After the battle, Ralph Kirkham returned to the place where he last had seen his best friend, William Burwell, during the charge. He found him near the spot where he had gone down and discovered the grisly results of his mutilation. Burwell’s dog, a pointer, was lying next to him, licking his face, but the animal had also been shot and died within a few minutes. Kirkham picked up a lock of his companion’s hair that had been severed by the blow of the lance, then had his body removed and buried beside other officers in the unit. Meanwhile, General Scott ordered Casa Mata destroyed, and Lieutenant William Armstrong of the Second Artillery was engaged in the task when the resulting explosion killed him. That night, Kirkham wrote a detailed account of the day’s events in his journal. Then he sat down to pen a letter to his wife, making sure to spare her the gory details of the battle. “I cannot give any particulars,” he wrote, but he did acknowledge that they had attacked with inadequate information about the enemy position and as a result had lost many of their best men. Before closing his correspondence, he wrote, “I feel very lonely tonight, I assure you, with my roommate and companion dead, and I sit here alone.”31
chapter twelve
God Is a Yankee
The Capture of Chapultepec
But usually one side is more strongly motivated, which tends to affect its behavior: the offensive element will dominate, and usually maintain its continuity of action.
—Carl von Clausewitz
The Americans were no closer to capturing Mexico City after the Molino del Rey battle than they had been before it, and the same question about how to advance on the city remained. Inadequate reconnaissance on August 20 and inadequate intelligence on September 8 had resulted in the two costliest engagements of the campaign, so Scott spent the next three days carefully gathering information about the enemy defenses. Six roads approached the city: two from the west and four from the south. All were raised and exposed causeways, which made for a treacherous approach. Before entering the capital, each road passed through a garita, or fortified gate, consisting of a strong block house, and these structures anchored the defenses that ringed the city. Two of the roads intersected at the Belén garita near the southwest corner of the town, one running from the Chapultepec castle to the west and the other running from the little village of Piedad to the south. The other causeway on the west side terminated at the San Cosme garita and was accessible from the castle by traveling north then turning due east to the city gate. The other roads on the south side all lay east of the Piedad causeway, each approximately a thousand yards from the next. One ran into the Niño Perdido garita; the next, the Acapulco Road, ran into the San Antonio garita; and the final road passed through the La Viga garita before entering the city’s southeast corner.
Choosing the best route for his final approach to the city constituted Scott’s immediate dilemma, and engineers Zealous Tower, Isaac Stevens, Robert E. Lee, and P. G. T. Beauregard conducted exhaustive reconnaissance in gathering information to help Scott make his decision. On Thursday, September 9, and the two days that followed, Scott renewed his interest in the southern causeways, and he even accompanied Lee in a close inspection of the southern gates on at least one occasion. By this time, it was familiar terrain for Beauregard and others who had been reconnoitering the area since before the Battle of Molino del Rey, and their inspections revealed growing enemy strength along the causeways and around the garitas. Around the San Antonio gate, the Mexicans had constructed fieldworks with six guns in embrasure. Additional fieldworks, trenches, and guns connecting the garitas of Niño Perdido, San Antonio, and La Viga were under construction, with hundreds of laborers engaged in the various projects. The layout of the works allowed them to command all of the southern approaches. The dangerous work of the engineers did not end when the sun went down. They conducted numerous missions at night, when they could creep closer to the enemy’s position, and on one such occasion, Beauregard, accompanied by a small escort and a Mexican guide, attempted to get into the city and examine the defenses from the inside. The effort, however, failed when the guide panicked in the face of a Mexican sentry.1
Scott ordered Bennet Riley’s brigade of Twiggs’s division up to Piedad to cover the engineers while they worked and to present a strong military presence around the southern causeways. On September 9, Riley ordered Lieutenant D. H. Hill’s company forward to the Niño Perdido causeway, and while there, Hill observed for himself the “immense force” and impressive fieldworks clustered around the garitas and connecting the roads. Later Riley ordered the company to return to the regiment, and as it prepared to do so, one of General Gideon Pillow’s staff officers arrived and instructed Hill to hold his position until another company arrived to relieve him. Hill had no knowledge of the brigade being placed under Pillow’s authority, so rather than obey “an ignorant puppy,” the lieutenant opted to do as his veteran brigade commander had instructed. On this occasion, Hill revealed his utter contempt for the Tennessee general, and his actions probably conveyed the feelings of many other regular officers. Having already referred to Pillow in his diary as “an ass” and “a pitiful fool,” he simply refused to obey the order. When the Tennessean found out, he confronted Hill and in “harsh and insulting language” reprimanded the lieutenant, but Hill cut him off by shaking his sword in his face and demanding that Pillow not speak to him in such a tone. Pillow then arrested him, although he later released him at Riley’s request and “retracted the offensive language.”2 Such was the resentment of the young professional officers for someone who owed his rank to political connections.
