by Tom Clancy
I turned my attention to our combat strength.
To this point in the fight, I was aware of two soldiers KIA and twenty-three soldiers WIA,39 and fifty-six soldiers classified as DNBI (disease non-battle injury). Today I knew there would be more. The pace of battle was about to pick up sharply as 2nd ACR and the divisions slammed into the Republican Guard and other units. Today we would see some heavy fighting both close and deep; it would go on into the night and continue tomorrow. We had the corps ready to fight those battles and to accomplish the mission at least cost. But there would be a cost. There always is.
We'd already had some fratricide from our own munitions--duds40 from MLRS and Air Force cluster bomblets. It was another difference between attacking and defending. When you are in the defense, it's rare that you would move through an area you have just plastered with air and artillery, so unexploded munitions are usually not a problem. For attackers, it's a different story. Unexploded munitions form de facto antipersonnel minefields through which you must pass, and in fact, the situation in Desert Storm was much worse than most of us had expected. We were surprised at the density of our own stuff on the battlefield. It was a real enemy.
In Vietnam, if we had been about to attack through an area, we would not have put in air strikes with cluster bombs; we didn't want the duds to wound our troops. There, though, our artillery did not have DPICM bomblets, nor did we need the volume of artillery fire that we needed here, and here, as well, we had no control over the types of munitions used by the air. However, we did have control over our own artillery, and despite the risk to our own troops, mission requirements saw us fire lots of DPICM and MLRS bomblets.
Turning to logistics: Our posture there was good. The availability rate for the major end items--that is, tanks, Bradleys, British equipment, and the like--continued to be well into the 90 percentile range, and supplies--including fuel and ammo--also were doing well.
By this time Log Base Nelligen was beginning to be established about sixty kilometers inside Iraq. By this afternoon, it would have more than 1.25 million gallons of fuel, ready for issue to our attacking force. Prior to Nelligen, COSCOM (Corps Support Command) had established PTP41 Buckeye, just south of the breach, with more than 1.2 million gallons of diesel, to refill the fuel vehicles of the 1st INF, 1st UK, and 2nd ACR (in Desert Storm, our divisions used up to 800,000 gallons or more daily). Both Buckeye and Nelligen were operated in part by troops from the U.S. Army Reserve called up for Desert Storm, and both had been set up on the initiative of Brigadier General Bob McFarlin and his COSCOM commanders as a result of my "no pauses" intent. They proved to be lifesavers in maintaining tempo--and the troops driving the fuel vehicles through the trackless desert in long convoys past sometimes bypassed Iraqi units were real heroes.
As the battle continued, I remained much more sensitive to fuel than to other classes of supply, including ammunition; none of the others ever seemed to be a problem. But as we turned east and got farther away from Log Base Nelligen, we knew that this would be a critical day for fuel.
My orders that morning were simple:
1. Continue to execute FRAGPLAN 7, with 1st INF in place of 1st CAV.
2. Focus the deep air beyond the FSCL that we could influence on the Iraqi 12th AD and Tawalkana Division.
3. Get the corps 11th Aviation Brigade into the fight that night to execute their CONPLAN Saddle about eighty kilometers deep, near what we had named Objective Minden. (Saddle was their contingency plan to support execution of FRAGPLAN 7, while Minden was an area in front of the 1st INF direction of attack where we anticipated the Iraqis would set another line of defense.)
At about 0700, Butch Funk came into the TAC for a chat. I was always glad to see Butch. He rested easy in the saddle and was always upbeat and forward-looking. (Butch was from Montana, and had a Ph.D.; in Vietnam he'd been an aviator, and had later commanded at all levels of armor; he'd also commanded the NTC, and been the III Corps chief of staff.)
His news for me was good. He was moving out with two brigades forward and one in reserve, he said, which were fully coordinated with the 2nd ACR, and would pass around to the north of Don Holder's northern squadron, rather than making a passage of lines. I liked that. It was a fine piece of initiative on the part of both units, and would mean a much swifter attack into the Tawalkana.
