by Tom Clancy
The operation continued with some heavy fighting at close range and progressive clearing of Al Qaeda from caves. U.S. and allied forces cleared more than 129 caves and 40 buildings. They destroyed 22 heavy weapons emplacements and seized caches of weapons and intelligence. Al Qaeda had fought from well-placed positions and with modern equipment. They lost in some estimates perhaps as many as one thousand of their best troops (Stewart, CMH, pp. 42-45).
The 10th Mountain battle summary states that Operation Anaconda eliminated an Al Qaeda sanctuary, strained the Al Qaeda regional logistic system, and reduced the Al Qaeda threat by destroying hundreds of their most experienced fighters and trainers (Hagenbeck, notes, December 2003). It was a major victory in one of the first battles of this new war.
10TH MOUNTAIN DIVISION REFLECTIONS
Many in the U.S. Army like to refer to T. R. Fehrenbach's book, This Kind of War, a richly detailed and candid account of the Korean War. The 10th Mountain leaders used Fehrenbach's book to call attention to the fact that you can attack land from the air, but if you want to control territory you have to put your own troops in there on the ground to do it. This operation clearly demonstrated the ability and will of the U.S. Army and military with our allies to do just that.
Those leaders also added,
"War on Terror demonstrates relevance of the Infantry . . . Soldiers who are proficient; up close, personal, brutal; our training works . . . skilled, tough, aggressive warriors. Small unit leaders are good--confident, initiative-taking, decisive, risk-takers. Our soldiers and leaders are innovative and flexible . . . Do the basics: PT, foot marching, marksmanship, live fire training. . . . Focus on battalion, company and below air assault training, combined arms. . . ." (U.S. Army Infantry Conference, "Lessons Learned," U.S. Army Infantry Center, Fort Benning, Georgia, 2003)
IRAQI FREEDOM
Iraq was the second theater of war opened by the United States and our coalition partners in the ongoing war.
Because Iraq, too, is in its assigned area of operations, CENTCOM, under General Tommy Franks, also planned and conducted this campaign. As with its counterpart in Afghanistan, Operation Iraqi Freedom was as swift as it was thoughtfully conceived. Simultaneous attacks from air, ground, and sea removed a brutal regime and its organized military forces in three weeks. It was swift but not easy, a phrase I used to describe our four-day destruction of Republican Guard forces in the VII Corps sector of attack in 1991. It is never easy for soldiers and Marines on the ground. The Iraqi Freedom three-week attack to Baghdad earns the title "brilliant" because of the heroic efforts of soldiers and Marines in that tough arena of land combat. Commanders get them to the right place at the right time in the right combinations, but in the end they made it happen and won decisive victory.
Following the capture of Baghdad, the campaign shifted its focus to winning against insurgents who still oppose a free Iraq as some oppose a free Afghanistan. Stabilization campaigns continue in both countries as of this writing.
EXECUTION
General Franks, along with his service component commanders in the Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps, set a campaign framework that was different from the one in Afghanistan yet resembled it in some aspects. Each commander devised their own part of the plan in conjunction with their peers and within the theater commander's intent. It was truly joint interaction among the military services, proving again the wisdom of the Goldwater-Nichols legislation that mandated more joint education, training, and assignments, and revised the way the Joint Staff and Regional Combat Commands operate and report to the Secretary of Defense and President. This generation of leaders in all the services had the benefit of that education, training, and cultural change in ways not yet possible in 1991. Joint interoperability was vastly improved from 1991. Service integration and teamwork was masterful from senior commanders to noncommissioned officers and soldiers and Marines executing in the harsh conditions against an enemy who sometimes were in armored vehicles and sometimes not even in military uniforms, with engagement ranges often measured in feet.
As a retired Army professional, the first J-7 on the joint staff in 1987 responsible for interoperability after Goldwater-Nichols, I was in a position to see how far we had to go in joint operations after 1987. As a combat corps commander in 1991, I saw what was required for successful execution of joint operations in combat. I greatly admire, profoundly respect, and am inspired by what this generation of joint warfighting professionals did, from the battle commanders to the soldiers, Marines, and airmen.
