by Ian Uys
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The 1st Regiment under Dawson occupied the south-east of Longueval. Lieut-Col Tanner left Montauban with the remaining three battalions at 2.30 am. When the brigade advanced their ammunition dump was set on fire by enemy shell fire. Private Frederick Govan of the 3rd SAI assisted in extinguishing the flames under heavy shell fire and danger from exploding grenades. He displayed great coolness in issuing material under heavy shell fire.
Many of the men still suffered from the effects of tear-gas. They had been told not to rub their eyes, so walked towards Delville Wood with tears running down their cheeks.
Two companies of the SA Scottish under Major Hunt were detached to assist the 26th Brigade in the attack on Waterlot Farm.
Captains Ross and Marshall with their B and C companies were to occupy the orchards between Delville Wood and Waterlot Farms. They later each supplied a platoon to cover the flank of the Cameron’s attack on the German strong-point.
It was a cloudy, misty morning. The 3rd SAI led the 2nd and two companies of the 4th. Where the road entered Longueval the battalions were left sheltering in old German trenches while Colonels Tanner and Thackeray reconnoitred. They found that the northern parts of Longueval were still in German hands.
In the south-west of Delville Wood the 1st SAI and 5th Camerons were engaged in hand-to-hand combat with the Germans. A Highlander from the Camerons then guided the 3rd SAI along disused German trenches into the wood.
Colonel Tanner spoke some words of encouragement to the men, then they advanced eastwards. Despite close German fire in the tangled shell-torn wood, with the assistance of one company of the 2nd SAI, they soon reached the south-eastern perimeter where they began digging in.
Parties under Captains Medlicott and Tomlinson (B and D companies respectively) attacked German positions east of the wood and took a number of prisoners.
The other two companies cleared the area between Princes Street and the northern perimeter from the east. Resistance was weak as the garrison had been thinned out on account of the shelling. The Springboks were soon exhausted by the tangle of fallen trees and branches and the thick undergrowth. When they stumbled to the edge of the wood they were subjected to a fierce bombardment and rifle and machine-gun fire. They did their best to dig themselves in and erect wire, however, with a front of 1,300 yards to hold they were spread very thinly.
At 11.30 am the 2/107th Reserve Regiment attacked. Rifle fire opened up at 600 yards, however they closed to 50 yards before a group of 4th SAI reinforcement came up and stopped them with accurate and rapid rifle and machine-gun fire. The Germans then dug in 80 yards from the wood.
An attack by the 3/107th Reserve Regiment in the east was also beaten back. These two battalions lost 28 officers and 500 men. At 1.30 pm the l/72nd Regiment (8th Division) lost nearly all its officers during the attack on the north-eastern side of the wood.
By 2 pm Tanner could report to Gen Lukin that he held practically the whole wood. He was, however, being strongly counter-attacked and requested reinforcements. One of Major Macleod’s Scottish companies was then sent to him.
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At 3 pm the 6th Regiment of the 10th Bavarian Division attacked in the east, astride the Ginchy Road, but were driven back by rifle fire. At 4.40 pm the Germans attacked from the sunken Flers Road in the north but were repulsed.
At 6.30 pm Tanner spoke to Lukin by telephone. He said that the casualties were extremely heavy and added that one company of the 2nd SAI was virtually destroyed. This was probably Captain Barlow’s B Company, where only two junior officers (Errol Tatham and Walter Hill) were left standing.
Lukin sent Macleod’s remaining company, together with one company of the 1st SAI, as reinforcements. Dawson was ordered to detail carrying platoons, as additional picks and shovels were necessary for the consolidation of the positions in the wood.
As dusk set in the German rate of shell fire increased — at times reaching 400 shells per minute. The South Africans were by this time fully deployed around the perimeter of the wood with the exception of the north-west corner.
The Springboks’ position that evening was that twelve weakened companies of infantry were holding a rambling perimeter of a wood a little less than a mile square. It was threatened at close quarters by German trenches on three sides in addition to which, as the enemy held the north-west corner, they had access to a large part of the wood. The only reserves were one company of the 1st SAI and the two companies (B and C) of the 4th SAI which had been lent to the 26th Brigade.
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General Furse’s decision to send the Springboks in was conveyed to Gen Lukin shortly before 1 am. Lukin’s report on the day’s events follows (with added information in brackets):
“At 12.55 am on July 15 orders were received that the brigade must attack the wood at dawn.
“I immediately sent for my battalion commanders and informed them that they must move at once in order to be in position to attack at daybreak.