Next he had a request for more room to maneuver his division, which, unfortunately, was something that I didn't have to give him. I could do that only if I attacked with two divisions, instead of three, and kept both the 2nd ACR and the 1st INF in reserve, and I did not want to do that. Two divisions might have served for twenty-four hours, but I figured we needed to sustain our attack for at least forty-eight, and maybe longer.
"I can't give you any more room, Butch," I told him. "I need you to pass around the 2nd ACR and take up the fight with the RGFC. Press the fight. We're going to crank up the tempo."
Though he understood, he had to be disappointed that his division was in such a straitjacket. Nonetheless, he said "WILCO," and left to execute.
AFTER Butch left, I gave some additional thought to our corps's restricted maneuver space. In order to get the focused combat power we needed and to sustain it at a peak, I had given the divisions a front about thirty to forty kilometers wide. They didn't have much room to maneuver laterally, but lots of depth. Though our VII Corps sector was about as wide as my covering force sector in front of V Corps had been in the Fulda Gap in Germany from 1982 to 1984, our VII Corps sector now had four divisions and an ACR with about 130,000 troops, while the Blackhorse had only had about 10,000 troops. In the relatively flat desert, it was a risk to focus that many troops and that many vehicles, with that kind of combat power, on one corps objective. We all knew that a wrong orientation of a gun tube--or of a unit with many tank gun tubes--meant rounds crossing boundaries, and fratricide. After they're fired, tank rounds cannot be recalled. Minimizing the risk, while maintaining the tempo of the attack, meant keeping my finger tightly on the pulse of the maneuvers. It also meant that in the overall corps rolling attack, some units would be stopped while others were moving. We would have to rely on the boundaries on our maps, GPS, and LORAN to keep our units from running into one another.
Where we did have additional room was in depth. That is why the problems of coordinating our deep attacks with CENTAF were so frustrating. Given control of all the air attacks in our sector from Smash to the Gulf, we could have created a 150-kilometer-deep death zone.
AT 0800, I called John Yeosock to give him a report on the progress of our maneuver, and to tell him that I expected the corps to be in contact with the Tawalkana that morning and that I would pass the 1st INF through the 2nd ACR to continue the attack later that day.
After I'd delivered the basic facts, I continued to voice my frustration at the apparent lack of a common picture of the battlefield between Riyadh and the field.
He himself understood what we were trying to do, John explained. As far as he was concerned, we were right where he expected us to be, and in the right posture. However, the CINC had gotten heated up again that morning about the pace of our attack.
When I heard that, my frustration leapt into high gear. I was genuinely frustrated about the command mood swings in Riyadh, and I once again wondered what the hell they knew about what was happening. And the question again entered my mind: What were they doing there about isolating the battlefield? But I did not talk to John about that.
Then, to top it off, John wanted me to order the British to attack south, in order to clear the Wadi al Batin area from the Saudi border north into Kuwait.
I didn't like that idea at all, and I said so strongly. We had come out west so that we could avoid all the mines and obstacles the Iraqis had put up the Wadi. Why in the hell would we go in there now? When John insisted, I asked if I could give the order but not execute it, and then look again later that night, and he okayed that. (After the war I discovered that he was thinking that a British attack south would
open a lane for 1st CAV to attack north past the British. That way 1st CAV could still get into the fight in time. It would also ease the logistics flow north in case the war went on around Basra for some time. It was a logical thought.)
Once we had worked our way through that issue, I asked if and when the 1st CAV would be released. Sometime today, John answered. And to us.
John's attitude had undergone a distinct change from the time of my late call to him the night before to today: The night before, we were doing OK. The CINC's intent was for us to conduct a deliberate attack to minimize casualties. Now there was abruptly a greater urgency, a change I was not to understand until long after the war.
