by Tom Clancy
That day Franks also finalized VII Corps's plans for artillery raids across the border and for feints. The purpose of these was to destroy Iraqi combat capability, especially artillery in range of the breach, and to deceive the Iraqis through the artillery fire and ground maneuver feints by the 1st CAV in the Ruqi Pocket that VII Corps's attack was going north up the Wadi al Batin.
While the 1st Cavalry Division conducted raids and feints to throw the Iraqis off balance, the 1st Infantry Division would conduct a deliberate breaching operation through the main Iraqi defensive positions. Further to the west, the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment would lead the main armored punch of the 1st Armored and 3rd Armored Divisions through the undefended border berms into Iraq.
On 26 January, Franks also sent Tom Goedkoop, his planner, to assume command of 4/66 Armor, an M1A1 tank battalion in the 1st AD, to replace the unit's commander, who had been injured. Goedkoop went on to command the battalion with distinction in combat. To replace him, Franks selected Lieutenant Colonel Bob Schmitt, another SAMS graduate, who had been working at Third Army on their planning. Schmitt proved to be an excellent choice--well read in the situation, bright, motivated, and savvy.
On 13 January, the VII Corps attack order had been published to include Franks's intent. That basic order remained unchanged in its essentials from that point until the actual attack on 24 February--though modifications in it continued to be made as air attacks caused Iraqi dispositions to change and as they received better-focused intelligence.
Yet Franks knew there was a limit to how long such adjustments could be made. That limit, in his judgment, was to be about two weeks before the ground attack. "Now is not the time to tinker with the plan," he told Toby Martinez on 13 February, a few days before the attack. "The more senior you get, the less you must meddle--do not try and make 100 percent. We have a good plan, just let the people execute." He wanted subordinate commanders to have time to do their planning, to brief and discuss their options with their soldiers, and to be able to conduct rehearsals. That all takes time. If he continued to change the plan, they would never be able to do that. A good plan that is thoroughly understood will be better executed than a perfect plan that nobody has internalized and rehearsed.
To better see how all of this affected individual units, let's take a quick look at how the 2nd ACR saw their own plan, which was published on 20 January. Their mission, it read, was to "attack through the western flank of enemy defenses and conduct offensive cover operations to develop the situation for VII Corps." In their concept of operations, it went on to say, the "regiment's task is to set the terms for action for the corps's main body and to serve as a base of fire and observation for the corps commander's maneuver. . . . If the enemy is moving, regiment meets and destroys advance guard battalions and develops the situation for the corps commander. If he is defending, regiment fixes the enemy from standoff range, finds his flanks, and assists in getting the divisions into the fight." Don Holder, the regiment's commander, and Franks discussed the regiment's maneuver many times both before and after their order was published. Since the regiment would be the key to finding and fixing the RGFC, Franks wanted Holder to be on the same mental wavelength with regard to possibilities for the coming battles. He was.
On 5 February, for instance, Franks visited a training exercise of the 3rd AD. Butch Funk had his commanders and key staff out in the desert in HMMWVs moving cross-country as though he had the whole division out there. At a break in their movement, he huddled all the commanders for a short AAR, and Franks spoke to them about the VII Corps plan and what he expected the Iraqis would do. The more the commanders knew, the better they'd be able to execute when the time came.
Late in January, Franks's planners began to develop the FRAGPLANs that would give the corps options off their basic maneuver and put them in the right attack formation to destroy the RGFC.
ON 8 February, Franks flew to Riyadh for the final briefing with Cheney and Powell. The briefing was held the next day.
Franks had printed his most important conclusions on the bottom of his concluding briefing chart. These were:
VII Corps is ready to fight
Soldier will and attitude unbeatable
Support of body politic and public has been vital to date
Spare parts a big unresolved problem
Use of massed air with intelligence and ground maneuver is key to
success
During the briefing, Franks went through the final iteration of the plan in detail, including a summary of combat actions up to that point, the RGFC's likely options, and a review of training time for each major unit.
Some questions came up, and then Cheney asked the biggest question of the war: "How will it all end?" It was a great question. Franks hesitated a moment, thinking Cheney should really hear the answer from General Schwarzkopf, from a theater perspective, instead of the perspective of one of five attacking corps commanders. But there was only silence. So Franks said, "Mr. Secretary, I cannot answer for anyone else, but I can give you my opinion from a VII Corps perspective. I believe the Iraqis will defend from positions about where they are now. We will get to a position about here"--he pointed to objective area Collins--"and then turn right ninety degrees, slamming into the RGFC with a three-division fist. We will continue to attack and finish around the area of the Kuwait-Iraq border here" where it intersects Highway 8. "XVIII Corps will attack to our north. We will be the anvil along the border area and they will be the hammer coming in from the north."
There was no discussion.
After the briefing, the CINC asked everyone to stay for a few minutes, and General Powell spoke in an informal setting. He told everyone thanks and related how Whitney Houston had sparked an emotional outburst of patriotism when she'd sung an inspired rendition of the national anthem at the recent Super Bowl. He said it was an indication of the lift the country had gotten from the operation so far, and said everybody should be proud of it. This operation was proof that the United States could do things well. He asked all the commanders to pass on to the soldiers how much they were supported at home. It really pumped Franks up. He was glad to hear it and pass it along.
