14 Gandini, pp.66 – 70. Georges Catroux (1877 – 1969) graduated from St Cyr in 1896. He transferred from the Chasseurs à Pied to the Legion in 1900, serving in Indochina 1903 – 1906. Commanding 2e RTA, he was wounded and captured at Arras in Oct 1915. Between appointments in the Levant 1919 – 25 and 1926 he served on Lyautey’s staff in Morocco, and was promoted brigadier-general and GOC Marrakesh Region in 1931. Governor-General of Indochina in 1939, in June – July 1940 he rejected the Armistice and a summons to return to Vichy France, and joined Gen De Gaulle in London. He commanded Free French forces in the fratricidal Allied capture of French Syria in summer 1941, and was appointed Gov-Gen of Algeria in June 1944.
15 The 75mm M1897 field gun became world famous for generations as ‘the French 75’. Its revolutionary hydraulic long-recoil mechanism gave it a possible rate of fire of 20 – 25rpm, though 8rpm was the normal cadence in order to avoid overheating. It had been claimed that Dreyfus had passed the Germans information about its development programme.
16 Gandini, pp.65, 71 – 3
17 Livre d‘Or, p.211; Gandini, pp.80 – 81, 131
18 Dunn, Resistance, pp.185 – 92. From Apr 1902, on the initiative of Maj Lapperine, the first Compagnies Sahariennes were formed to patrol the great southern voids from the Touat. Each had 200 – 400 locally recruited foot, horse and méharistes camel-riders with French cadres of Native Affairs officers, NCOs and specialist enlisted men. The first three companies were formed at In Salah, Adrar and Timimoun, mainly from Shaamba and Tuareg. Camel patrols carried food for a month and water for ten days, and marched 25 – 50 miles per day; this gave them an operational radius of about 600 miles. (Clayton, pp.281 – 5)
19 Dunn, Resistance, pp.196 – 7; Gandini, p.74. Pointurier had 30 moghaznis, and 1er Peloton, 22e CM/2e RE with 94 all ranks.
20 Gandini, pp.74, 128; on tribal identification, Dunn, Resistance, p.48
21 Gandini, p.74
22 ibid, pp.45 – 7, 79. The original chosen name was Fort Mercier, but in practice the post was simply called Taghit.
23 ibid, pp.75 – 8
24 The warriors’ failure to take the ‘signallers’ ridge’ from the west is inexplicable. Frustratingly, the current tensions on both sides of the Moroccan/Algerian frontier have prevented the author from studying the ground at any of the battle sites in the Djebel Béchar and the Zousfana valley, which lie well inside modern Algeria.
25 Dunn, Resistance, p.200
26 Gandini, pp.75 – 8
27 ibid, pp .89 – 90
28 Details from an anonymous account by a survivor, published on the 10th anniversary in Légion Étrangère, Sept 1913.
29 Gandini, p.111; Bergot, La Légion, p.111
30 Gandini, pp.121, 128 – 30
31 As explained above, the current security situation has prevented the author from finding El Moungar itself. However, these notes on light and ground are based on stretches of terrain south of the Oued Dadès, east of the lower Oued Ziz, and south of the Oued Guir, plus Gandini’s contemporary monochrome and modern colour photos of El Moungar.The strength of the Shaamba is variously estimated but actually unknown; the Legion company were outnumbered by about three to one, but the ground and the warriors’ fieldcraft were more decisive than the relative numbers.
32 Holtz’s sketch map shows a Spahi picket ahead and right of the 22e CM, another bringing up the rear of the camel train, but none on the company’s left flank. If there was one, its position during the halt is unclear.
33 See Fig 17 in this book. QM-Sgt Tisserand’s sketch-map shows steep banks only at two points, on the north of the north mound and the east of the south mound. The Shaamba do not seem to have attempted to attack at either of these points.
