The Romano-centrism of our source gives the impression that the Carthaginians had no concerns other than the Romans. This is misleading, as the experiences of the Carthaginians in Africa and Iberia between 241 and 218 bce make clear, but not totally so. Their relationship was initially one of bipolarity, eventually giving way to Carthaginian subordination, as their activities everywhere became increasingly entangled with the Romans’ affairs (Purcell 2017). Our sources’ representation of Carthage and Rome as two opposing forces in violent collision also obscures the extent of peaceful interaction between them. Throughout the period under discussion here, Carthaginian aristocrats maintained ties of guest-friendship with Roman aristocrats (Liv. 27.16.5). Carthaginian merchants were resident in Latium, as were Italian merchants in Carthage (Palmer 1997; Fentress 2013: 157–67; Maraoui Telmini et al. 2014: 133–36). Italians had been serving Carthage as mercenaries since at least the late fifth century bce (Fariselli 2002: 281–330). The Romans were not aliens to the Carthaginians. In fact, they were quite relatable. Both were city-states of the characteristic Mediterranean type, most studied as the Greek polis, but equally fundamental for Phoenician, Etruscan, Italic, Elymian, and Lycian cultures. Within the Mediterranean cultural sphere, Carthage and Rome had quite a bit in common. Both exercised loose control over an array of allies by similar systems of bilateral alliances (Aristot. Pol. 3.5.10–11) and entrusted their generals with very wide-reaching powers to conduct campaigns as they saw fit. Both states were highly aristocratic, with most authority invested in the annual magistracies and councils, rather than the assembly of the people. The wealth of these aristocrats, in both, derived from large rural estates, where cash crops were grown, with a central building where the raw product was processed, which was built in an urban style to serve as a locus for their owners’ self-representation as part of the elite (Fentress 2013: 167–78). Greek culture, including literature, material culture, and religion, was familiar at Carthage as at Rome (Lancel 1995: 303–50; Rawlings 2011; Van Dommelen and López-Bertran 2013), especially among elites, whose debts to Hellenistic monarchy are often stressed (e.g., MacDonald 2015). At the same time, there are traces of Carthaginian suspicion of Greek culture (Just. Epit. 20.5.13) and the Carthaginians’ Phoenician-ness was an important aspect of their identity, mirroring the awkward relationship Roman aristocrats had with Hellenism and the premium they put on Romanitas. Many of these commonalities were noted by Greek sources already at the beginning of the third century bce, became increasingly marked over time, and are best understood as a product of their long history of interaction with each other and with the wider Mediterranean world (Purcell 2017). Commonality is neither identity nor affinity, but we should avoid thinking of the Carthaginians and Romans as separated by a vast cultural divide.
Central for any investigation of the way the Carthaginians interacted with the world are the Carthaginian treaties with Rome of 509, 348, and 279, and with Philip V in 215 bce (Polyb. 3.22.4–13, 3.24.1–13, 3.25.1–6, 7.9; Scardigli 1991; Eckstein 2010). These are frequently deployed in discussions of the states’ legal and territorial claims, but they are also the best sources we have for how the Carthaginians presented themselves on the world stage. All present the Carthaginians as powerful, but beneficent. They presume themselves capable of—and considerate enough to—make agreements on behalf of others with whom they “have peace and friendship.” These peoples are not enumerated—what matters about them is their relationship with Carthage and the special effort that Carthage makes to protect them. In the treaties, Carthaginian power is conceptualized as the ability to move freely through the Mediterranean while limiting the movement of others and preventing piratical attacks on themselves and their friends (e.g., Livy 21.44.5–8; App. Pun. 86–88; Rawlings 2010). In the 509 and 348 bce treaties, the Carthaginians place limits on Roman navigation for piracy, trade, and city foundation, beyond various points (whose exact location is irrelevant here). The Carthaginians make no reciprocal undertaking. Rather, the 509 and 348 bce agreements presume that Carthage will continue raiding and sacking cities in Latium. Strikingly, despite the increase in Roman power in the meantime, the Carthaginians did not adjust this representation at all in the agreement of 279 bce. It was not a description of objective realities but, rather, part of the construction of a specifically Carthaginian model of the world. This model was important to the Carthaginian elites’ self-image. Despite the diverse multiculturalism of Carthaginian armies, almost all attested generals are Carthaginian. The extraordinary hostility shown by Carthaginian elites to the major exceptions, Xanthippus and Muttines (Polyb. 1.32–36; Liv. 25.40), really does prove the rule. The importance of Phoenician kinship links to the Carthaginian identity is shown by the way the treaties single out the Tyrians (in 348 bce) and Uticans (in 348 and 215 bce) and by the annual religious embassies to Tyre (Diod. Sic. 20.14.1–2; Polyb. 31.12). At Carthage, Phoenicians were the dominant ethno-class, led by the members of the council, called h’drm, “the mighty ones”—a root used of kings and gods (HALOT, s.v. אַדִּיר/’adir).