By Saturday, September 11, Scott decided “to avoid that net work of obstacles” on the southern approach to the city, and he called a conference to discuss options. Lee, Beauregard, and Tower were out on a reconnaissance mission when they were summoned at 10:00 A.M. to report to the church in Piedad, and when they arrived there, the principal parties were gathered: Generals Cadwalader, Pierce, Pillow, Quitman, Shields, Twiggs, and Bennet Riley, recently promoted to brigadier general. Worth and Persifor Smith were on duty elsewhere and did not attend. The engineers were also present, as was Nicholas Trist and members of Scott’s staff. Scott began the meeting by stating the obvious. The previous two battles had been costly; therefore, it was imperative that the upcoming attack be made where there was the least risk of casualties and the greatest chance of success. He went on to give his views on the advantages and disadvantages of attacks from both the south and west before expressing his opinion in favor of the latter. Although the Chapultepec castle, perched atop a steep hill, posed an ominous threat to attackers, if captured, Scott pointed out, it could serve as a safe place to lodge U.S. troops and a base for future assaults if necessary. The castle might even surrender without an assault but after an effective bombardment, and once the castle fell, he opined that the city might capitulate. In addition, the ground on the west side of the city was harder and more conducive for artillery and troop maneuvers. Although Scott did not say so, one wonders if, in his mind, a decision for a southern approach would make the attack on Molino del Rey seem all the more irrelevant.
Having voiced his preference, the commanding general opened the floor for other opinions. Gideon Pillow was the first to speak. In a lengthy monologue, he persuasively argued for an attack from the south so as to avoid the castle defenses. Then when Quitman requested to hear from the engineers, four of them, including Lee, spoke in agreement with Pillow’s views. So Quitman, followed by Shields, Cadwalader, and Pierce also came out for the southern approach, but Twiggs sided with the commanding general. Riley, a veteran of the War of 1812 who was in his thirty-fourth year of army service, then asked the engineers which approach would require less time and labor in constructing batteries. When they responded the western, he pointedly said, “Well, I go in for less work and more fighting.” At this point of the discussion, Trist and Colonel Hitchcock began to prod Lieutenant Beauregard to speak his mind. Beauregard had been surprised to hear his fellow engineers argue for an a
ttack up the southern causeways, a course that he regarded as a mistake in judgment, but not wanting to oppose his friends publicly, he had resolved to remain silent. As Trist and Hitchcock urged and Beauregard demurred, their whispering from across the room attracted Scott’s attention. Looking right at the lieutenant, Scott demanded, “You, young man, in that corner, what have you to say on the subject?”