MARCH 2003
From all that collaborative and iterative planning came an imaginative and bold campaign plan. General Franks designated Lieutenant General (LTG) David McKiernan to be the CFLCC. McKiernan had in his land force command U.S. Army V Corps under LTG William (Scott) Wallace, U.S. Marine I MEF (Marine Expeditionary Force) under LTG James Conway that also included the British 1st Armored Division commanded by Major General (MG) Robin Brims. His ground reserve was the 82d Airborne Division commanded by MG Chuck Swannack. He also had Special Operating Forces available in his sector as well as air support from the Joint Forces Air Component Commander LTG T. Michael "Buzz" Mosley. Army Chief General Shinseki had considerably reinforced McKiernan's headquarters with senior and experienced general officers and other staff tailored for this mission as well as providing resources to upgrade it into a Force XXI capable operation. In addition, McKiernan had U.S. Marine Corps Major General Robert "Rusty" Blackman as CFLCC Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force Major General Dan Leaf for air coordination, and British Brigadier Albert Whitley (On Point, final draft, p. 71). Because of a sizeable Army investment, McKiernan's forces had the latest Force XXI battle command technology to permit interoperability and simultaneous situational awareness we did not have in 1991 and were only beginning to visualize in our warfighting experiments in the early 1990s. In 1991 we had paper maps with sticky markers to indicate enemy and friendly situations. Updating such a map required manual movement of these stickers done after voice transmission of new information, often hours after events. In this operation, each command echelon had simultaneously updated electronic displays for situational awareness. It was an enormous leap in battle command capability. Such a capability, combined with the tactical skill and courage of Soldiers and Marines, would make a huge difference in the tempo and precision and precision of the campaign and in the ability of land and air forces to dominate a given battlespace with fewer of their own forces.
McKiernan had the mission to attack straight toward Baghdad and collapse the regime. His was the main effort. Two supporting efforts were in place. One to the north combined Special Operating Forces, conventional forces, and Iraqi Kurdish forces to fix Iraqi forces there, attack south toward Tikrit, and to stabilize the Kurdish region. The other supporting effort was to the west where the CFACC (Coalition Forces Air Component Commander or overall theater air force commander) with special forces, was assigned the mission of preventing Iraqi SCUD missile attacks beyond the borders of Iraq (On Point, final draft, pp. 74-75).
Allied ground forces totaled about 200,000 troops, with about 1,600 aircraft in support (Brown, CMH, p. 28). Iraqi forces numbered about 280,000 to 300,000 regular army and Republican Guard with about 2,200 tanks and 4,000 artillery pieces. They also had many irregular forces, including the Sadaam Fedayeen, Al Quds, Ba'ath party militia, and intelligence services totaling close to 20,000 spread from Basra to An Najaf to Karbala, as well as An Nasiriyah, As Samawah, and elsewhere. It is more than 300 miles from the Kuwaiti border to Baghdad, with another 200 miles to the northern city of Mosul. Baghdad is a city of more than five million people split by the Tigris River. Between Kuwait and Baghdad are a number of cities along a resupply route. In the south and in the north there are Iraqi oil fields, which both Franks and McKiernan knew could be destroyed at any time by Saddam Hussein's regime just as they had destroyed Kuwaiti oil fields in 1991. Moreover, by early March, only the 3d Infantry Division commanded by Major General Buford "Buff "
Blount and I MEF, which included British forces, were completely into theater (On Point, final draft pp. 122-132).