The First War (264–241 bce)
Polybius calls the first conflict between Carthage and Rome “the most protracted, most unremitting, and largest war that we know of” (Polyb. 1.63.4). For the Carthaginians, who lost thousands of lives, dominion over Sicily, and nearly their homeland as well, it was a complete disaster (Polyb. 1.11–64; Diod. Sic. 23–26; Nep. Ham; Liv. Per. 16–19; App. Pun. 11–17; Flor. 1.18; Cass. Dio 11–12.17; Zon. 8.1–8.20; Huss 1985: 216–51; Lancel 1995: 361–72; Rankov 2011). (For the Phoenicians and Carthaginians in Sicily, see chapter 35, this volume.)
The spark that ignited the conflict was a minor Roman intervention in Sicily in 264 bce (Hoyos 1998: 17–66). When Hiero of Syracuse attacked Messina, both Carthaginians and Romans were quick to respond to the Mamertine rulers of Messina’s request for help. The Carthaginians took exception to the Roman intervention and allied with Hiero, who defected to the Romans in 263 bce, along with many other communities, including Carthaginian vassals like Segesta and Halicyae. The situation looked familiar to the Carthaginians. They had been fighting wars for centuries against powers that sought to use Syracuse as a springboard from which to “liberate” the West; the Romans now stepped into the role, which Pyrrhus had recently vacated (Prag 2010; Vacanti 2012: 26–55). Over the fourth century bce, the Carthaginians had developed an effective strategy for fighting these wars, based on Carthaginian superiority in manpower and sea power, which was to retreat to well-fortified coastal cities, while the enemy overextended itself, and use control of the sea to supply the strongholds and to prevent the war from spreading beyond Sicily. The Carthaginian territory in Africa and Sardinia would remain safe and they could gather a massive reinvasion force at their leisure. If that force was defeated, the process could be repeated until success was achieved or the opponent came to terms.
The Carthaginians followed this strategy against the Romans. The first major land defeat was the loss of Agrigentum in 262 bce; by 250, the Carthaginians had withdrawn to Drepana and Lilybaeum. But, unlike in previous wars, the Carthaginians were not able to recover from this situation. The Romans’ manpower allowed them to send larger armies and navies than the Carthaginians had previously faced, and they could concentrate these forces on Sicily and Africa because the defensive nature of the Carthaginian strategy left Italy largely unthreatened. Thus the Romans could challenge Carthaginian naval superiority—the lynchpin of the whole strategy. Until this point, the Romans had possessed few if any ships of their own, but they were soon launching fleets of over three hundred ships (Polyb. 1.26.7). The key to this astonishingly quick development may have been the Carthaginians themselves. Polybius reports that the recovery of a shipwrecked Carthaginian ship provided a model for the Romans (Polyb. 1.20.15). The excavation of the Marsala shipwreck reveals how great a boon this was. It shows that the planks of Carthaginian ships were covered in annotations, which enabled to the Carthaginian shipwrights to assemble them quickly, l
ike a kit set, but they would also have made it easy for the Romans to reverse-engineer both the ship itself and the quick construction process (Frost 1989). The Carthaginian naval defeats at Mylae in 260 and Heraclea in 257 allowed a Roman invasion of Africa itself. While the Carthaginians managed to defeat this force in 255 and destroy the Roman navy at Drepana in 249, this simply led to a stalemate. Lilybaeum remained under Roman siege; Italy suffered only a few minor raids. The Carthaginian fleet was apparently mothballed after Drepana (Hoyos 2003: 16–17), as attention was focused on Africa, where Hanno the Great campaigned against the Libyans all the way to Hecatompylus-Theveste and Sicca, perhaps still reestablishing control after Regulus’s invasion, perhaps seeking booty for the war effort (Polyb. 1.73.1; Diod. Sic. 24.10; Hoyos 2007: 15–19). When a new Roman fleet arrived in Sicily in 242 bce and blockaded the remaining Carthaginian strongholds, the fleet that the Carthaginians sent was hurriedly assembled, overladen, and mostly composed of previously captured Roman ships (Polyb. 1.61.3–5; Tusa and Royal 2012). It was ambushed and annihilated at the Aegates Islands and the Carthaginians had to grit their teeth and surrender Sicily.
