landing frontage came up against rather stiffer opposition. Four assault boats carrying men from B Company including Major Whittle landed 100 yards or so east of the blazing factory buildings near Heveadorp and were immediately attacked with hand-grenades by German troops manning the top of a steep, 100-foot-high bank overlooking the river. After gathering a party of around thirty men including Lieutenant Dennis McDermott, Major Whittle launched an assault up the bank that drove the Germans back and secured the crest at a cost of half the party becoming casualties; the survivors immediately set about digging in on their new location.12
Lieutenant-Colonel Tilley also reached the crest of the slope after landing, presumably accompanied by his tactical Battalion HQ after leading a headlong charge up the slope shouting ‘Get them with the bayonet!’ He was reportedly struck on the head by a grenade in the rush and suffered a slight wound from the subsequent detonation.13 In the process he appears to have lost contact with the remainder of his Battalion and remained isolated throughout the hours of darkness. Lieutenant Hope-Jones from the 1st Border party came in with the second flight east of the Heveadorp ferry terminal after his assault boat had reportedly turned ‘in a complete circle’ midway across after the crew realised the vessel was heading too far upstream. He was confronted by the same ‘steep and thickly wooded slope’ that had confronted the Dorsets’ B Company. He then became separated from the remainder of his boat party after returning to the vessel with a signaller to retrieve a forgotten radio battery. While searching for his own party he ran across a ‘rather frightened platoon of Dorsets’ who reportedly ‘looked on him as a gift from heaven, obviously expecting to be led safely…into the arms of their Battalion’. Despite considering himself hardly ‘qualified to do the job’ Hope-Jones nonetheless led the group up the slope despite much slipping and sliding in the loose sandy soil until they were challenged by German troops manning the crest; he then led his new charges in a rush that cleared and secured the enemy position. Whilst reorganising after the assault Hope-Jones discovered that the stray party of Dorsets included a Platoon officer, which he not unreasonably decided absolved him of any further responsibility for them. He therefore struck off eastward on his own in search of the Airborne perimeter and his Battalion.14 Irrespective of their location and situation, the men who succeeded in reaching the north bank were effectively abandoned to their own devices at 02:15 when the crossing effort was suspended reportedly due to ‘HVY enemy pressure’, just an hour and fifteen minutes after the crossing effort had commenced. It is unclear if the order originated with Brigadier Walton at 130 Brigade HQ or further up the British chain of command.15 The effort was then switched to passing supplies for the 1st Airborne Division across the Lower Rhine, although this also proved to be less than successful. Three of the DUKWs either did not arrive at the crossing point or were unable to access the water due to the steep bank depending on the source, but the remaining three vehicles succeeded in crossing the river carrying approximately two tons of ammunition, food and the medical supplies gathered by Lieutenant-Colonel Herford. They were again carried downstream by the current and then became stuck in deep mud on exiting the water around 1,000 yards west of the Oosterbeek perimeter, from where two of the RASC drivers, a Corporal Varney and Driver Chilton, swam back to the south bank in an unsuccessful bid to secure assistance.16 1st Airborne Division HQ became aware of the supply effort at 06:05 and reported being unable to distribute the supplies in the ‘ducks’, due to a combination of enemy action and lack of transport, at 09:40; given that the stranded vehicles lay the better part of a mile outside the Oosterbeek perimeter the former factor was key, and the supplies were presumably appropriated by the Germans.17
The onset of daylight proved to be a mixed blessing for the marooned Dorsets in their isolated pockets along the north bank. Lance-Corporal Wally Smith and his Bren team were part of a group that had dug in on the riverbank in the darkness. Daylight found them exposed to merciless fire and a rain of hand-grenades from German troops overlooking them from higher ground that killed Smith’s gunner, Private Harold Wyer, and over time reduced their number to around ten, pinned down along 200 yards of the riverbank. The Dorsets maintained the unequal struggle until their ammunition was exhausted at some point in the morning, after which the survivors ‘lay doggo’ and awaited nightfall.18 After reaching the crest of the slope Major Whittle managed to gather in a number of men from several Companies but failed to make contact with Lieutenant-Colonel Tilley or any formed elements of the Battalion. He therefore led the B Company party forward to a more defensible location deeper in the woods, or behind a bank midway between the river and the wooded high ground depending on the account, where they remained for the rest of the day.19 Major Philip Roper and twenty of his men from C Company also took a more aggressive approach by moving deeper into the woods at first light in an effort to locate other men from the Battalion. The party included Private Aubrey Steirn who had a narrow escape during a sudden, close-range encounter:
I was in the lead when a machine-gun opened up on me from a very short distance. I was knocked over…I came to in one piece, apart from a facial wound and badly bruised shoulder where a burst of fire had ‘clipped’ me and left metal fragments in my uniform.