Beauregard then launched into the most forceful argument offered by anyone present. He explained to the generals that he had been engaged in close reconnaissance of the southern defenses for the past four days and he could attest to the steady and impressive buildup on that side. The open terrain, irrigation ditches, and soft ground all made for a dangerous approach. Furthermore, a flank attack was impossible, and Beauregard pointed out that such maneuvers had been the cornerstone of American tactics thus far in the campaign. Taking all things into consideration, he asserted that to attack from the south would be fraught with more difficulties than the assault on Churubusco. After explaining that Santa Anna anticipated an attack from the south, he reminded them of the maxim, “never do what your enemy expects and wishes you to do.” When Beauregard finished, the room fell silent. Scott then asked for further comments, and Pierce spoke up, changing his mind in favor of a western approach. More silence. Then Scott rose from his chair and firmly stated, “Gentlemen, we will attack by the Western gates!”3
Everyone understood that Chapultepec was the key to victory. The castle, which sat atop a two-hundred-foot-high rocky hill, had been built in the previous century by a Spanish viceroy, but since 1841, it housed the military college of Mexico. The stone walled complex formed a rectangle three quarters of a mile long and a quarter of a mile wide. On the western extreme of the grounds and about a thousand yards from the castle stood the buildings of Molino del Rey. Near the mill, the ground was flat but broken by numerous irrigation ditches that kept it drained. Proceeding east from the mill and toward the castle one encountered a marshy bog where the muddy ground provided an impediment for advancing infantry, and beyond that stood a grove of large cypress trees thick enough to provide cover for both attackers or defenders. From there, the ground sloped sharply up to the western face of the castle—a difficult climb, yet not as severe as the precipice that bounded the other three sides. Attackers ascending this incline would first encounter a redan—an angled field fortification shaped like two sides of a triangle designed to provide defenders with protection from the front and both flanks. Farther up the hill was a minefield and beyond that a ten-foot-deep fosse—a ditch or moat designed to impede the advance of infantry—that was in musket range of the castle above. Finally, a parapet wall surrounded the castle itself. The incline was steeper south of the castle, but a road cut into the side of the hill led to the summit. In the elbow of this road, the Mexicans had constructed a circular redoubt, inside of which they had mounted a field gun with entrenchments extended on both sides. Across the northern edge of the Chapultepec grounds ran an old aqueduct, but its arches had been filled in with bricks and mortar, making it a solid wall, and the vertical rock face on that side, as well as to the east, made an attack from those directions impossible.
To the Americans, the castle appeared as a fortress with its infantry trenches, sandbag redans, and ten cannon, but appearances can deceive. Because the Mexicans lacked the time and material to convert the academy grounds into a real bastion, its defenses were actually inadequate and incomplete. Santa Anna remained fixed on defending the southern approach to the city, and consequently Major General Nicolás Bravo commanded no more than nine hundred men on the Chapultepec grounds—less than half the number needed to repel an attack. Furthermore, its worst feature was its isolated location two miles southwest of the city, and the same raised causeways that made it difficult for the Americans to approach the city also made it hazardous for Mexicans to come to the castle’s aid. Scott hoped that an all-day bombardment on September 12 would induce the castle garrison to surrender thus negating the need for an assault.4
Battle of Chapultepec. From Donald S. Frazier, ed., The United States and Mexico at War (New York: Macmillan, 1998). Reprinted by permission of The Gale Group.