The 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), commanded by Major General Dave Petraeus, began deploying on 6 February 2003. Their 3d Brigade had just returned from Afghanistan in August 2002 and completed a training rotation at the Joint Readiness Training Center in Fort Polk in November. One CH-47 company was back at Fort Campbell only twenty-two days before deploying again to Kuwait. The division offloaded its first ship in Kuwait thirty days after receiving its deployment orders, half the time required in 1990, and a tribute to the deployment transformation that had gone on in the U.S. Army in the 1990s along with deployment savvy commanders, noncommissioned officers, soldiers, and civilian experts. Soldiers arrived mostly by air as equipment and vehicles moved by ship. The last soldiers arrived on 10 March. Even though assembling the division took place in record time, preparations for combat were still under way when the attack began on 19 March because the formal deployment order had come so late (On Point, final draft, pp. 104-105).
Meanwhile, after Turkey refused permission to land, the Fort Hood, Texas-based 4th Infantry Division, commanded by Major General Ray Odierno, moved from the eastern Mediterranean to Kuwait. To ensure Iraqi forces stayed fixed in the north, General Franks adjusted his plan and used the 173d Airborne Brigade with SOF units and a heavy tank-Bradley task force from Germany to operate there (On Point, final draft, pp. 105-06). This air transportable heavy-light contingency task force was a package developed in U.S. Army and U.S. Air Forces in Europe in the 1990s in anticipation of this type of contingency, another indicator of 1990s continuing transformation. McKiernan then moved the 4th Infantry through Kuwait, where they landed by sea and air, trained briefly, and then moved rapidly to relieve the U.S. Marines of Task Force Tripoli north of Baghdad and join V Corps. They later successfully captured Saddam Hussein on 14 December 2003. (Note: Task Force Tripoli was a U.S. Marine task force commanded by BG John Kelley. It consisted of three Marine infantry battalions, artillery, SEALs, engineers, and logistics support who had attacked north of Baghdad to Tikrit, seizing that area on 13 April, then turning it over to the 4th Division on 21 April (West, Bing, and Smith, Ray L., Major General USMC (ret.), The March Up, Bantam Books, New York, New York, 2003, pp. 247-252).
"The 82d Airborne Division . . . already had a BCT (brigade combat team) and part of the division headquarters deployed in Afghanistan . . . in early January the remaining 'All Americans' were alerted for deployment to Kuwait . . . By 17 March, the 82d was ready for war in Iraq" (On Point, final draft pp. 70-71).
U.S. Army forces were introduced into the theater from all over the world. This operational maneuver from strategic distances is a cultural transformation as well as a physical capability transformation, an added capability, and points the direction the Army is headed with its modular design work (On Point, final draft, p. 397ff).
ATTACK
On President Bush's order, after a forty-eight-hour ultimatum, CENTCOM launched simultaneous attacks throughout Iraq on 19 March (On Point, final draft, p. 115). Air and ground operations were synchronized to begin the most rapid air-ground attack in the history of the U.S. military. In three weeks Baghdad fell, Saddam was removed from power, and Iraq began its long and difficult rebuilding from thirty years under a brutal regime.
The outline of the CFLCC attack was as simple as it was thorough. V Corps with the 3d Infantry Division (3 ID) and 101st Airborne was CFLCC main attack. The 3rd ID leading U.S. V Corps would be corps main effort, crossing the berm between Kuwait and Iraq, then moving as fast as possible to Baghdad. Along the way there they would seize Tallil Air Base, making it available for Coalition air operations and logistics. They also would isolate the city of An Nasiriyah, seize crossing sites over the Euphrates, then hand those over to the I MEF (On Point, final draft, pp. 117-118). The I MEF consisted of the 1st Marine Division (MG Jim Mattis) Task Force Tarawa composed of a reinforced Marine regiment from the 2d Marine Division, the 3d Marine Air Wing (MG Jim Amos), and the British 1st Armored Division, which was tailored by the British with armor and infantry for this mission. After crossing the berm just to the north of V Corps, the Marines would seize the Iraqi oil fields at Rumaylah, while simultaneously attacking toward Basra and the ports in the Al Faw area. Following seizure of the oil field, the 1st Marine Division would continue the attack through An Nasiriyah across the Euphrates and up the east side toward Baghdad as the U.S. Army sped up the west side (On Point, final draft, p. 70ff).
