A Spy's Journey

  Fortunately, I was overseas when these hearing made prime-time TV. But their effect was immediate and enormous on the morale of our CIA employee population. Even overseas, the films of Senator Church holding up CIA-made guns for assassination and the jocular handling of this by members of the committees was devastating to those of us trying to recruit people to spy on behalf of the United States government. It was the Church Committee that coined the now famous comparison of the CIA to the rogue elephant. And, President Ford, one of Congress’ own, continued to have to battle the intelligence committees of both houses of Congress to keep what secrets were left. Also, during this time, in December 1975 the CIA station chief in Athens, Richard Welch, was brutally gunned down by the cowards known as “November 17.”

  Ford’s difficulties with Congress finally ended. His early efforts to restore CIA morale in 1976 were aided by the fact that the Pike Committee self-destructed in controversy when the entire committee voted not to release its own report for security reasons. Additionally, the Rockefeller Commission, and even the Church Committee, found in the end that “the CIA has done its job.”

  As an important footnote, from 1975 to 1979 I personally recruited more high-level spies than at any other juncture in my career. The truth was that all the publicity about the CIA enhanced the belief by foreigners that the CIA could do anything.

  At the Republican National Convention in August 1976, Ford barely defeated another Republican, whose criticisms of him were fatal—Ronald Reagan. And the result was that Ford lost to Jimmy Carter in November by less than two percent of the vote.

  President Jimmy Carter (1977–1981), in the words of author John L. Helgerson, “distinguished himself in the eyes of CIA officials by becoming the first presidential hopeful to request intelligence briefings even before receiving his party’s nomination.”9 None of us intelligence professionals will ever forget the four years under President Carter. He made being a Washington outsider into a plus in the early stages of his presidency. And, we faced in Walter Mondale, Carter’s vice president, one of the most anti-CIA senior cabinet officers in history. However, I must note that, after he became ambassador to Japan, Mondale had an awakening. He had refused to deal with the CIA when he visited Japan in the mid-1970s, but when I visited Tokyo as chief of the East Asia division, Ambassador Mondale hosted a reception for me.

  It was very difficult to deal with Carter’s belief that HUMINT—spying by people—was distasteful, but the interception of their communications—SIGINT—or the photographing of their denied areas—IMINT—was acceptable. Carter’s ultimate rejection of spying came when he refused, for the first time in history, to retain the sitting DCI, George H. W. Bush. And, although Carter eventually replaced him with a crony from the Naval Academy, Stansfield Turner, most people forget that Turner was not Carter’s first choice. That honor went to ex-JFK aide Theodore Sorensen. However, Sorensen’s background as a conscientious objector worked against him, and during confirmation he withdrew his nomination, clearing the way for the later nomination and confirmation of Turner.

  The nomination of Turner, who, along with Carter, had no use for human spying, drove the sagging morale at the CIA even lower. The clandestine service, the DDO, was a shell of its former self, being reportedly nearly only half of its previous size when Turner took charge. In August 1976, Turner announced that the spy directorate would have to take another 820 cuts in the next two years, 147 being immediate forced retirements.10

  I was overseas when the bombshell was announced, and the lack of sensitivity in the way this was handled was incredible. A number of officers found out they were on the list of 147 by being notified of their retirement electronically. Confidence in Turner, and Carter by extension, was lost. It didn’t help that it took Carter a year and a half from Turner’s confirmation to make his first visit to the CIA headquarters.

  It’s ironic that, with the decimation of our human intelligence collection network, it was the subsequent lack of human intelligence on Iran that let Carter down in the end during the hostage crisis. But you can’t have it both ways—fire and retire hundreds of experienced, language-qualified officers, and still enhance your ability to recruit spies. By February 1979, when Ayatollah Khomeini returned in triumph, the stage was set for tragedy in Tehran.