The German position was overrun and eliminated while Private Steirn was recovering and the party moved on, gathering up more scattered elements of the Battalion including Lieutenant-Colonel Tilley.20
Obergruppenführer Bittrich at II SS Panzerkorps became aware that the British were mounting a reinforcement effort across the Lower Rhine at 05:15 when Wehrmachtbefehlshaber Niederlande forwarded a signal from Kampfgruppe von Tettau informing the higher HQ that ‘the enemy has crossed the Rhine at Kasteel Doorwerth and Heveadorp after heavy artillery fire’ and that ‘counter-measures have been initiated’. Another signal at 06:10 reported that the crossing had taken place only at the ‘Driel ferry’ crossing, was in battalion strength and had penetrated Schiffsstammabteilung 10’s sector. Moving with his customary swiftness Generalleutnant von Tettau launched Oberstleutnant Shennen’s bataillon from Sicherungs Regiment 26 in an immediate counter-attack, supported by two kompanien from Fliegerhorst Bataillon 1 and SS Kompanie ‘Moll’, which proceeded to clear the ‘incursion’.21 Major Roper’s party from C Company was surrounded after occupying some abandoned German trenches and Lieutenant-Colonel Tilley took the decision to surrender to save further loss of life. While all this was going on Lieutenant Hope-Jones had abandoned his solo attempt to reach the Airborne perimeter and linked up with another group of Dorsets, which came under small-arms and mortar fire while he was digging in; this ceased with the arrival of British and German officers who informed the party that Lieutenant-Colonel Tilley had ordered a surrender and led them to the C Company location. There he discovered Lance-Corporal Nolan and Private Kelly, the former badly wounded in the stomach; Hope-Jones administered a dos
e of morphine and helped Kelly get him to a Dressing Station. There was no sign of Lieutenant-Colonel Haddon, who had also embarked on a solo attempt to reach the Airborne perimeter; he was captured in the attempt.22 Kampfgruppe von Tettau subsequently identified the British attackers as belonging to the 43rd Division which had ‘moved by foot march from Nijmegen’ and reported that ‘the enemy has high losses. 140 are taken prisoner, including nine officers and the battalion commander, a colonel'.23
Thus the 4th Dorset’s valiant effort to reinforce the beleaguered Oosterbeek perimeter came to a premature end after seventy-five minutes, during which time just seven Officers and 298 Other Ranks reached the north bank of the Lower Rhine; of these, thirteen were killed, approximately 200 were captured and five from 204 Field Company RE were wounded.24 The 43rd Division’s semi-official account gives the distinct impression that the effort went on through the whole of the night and characterised it as a period of ‘heroic struggle against hopeless odds’; interestingly, the 204 Field Company RE War Diary also wrongly refers to the ferrying operation not ceasing until dawn.25 On the other hand Middlebrook noted ‘a lack of push about the operation from the highest level of the 43rd Division downwards’ and characterised the aborted crossing as a ‘sacrifice’.26 Given the evidence the latter view is nearer the mark, although it pitches responsibility a little low on the chain of command, for as we have seen, the commander of 30 Corps had personally involved himself in the 43rd Division’s activities north of the River Waal from 23 September, when he and Browning were given the authority to terminate Operation MARKET and withdraw the 1st Airborne Division across the Lower Rhine if required. On that basis neither Brigadier Walton nor Major-General Thomas can have been responsible for the planning, execution or premature termination of the Sunday night crossing. This is clear from the fact that 30 Corps specifically ordered the crossing to be pared down from an already inadequate two battalions on the night of 23-24 September (amended to ‘two companies’ in a subsequent order) to a single battalion effort on the night of 24-25 September; even had it reached the north bank intact, a single battalion could not have ‘relieved the pressure on the [1st Airborne] bridgehead’ as intended in any meaningful way.27 It is difficult to see how this would not still have been the case even if 130 Brigade had crossed the Lower Rhine in its entirety. The 1st Airborne Division required immediate reinforcement