by Ervin Staub
Nationalism, belonging, and the self-concept
Nations have a tremendous capacity to enlist the loyalty and self-sacrifice of their citizens, especially in conflicts with other nations. Belonging to groups is of profound significance for human beings. It fulfills deep needs and provides satisfactions inherent in connection. It provides a feeling of security. It is essential in defining the self: as a member of a family, a profession, a religious group, voluntary associations, a nation. Individual identity is defined and the self gains value and significance through identification with groups and the connection to others that membership provides. Group support – whether it is a group of fellow concentration camp victims or companions working for a shared cause – contributes to survival even under the worst conditions.7 It can make life hopeful and satisfying.
The importance of the group arises partly from a genetic proclivity, a sociotropic inclination, and partly from the experience of the child while growing up in a group unit.8 As we grow older at least part of the initial connection to a small unit such as the family or clan is replaced by connection to a larger unit, the nation. The less is the need for connection and belonging fulfilled in the family and other small groups, the greater will the need be for larger groups. In many places in the modern age the extended family has disappeared, the nuclear family has loosened its hold, and the clan and the tribe have lost their significance. As John Mack notes, the intense commitment to these smaller groupings has often been transferred to the nation.9 This identification is enlarged by the capacity to generalize and expand the group boundaries, which is encouraged by the state through the use of symbols, education, and other means.
Belonging to a group has a destructive potential if the members stop questioning its beliefs, values, ideals, policies, and actions. But not belonging results in physical and emotional vulnerability. Most people cannot stand emotionally alone and be effective, well-functioning human beings.
It is possible, however, to have a strong bond to the group without giving up individual identity. If the integrity of the self is maintained, discrepancy between one’s own values and those of the group can be noticed and faced. Independent judgment and deviation from the group become possible. This is easier in groups that do not severely punish nonconformity. Moreover, people who are connected to varied, smaller communities and have varied group identities can shift perspective more and free themselves more of their embeddedness in a particular group. Critical loyalty – deviation from current group beliefs and practices in the service of the ultimate integrity and well-being of the group and in the service of human welfare – becomes easier.
The relationship to the other, to outsiders, is partly a function of the self-concept. If groups do not have valid ways of defining themselves on the basis of their past history, tradition, values, and customs, they will have to define their identity by contrast to outside groups. Psychoanalytic thinking suggests that groups, like individuals, project unacceptable aspects of themselves onto others. Pinderhughes posits an urge to join or come together in groups and an urge to differentiate from the self and repudiate. Those who are repudiated become “bad"; they possess the rejected and renounced parts of the self, which remains pure and “good.”10
The tendency to maintain a view of the good self (group, nation) by making others bad should be strongest in groups whose self-image is least accurate. The more a group has succeeded in encoding most aspects of its experience into its self-concept, and the more this self-concept is realistic and moderately positive, the less likely that it will give rise to nationalism as an important goal. There will be less need to protect and enhance the nation by “purifying” it or by enlarging its territory or power.
National self-examination is important, but difficult.b It is even more difficult for nations than for individuals to see and accept imperfections in themselves, to discover their denied and unacknowledged parts, as well as to see others without distortion and become aware of their own impact on others. Members of the community of nations have an obligation to be active bystanders who act as mirrors in which other nations can see themselves. The words and acts of friendly nations are more likely to be accepted, but showing critical loyalty to friends requires both courage and tact.
National security and related ideologies
An ideology of national security is another important source of national policy. In the Southern Cone of South America, ideologies of national security led to the widespread murder of supposed internal enemies. The ideology depicted subversion aimed against a country’s government, economic order, way of life, religion, and values. Internal enemies were supposedly supported by communist nations. Drastic policies were justified as necessary for national security, even survival.
Richard Barnet has proposed that the ideology of the national security state also characterizes the United States. The search for national security has become pervasive in this “Century of Total War.” That peace depends on preparation for war was thought to be a lesson of the Hitler era and of the appearance of Soviet totalitarianism on the march after World War II.11 A permanent arms race is justified by the image of the Enemy.c In Barnet’s view, the ideology of the national security state “distorts the meaning of security by defining it primarily in military terms.”12 Such an ideology is built on specific ideologies of antagonism, or a view of the world and of other nations as hostile. It exists in the Soviet Union as well, which has been devastated by many enemies in its history, with about twenty million people killed during World War II.
When national security becomes an ideology, nations stop testing the reality of danger. Attempts to gain security by nonmilitary means are relinquished. A conflict mode of relating to “antagonists” becomes nearly inevitable. Within the nation the flow of information is limited and there is less open discussion of facts and policies.