“At 2 am I received the following telegram from division: ‘Before forming up for the attack on Delville Wood at 5 am to be sure to obtain reliable information regarding situation in Longueval. It may be unsafe to form up west of village unless village is in our hands. If enemy is still north of village and we are in occupation of south-east of same it would probably be better to enter wood at south-west corner.’
“The following order was then issued to Lieut-Col Tanner: ‘A copy of 9th Division telegram G 527 timed 1.15 am is attached for your information. On arrival at Longueval you will ascertain the position and then confer with Lieut-Col Thackeray. If the position is such as to necessitate an attack from the south-west it will be made on a one battalion front; the 3rd SAI leading, supported by the 2nd SAI. If the enemy is not in possession of Longueval, the attack on Delville Wood will be launched as originally ordered. The attack will be launched at 5 am.’
“Similar orders were issued to Lieut-Col Thackeray, and the Officer Commanding 4th SAI (Major MacLeod) was ordered to move in support of the 2nd and 3rd Battalions.
“The three battalions were clear of Montauban at 2.30 am.
“At 2.40 am an order was received to place two companies of this brigade at the disposal of the 26th Brigade.
“The Officer Commanding 4th SAI (Major MacLeod) was instructed accordingly, and two companies (B and C) reported to the Officer Commanding, 5th Camerons, at the square in Longueval, at 5 am. These companies returned to my command at 6 am on the 16th.
“At 6 am the 3rd SAI entered the south-west corner of Delville Wood.
“By 7 am that portion of the wood south of Princes Street was in our possession.
“By 9 am a company of the 2nd SAI had moved up via the Strand and gained the northern edge of the wood, where consolidation was immediately commenced.
“The wood was shelled by the enemy as soon as our men gained the northern perimeter.
“Prior to our occupation of the wood the enemy had a system of trenches dug to the north and south-east of it. These in places came to within 70 yards of the wood.
“Machine-gun and rifle fire from the enemy in these trenches, combined with the fact that the ground was a mass of tree roots, rendered digging-in extremely difficult.
“Many casualties were incurred in attempting to wire the face of the wood.
“Our men were kept fully occupied in holding off the enemy and in harassing him in every way possible.
“On two occasions they advanced against parties of the enemy, and succeeded in capturing 3 officers and 130 other ranks, and a machine-gun. (These were raiding parties under Captains Medlicott and Tomlinson of the 3rd SAI.)
“The 1st SAI had returned to my command at 11.15 am.
“At 2.40 pm Lieut-Col Tanner reported that he was holding the whole of the wood, excepting the strong points portion in the northwest; he was being strongly counter-attacked and asked for reinforcements, and I accordingly sent forward a company of the 4th SAI.
“My intention was to thin out th
e troops in the wood as soon as the perimeter was seized, leaving the machine-guns with small detachments of infantry to hold it. The enemy, by launching counterattacks at once, prevented this intention being carried out and Lieut-Col Tanner reported that he required all the men under his command to hold off the enemy. He stated that the enemy’s counterattacks were ‘most determined and sustained’ and that the enemy was ‘now massing men on the northern face and may resume attack.’
“Later (6.30 pm), he reported that the enemy was massing large numbers to the north and north-east of the wood.
“I spoke to Lieut-Col Tanner over the telephone and discussed with him the question of the number of men necessary to hold the wood. He informed me that our casualties had been very heavy and asked for further reinforcements.
“I accordingly sent him a company of the 1st SAI and another company of the 4th SAI to reinforce the 2nd and 3rd Battalions respectively.
“A staff officer (probably Lieut P Roseby) was despatched to the wood at 7 pm to obtain full particulars regarding our dispositions there.
“The Officer Commanding 1st SAI (Lieut-Col Dawson) was ordered to detail special carrying platoons to keep up the supply of ammunition in the wood, and he was further instructed to put a Vickers and Lewis gun at the south-west corner of the wood to cover the southern face.
“Additional picks and shovels were also sent forward to enable the men in the wood to dig themselves in, and the Officers Commanding 2nd (Tanner) and 3rd (Thackeray) SAI, were urged: ‘that despite the fatigue of the men this necessary work should be undertaken without fail, as it is probable they will be exposed to heavy shell fire tomorrow.’
“The system of consolidation in Delville Wood was as follows:
(1) Rifle pits were dug immediately the objective was gained. Pits in most cases to hold two.
(2) Lewis guns were brought up and placed in position around the perimeter.
(3) Vickers guns were brought up as soon as possible and placed around the perimeter.
(4) Rifle pits were connected up to form a continuous trench, and strong points formed at salients.