  Meanwhile, as with every recent president before him, Carter became enamored with the idea of CIA covert action capabilities helping solve a political/foreign policy problem. This took root when, on December 27, 1979, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. Carter was determined to make the Soviet Union pay the price. Under a presidential covert action finding (the requirement that a president find that a covert action is essential to American foreign policy before it can be funded in Congress), in January 1980 Carter authorized the CIA to begin funneling arms to the Mujahideen guerrillas. Again, ironically, it was Carter’s successor, Ronald Reagan, who got the credit for driving the Soviets out of Afghanistan via one of the most successful covert action programs ever run—begun by Carter.

  But the takeover of the American Embassy in Tehran on November 4, 1979, left Carter with a problem that dominated the remainder of his term. To his credit, Carter authorized a rescue attempt for six diplomats who had managed to escape to the Canadian embassy undetected, and, through daring and good intelligence, these six were rescued in January 1980. Details of that escape are contained in Antonio Mendez’ book, Masters of Disguise. That success encouraged Carter to direct a military rescue attempt to save the other 43 hostages being held in Tehran; Operation Eagle Claw was born.

  The CIA and intelligence units of the U.S. military had done their jobs right. Agents and support mechanisms for the rescue were in place. April 24 was set as the date. But things went wrong from the start, and at a refueling location in the Iranian desert, eight Americans and one Iranian interpreter were killed in a mishap when helicopters and refueling aircraft collided. Combined with the earlier loss of three essential helicopters, Carter had no choice but to abort the rescue and announce its failure to the American people—and the world. Carter’s presidency never recovered, and he was defeated decisively by Ronald Reagan that November.

  In the 1980 campaign, candidate Reagan received but one intelligence briefing, but he became an intelligence advocate following his election. Reagan had a built-in intelligence advantage because his vice president—George H. W. Bush—was the first former Director of Central Intelligence to be elected to that position (and later, as president).

  No president in history initiated as many covert action programs as did Ronald Reagan (1981–1989). Interestingly, Reagan’s first exposure to intelligence and intelligence matters came after the end of his time as governor of California. President Ford appointed him to the Rockefeller Commission that was to look into the issue of alleged CIA abuses. And, during his campaign against Carter, Reagan scored big when he promised to unleash the CIA.11 When he appointed as his DCI William J. Casey, an OSS veteran who hated communism and bureaucracy, it was inevitable that trouble was brewing in the intelligence arena.

  Morale boomed as the administration got money to rebuild the spy apparatus and launched an all-out assault against communism. But with Casey sitting at the president’s elbow, having successfully lobbied to be the first DCI in history to be a cabinet member, it was inevitable that this combination would push covert action and intelligence to its legal limits.

  Central America was first on both the president’s and Casey’s agenda, and Nicaragua and the Sandinistas were first on that list. Reagan signed his first finding against Nicaragua, and this included defending El Salvador as one of its objectives. By the end of Reagan’s first year, we were arming and training the anti-Sandinista guerrillas from a base in Honduras. The resistance group was known as the Contras.

  Interestingly, President Reagan’s hard line against the Soviets and Eastern Europe was more popular than the threat that he and Casey saw closer to our own borders. Congressional opposition came in the form of a proposal, the Bola
nd Amendment, which was a structure to forbid the use of U.S. funds to overthrow the democratically elected communist Sandinista government. In December 1982 both houses of Congress adopted the amendment, thereby prohibiting the CIA from providing equipment, training, or advice toward the overthrow of the government of Nicaragua. Casey seethed. And while he seethed, Iran-Contra was born.

  It was preceded by the incredible presidential approval for the CIA to begin placing mines in the harbors of Nicaragua, ostensibly to interdict arms shipments arriving there. The blunder worsened when six ships from six different nations—including one from the Soviet Union, struck the mines. It was only through good luck than none sank. A full crisis was now on hand as Congress learned the full extent of the operation and the CIA involvement. (Interestingly, one of my classmates was on the ships laying the mines. He told me that all of our maritime experts had told their superiors that this was an operation that would not stop the arrival of shipping, and would not likely remain covert.)