34 The times are from Tisserand; Capt de Susbielle claimed to have arrived at 4.30pm. This description of the action is mainly from Gandini, pp.82 – 104, particularly the after-action report by Tisserand dated at Taghit on 6 Sept, which is the nearest to a coherent eye-witness account that exists. The anonymous veteran’s account published in Légion Étrangère (Sept 1913) shows signs of drawing on Tisserand’s; while it does not always agree, some of its additional names and details have been incorporated here. Livre d‘Or (pp.212 – 13) gives only a brief summary. Any conclusions drawn are the present author’s.
35 These were followed shortly afterwards by the other half of that sqn under Capt Pages, and by Lt Dubois with half of 18e CM/1er RE and some mule-litters.
36 From a morning strength of 2 offs, 7 NCOs, 7 cpls and 97 men (= 113 all ranks), Tisserand lists: killed 1 off, 2 NCOs, 2 cpls, 30 men (= 35, but actually Capt Vauchez then alive); wounded 1 off, 5 NCOs, 3 cpls, 39 men (= 48, but actually plus Capt Vauchez); unhurt 2 cpls, 28 men (= 30). Of the 49 wounded, 2 offs and 1 man would die later; so final casualties 37 dead and 46 wounded recovered = 83 out of 113. (Gandini, pp.98, 105)
37 Gandini, p.110
38 The second half of Capt Bonnelet’s 18e CM/1er RE, and the whole of Capt Fort’s 14e CM/2e RTA. (Gandini, pp.92, 105)
39 Both officers would receive posthumous citations; Sgt Charlier was also awarded the Cross, and 8 other survivors the Médaille Militaire. QM-Sgt Tisserand was naturally recommended for the Legion of Honour, but on 3 Nov the War Minister decided to give him a sub-lieutenant’s commission instead (probably what he had been working towards since he joined the Legion). The médaillés were Sgt Perré-Dessus, QM-Cpl de Montès, Cpl Detz, and Ptes Brona, Copel, May, Ueber and Vandevalle. (Gandini, pp.107 – 12)
40 Charles Eugène, Vicomte de Foucauld (1858 – 1916); see also Fig 14, and Ch 15, n 27.
41 Gandini, pp.117 – 18
42 Correspondence of 30 Sept – 24 Nov 1903 (Gandini, p.122)
43 Dunn, Resistance, p.200; Gandini, pp.123, 125
44 Maurois, p.87
11. The Lyautey Drill
1 Intimate Letters, p.122. The context was the disproportionate consequences of Gen Brière de l’Ile’s alarmist cable to Paris in March 1885 reporting the abandonment of Lang Son.
2 After 30 years of European peace, promotion was very slow; a logjam in 1894 – 1908 raised the average age for the step from captain to major to 47. At about 4,000 francs p.a., a captain’s pay fell somewhere between one-third and one-half short of the income needed by even a single man for reasonable security, and the broad range of social background meant that only a minority of officers had private means. (Serman and Bertaud, pp.570 – 71)
3 Ralston, pp.280 – 83; Maurois, p.125
4 Ralston, pp.260 – 69
5 Serman and Bertaud, p.598
6 The involvement of the Freemasons was revealed in the Chamber on 28 Oct 1904, and André was forced to resign on 14 November. (Ralston, pp.269 – 70)
7 Ralston, p.278
8 Maurois, p.87. On Lyautey’s religious sensibilities: in retirement he told the journalist Pierre van Paassen that if he had been Pontius Pilate, responsible for peace and order in Judea, he, too, would have delivered Christ up for crucifixion. (Van Paassen, pp.144 – 9)
9 Hoisington, p.21; Gandini, p.125
10 Lyautey, Vers le Maroc, p.144
11 Maurois, pp.104 – 105
12 Eberhardt stayed in the Sud-Oranais until Feb 1904, and after her return to Algiers many of her articles were published in the Arabic El Akhbar. This remarkable but driven young woman, then 27 years old – who travelled alone dressed as an Arab youth, and who married an Algerian Spahi – returned to Ain Sefra in May 1904, when she became friendly with Lyautey despite her more advanced opinions on Arab – French relations. She died on 21 Oct 1904 when a flash flood devastated the Muslim town at Ain Sefra. Lyautey ensured that troops clearing debris kept an eye out for her papers; many were recovered, and published posthumously. (Gandini, pp.120 – 21)
13 Gandini, p.127
14 Rankin, pp.34 – 5. For readers interested in such details: Over his greatcoat the légionnaire first wound – with the aid of a comrade – his 9ft blue woollen waist sash, to provide support for the back.
