Into the Storm: On the Ground in Iraq

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Into the Storm: On the Ground in Iraq Page 88

by Tom Clancy


  Battlefield Laboratories of

  and engine of change

  and FM 100-5 manuals

  and future battlefields

  and ideas for change

  and land war doctrine

  responsibilities of

  Transcribers

  Transition wars

  Transportation

  "Trap lines,"

  Trench warfare

  Triage aid station

  Triple canopy rain forest

  Troops. See Soldiers

  Truck convoys

  Trucks

  Truck vans

  Trust

  betrayal of

  between Army and country

  in leaders

  Tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided antitank (TOW) missiles

  Tunnel rats

  Turkey option

  Turning movement as form of maneuver

  Twenty-fourth Mechanized Division (U.S.)

  Twenty-second SUPCOM

  Two hundred and seventh MI Brigade

  UH1 "Huey" helicopters

  Umm Hajul Airfield

  Umm Qasr

  Unexploded munitions

  Unified Commands

  Unit battlefield tasks

  United Nations

  deadline to Iraqis

  and peace treaty signing

  resolutions of

  United States

  diplomatic maneuvering of

  prisoners of war

  strength of

  Unity of command as principle of war

  Unmanned drones

  Unobserved fire

  Unterseher, Jim

  Uranium residue

  Urinalysis drug testing

  VA counselors

  "Valley of the Boogers,"

  Valley Forge General Hospital

  Values of soldiers

  Victory, disorganizing effects of

  Video cameras

  Video legacy of Desert Storm

  Viet Cong

  Vietnamese interpreters

  Vietnamization

  Vietnam Veterans Memorial

  Vietnam War

  air support in

  antiwar feelings

  attack helicopters in

  battle for Snoul, Cambodia

  combat experience in

  Easter offensive (1972)

  Franks in

  guerillas in

  helicopter use in combat

  maneuver warfare in

  personalness of

  refresher course on

  rites of passage in

  soldiers in

  tactical methods in

  and trust between Army and country

  unlimited price for limited objectives

  U.S. Army in

  and U.S. leadership

  Vincent, Mark E.

  Virtual reality

  Visual signals

  Voice communication

  VOLAR Project

  Volunteer organizations

  Von Steuben, Baron

  Vuono, Carl

  as Army Chief of Staff

  in Army's third generation

  and BCTP

  Iraqi helmet gift to

  and residual force

  in selection of Franks for TRADOC command

  at TRADOC

  Wadi al Batin Iraqis in

  Waller, Cal

  as acting Third Army commander

  at Al Khubar Village ceremony

  Franks talking with

  Walsh, Rich

  Walters, Vernon

  War, principles of

  War College

  WARFIGHTER exercise

  War games

  Warning lights for change

  Warning orders

  War of 1812

  Warrior spirit

  Warsaw Pact

  echelonment tactics of

  and Eleventh Armored Cavalry Regiment (U.S.), the "Blackhorse,"

  focus on stopping

  Franks observing military exercise of

  and Fulda Gap

  See also Cold War; NATO; Soviet Army

  War trophies and souvenirs

  War Zone C, Vietnam

  Washington, George

  Washington parade for Persian Gulf veterans

  Washington Post

  Wass de Czege, Huba

  Waste disposal

  Water bladders

  Water distribution

  Water-purification equipment

  Weapons of mass destruction

  Weapons skills

  Weapons system

  Weather

  and air support

  on 1st day

  on 2nd day

  on 3rd day

  on 4th day

  "Wedge" of First Armored Division

  Wehrmacht

  Weight-control programs

  Weisman, Dave

  West Lawn, Pennsylvania

  Westmoreland, William

  West Point

  cemetery at

  Franks attending

  Franks teaching at

  women graduates of

  Whiskey Rebellion

  Whispering Death

  Whitcomb, Steve

  White, Jerry

  WIA. See Wounded in action

  Wickham, John

  Williams, Mike

  Williams, Paul "Bo,"