including armour to stand a chance of survival, and that was not in the offing as 30 Corps did not specifically instruct the 43rd Division to begin reconnoitring possible sites for a full-scale crossing of the Lower Rhine until 25 September, when the decision to withdraw the Airborne formation had already been taken.28 It therefore looks as though the 4th Dorset’s crossing was never intended to succeed from the outset. Rather, it appears to have been intended as a token gesture to allow Lieutenant-General Horrocks to claim that reinforcing the 1st Airborne Division and maintaining a foothold on the north bank of the Lower Rhine was impossible, and thus provide justification for the withdrawal decision; this would also explain the rendering down of the reinforcement effort to the inadequate level of a single battalion. Lieutenant-Colonel Tilley and the 4th Dorsets were therefore sacrificed not in a serious effort to bring succour to the Airborne troops struggling in Oosterbeek, as has been routinely claimed, but on the altar of political expediency for the benefit of the upper echelons of the British chain of command.
Possibly the last man to reach the north bank of the Lower Rhine in the early morning of Monday 25 September was Lieutenant-Colonel Edmund Myers, the 1st Airborne Division’s Commander Royal Engineers, who had been assisting the 43rd Division with its latest crossing effort; he reportedly crossed the river aboard one of the three DUKWs loaded with Lieutenant-Colonel Herford’s supplies and then made his way upstream along the riverbank into the Airborne perimeter.29 Myers arrived at the Hotel Hartenstein at 06:05 carrying two letters for Major-General Urquhart, one from Major-General Browning and one from the commander of the 43rd Division, Major-General Thomas.30 Thomas informed Urquhart that the 2nd Army plan was no longer to establish a bridgehead across the Lower Rhine west of Arnhem, but to withdraw the 1st Airborne Division back across the river. According to Urquhart’s account the withdrawal was to be an arrangement between himself and Thomas ‘on a date to be agreed’, but the 1st Airborne Division HQ War Diary reflected the urgency of the situation by adding a caveat that it was to be carried out when the Airborne formation ‘could no longer hang on’. Ironically, given that MARKET GARDEN was intended to open the way for an advance eastward across the North German Plain, the withdrawal was codenamed Operation BERLIN.31 Perhaps unsurprisingly the 43rd Division’s semi-official account claims that the decision to launch BERLIN was taken by Thomas alone, who then ordered Urquhart to comply via a radio message.32 That aside, Urquhart took two hours to consider the matter, although the writing was pretty much on the wall. As described, the Airborne units holding the perimeter had been reduced to mere shadows of their former selves with the survivors virtually out of food and ammunition and the Dorsets’ crossing of the Lower Rhine had failed to materially alleviate the situation; furthermore, the evacuation of the Division MDS from the Hotels Schoonoord and Vreewijk had effectively removed access to anything more than basic medical treatment for the mounting number of casualties. The perimeter itself had been compressed to its limit, with the Germans to the west being within small-arms range of the Hotel Hartenstein while those to the east had made inroads that threatened to fragment it altogether. A report from the Airlanding Light Regiment suggested the enemy there were about to launch a concentrated effort to cut the perimeter off from the Lower Rhine.33 With the caveat that the evacuation should be launched when the 1st Airborne could no longer hang on thus pretty well fulfilled, Urquhart responded to Thomas’ letter at 08:08 via the radio link with the 64th Medium Regiment RA, with the request that BERLIN had to be carried out that night before summoning his senior commanders to a planning conference at the Hotel Hartenstein at 10:30.34