He next slung on his left hip a haversack with one day’s ration of bread, meat and often vegetables for the soupe, a plugged length of bamboo for salt and pepper, and probably his pipe, tobacco and soap. Balancing this on his right hip was his 2-litre waterbottle (not always containing water), with the handle of his ‘quart’ tin mug threaded on to the sling. Over these he buckled his leather belt and Y-strap suspenders, the former with ammunition (3 packets of 8 rounds in each of his 3 pouches, so 72 rounds immediately available), and on the left hip the scabbarded needle-bayonet for his Lebel. He thus could not lift the waterbottle to his lips without disturbing the pack and belt equipment – he was not supposed to drink except at designated halts.On his back, hooked to the suspenders, was the ‘Azor’ knapsack of tarred canvas over a wooden board frame. This was packed with a spare shirt, drawers and canvas camp shoes; rifle- and shoe-grease, cleaning brushes, ‘housewife’ sewing kit and towel; another 6 packets of cartridges (giving 120 rounds in all); a tin of concentrated soup, 24 hard-tack biscuits, an emergency ration of sweet chocolate, and two doubled bags with sugar and coffee, beans and salted rice. Rolled and strapped round the outside of the pack were a blanket and tent-cloth section with a halved tent-pole, cord and pegs, a spare blouse, stable-jacket and trousers, and a spare pair of hobnailed boots. On top of the roll, one of the stowage straps secured his gamelle or mess tin with cover, and a bundle of firewood was tied over all. Finally, of course, the légionnaire carried his rifle.
In addition, he also carried on the outside of his pack his share of his squad’s collective camp equipment. One man in 8 carried a large flat cooking dish (marmite), and one in 10 a towering 10-litre water bidon; one in 6 had a canvas bucket and a sack, one in 12 a hatchet, and one man in 30 a coffee-mill. In addition, each infantry company’s pack-animals were supposed to carry 4 doubleheaded and 4 single-headed pickaxes, 8 shovels, 3 felling axes, a folding saw and a pair of wirecutters. (Rankin, pp.46 – 8)
15 See Ch 5, n(21) on trades in the ranks.
16 Gandini, pp.10, 17, 128, 132 – 3; Dunn, Resistance , pp.60, 214 – 15; KB, No.163
17 Dunn, Resistance, p.208, 214; Gugliotta and Jauffret, RHdA, 1981/1
18 Dunn, Resistance, p.207 – translation slightly adjusted.
19 Harris, pp.1 – 6; Woolman, pp.5 – 8
20 Bernard, pp.36 – 7, 41
21 Hoisington, p.24. In 1904 Bou Amama was indeed on the move northwards from the Tamlelt steppe, but his purpose was to explore contacts with El Rogi. By 1906, the old rebel had drifted out of history. (Dunn, Resistance, p.158)
22 Hoisington, p.24; Lyautey, Vers la Maroc, pp.76 – 81
23 Maurois, pp.107 – 15
24 Gandini, p.22
25 At this date the Cies Montées were numbered 2e and 3e/1er RE and 21e and 22e/2e RE, but, as already noted, there would be frequent administrative redesignations, depending upon which battalions where currently posted to the Sud-Oranais.