General Schwarzkopf also spoke to the assembled commanders. He said he was "very well pleased" with what he had heard. "You should start on your countdown. February 21 to 24 is the window for attack."
Franks himself was really pleased with the outcome. He thought they were all of one mind on the attack, and on what the corps and Third Army would do if the RGFC stayed where they were. He also thought the ground and the air component saw eye to eye on what needed to be done, and that if the RGFC stayed where they were, the air would isolate them in the theater.
His only regret lay in one piece of coordination that didn't happen. While in Riyadh, Franks went to visit the Air Force to try to get better help in destroying artillery in range of the breach. He proposed to Major General John Corder, the deputy for Lieutenant General Chuck Horner, that the Air Force put up aircraft at the same time the corps flew their Pioneer UAV. When the UAV spotted an artillery target, Franks proposed, the corps could relay it to the circling aircraft, and the aircraft could roll in and take it out. Corder agreed to do it, but on 10 February Franks was informed that his decision had been disapproved and they would not do it after all. He never knew why.
Other than that, though, he was enthusiastic. The last time Franks had briefed them in December he had the 2nd ACR, two battalions of the 210th Artillery Brigade, and one AH-64 battalion in Saudi ready for war. Now he had a four-division corps ready to fight. It was a hell of an achievement by the commanders and soldiers of the VII Corps, with help from many outside the corps. Franks was proud of the VII Corps and proud to report to General Powell and Secretary Cheney that if called on, they were ready to fight.
DURING the period before the war, Franks never really stopped thinking about the upcoming battles--mentally preparing himself for what the corps was about to face. He was motivated to win at
least cost, and he never concentrated so hard on anything in his life. It never left his conscious or subconscious thoughts. Total focus like that was a method of problem solving that had never failed him. An aspect of these meditations (as Napoleon called them) was to continue to sit in front of a map and concentrate on it--looking from that angle at the corps plan, at possible combinations, then thinking about something else, and then looking back again.
The corps was scheduled to move from its TAAs to its final attack positions starting on 16 February. During one of his map sessions before that move, Franks's concentration on unit dispositions paid off: he noticed that the corps units were now arrayed south to north in the same physical configuration as they would later--in the tactical maneuver toward the RGFC--attack south to north. That configuration meant that it would be possible to conduct a corps rehearsal of this difficult and complex maneuver as the corps traveled the 160 to 180 kilometers to its attack positions, an invaluable training opportunity. It was the only chance the corps had for such a rehearsal. Franks gave the order.
From 16 to 18 February, the rehearsal took place, and it was awesome, that massed wave of iron, itself over 100 kilometers wide, hurtling across the desert. Typically, they did an AAR after the move.
At the end of the move, on 18 February, Cal Waller became ARCENT and Third Army commander, as John Yeosock had been evacuated to Germany for emergency gallbladder surgery.
On 20 February, during a visit, Waller made it clear that from G-minus three to G-Day itself, it was imperative that the corps avoid getting into any fights that might force a strategic decision to go to war (this was during a time of intense, last-minute diplomatic maneuvering between the United States, the Soviets, and the Iraqis). At the same meeting, he also confirmed that there would be a coordinated attack by XVIII and VII Corps to the final objective, adding that VII Corps should not get in a hurry attacking the RGFC; he expected both corps might need the operational pause near Objective Collins. And he confirmed further that it would be twenty-four to thirty-six hours after the attack before there was a decision from CENTCOM on release of the 1st CAV Division.
Franks, of course, welcomed the decision on the mutually supporting attack, but he still did not want to pause in front of the RGFC.
At 2200 on 21 February, Waller called Franks to tell him G-Day would be 24 February. They would go on the twenty-fifth.
On 22 February, Franks had his final commanders' meeting. He told them to "fight tough and smart, close and deep, use arty and air, and cover each other," and gave a short pep talk about the importance of the mission and how well prepared the corps now was for combat.
Later that day, Franks visited a hospital and the 1st CAV soldiers wounded on 20 February. He told them thanks, and asked about their fellow soldiers and how soon they could go back to the division. Most of their wounds were from fragmentation or burns.
COMMAND OF GROUND FORCES
Meanwhile, an issue was still floating out there that needed to be resolved--the issue of overall command of ground forces. The designation of a land force commander, with a separate staff competent to direct land force operations in a joint theater environment, has been an issue in many U.S. joint operations back to World War II.
As a final "rehearsal," VII Corps conducted a corps-wide maneuver, in attack formation, as units moved to their final attack positions south of the Iraqi border. This provided invaluable training prior to execution under fire.
Normally in a theater of operations, there is a joint force commander, a CINC, who directs operations through what are called service component commanders of land, sea, and air. In the Gulf theater, there was no problem with sea and air component commanders. The Joint Forces air component commander was Lieutenant General Chuck Horner, and all air forces in the theater reported to him, including Navy air not needed for ship protection and Marine air not needed for close air support of marines. Likewise, all naval forces reported to Vice Admiral Stan Arthur.
