In many ways, political parties have it easy; they are not subject to the same stresses as companies. Indeed, political parties are also lucky in that unlike, say, consumer goods companies, their “consumers” are much more loyal in their preferences. This stickiness is under threat. Persistently lowered income expectations, demographics, immigration, and the influence of social media all tend to lead many voters to be less anchored by party heritage and identity. Allegiances to parties tend to be built through families and communities and are only broken by the deepest of crises. In this way they are like football clubs: there is always a sense of place, of roots, and of an identity even though players come and go and the level of support ebbs and flows too.
Another reason established parties are drifting from their political moorings is that many of them are associated with events and individuals in history (Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, Éamon de Valera, Ronald Reagan, Helmut Kohl, and Charles de Gaulle are examples). As time passes, events foundational to their rise have less meaning and relevance for younger generations. In this respect, political parties may also follow a life cycle: an initial enthusiastic start-up phase, growth and government, entering the establishment, and then in some cases decline. These life cycles operate around strong and decisive leaders. When these leaders are gone, parties spend time in the political wilderness, where they may slowly change and in some cases die out and be replaced by new ones. Intuitively, parties whose identity is tied to ideology (mostly on the left) will find it harder to adapt than will those tied to concepts of culture and nationalism (more on the right).
Applying this to the developed world, it is possible to imagine that fractures in large, mainstream parties in Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States will produce new parties. In both the United States and the United Kingdom, for example, factions and splits are developing in the main political parties, and in the United Kingdom new movements like United for Change are emerging. In the United States, we have the Trump Republicans versus the Bush country-club Republicans and the Sanders/Warren Democrats versus the Clinton Democrats. In the United Kingdom, the Tories are split between Brexiteers and Remainers, while Labour is cleft between hard-left-wing Corbyn socialists and a moderate New Labour faction. In this context, full-scale splits are likely. On a more speculative level, there are already subgroups with specific interests within the Chinese Communist Party, though it is difficult to see it being rent apart.
Heimat
New political parties can rise up for several reasons. Social change is making many established parties redundant, especially those with strong ideological roots. Changing demographics, the better representation of women, a recognition of the importance of mental health as a variable in health-care spending (one of the biggest spending items in most countries), the impact of multilateral institutions on the spending decisions of individual states, the impact of technology on society and work, and the sense of dislocation that people in many countries appear to feel are some of the emerging political issues.
Historically, political parties have tended to fit the configuration of their societies: the divide between the Left and the Right and the extent to which nationalism, religion, and liberty are invoked in public life. Some of these axes are being reinforced; others are withering. One important change is the perception that the Left-versus-Right debate is no longer a valid basis for the differentiation of political parties. There are several reasons for this; mainstream parties on the right have in general not managed to boost economic growth, and those on the left are politically vulnerable to new trends such as terrorism and immigration.
The new trend in politics will be the rise of new parties. Some of these parties may base their manifestos on cross-border appeal (e.g., green parties or Steve Bannon’s Movement, which seeks to connect far-right groups in the United States and Europe). New parties may begin small, but some of those small parties will become mainstream parties, and they may be built up on principles and issues that existing parties do not address well. For instance, many existing parties eschew the role of religion in public life, few of them can craft and communicate a sense of homeland, or heimat, without seeming right wing, others struggle with how to frame the role of technology in societies and economies, and most have failed to address fault lines in public health provision.
Other, new axes and grand questions may also become part of the political geometry. In addition, the view that, in both developed and emerging countries, the new divide is between insiders and outsiders—or better, between Grandees and the rest (Levellers, perhaps)—leaves both the Left and the Right in an isolated position.
Moreover, if we assume that the world is levelling in terms of how many socioeconomic variables have reached their limits, incumbent parties may simply not be equipped or willing to deal with such challenges.
Since the aftermath of the global financial crisis, some of the economic and sociopolitical changes that have come about and that can be tied to the levelling have left some mainstream political parties struggling—both the Republicans and Democrats in the United States, the Tories in the United Kingdom, the SPD in Germany, the Socialists in France, and PASOK in Greece, to name a few. Weak leadership has played a role in these cases, as has a shifting political landscape. It may also be that these parties have traditionally operated in two-party systems, which have now been disrupted by the advent of new parties and new political questions. Parties in multiparty systems tend to be more adaptive. (The Netherlands is an example of such a system: six parties have 9 percent of the vote or greater, coalition governments are the norm, and there has not been a single-party government since the Second World War.)
To continue the analogy between political parties and companies: the evidence on the success of new political parties also resembles that of corporate success. New parties tend to be successful when they can co-opt or take over the social network of an existing party (its grassroots candidate-selection process, funding, and general savoir faire). As with a company, building all of these up from scratch takes time and can be error prone. Often the takeover of an existing support base comes in the wake of the collapse of an existing party.