The Mercenary War (241–238 bce)
This disaster was compounded by problems faced in the immediate aftermath, which exploded into the conflict known as the Mercenary War, the Libyan War, or the Truceless War (Polyb. 1.65–88; Huss 1985: 252–66; Fariselli 2002: 78–120; Hoyos 2007, 2011: 206–10). The Romans had demanded a massive indemnity: 1000 talents immediately and 220 talents per year for ten years (Polyb. 1.62.7–63.3, 3.27.2–6). Simultaneously, the substantial Carthaginian forces needed to be demobilized and discharged. Thus, over 20,000 Libyan, Italic, and Gallic mercenaries were brought back to Africa, but not paid. When negotiations failed, they rebelled (Polyb. 1.66). Polybios represents the rebels as a stereotypical, disorganized mob (Polyb. 1.80), but the rebels were able to select leaders—one from each major ethnic constituency—and to mint several series of silver and bronze coinage “of the Libyans” (Zimmerman 2001). Many Libyan communities joined them, probably inspired by anger at Hanno the Great’s recent campaigns, but the regularity of Libyan revolts throughout Carthaginian history indicates that deeper antipathies arising from the exploitative relationship of Carthage with its African hinterland lay behind this (e.g., Diod. Sic. 15.24.2–3, 15.73.1–3, 20.17; Barceló 2011). The rebels also received essential support and supplies from Italian merchants, whom the Carthaginians were unable to effectively suppress without antagonizing Rome (Polyb. 1.83.6; App. Pun. 21–22; Zon. 8.18.3). With the support of these groups, the rebels managed to blockade Carthage, Utica, and Hippo.
The final Carthaginian victory in 238 bce resulted from a number of factors, including foreign aid from Hiero and the Romans, who crucially banned Italians from supplying the rebels (Polyb. 1.83.2–10; Val. Max. 5.1.1; App. Sic. 2.10; Eutrop. 2.27; Zon. 8.17.9), and Hamilcar’s military skill. By driving the rebels inland, cutting them off from supply by sea, he was able to isolate and crush them at the Battle of the Saw. Also crucial were defections of Libyan leaders from the rebels, such as Navaras of the Massyli (KAI 141; Polyb. 1.78). The atrocities carried out by the rebels to prevent rapprochement with the Carthaginians indicate how serious a problem defection was for them (Polyb. 1.79–81). These defections are part of a dynamic, also seen in earlier Libyan revolts (e.g., Diod. Sic. 20.18.3, 20.66–67). Their immediate cause was the exceptional cost of rebellion for the Libyans in terms of manpower, taxation, and disruption of ordinary economic, agricultural, and pastoral life (Polyb. 1.70.9, 1.72.1–6). Moreover, for the Libyans, rebellion was just diplomacy by other means, the route to a better deal with the Carthaginians, rather than an end to itself. Thus, though the war put Carthage in serious peril, it was a familiar form of peril, and the traditional responses resolved it.
The most unexpected consequence of the war was the clash with Rome over Sardinia (Huss 1985: 266–68; Carey 1996; Hoyos 1998: 132–44; Fariselli 2002: 92–94). (For the Phoenicians and Carthaginians in Sardinia, see chapter 34, this volume.) The Romans had left Sardinia to the Carthaginians in 241 bce, but a rebellion had broken out among the Carthaginian mercenaries there in parallel with the war in Libya. They clashed with the Sards, were expelled, and sought aid from the Romans, who eventually agreed to help in (probably) 237. When the Carthaginians attempted to restore control over the island shortly after, the Romans declared war, some obscure diplomacy followed, and the Carthaginians were forced to surrender the island and pay 1200 talents (Polyb. 1.79.5, 1.88.8–12, 3.10.1–3, 3.27.7–8, 3.28.3–4). Discussion has tended to focus on the Romans’ motives more than the implications of the island’s loss for Carthage. The island had tactical value as a key base for naval raids on Italy and Sicily. But these advantages seem to be overemphasized, since the Carthaginians had made limited use of them in the preceding war. Besides, Carthage had already effectively lost them when the island first revolted. Sardinia had also been an important market for Carthaginian goods, a key source of mercenaries and especially grain for Carthage (Diod. Sic. 21.16.1; Dyson and Rowland 2007: 117–21), but the Roman conquest did not need to mean an end to these relationships. On the contrary, they were probably more disrupted by the island’s revolt, since they required the maintenance of peace and the suppression of piracy. After 237, these difficult tasks were performed once more—and at Roman rather than Carthaginian expense. The real consequences of the seizure for the Carthaginians were less tangible. Any nascent goodwill arising from the Roman assistance during the Mercenary War was squashed, replaced by humiliation and suspicion (Polyb. 3.10.4; Liv. 21.1.5).