I MEF seized the Rumaylah oil fields before the Iraqis could destroy them. Of the more than 1,000 Iraqi oil wells in the south, only nine were set afire, and they were all extinguished by the end of April (On Point, final draft, p. 127). It was a remarkable tactical feat with huge strategic implications for the future. As part of the I MEF, the British also seized Basra and the Iraqi ports in the Al Faw peninsula early in the fight.
Meanwhile, the 3d Infantry Division breached the berm in eleven different locations and attacked on two fronts. In the west, 3 ID was led by 3-7 Cavalry, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Terry Ferrell, and in the east by Third Brigade (3 BCT), commanded by Colonel Dan Allyn. The 3 BCT quickly seized Tallil Air Base and the crossing site over the Euphrates and isolated An Nasiriyah (Blount, notes, February 2004). Following the 3 ID, the 101st first Airborne (On Point, final draft, p. 145) began a series of operations on 20 March to build refuel and rearm points and extended V Corps' reach all the way to the outskirts of Baghdad with attack helicopters. Having a mechanized infantry division combined with an air assault division and the 82d Airborne division with its brigade of parachute infantry in CFLCC reserve gave McKiernan and Wallace great versatility to adapt schemes of maneuver as the face of the enemy changed. It was a wise choice in unit combination.
Isolating cities along the way would be a continuing method of advance. On 22 March the 3-7 Cavalry reached As Samawah to the north and isolated it. The divisions' 3d Brigade relieved them on 23 March as division momentum continued north (On Point, final draft, pp. 161-167). At both As Samawah and An Nasiriyah, it became apparent that combat power would be necessary to deal with Iraqi irregulars attacking U.S. forces directly and also attacking along LOCs (lines of communication).
Adapting their plan as enemy actions became more clear and other options opened, McKiernan released his CFLCC reserve, the 82d Airborne Division to V Corps on 26 March along with 1/41 Infantry, a tank-Bradley task force (On Point, final draft, pp. 265, 268). Wallace immediately sent them into action to take As Samawah and release 3 ID to continue north. That urban fight in As Samawah by Colonel Arnie Bray's 82d Airborne 325th Parachute Infantry Brigade Combat Team was at close ranges, intense, and replete with small unit initiative so characteristic of U.S. infantry.
"The engagements included shots as close as ten feet . . . A Company 3d Battalion was ambushed on the northwest side of As Samawah, when the lead platoon executed a classic react to contact drill returning fire as the company dispersed to covered positions . . . the enemy continued to fire . . . without direction, the lead squad under SSG Pitts recognized that they needed to get closer and maneuvered to place effective fire on the enemy--keeping the enemy from accurately engaging the maneuvering platoons." (Bray, Arnold, Colonel, U.S. Army, notes, 1 2/3 1/03)
A squadron from the 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment deployed by air from their base at Fort Polk, LA, and later joined the 82d in this fight to secure LOCs on 8 April (On Point, final draft, p. 276).
Under heavy contact at An Najaf, the 3 ID attacked to isolate the city. Colonel Ben Hodges and his 1st Brigade Combat Team of 101st Airborne, reinforced by Company A, 2/70 Armor, a tank-Bradley task force, began to clear the city on 31 March in an operation with tough urban fighting, including a mini "Thunder Run" by a tank company they concluded five days later (On Point, final draft, pp. 326-332). Meanwhile the 3d Infantry Division continued north toward Baghdad and the U.S. Marines continued their advance to Baghdad on the east bank of the
Euphrates River. On 28 March Colonel Greg Gass and his 101st Attack Aviation Brigade, conducted a successful two battalion (forty-eight Apaches) attack over one hundred kilometers against defending Republican Guard forces defending near Karbala and the approaches to Baghdad. And on 31 March, a daylight armed reconnaissance to protect the western flank (On Point, final draft, pp 248-49, 336).