In a student monograph at the U.S. Army's War College at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, Colonel Mike Kendall unraveled some of the knots that had long puzzled me. During the war, Mike had been John's exec, and he kept excellent notes of John's discussions with General Schwarzkopf. The monograph bases its conclusions on these notes.
On 25 February, Kendall writes (as we have already seen): Yeosock "concluded that the CINC was satisfied with the operational pace" of VII Corps, and even "expressed concern with possible fratricide if the pace increased; the CINC stated that the intent was for deliberate operations with low casualties. In Yeosock's words, the CINC's intent was, 'fighting smart, deliberately, with small casualties, developing the situation, and fixing by fires.' " Yeosock "concluded that the CINC expects 26 February to be a slow day because of weather," and Yeosock "passed this information to the corps commanders during late-night discussions." It was this attitude and guidance that Yeosock had passed to me during the night of the twenty-fifth. But at "0215 hours on 26 February, the CINC was awakened by Brigadier General Neal, his night operations officer, with a report that the Iraqis had ordered their units out of Kuwait City. The CINC talked to CJCS [General Powell] and expressed concern that a cease-fire could occur within two days, resulting in the escape of the RGFC."
In "private conversations with me during the morning," Kendall continues, "General Yeosock discussed the atmosphere of the moment. He understood the CJCS's call to the CINC had caused the intent to change ..." from, in Yeosock's (unforgettable) words, " 'slow and deliberate to magic units forward.' " This "reflected a CENTCOM lack of appreciation, in Yeosock's view, for the time/distance factors associated with the movement of a heavy corps against enemy forces whose intent was still ambiguous."
In other words, John Yeosock was aware that the CINC's perception had changed after his discussions with Powell. Because the Iraqis seemed to be abandoning Kuwait, which could result in an early cease-fire, Generals Schwarzkopf and Powell now believed that the Army--i.e., VII Corps--would have to speed up the attack against the RGFC, if there was any hope of destroying them.
However, I do not think Schwarzkopf recognized that it was Third Army, not VII Corps alone, attacking the RGFC. CENTCOM had the means and, it seemed to me, the responsibility to seal off the theater and bring land, sea, and air forces together to end it right. That was the time to set it in motion.
And yet, because Yeosock was aware that there was no way to make the corps go faster, and because he was aware that we had a defending enemy in front of us and XVIII Corps with a defense plan, he simply told me to keep pressing the attack.
And that is in fact the only intent I got from John that morning. There was nothing about the CINC's or Colin Powell's concerns. "Press the attack," John told me.42
It was like telling me to do something we were already doing. We were already committed east. We were already attacking. I soon forgot the discussion.
We had maneuvered the corps into a posture that would allow us to sustain the intensity of our attack for two to three days, as necessary. That was what we were out here to do . . . or at least, so I thought. CENTCOM could orchestrate the air deep to isolate the RGFC with the Third Army attack on 26 to 28 February. It would also help if Third Army could rapidly turn XVIII Corps east to attack to our north, so there would be a two-corps coordinated attack.
BEFORE he left for the main TAC, I said to John Landry, "John, make sure Third Army knows what the hell we are doing out here. Call them yourself. I talk to Yeosock all the time and tell him, but I'm not sure what picture they have."
He assured me he would. John was as good a tactician as I knew and had a great feel for what was going on. If anyone could get our ratings up in Riyadh, he could. And he did make sure that reports of our unit combat actions during the rest of the war were as accurate as they knew them at the Main CP.
WEATHER AND AIR
On 26 February, the rotten weather of the night before did not let up. Most of the day, we had intermittent heavy rain, blowing sand, and low cloud cover--with lucky breaks when we could fly helos and CAS. The weather was local and spotty. Some places would be relatively clear and others would have rain and blowing sand. This was our worst weather day.
It was a real tribute to both Army aviators and USAF CAS pilots that they were able to give us so many air attacks. By unit, 2nd ACR had 48, 1st AD 32, 3rd AD 26, and 1st UK 22, for a total of 128. And more were available if we'd wanted them. CENTAF had originated a system they called "push CAS," whereby they would push sorties of CAS into our area without request. We could then employ them or send them to someone else.