On the ground, however, things were more complicated. On the ground were essentially five corps: two Arab corps and three U.S. corps. A lot of combat power. Yet initially no overall land forces commander had been designated.
Thus, for example, when Chuck Horner needed to coordinate airground actions, he had no land force counterpart with whom to coordinate, but went directly to the CINC.
In the end, General Schwarzkopf felt he had to assume the role of de facto land forces commander. This would still have been a viable choice if Schwarzkopf's staff had been able to direct land forces operations and be the theater staff. They were not. They had never practiced it, and were inclined not to get involved.
This is how the ground forces broke down: the USMC had a two-division corps-sized force, under Lieutenant General Boomer, reporting directly to the CINC; the two U.S. Army corps, with a total of nine divisions, reported to Lieutenant General Yeosock, who then reported to the CINC; and the Saudi composite--essentially two division corps--the Egyptian two-division corps, and the Syrian division each reported to the Royal Saudi Land Force's designated commander, Lieutenant General Khalid. In Riyadh, a staff coordination cell for all non-U.S. Coalition forces was created. It was called C3I (Coalition Communication Coordination Integration Center), and it was headed by U.S. Army Major General Paul Schwartz.
Thus, three land commanders reported directly to the CINC. But the CINC had no staff to direct land forces operations. During planning, this vacuum didn't have much consequence, but during operations, because there was no overall direction of land forces operations, it would matter a great deal. This continues to an be area of much discussion today.
OPERATIONS BEFORE G-DAY
Unlike forces in England preparing to attack German defenses on D-Day, who had no operational mission until they sailed to conduct their assault, VII Corps was an operational unit, part of CENTCOM's land forces, and had an operational mission, even as it deployed and planned the attack.
This meant that as soon as units were in-theater, they were assigned operational missions, which had to be planned for and trained for. They were not simply placed in some administrative area for sixty days to get themselves assembled and combat ready, at which point they could signal that they were ready to play. While they were assembling, training, planning, and dealing with the myriad other details of preparing for battle, VII Corps units had a number of tough things to do.
The 2nd ACR, the first unit in-theater, became operational on 21 December. At that time, the VII Corps mission was to provide a security force in the then-150-kilometer gap between XVIII Corps's western boundary (at this time XVIII Corps had a defensive mission from the coast to about 100 kilometers west) and the eastern boundary of the Joint Forces Command North (that is, the two Egyptian divisions and the Syrian division). The 2nd ACR had that job.
From that point on, VII Corps was directed to be prepared to fight with the forces they had in-theater. This directive required continuing adjustments in estimates, planning, training, modernization, debarkation and movement to TAAs, and in command, even as the corps planned for its attack toward the RGFC (if that proved necessary).
On 26 December, after a heads-up that Third Army might be called on to attack soon after the UN deadline passed on 15 January,16 John Yeosock informed Franks that he wanted VII Corps's combat power (i.e., the forces they had then) available as of 15 January, 1 February, and 15 February. From that moment on, the corps planners had to be simultaneously available for war with what they had, while planning for war with the entire fully deployed corps.
On 27 December, at an informal meeting in his office in Riyadh, General Schwarzkopf informed Franks, Pagonis, Luck, and Yeosock that the President had called on Christmas Eve to tell him that they might be at war in three weeks. The CINC then instructed his commanders that he would try to hold off the ground attack until somewhere between 10 and 20 February, but that they should be ready to go earlier with what they had.
On 27 December, VII Corps was far from ready to go. T
hey would be only slightly more ready to go in three weeks. Franks, in short, was not at all pleased to hear that they might be expected to attack then. All the same, he determined to drive the corps even faster to get ready.
He speculated in his journal on possible reasons behind the CINC's announcement: "[I] believe," he wrote, "some promises were made at the highest levels . . . that if we committed forces by early November they would be ready by 15 January. Then our gov't took that date and got the UN resolution passed. I'd like to meet the staff who came up with that projection. Here we are with 2nd ACR, one AH-64 battalion, and two artillery battalions. Have next to no CL IX"--spare parts. "Have no maps. Have no nav aids"--137 total. "Have lousy comms."
But an order is an order. So he kicked the corps into higher gear and planned accordingly. It was at this point that he adjusted his pre-combat training time from three weeks to two.
MEANWHILE, other missions came to them:
On 7 January, John Yeosock gave Franks the order to defend the Tapline Road against a possible Iraqi attack down the Wadi al Batin. To cut that would cut the major northern Saudi east-west supply corridor, as well as the avenue XVIII Corps would soon be using for their move west to their attack positions. For this mission, Franks planned to use the 1st CAV and the 2/101st to defend, while the aviation elements of the 1st AD would be his reserve. Air and the reinforced 1st CAV would be enough combat power to stop an Iraqi attack, he reasoned, and by using no more than those forces, he would be able to preserve his ground troops so as to protect their training and to allow them the time they needed to get out of the port area.