  Williams, Ray

  Williamson, Norm

  Wilson, Bob

  Wilson, Glenn

  Wilson, Lee

  Winans, Herm

  Wireless radios

  Women in U.S. Army

  Woolsey, R. James

  World War I

  defensive arrangements of

  human cost of

  masses of soldiers

  and national survival

  Tank Corps of

  World War II

  Ardennes

  Army's unpreparedness for

  Burma

  combat veterans of

  D-Day

  El Alamein

  foot-mobile infantry in

  French in

  fuel consumption in

  Germans in

  joint operations in

  massed air and sea armadas in

  mounted warfare in

  and national survival

  operational objectives in

  Wounded in action (WIA) See also Casualties

  Xuan Loc, Vietnam

  Yellow-ribbon campaign

  Yeosock, John

  on 1st day

  on 2nd day

  on 3rd day

  on 4th day

  calling Franks from Saudi Arabia

  cease-fire change in orders

  cease-fire warning order

  as commander of Third Army

  communications with

  drawing up demilitarized zone

  and early attack

  emergency surgery of

  leaves Kuwait

  in planning for Desert Storm

  and protection of refugees

  and Safwan crossroads

  at Schwarzkopf 's mission briefing

  welcoming Franks to Saudi Arbia

  Yom Kippur War. See Mideast War (1973)

  Zanini, Dan

  Zero-tolerance policy on drugs

  Zone, the

  Zulu time

  1 Third Army was Franks's next higher command, while CENTCOM (Central Command) was the overall U.S. Joint Command (Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines) in the Gulf. CENTCOM was commanded by General H. Norman Schwarzkopf.

  2 A meeting engagement is a tactical action in which a force that is usually moving "meets" or otherwise runs into an enemy force that is also usually moving, but which could also be stationary. Normally, this is a surprise encounter, even though you know the enemy is out there somewhere. The faster-reacting force usually wins. It takes a lot of practice for units to absorb the initial surprise and continue to act faster than the enemy and in a way that brings combat power
to bear. It is a tough tactical maneuver, and indeed a commander obviously would prefer to know in advance where the enemy is so he can think ahead about his mode of attack.

  3 In order to lure the Iraqis into believing that the main American attack was coming due north up the Wadi al Batin axis rather than further west, Franks and his planners had devised a deception scheme that had the division operating in the Ruqi Pocket of the Wadi al Batin. (The Ruqi Pocket was at the tricorner area where the borders of Iraq, Kuwait, and Saudi joined. This area lay at the eastern edge of the VII Corps zone of operations.) Here the 1st CAV had conducted a skillful series of feints and demonstrations against Iraqi forces. During their operation they had captured 1,800 Iraqi prisoners.

  4 The following ideas--as well as most of the other more "conceptual" or "philosophical" portions of this chapter--do not actually represent Fred Franks's understanding of his experiences while he was in Vietnam. Rather, and more accurately, they represent the distillation of a lifetime of experiences. In Vietnam, this understanding was in seed and green shoot form. But it was there.

  5 After Vietnam, Leach became armor branch chief at the Army's Personnel Command in charge of assignments of all armor officers. While there, he saw to it that battle-wounded soldiers who wanted to remain in the Army were given the opportunity to do so. More than anyone else, Jimmie Leach helped Franks stay on active duty. Franks would never forget this. It was the cavalry family looking after its own.

  6 The following dialogue was reported by James P. Sterba in "Scraps of Paper from Vietnam," The New York Times Magazine, 18 October 1970.

  7 Dialogue again as reported by James P. Sterba.

  8 For a more complete description of all these systems, see my Armored Cav: A Guided Tour of an Armored Cavalry Regiment.

  9 Divisions normally differ only in the number of tank and Bradley battalions; an armored division might have six tank and four Bradley battalions, while a mechanized division will normally have five battalions of each.

  10 Large metal shipping containers.

  11 Third Infantry also ran the convoy operations over German highways to ports in northern Germany and Holland and provided the cadre to load the ships at the port.