It worked well--just as CAS had worked well for us in the Blackhorse in Vietnam. CAS pilots went way beyond their duty in order to give us their best. Pilots even ignored the 10,000-foot altitude limit, which put them at considerable risk. Our own Apaches were no less selfless--flying day and night in weather that would have grounded us in Germany in peacetime, and with little regard to rest.
0730 EN ROUTE TO 1ST AD
"JAYHAWK 6, this is JAYHAWK 3 OSCAR." I was in my Blackhawk, and this was my TAC FWD calling.
"This is JAYHAWK 6."
"Dragoon reports contact with RGFC, Tawalkana Division." Dragoon was the 2nd ACR.
"Roger, location?"
"PT 528933." That was about the 50 Easting, or right on Phase Line Smash.
"Have them continue to attack."
"WILCO."
I found out later that, at 0713, 3rd Squadron had killed a T-72 at 52 Easting. The regiment read this as first contact with the Tawalkana. Then, at 0754, a T-72 company was sighted at grid line 5299. And the regimental log records, "At 0847 T'kana Div screen at 52 Easting. 2/2 reports all units in contact. 3d sqdn had incoming arty fire. At 0915 3d sqdn reported visibility dropped to less than 1,000 meters. At 0918 3 AD passing to north of 2nd ACR."
That was a big report. It confirmed what I had been expecting. We had them fixed.
What surprised me a bit was the location given; it was about ten kilometers farther west than I had thought. No matter. We were in the RGFC security zone, maybe deeper, and the regiment was doing exactly what a cavalry regiment in front of an attacking corps should be doing in an offensive covering force mission.
Now to keep them attacking while bringing the corps fist together to smash the RGFC. We had been maneuvering the corps for the past day and a half to put ourselves in this position. Now we had them fixed and were going to attack and hit them hard and keep hitting them until they were finished.
0800 1ST AD FIELD LOCATION
As I approached 1st AD, I was thinking that I needed to make clear what I wanted done today and my continued intentions. In light of this 2nd ACR report confirming the location of the Tawalkana, I wanted to be sure that the 1st AD and all my commanders understood my intent: no pauses in front of the RGFC. It was still possible there might be misunderstandings on that score, despite my repeated and forceful orders. I wanted nothing but hard forward momentum into the enemy. It also occurred to me that once 1st AD got to al-Busayyah, they might conclude they'd have time to stop, read the RGFC, get an attack order out, and even change map sheets, while the rest of the corps closed on Phase Line Smash.
So I needed to be crystal clear to Ron.
The battle tempo of VII Corps was my responsibility al
one. It made no difference if there were misunderstandings or internal stops because of tactics selected by subordinate commanders--I alone would be accountable, and that was the way it should be. So if I did not like what a unit was doing, then it was my job to tell the commander to do something else, or else to go see him, get an explanation, and then decide.
As Ron Griffith and I met, the fight for al-Busayyah was well under way. Ron was attempting to finish that fight and press forward to Collins, where I had ordered him to be later this morning.
First AD had attacked al-Busayyah with two brigades abreast. On the left was the 2nd Brigade, commanded by Colonel Monty Meigs, with four battalion task forces (three tank and one Bradley). On the right was the 1st Brigade, commanded by Colonel Jim Riley, with three battalion task forces (two Bradley and one tank). Riley's brigade passed to the east of Purple in the early morning and turned ninety degrees east, continuing to attack in the center of the 1st AD and north of 3rd Brigade. Most of the fighting inside al-Busayyah was done by Lieutenant Colonel Mike McGee's 6/6 INF, supported by a combat engineer vehicle that turned many of the buildings to rubble, and killed or buried the commando defenders who refused to surrender. Most of the action fell to the 2nd Brigade.