Scott’s plan called for a feint against the southern garitas on September 12, coupled with the bombardment of the castle. Then, if necessary, he would attack the Chapultepec complex. Scott hoped that Santa Anna would interpret movements around Chapultepec as a diversion from a southern attack. Before dismissing the generals from the conference, he ordered Quitman and Pillow to march their divisions to Piedad that afternoon and join Riley’s brigade, which was already there. He wanted a troop buildup there before sunset so that the Mexicans could see the Americans massing to the south. Then around midnight, Quitman and Pillow were to move their men west to Tacubaya, where Worth’s division was stationed. Scott ordered Twiggs to remain in Piedad with Riley’s brigade to carry out the demonstration along the Niño Perdido causeway next day and to move his other brigade under Persifor Smith up from San Angel to Mixcoac. While he shuffled his troops under cover of darkness, Scott also wanted batteries constructed and ready to fire on the castle next morning.5
All night (September 11–12), the Americans prepared their gun emplacements. Lee, along with Captain Benjamin Huger of the Ordnance Department, supervised the artillery preparations. It was the first night of a forty-eight-hour stretch that Lee would go without sleep. Captain Simon H. Drum commanded a battery of three guns, a howitzer and two 16-pounders, that he placed in a concealed position along the road just north of Tacubaya and a thousand yards from Chapultepec. A two-gun battery consisting of a howitzer and a 24-pounder under Lieutenant Peter V. Hagner rested to the west and also just above Tacubaya. These five guns opened on the castle Sunday morning and kept up a steady fire all day. Several hours after sunrise, two additional batteries with three guns total and located just south of Molino del Rey joined in the bombardment. Not only did the cannonade pound the castle, but occasional well-placed canister prevented the enemy soldiers clustered in the western suburbs of the city from reinforcing Bravo’s force. Scott listened to the bombardment all day from his Tacubaya headquarters, and he waited in vain for news of the garrison’s surrender.6
Meanwhile, south of the capital, Riley’s brigade orchestrated a day-long demonstration as if it intended to advance up the causeways. Two batteries of small-caliber field guns under Captains Francis Taylor and Edward Steptoe fired at the city’s southern defenses from the Belén and Niño Perdido causeways. In addition, that morning, some of Riley’s brigade advanced as if in preparation for an attack toward the Niño Perdido gate, and he ordered the Fourth Artillery up the causeway to disperse some Mexican infantry. They remained within range of the enemy’s guns for some time before rejoining the regiment and withdrawing toward Piedad. In his report of the operation, Scott characterized this movement as effective in holding Mexican troops in their defensive posture on the south side. However, because the entire brigade never deployed and showed itself on the causeway, the ever-critical D. H. Hill thought the feint was inadequate and of too short a duration to be effective.7
In the afternoon, an anxious Scott summoned Captain Lee to his headquarters to report on the day’s bombardment. Lee arrived with Tower and Beauregard to find the commanding general in an irritable mood. Scott, contemplating a night attack, needed information about the effects of the day’s bombardment, and he was angry that Lee had not reported to him sooner. When Scott questioned them about the prospect of attacking the castle that evening, the engineers expressed skepticism about their ability to be ready, and Lee tactfully argued the merits of a daylight attack the next morning. But Scott’s fear concerned the possibility that Santa Anna might send additional troops to reinforce Chapultepec during the night, and he wanted to attack when the enemy was most vulnerable. However, as Scott calmed down, he began to agree with Lee’s recommendation, and at dusk, he ordered the guns to cease fire and called a conference of his division commanders.8
At 8:00
P.M., Lee returned to Scott’s headquarters, where the generals had gathered for final instructions. During the conference, Pillow, in an incredible breach of etiquette, audaciously proposed his own plan for the next morning’s attack. The commanding general listened to Pillow’s “peculiar plan” in “polite and patient amazement,” then, “with an exactitude not to be misunderstood,” he laid out his plan and issued orders to each of his subordinates. Riley’s brigade would remain at Piedad to cover the army’s right flank and once again demonstrate against the southern causeways. Meanwhile, the artillery would resume a brisk fire on the castle, followed by a two-pronged infantry assault. Pillow would attack up the western slope from Molino del Rey with Worth’s division in support, and Quitman would attack up the Tacubaya Road from the south, with Smith’s brigade from Twiggs’s division in support. And because Scott did not trust Pillow and lacked complete confidence in Quitman’s volunteers, he instructed the supporting units (regulars) to supply 250 volunteers to spearhead each attacking column. Worth was to furnish 250 men to lead Pillow’s charge, and Twiggs was to furnish 250 men to attack at the head of Quitman’s division. These storming parties would carry ladders with them as they advanced, and their perilous task was to breach the enemy’s defenses by scaling the outer walls and clearing a way for the rest of the troops. These spearhead attacks, “the forlorn hope,” were unenviable tasks certain to result in heavy casualties, but promises of promotions resulted in no shortage of volunteers to fill their ranks.9 Scott had formulated his plan to ensure that every division would have troops in the fight, which in turn would safeguard against disgruntled generals who were prone to complain about their unit’s role.
A Gallant Little Army Page 31