World views that contribute to war
Many have believed that war is glorious both in itself and in its consequences. We continue to glorify past wars: the companionship, the bravery, the worthy cause, the honor it brings the nation. Great military leaders, like Alexander, are celebrated, even if conquest was their only purpose. Napoleon is a French national hero, in spite of the destruction he wrought. To create loyalty to the group and to communicate its values and ideals, most nations extol their military triumphs in their schools.13
William James eloquently described the good qualities brought forth by military service and war: persistence, strength, bravery, spirit of adventure, devotion to community, and discipline in the service of a just cause. Without war these admirable human qualities might be lost. Human beings would know only drudgery, boredom, weakness, and uninventive participation in unappealing labor. James believed that special effort was required to preserve the good qualities brought to life by military service and war. He proposed community service as a moral equivalent to war.14
The glorification of war persists in the age of nuclear weapons. Human thought patterns do not abruptly change with the evolution of new technology and new realities. Freeman Dyson wrote that some people “believe that nuclear war is not fundamentally different from other kinds of war and that the old fashioned military virtues, preparedness, endurance and discipline, will enable us to survive it.”15
Traditional thinking about human nature, morality, and war also contributes to a proclivity for war. “Realist” thinking and just-war theory are widely influential.16 Realist thinking from Hobbes and Machiavelli on assumes that human beings are self-seeking. They try to fulfill their aims regardless of the harm to others, using “instrumental calculation” and force. Both individuals and nations are untrustworthy; force is necessary to maintain civic virtue. Just-war thinking specifies what makes a war acceptable. It must be fought against enemy forces, not unarmed civilians, and for self-defense, not conquest. However, one cannot always wait until an enemy actually strikes. It is necessary to prepare for war when others have hostile intentions, and at times one must strike first
to avoid mortal danger.17 Because others’ intentions and actions are judged not only on the basis of “objective reality,” of actual conditions, but on the basis of a world view and other cultural preconditions, miscalculations are highly probable.
Both general world views and specific beliefs affect relations among nations. According to Richard Ned Lebow the Argentine leaders decided to attack the Falklands on the belief that if you throw out a colonial power in the year 1982, it cannot return. In contrast, the English response was partly dictated by their experience with Hitler and the resulting view that if you appease dictators, they will never stop.18
Pluralistic versus monolithic societies
Heterogeneity in society is essential for diminishing the chance of war as well as genocide. Unfortunately, pluralism is vulnerable in international relations, even if it exists within a society. The existence of diverse values and ethnic and religious subgroups may lead to a yearning for a larger unity and the belief that citizens and subgroups must overcome differences in facing external threat.
In addition, there are usually no institutions to restrain hostile acts against another nation, as there are internal institutions in a pluralistic society to restrain discrimination and the mistreatment of subgroups. There are no procedural rights that protect other nations, or watchdog groups that would speak out in favor of the other side. Those who do speak out may have to face the wrath of the rest of society. Even a democratic nation is therefore highly vulnerable to manipulation by leaders who create incidents or produce false information, as in the U.S. attack on Libya or the Gulf of Tonkin incident that Lyndon Johnson used to intensify the Vietnam War. The result is patriotic fervor, a uniform definition of events, and lack of critical analysis.
Leadership
Leaders have great power to shape relations between nations, but they are also the products of their societies. Characteristics of the culture and social organization – or at least the culture and organization of a powerful subgroup – shape their thinking and define their range of possibilities. Unfortunately, some of the cultural preconditions for war are present in most countries.
The leaders’ power is enlarged by their capacity to initiate a cycle of hostility. Citizens rarely criticize hostile acts of their own country (especially if they are effectively justified by leaders), but they are aroused to patriotic fervor by hostile acts against their country, even merely retaliatory ones. By generating hostile acts from others, leaders can create psychological readiness for war.
The process of leadership may also produce faulty decision making, such as groupthink.19 Cultural characteristics may contribute not only to motivations for war but also to faulty decision making. For example, leaders may underestimate an opponent on the basis of devaluative stereotypes, or the culture may produce authoritarian leadership that limits the consideration of options. But faulty decision making accounts for only a small part of the process that leads to war. Given hostile intentions, effective decison making can be more destructive.
The power of leaders to diminish hostility is also great. Sadat’s trip to Jerusalem and Nixon’s trip to China are examples. Such acts may require great courage when they break with an already predominant orientation in the group, as Sadat’s fate demonstrated. Although they can produce a drastic temporary change in perspective, further action is required for lasting change. Less dramatic actions by leaders can also be starting points for change in relations. For change to persist, the cultural elements that underlie conflict must change over time. Beginning steps are crucial, however, in initiating a cycle of positive reciprocity and crosscutting relations (see Chapter 18). A new Soviet rhetoric and new policies initiated by Mikhail Gorbachev and a changed rhetoric by Ronald Reagan, partly a response but probably also a result of societal processes including the peace movement, appear to have started such a cycle between the United States and the Soviet Union.