A somewhat self-evident research finding shows that, as with business start-ups, achieving a good showing in its first election is also a marker of success for a new party, though many new parties still miss a businesslike focus on the mechanics of elections (e.g., the failure of the Party of Hope in the 2017 Japanese elections is an example of potential turned to withering defeat).12 One approach, whose appeal has been strengthened by the rise of social media, is for smaller, new parties to be radical in their ideology and in the way they communicate because in an age of social media, radicalism translates into greater marketing impact. As in many other walks of life, technology is disrupting politics: hacking, the concept of “fake news,” social media, and the pressures of constant media interaction are some of the factors that have accelerated the rise of new parties and causes and left others behind. For instance, the 2018 Edelman Trust Barometer showed that seven in ten people internationally are worried about fake news.13 A related trend—and one that is also part of the rise of a globalized, consumer culture—is the extent to which people are attracted by and attached to brands. Brands and politics are increasingly linked, the best illustration of which was speculation that Oprah Winfrey would run for the office of US president.
New parties will also have to navigate the complexities of electoral systems. In some countries, such as Germany, small parties need to get above a threshold vote in order to be allowed to take up seats in the Bundestag, and this can dissuade voters from voting for new, smaller parties. This is referred to as “Duverger’s Law,” named after the French sociologist Maurice Duverger, who observed that “first-past-the-post” electoral systems tend to foster two-party systems, whereas double-ballot-majority systems and proportional-representation systems tend to foster multiparty landscapes.
Much of the evidence on the formation of ne
w parties comes from Western democratic countries. Parties are less consequential in one-party systems or in nations where individuals and their families and close supporters rule. This does not mean that new political parties do not matter to emerging countries. Quite the opposite.
Outside the older, developed countries in the world, there is, broadly speaking, an absence of anger simply because in many emerging countries expectations of income are still positive, and especially so in Asia, where the Asian economic miracle has managed to spin along for so long.14 But there is growing discontent with corruption and with environmental and labor issues, though perhaps not yet a level of agitation that would suggest a political paradigm shift. To a growing extent there is now a perception in emerging countries that an elite has formed, not simply at the political level but also at the level of elites based on family dynasties (“princelings”) who monopolize wealth, influence, social standing, and access to power. This “Grandeeization” may prove to be the basis for a levelling-led discourse in some emerging countries, such as Turkey, Nigeria, and Brazil.
Aspirations and expectations are the key political elements for emerging markets. Aspirations for better income, consumption, and social status are rising, and in many cases a natural tandem trend is a desire for ideas and a more open society. To an extent some countries can curb this by overlaying nationalism, for example, on the political debate. The burden of rising expectations is also dangerous for emerging countries if those expectations are checked by a recession or a financial market event. A realization that the future will not be as bright as the past twenty years may encourage some political and intellectual entrepreneurship.
How to Succeed in Politics
The central theme in The Levelling is the passage of the world from a state of growing disorder toward a new order in politics, economics, finance, and geopolitics. In politics, a key element of this passage is the successful development and passage of constructive new ideas and new political initiatives. However, new ideas and initiatives are not always successfully implemented. The Levellers in the seventeenth century were stymied by the Grandees. So before we rush off to set up new, start-up political parties, let’s bear in mind a few cautionary tales. At least two stand out. The first, which confirms much of the academic evidence on new political initiatives (which shows that a takeover of existing political structures works well), is the speedy rise of Emmanuel Macron and his new party, La République En Marche. It is instructive in the sense that it shows the way successful revolutions can be driven from the inside rather than the outside of the political system. In terms of his education, background, and formative experiences, Macron is a stereotypical insider of the French model, adhering to the profile of a system insider: middle-class (father a neurologist, mother a doctor), well-educated (École Nationale d’Administration and assistant to a philosophy professor), employed by a pillar of the private sector (Rothschild Bank, like former president Georges Pompidou), and widely supported by the French business establishment.
Moreover, we might say that Macron was as much chosen by the French establishment as by the people. Some suggest that he has simply replaced an incumbent elite with a younger one, though this view ignores the energy and intent of the French president and those around him who assiduously prepare each policy move. His arrival on the political scene was well timed because the French people were highly dissatisfied with the two previous presidents and with their sense of where their country was going. An open path to power and a welcoming establishment helped create the perception of a revolution. The structure of the presidential system in France also permitted Macron to use his personal standing to form a personalized party structure that soon co-opted parts of the Socialist and Republican Parties. The lesson here is that using the system rather than breaking it can be productive.