  12 Combat loading places a unit's weapons, equipment, ammo, and vehicles on board a ship in such a way that when these are unloaded at their destination, they'll be "ready to go." You can, for example, theoretically drive a combat-loaded unit off the ship and go fight it.

  13 Tactical Satellite Radio. When VII Corps deployed, they had none of these. They eventually got thirty-three for the whole corps. They could have used more.

  14 Franks and the commander of Egyptian forces in the coalition, Major General Saleh Halaby, exchanged visits several times during the course of the preparations for war. They talked about command arrangements and exchanged plans. In fact, as it turned out, the Egyptian army knew the Iraqis very well, for they had seen them during the Iran-Iraq War. And during one of their visits Franks got from Haleby his appraisal of Iraqi forces. It turned out to be the most accurate assessment Franks would get of the Iraqis: He was right on target.

  15 They thought the RGFC would attempt either to escape from the theater via Highway 8, to counterattack against attacking Third Army corps, or to defend the approaches to Basra. It was believed that the last was their most likely choice.

  16 The UN gave the Iraqis a 15 January deadline to get out of Kuwait, after which point the Coalition considered itself officially at war with Iraq. The deadline passed, and the air war began on 17 January.

  17 In July 1994, Franks directed that a building at TRADOC headquarters at Fort Monroe, Virginia, be dedicated in his memory. Present at the dedication were his family and his whole chain of command, from platoon leader to corps commander (by now John Tilelli was also a four-star general and Vice Chief of Staff of the Army.) It is the first building at that national historic landmark to be dedicated to an enlisted soldier. Ardon was a hero.

  18 Phase lines are used to keep units abreast of one another when that is necessary, or to otherwise control a unit. It is easier to maneuver units if they have common reference points on which to orient--especially in the desert, where there are no landmarks.

  19 Dual-Purpose Improved Conventional Munitions--small hand grenade-sized bomblets packed into an artillery shell and dispensed when the shell bursts in the air; about 5 percent were duds.

  20 As it turned out, this period set a ten-year record for rainfall.

  21 Ray died of a heart attack in 1993; he was a superb officer who knew more about corps deep operations than anyone I knew. He was also a meticulous planner and relentless in seeing orders executed to completion.

  22 Such is the nature of investment decisions for strategic and tactical communications. Strategic comms work well and get big dollars for development, while the closer you get to where rounds impact, the less money and the more primitive the comms. So you improvise and do other things. Except for 3rd AD, we had tactical line-of-sight communications that dated back to the early 1960s and had been used in Vietnam.

  23 Cal Waller died of a heart attack in 1995. He was an invaluable line of communication with General Schwarzkopf, and in January had the courage to say that we weren't then ready to attack (even though several people wished that was somehow so); he was for a time Third Army commander, a job he handled with professionalism and skill; and he was a friend.

  24 Lieutenant Colonel Tom Goedkoop and my corps planners had on their own initiative named all the assembly areas and attack positions of the VII Corps after World War II Medal of Honor winners: Garcia, Butts, Henry, Thompson, Roosevelt, Keyes, and Ray.

  25 On a visit to Fort Huachuca on 19 December 1991, I was surprised to receive a UAV propeller blade from one of the task force members with the inscription "Thanks for the TANKS, Sir."

  26 After the war, I learned from the USMC history that a decision to go early really did not happen until early afternoon--despite the flurry of phone calls in the morning. The 0930 phone call from John Yeosock was therefore a "what if " . . . a trial balloon. In other words, contrary to some postwar analyses and commentaries, the decision to attack early was not predicated on some kind of perception of a rout of the Iraqis or that the Iraqis were getting away. The motive for the early attack was protection of the Marines' left flank. That makes sense.

  27 Easting lines--north/south grid lines--were another means of orientation. As you moved from west to east, the numbers grew higher. Thus 60 Easting was farther west than 70 Easting.

  28 FRAGPLAN 7 had originally been the proposal of my chief of plans, Lieutenant Colonel Bob Schmitt, and British staff planner Major Nick Seymour, a fact that accounted for some British names for objectives, such as Norfolk and Minden.

 

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