  This was the point at which Reagan and particularly Casey felt the CIA was being too negative and not aggressive enough in taking on the communist threat, particularly in Central America. Thus it was that the direction of these covert action programs moved from the CIA to the National Security Council (NSC), then under National Security Advisor Robert “Bud” McFarlane. With Casey’s eager encouragement, McFarlane had been attempting to find other sources than Congress to support the Contras. He found funding initially from Saudi Arabia. And he found the man to make the operation work, Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North, one of his assistants at the NSC.

  Meanwhile, in the 1984 presidential campaign, Democratic candidate Walter Mondale received only an overview of world events from the sitting National Security Advisor Bud McFarlane. Mondale never requested any briefings from the CIA, and he lost the election to Reagan.

  In Reagan’s second term, North quickly became the driving force to Casey’s and Reagan’s desire to defeat the communists in Central America, no matter the cost. The entire operations left the control of the CIA. North assumed powers far beyond his Lieutenant Colonel position. And, covert operations began to intermingle. Reagan was also preoccupied with the developing problems in Lebanon, where, by the end of 1985, nine Americans had been taken hostage. Given the Iranian hostage crisis, which turned to his benefit, Reagan was determined to rescue these hostages. Thus, Iran-Contra was born.

  Incredibly, Reagan authorized the covert sale, by Israel, of U.S.–made TOW missiles to Iran in an attempt to gain the release of the hostages held in Lebanon, taken and held supposedly under the direction of Iran. In short, the President of the United States of America was humiliated by a gang of thieves, approved of during the rogue operations of the NSC, with the result that only three hostages were released while Iran gained thousands of missiles and other equipment. The basic problem was simply that DCI Bill Casey, and President Reagan as well, simply could not pass by the opportunity to have an antagonistic state—Iran—pay for missiles, the proceeds from which the NSC would then divert to pay for the war against communism in Central America. The trouble was that it was all illegal and ignored intelligence community assessments.

  The foolishness of this operation was best illustrated by the scandal which followed, greatly embarrassing President Reagan. Casey was spared the ignominy of this by his unfortunate and untimely stroke and subsequent death in 1987. And, his successor, Bob Gates, had to withdraw his nomination as Director of Central Intelligence in the uproar that followed. In all, it was an inglorious end to the reign of a president and a Director of Central Intelligence who had been provided the very best that the CIA could offer in intelligence and analysis.

  During the 1988 election campaign, Democratic candidate Michael Dukakis agreed to and received only one intelligence briefing before the election. Dukakis’ vice-presidential candidate, Senator Lloyd Bentsen, attended that one briefing.12

  By 1989, however, Reagan’s legacy had come full turn, and his vice president, George H. W. Bush, a former Director of Central Intelligence, became President of the United States (1989–1993). Earlier, when he had been offered the post of DCI, Bush, a savvy politician, had at first been concerned about being earmarked for a position that was a dead end for a politician—a no-win job designed to take him out of the political arena. Bush, however, was wise enough to accept it only on the condition that he gain direct access to the president—a condition President Ford had agreed to.

  Despite the fact that Bush had been DCI, the DCI when he became president, William Webster, was never close to him. As a result, initially Bush relied on his National Security Advisor, Brent Scowcroft, and his deputy, Bob Gates. President Bush began to rely more and more on the advice of Bob Gates to deal with his most pressing problem, the Soviet Union.

  And the Soviet Union began to unravel early in Bush’s presidency. By the middle of 1989, Soviet leader Gorbachev’s own intelligence apparatus had begun to work against him, and Bush was well served by good, accurate CIA assessments about the staying power of Gorbachev and his likely successor, Boris Yeltsin. Bush was well prepared for the events that followed, due to his affinity for, and support of, good intelligence. Even though the CIA had not predicted the ultimate dissolution of the Soviet Union, they had warned well and early about the likelihood of revolt and trouble in the Eastern European countries. And Bob Gates gained still more influence with the president.