***
While the Dorsets were struggling across the Lower Rhine and the hungry and exhausted Airborne troops manning the Oosterbeek perimeter took the opportunity to snatch a little rest, the Germans were busy reorganising and integrating reinforcements. Obersturmbannführer Harzer had persuaded Generalfeldmarschall Model that the liberal use of artillery to reduce the Oosterbeek pocket would be more effective, quicker and less costly in German lives than digging out the stubborn British defenders with tanks and infantry; Harzer may also have been trying to compensate for his relative lack of manpower, given that the fight at Oosterbeek was low on the priority list for reinforcement. Heeresgruppe B therefore instructed the overall area artillery command, dubbed ArKo 191, to employ all its 110 guns and SS Werfergruppe Nickmann’s two batteries of Nebelwerfer rocket launchers in systematically raking the British perimeter, which had now shrunk to less than two square kilometres in extent.35 On the west side of the perimeter Generalleutnant von Tettau rationalised his Kampfgruppe by withdrawing the hodge-podge of internal security and rear-echelon units to Elden and Velp where they were to regroup and form a reserve; combat operations remained the responsibility of Luftwaffe Bataillon Worrowski on the sector abutting the Lower Rhine with SS Bataillonen Eberwein and Schulz to its left linking in with the elements of 9 SS Panzer Division covering the northern aspect of the perimeter, presumably still supported by the surviving tanks from Panzer Kompanie 224.36 Standartenführer Lippert had been relieved of overall command of these units by von Tettau, reportedly because von Tettau was no longer willing to tolerate the outspoken and critical behaviour of his SS subordinate. Who replaced Lippert is unclear.37 On the eastern side of the Pocket Obersturmbannführer Harzer carried out a more in-depth reorganisation, particularly of the units responsible for the line running south from the Utrechtseweg to the Lower Rhine: Kampfgruppen Möller, von Allwörden and Harder. These units were broken up into small combat groups that were augmented with assault pioneers from SS Panzer Pionier Abteilung 9 and
Pionier Lehr Bataillon 9, the latter a specialist urban combat demonstration unit Heeresgruppe B had flown into Deelen airfield on the nights of 21 and 22 September.38
Monday morning dawned with heavy rain over the Oosterbeek perimeter.39 The by now customary early-morning mortar and artillery barrage began to fall on the 1st Border’s positions on the western face of the perimeter at 06:00 and the south-eastern sector including the 1st Airlanding Light Regiment’s gun positions around the Oosterbeek Old Church appears to have come under fire at around the same time.40 The barrage was not universal across the entire perimeter however, with the 7th KOSB on the northern face reporting a ‘quiet period [that] continued until about 1100 hours’.41 On the western face of the perimeter the bombardment heralded a resumption of the German pressure upon the 1st Border’s stubbornly held positions along the Van Borsselenweg, with 1st Airlanding Brigade HQ reporting: ‘No major attack was put in anywhere but under its cover parties started infiltrating at all points and the morning was very sticky everywhere.’ This included the environs of Brigade HQ itself, where a group of infiltrators occupied houses midway between the Brigade HQ and the Hotel Hartenstein and had to be eliminated by the Glider Pilots providing security for Brigade HQ commanded by Major James Dale DFC.42
At the southern end of the line abutting the Lower Rhine the survivors of B Company, Lieutenant Arthur Royall’s 12 Platoon dug in near the municipal gasworks and Lieutenant Stanley Barnes composite platoon dug in near the Dennenord, repelled several German attacks over the course of the day and while armoured vehicles were clearly audible moving around in the woods to the north of their location, they did not put in an appearance. The constant German artillery and mortar fire proved to be more deadly. Lieutenant Barnes and his men had begun began taking temporary shelter from the rain in the garage of the Dennenord from where they could still cover their assigned frontage and the Platoon Commander was thus engaged with Lance-Corporal Ginger Wilson when a shell exploded in the doorway to the garage, killing four men standing just inside and badly wounding Lieutenant Barnes in the foot. The unscathed Lance-Corporal Wilson promptly carried the wounded officer round to the cellar of the Dennenord where B Company’s Aid Post was located and assisted a medical orderly in trying to staunch the bleeding with field dressings and then an abandoned Denison smock.43
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