The Recovery (237–218 bce)
The subsequent two decades saw an astonishing recovery in Carthage’s fortunes, of which the attempt to regain control of Sardinia is probably the first sign. Transport amphorae finds suggest that Carthage was a greater hub of commercial activity in this period than ever before (Bechtold and Docter 2010: 97–99). At Carthage, transport amphorae from Sicily, Italy, and Rhodes increased, as did Punic amphorae in western Sicily, as well as southern and northeastern Iberia. In Iberia, this was accompanied by an increase in other types of central Mediterranean amphorae, which Bechtold sees as coming via Carthage. The striking aspect of these trade links is the way they transcend political boundaries.
The recovery was accompanied by territorial expansion, in Iberia under the Barcids and (more obscurely) in Africa, where the Massyli were vassalized (Diod. Sic. 25.10.3; Liv. 40.17.2). There were existing ties with the Phoenician communities of Turdetania (southern Iberia, including Gades) of an uncertain sort, possibly extending to a light military presence (Hdt. 5.42; Ps.Scyl. 111; Wagner 1989; Ferrer-Albelda and Pleigo-Vazquez 2011), but Hamilcar Barca’s campaigns from 237 bce were far more active. Starting from Gades, he defeated a number of neighboring groups, extending control up the Guadalquivir and beyond the Segura, where he founded the “massive city” of Akra Leuke (probably modern Alicante), which implied that the Carthaginian presence would be permanent (Polyb. 2.1; Diod. Sic. 25.8–11; Hoyos 2003: 55–72). He was succeeded by his son-in-law Hasdrubal in 229/228 bce, who founded New Carthage (modern Cartagena) in 227 and had extended Carthaginian control as far as the Tagus River by his death in 221 bce (Polyb. 2.13, 10.10; Diod. Sic. 25.12; Hoyos 2003: 73–86). This new Iberian empire was exceptionally lucrative, above all because of its vast reserves of silver and gold (Polyb. 34.9.8–15; Diod. Sic. 5.36–38; Strabo 3.2.10–11, 3.2.14; Nep. Ham. 4; Plin. HN 33.96–97). J. J. Ferrer Maestro has calculated the profits of Iberia at a massive 1750 silver talents per year, dwarfing the annual Roman indemnity of 220 talents. But the same calculations place the annual cost of the Barcid military in Iberia at 1700 talents (Ferrer Maestro 2006). The continuation and expansion of trade links with Sicily and Sardinia, despite the loss of political control over them (mentioned earlier), and the subsequent prosperity of Carthage after the second war with Rome when it had no empire at all, demonstrate that empire was not necessary for survival nor even for prosperity. Co
nquest was valued for its own sake.
Barcid Iberia is our best-attested example of a Carthaginian subject territory. There is very little evidence for institutions or bureaucracy. The division of Iberia into three separate commands in Gades, Castulo, and Saguntum (Livy 26.20.6) might indicate separate districts, but could equally have been an ad hoc military decision. The only institution that we do hear about—frequently—is the military. Its primacy is clear from the army’s role in the succession of Hasdrubal and then Hannibal to power (Diod. Sic. 25.12; Polyb. 3.13.3–4). The Barcids’ field armies suppressed opposition by force and by shock and awe—hence their heavy use of elephants, which were tactically impractical, expensive, and often dangerous for them (Livy 27.49.1–2; Plin. HN 8.7.18; Charles and Rhodan 2007). In their absence, garrisons kept watch and controlled movement (Liv. 28.2.10–12, 28.3.9). Those who led armed opposition were crushed and violently punished, like Indortes, who was blinded, mutilated, and then crucified; his men were recruited into the Barcid forces (Diod. Sic. 25.10.2). But control by force alone was impractical—the costs could be high, as the death of Hamilcar shows, and the armies could not be everywhere.
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