  About the same time, an intelligence fiasco further diminished DCI Webster’s standing with the administration. The CIA had attempted to plan a coup against Panamanian leader and thug Manuel Noriega. He had proven to be a real pain to the Bush administration, and Bush consequently wanted him removed. The failure of the CIA to implement a covert action there to remove Noriega led Bush to finally order military action to accomplish the goal. The United States invaded Panama on December 20, 1989, and secured the surrender of Noriega the following month. Operation Just Cause, as it was known, was the largest use of military force since the Vietnam War.

  By mid-1990, the president was occupied by the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait—an event intelligence had warned was coming but which still surprised the administration diplomatically. The fact was both human and technical intelligence confirmed Hussein had no intention of invading our closet Arab ally, Saudi Arabia, thus freeing the administration to concentrate on a response to the Kuwait invasion. The administration responded with a full-fledged war in the Middle East, Operation Desert Storm, launched in January 1991. No president has ever been served better by intelligence than was President Bush during the war that followed. Human intelligence, imagery, and signals intelligence—all served to provide immediate and up-to-date information desperately needed by—and used effectively by—U.S. military commanders. This was to become the model for “support to the war-fighting commanders-in-chief,” a phrase that would become the guiding principle for U.S. intelligence for the next two presidents, Bill Clinton and George W. Bush. It involved the total dedication of all intelligence resources—human intelligence, signals intelligence, imagery, and mazint (the measurement of emanations such as telemetry)—to provide all source collection and analysis directly to the battlefield commanders.

  But the Bush administration was to learn a lesson—there are limits to what intelligence of all sorts can do. The first Bush administration got involved in what was known as the Great SCUD Chase.13 Despite the best intelligence that the United States and Israel could garner, the U.S. forces never totally destroyed Hussein’s primary weapon of fear, the SCUD missiles which continued to bring death and destruction throughout the First Gulf War. As we know, the second Bush administration made the same mistake in their mistaken pursuit of weapons of mass destruction during the 2002 Second Gulf War.

  One thing the first Bush president did was to ensure a trusted intelligence professional held the nation’s highest intelligence office—the Director of Central Intelligence. The first Bush did so when he made Bob Gates the DCI in the fall of 1991. The second Bush
emulated his father and decided to leave the consummate intelligence professional, George Tenet, in the position following the election of 2000. In between, as we shall see, the two terms of the Clinton administration largely ignored both intelligence and the DCI.

  The presidential campaign of 1992 had many unique aspects as regarded the candidates and intelligence briefings. President and candidate George Bush continued receiving the briefings he had been getting for 12 years. Given that he had also been the Director of Central Intelligence in 1976, he knew and understood the importance of making the intelligence briefings available to all candidates. Candidate Bill Clinton was offered and accepted intelligence briefings. In another unique growth in the process of acquainting the potential presidents and vice presidents with intelligence, for the first time the briefings of candidates Clinton and his running mate, Al Gore, included sessions with the outgoing chairmen of the two congressional intelligence committees, Senator David Boren and Representative David McCurdy.14 The candidates were well prepared.

  If there is one word to describe the Clinton (1993–2001) administration’s attitude toward intelligence in its eight years, it is neglect. Along with the Clinton administration’s obvious focus on the domestic economy—which won them the election—it was quickly clear that the administration in reality had little interest in intelligence as an adjunct to foreign policy. In one of his first appointments, Clinton ousted one of the most experienced professional intelligence officers to hold the position of Director of Central Intelligence, Bob Gates. The selection of R. James Woolsey as the new Director of Central Intelligence made sense in that he was an experienced Washington insider who knew the ways of Congress. What he did not have, however, was the ear of the president. Nor was the new president interested in the staple of intelligence for presidents, the president’s daily brief (the PDB). Breaking with a long tradition, Clinton seldom saw the DCI (reportedly twice in two years), and only had the gist of the PDB briefed to him by his National Security Advisor, Sandy Berger—who had little intelligence experience.