The national interest
Rarely is there a formal specification of what a nation’s citizens and leaders regard as the essential national interest. Hitler is an exception: in Mein Kampf he agreed with German leaders before the First World War that the national interest required the conquest of new territories.
According to Hans Morgenthau, interest is best defined as power.20 Sufficient power to balance others’ power is essential to give a state the capacity to protect its interests. The tradition of political realism, of which Morgenthau’s writings have been perhaps the most influential contemporary expression, regards international politics as a struggle for power, a contest among sovereign states. However, power ought to be regarded as a means toward an end. Stanley Hoffman suggests that “one ought to start with a definition of those ends and calculate the amount of power needed to reach them”21 Selecting and specifying goals are essential in defining the national interest.
In the United States, after World War II, national interest came to include protecting the free world from communism. This meant containment of the Soviet army, keeping communists out of power everywhere in the world, and strengthening and spreading institutions that maintain capitalist democracy. At first, this seemed reasonable, but it developed into a rigid ideology of antagonism and a conflict mode of relating and made everything that happened in the world seem to be part of the struggle with communism.
To reduce the dangers of war, nations need a definition of national interest that differentiates essential goals from desirable ones. Several components of national interest can be identified: the capacity of each state to fulfill its internal goals; the security required for this and for survival; relations with other states that maximize the benefit of one’s own. These interests can be interpreted in widely varying ways. How a nation maximizes its benefits depends, for example, on whether it desires peace and cooperation more than power and dominance. It depends on whether its world view makes peaceful cooperation seem possible.
Minimalism in the relations of nations
In the long run it is possible to create changes in individuals, cultures, social organizations, and the systems of relations among nations that will reduce group violence. Until then, we must strive to further minimalism in order to make genocide and war less likely. This means (1) a limited definition of national interest as a guide to foreign policy, (2) foreign policies toward other nations guided in part by the extent they fulfill essential, “minimal” values, and (3) the practice by nations of “persistent minimalism” in their relations.
Minimalism requires that nations respect the human rights of their own citizens, their right to life and freedom from abuse by authorities. Less imperative but also important is respect for civil rights. Nations must also respect the security and legitimate interests of other nations. Minimalism is antithetical to expansionist ideologies or an expansionist nationalism. Minimalism also requires that nations act as responsible, active bystanders. By influencing one another, so that each acts on the basis of the “essential” values, nations can both serve their own interests and fulfill their obligation as members of the community of nations. Apart from its focus on essential values, minimalism allows heterogeneity in political and economic systems.
The above principles should be expressed in the practice of persistent minimalism, which relies on the power of bystanders. Nations should be unwilling to accept a nation’s mistreatment of its citizens. They should protest and, if necessary, limit trade, aid, and cultural exchange to stop the mistreatment. Only as a last resort should nations break their relations with an offending nation, since they can exert more influence in the context of ongoing relations. Nations should respond to other nations’ positive actions (and minimalist practices) by expanding relations. The more nations practice persistent minimalism, the more stable the world order will be. Great powers such as the United States have a special obligation, because they are especially influential.
Experience shows that minimalist practice by nations and international groups can have powerful influence. International pressure, including p
ressure by human rights organizations and the policies of the Carter administration, helped to reduce torture in South American countries. For a long time it had little effect on the Soviet practice of diagnosing and treating dissidents as mentally ill.22 But there was inconsistency in opposition and pressure. For example, the International Medical Association was extremely slow to condemn the Soviet practice.23 This applied to Iran: it had been pressured by some nations to stop its war with Iraq, while receiving arms and support from other nations. Unequivocal minimalist practice by nations and organizations, which is extremely rare, is likely to have great influence on state violence at home or abroad. The earlier such influence is exerted, the greater its chance of effectiveness.d
Toward positive reciprocity
An important source of war is the perception either of the need for self-defense or that a conflict cannot be peacefully resolved. People must become aware of individual and group processes that cause biased perception and must learn to test perceptions and create strategies to resolve conflict peacefully.
Reciprocity, for example, is a profound law of human relations, so universal that some sociobiologists argue it is part of our genetic makeup. We harm those who have harmed us and help those who have helped us. Thus a friendly initiative directed at a supposed adversary may lead to better relations on both the individual and the international level, especially when the power of adversaries is balanced.24 This is one way to test the intentions of a supposed enemy.