26 Livre d‘Or, p.214; Bernard, pp.196 – 8; Dunn, Resistance, p.205 – 206; Gandini, pp.21 – 3; Clayton, p.282
27 Maurois, p.116 – author’s slightly amended translation.
28 Maurois, pp.117, 130. Datelined Sept 1906 at Kenadsa; after Jaeglé’s death in action the piece was posthumously published in No.8 (30 Nov 1912) of the monthly Légion Étrangère.
29 Bernard, p.20
30 Hoisington, p.28; Dunn, Resistance, pp.25, 216
31 Dunn, Resistance, p.208
32 Gugliotta and Jauffret, RHdA, 1981/1; Gandelin, RHdA 1981/1
33 Lyautey, Vers le Maroc, pp.255 – 6
34 Dunn, Resistance, pp.212, 216 – 18, 221 – 2; Hoisington, p.29
35 Gugliotta and Jauffret, RHdA, 1981/2
36 Porch, Foreign Legion, p.324
37 Gugliotta and Jauffret, RHdA, 1981/1, quoting Maj Poirmeur, Notre Vieille Legion; Bernard, p.39
38 Porch, Foreign Legion, pp.312 – 14
39 Gandini, pp.28 – 9
40 Gugliotta and Jauffret, RHdA, 1981/1
41 Gandini, p.30 – 31
42 KB, No.114
43 Gandelin, RHdA, 1981/1
44 In Nov 1894 the cadre of each RE was increased by 4 capts, 4 lts, 2 sgt-majs and five sgts and QMSGTS, and in 1905 by 10 more lieutenants. Such supplementary cadres were standard in the Line, to accommodate the enlargement of conscript units when raised from peacetime to wartime establishment. (Morel, p.55)
45 Porch, Foreign Legion, pp.289 – 302; Morel, pp.55 – 6
46 Ralston, p.300
47 ibid, pp.283 – 8; Porch, March to Marne, pp.110 – 29. The Left coalition began to break up from 1906, separating the ever more extreme Radicals from the moderate Socialists led by Jean Jaurès.
48 Woolman, p.38
49 Maurois, p.135
50 Hoisington, p.31
51 Porch, Morocco, pp.149 – 59; Serman and Bertaud, p.696. Morel (p.63) actually dates the order to VI/1er RE on 3 Aug – before the crisis – giving only about 36 hours to organize the unit before it marched out to entrain for Oran. This urgency prevented the usual selection of a picked Legion bataillon de marche, and VI/1st RE had its share of the poorer kind of material that was now too common – thus, no doubt, their bad behaviour in Casablanca.
52 Hoisington, p.31
53 Porch, Morocco, pp.166 – 7; Morel, p.63. Maj Provost was replaced by Maj Huguet d’Etaules (Livre d‘Or, p.216). The reinforcements were I/2e RE (Maj Corbière) and IV/2e RE (Maj Szarvas). VI/1er RE and a bn of turcos from 1er RTA formed 1er Rgt de Marche de la Chaouia (LtCol Blanc, later LtCol Passard); I/ and IV/2e RE formed 3e Rgt de Marche de la Chaouia (LtCol Brulard).
54 Rankin, pp. 8, 9 and 52. The Spanish 69th Rgt (Col Bernal), which camped SW of Casablanca in a purely defensive stance, was present as a token of Spain’s rights under the Oct 1904 Franco-Spanish agreements and the June 1906 Act of Algeciras.
12. Two Kinds of War
1 The first epigraph is from Rankin, In Morocco with General D’Amade, p.159. The second is from Moulay Ahmad Lahsin’s letter of challenge to Maj Fesch at Boudenib, 29 Aug 1908; the reference in the Archives du Ministère de la Guerre is given by Dunn, Resistance, p.235 n(10). Since it is quoted there in an English translation, from French, from Arabic, the present author has felt free to adjust the English slightly.