In contrast is the second standout cautionary tale, the Arab Spring, which failed, though it was greeted with great hope in the developed world and across North Africa. That failure was a disappointment, given the broad base of the initial protests, given that hunger, corruption, and inequality had motivated millions of people to protest, and given that they were quickly enabled by social media. A number of factors complicated the Arab Spring revolutions: brutal intervention by armies and police forces, the complexity introduced by religious groups, the threat of outright Islamification in countries like Egypt, the often less-than-discreet intervention by outside governments, and the consequences of ensuing economic meltdown. Another factor relates to the structure of the countries involved in the Arab Spring. Few were resilient, most were riddled with corruption, and their economic structures were relatively basic. As a result, when governments fell, there was, beyond armies and police forces, very little by way of institutional apparatus that could sustain the running of countries like Egypt.
A few more examples help illustrate the complexity of accomplishing change, in different ways. In Chile after the fall of Augusto Pinochet and the restoration of democracy, a group of well-trained technocrats was able to stabilize the country and stave off the risk of a financial crisis. In addition, much is written about the ability of the Allies to run Germany and Japan once they had surrendered at the end of the Second World War. In both cases, institutions, laws, and technical skills remained in place, so the apparatus of the state was, to a degree in the postwar climate, intact. In post–Gulf War II Iraq, by contrast, once the Iraqi Army had been disbanded, there were few viable institutions or political infrastructures left to build a nation around, and chaos soon ensued.
The lessons here, in the context of the levelling, is that what makes states work and what makes them resilient are factors like institutions, skills, and established ways of doing things. Revolutions or events of political turmoil that disrupt institutions will therefore usually end in failure. So there are several lessons for political opportunists and revolutionaries. First, timing is important, because a crisis or a sharp shift in a factor like migration or economic activity will provide the circumstances around which people may be willing to contemplate a new party. Second, the institutional structure of a country is the avenue through which a new party can rise. Usually a new party needs to be adopted or co-opted by some element of the establishment, and more often than not the absence of such an establishment is as much a risk to new parties as it is an opportunity. This also suggests that for a new political initiative to be successful, it must be carried through by those who have knowledge of how the system works.
New Parties
The scene is set for new people, new ideas, and new parties in the major economies. The old political world is riven by cracks and fissures. The Democrats and Republicans in the United States are looking unsure of themselves and outmaneuvered on their flanks, Germans are starting to think of political life beyond Angela Merkel, England’s Tories are divided from far right to right, and the Labour Party is split from center to far left. In addition, within existing party umbrellas in the United States, new left-wing candidates in the Democratic Party and right-wing candidates in the Republican Party are emerging, and this new political blood will stretch the divides within parties even further. We can imagine new political parties rising across the world into this vacuum as a response to the irrelevance of incumbent parties, and, it should be said, we can also imagine the uglier extreme, new parties whose only ambition seems to be to tear down the existing world order rather than contribute to the establishment of a new one. In time, the idea that people can continue to vote for parties who reject the existing world and who consider “no” a valid response to its problems will run out of steam. People, at large, will begin to demand long-term, workable solutions to the issues they face, and new party structures will be part of this.
In the next section, I speculate as to what new, fictional parties might look like, so as to guide how existing parties could be replaced. My new parties are the Levellers, a party of reform, equality, and accountable politics; the Diggers, a left-wing, environmental party; the He
imat Party, popular in Alpine countries, focused on tradition and customs; the Pilgrim Party, centered on the role of religion in public life, attracting both Christians and Muslims, for example; the Governance Party, focused on a citizenry tied to technology and favoring technological oversight of codes of conduct in public life, society, and business; the Atlas Party, favoring the right of individual freedom and responsibility for citizens; and the Leviathan Party, whose political bargain involves diminished personal freedom as the price for heavy state direction of the economy and society.
What might they look like in more detail?
The Leveller Party
The Leveller Party is understandably central to the process of the levelling. Its aim is to replace political disorder and economic imbalance with a new approach to policy making. The Leveller Party seeks to bring politicians—and in some cases policy makers—closer to the people they serve by making them responsive, responsible, and accountable for their actions. The core belief of the Levellers is that there should be equality of treatment for all citizens before the law and in policy making. They want to return the focus of policy making to individuals and to give much greater importance to human development as a central pillar of economic and social policy. They favor economic concepts such as resilience and country strength (i.e., a mentality that fosters the ability to withstand external shocks, achieve sustainable economic growth, and promote social stability and human development) over an outright focus on growth. The Levellers do not aim for an economic levelling; rather, they want a socioeconomic system that is open and generally unburdened by imbalances such as indebtedness, excessive wealth inequality, and differential access to health care. Correspondingly, they require that new developments in technology, ownership of personal data, trade, and demographics be balanced, or “levelled,” by responses in the form of education, infrastructure in the broad sense, and institutional development.
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