2 On 15 Jan 1908 the Corps de Débarquement had: Inf 3x Rgts de Marche de Tirs Alg (6x bns from 1er, 2e and 3e RTA); Rgt de M du 2e RE (LtCol Brulard – I/ and IV/2e RE); Rgt de M Mixte (LtCol Passard – VI/1er RE + bn from 1er RTA); Rgt de M de Zouaves (2x bns). Cav 4x sqns Chass d’Af (from 1er, 3e and 5e RCA); 2x sqns Spahis (from 1er and 3e RS); sqn Alg irregulars. Arty 3x field btys (each 4x 75mm); 1 mtn bty (6x 80mm, mule-pack); 2x sects Navy 37mm QF (cart-mobile, manned by sailors from Desaix). Services incl Rgt de M du Génie (2x bns Senegalese). By Apr 1908 the Corps had been reinforced to c.14,000, of which c.11,000 combat troops. (Rankin, pp.10 – 11)
3 ibid, p.17. Successful French trials of military wireless telegraphy dated from 1900. In 1908 a station on the Chaouia communicated with a ship off Casablanca, which relayed to another off Tangier, and thence to Oran, Marseille and Paris. However, the wire telegraph, the signal-lamp system and carrier pigeons also remained in use. (Serman and Bertaud, p.539)
4 Rankin, pp.54 – 5. On other occasions he describes columns routinely moving in two squares, one for combat and a smaller one formed by the escorted baggage, à la Négrier. The fighting square was actually an oblong, longer at the front and rear faces, which were formed of infantry marching in a parallel series of platoon columns 4 men wide and 10 – 15 deep, with intervals of about 40yds between platoons to allow them space to deploy for action – to swing outwards into a single continuous rank. The sides were formed of columns of platoons marching at intervals, or sometimes in single file. In Jan 1908 the Legion companies averaged 240 men. (Rankin, pp.25, 59 – 60)
5 ibid, p.65
6 ibid, p.90
7 ibid, p.90
8 Porch, Morocco, pp.170 – 71; Rankin, p.59
9 Rankin, pp.94, 97
10 ibid, pp.28 – 30, 112 – 14, 185; no correspondents accompanied this column, and his account was written up from later interviews.For those interested in firearms: this seems to be the earliest description of the Legion’s use of machine guns. Rankin wrote that each Rgt de Marche had ‘a tripod-mounted mitrailleuse’, but that its value was dubious. It is useful to be reminded that early MGs were often distrusted rather than welcomed as battle-winning weapons, and were believed by some veterans to be a failed experiment. Several 8mm MG types were being tried out by the French Army at this period; all were air-cooled, and fed by metal strips gripping 25 – 30 cartridges that were passed sideways through the breech mechanism – they thus required reloading much more frequently than Maxim/Vickers-type guns fed by a continuous 250-rd canvas belt. The best of them was the M1900 Hotchkiss (distinguishable in photos from the better-known M1914 by its T-shaped shoulder stock). A photo in Gandini’s La Légion à travers les cartes postales (1997) shows ‘a machine-gun platoon of 2nd RE at Boudenib during the Upper Guir Column’, which dates it to 1908. The photo shows a sergeant, and 2 gun-corporals each with 7 men, serving a pair of M1905 Puteaux MGs, identifiable by their brass barrel-jackets with cooling fins around the whole length (a needlessly over-complex weapon, as was the more notorious M1907 St Étienne). MG crews were issued with a padded crossbelt to enable them to carry dismounted guns on the shoulder, and mittens with ringmail palms for handling the barrels, which got extremely hot in use and lacked the protective jacket of the water-cooled Maxim-type guns. (Gandini, op cit, p.99; Hicks and Jandot, French Military Weapons 1717 – 1938, New Milford CT; N. Flayderman, 1964, pp.121, 123)
11 Rankin, pp.164 – 70; Porch, Morocco, pp.175 – 76
12 Porch, Morocco, pp 172 – 4; Maurois, p.141; Rankin, pp.153 – 7. Gen Picquart was the officer persecuted during the Dreyfus Affair; a decent man, he had been promoted beyond his talents, probably as a deliberate provocation to Army reactionaries.
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