(5) Supporting trenches were dug in Buchanan Street and Princes Street.
(6) Trench was dug in Strand Street by the Engineers.
(7) A strong point was made by the Engineers about 150 yards north-east of the junction of Buchanan and Princes streets.
“I was in constant touch with the Officer Commanding, 64th Field Coy RE — Major Hearn — regarding consolidation in the wood, and B Company, 9th Seaforth Highlanders, worked under his orders.
“The Field Coy RE and Pioneers carried out such work as was possible in consolidating the position.”
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Two brigade signallers, Privates Marcel Smuts and Richard Holmes, were sent into the wood as linesmen to establish communications. Throughout the whole time the wood was occupied they attended to their duties under fire. Holmes was hit by a shell splinter but remained at his post. They went out several times repairing the lines under fire. They were both awarded MMs and mentioned in despatches.
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In the early morning the trench mortar battery, including the 4th SAI platoon attached to it, moved to Longueval to support the assault. A gun which was placed near the church accounted for a German machine-gun nest and a sniper. The remainder of the battery then retired to Montauban Alley.
Gordon Forbes was appalled by the horror of the Longueval street-fighting.
“Officers lost their way and led the whole lot of us up to the 3rd Division trench and over the field they had charged the day before. It was most pitiful and gruesome to see numbers of our men lying dead on the ground still grasping their rifles with fixed bayonets, although cold and stiff like marble. After wandering round for some time we found the SA Brigade and took two guns up to do some straffing which brought on a heavy bombardment by the Germans.
“The 2nd and 3rd Regts were attacking a wood (Delville Wood) just in front of us, and the rifle and machine-gun fire was appalling and we had to keep well down to escape the bullets which were whistling like hell over our only partially-constructed trench, and several times I was covered with ground thrown up from big shells dropping only a few yards wide of the trench.
“About 4 pm we got orders to file out with the Stokes guns and retired to a big communication trench a mile back. The 2nd and 3rd took their objective but at a big death roll, of which I am very anxious to know details. Lieut Bru-de-Wold and Capt Gray were killed in this fight, two of our very best officers. Schultz in our gun team wounded in the eye and two of the Scottish TMB’s killed. The village of Longueval was a sight, too. Men lying dead in every street, buildings burning and rifles, equipment, etc., strewn all over the place. The town itself is wholly demolished, tom up by high explosive and raked by shrapnel.”
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The 28th Brigade MG Coy war diary was written up at Brigade HQ at Montauban.
“The SA Brigade attacked Delville Wood and took it this morning. The northern end of Longueval is still held by the enemy which is rather disconcerting to anyone going through, on account of the snipers and MG fire.
“Went up to Delville Wood this evening and after a stormy journey managed to see the guns in the south and south-east edges of the wood. Colonel Thackeray of the 3rd SAI asked for more guns if possible so, after seeing the adjutant of the 1st SAI, took four guns from that regiment and ordered two each to go to the north-east and south-east edges of the wood.”
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The company which Pte James Simpson was attached to (probably 4th Battalion, D Coy) entered Delville Wood much later than the leading companies.
“We remained on the road just outside Longueval till long after sun up; in fact, till about 11.30 am. We were now carrying the extra weight of the day’s rations. The regiment now started to move off into the village and wood by companies, and a young fellow who had been sitting next to me was killed three minutes after leaving, for we were being shelled all the time.
“The company my gun was attached to now moved up, and we passed through the ruined Longueval. There I saw a number of dead, including the little fellow I had just been speaking to a few minutes before. We continued through the village into the wood.
“Here things were terribly confusing, for fighting was going on there at the time, and no one seemed to know just which direction to fire, and fellows in trenches in the centre of the wood did not know which direction from which to expect an attack.
“Our lot went right through to the far edge of the wood (probably to the north-east side) and there dug ourselves in. We could see the Germans moving about in the open, about 1,100 yards away. There was a valley between us and them. For all we knew there may have been thousands down there. A number crept up to about 50 yards of us, and started shooting, and as a matter of fact the ground from 50 yards was practically full of them.
“We amused ourselves shooting them from behind trees. It was impossible to know what was really going on except on our own little front. Our fellows were being moved about from one place to another till we had no idea where the regiment got to.
“The second regiment got cut up driving the enemy out of the wood. After a time orders became very confused; at one time we would get the order to face about as the enemy was in the wood. That meant holding two fronts. Then another came to leave our positions and wheel round on the left, and drive them out, but we just sat still, and no Germans appeared our way from within the wood.
“We were now with the (3rd) Regiment. Our left (2nd) was continually asking for reinforcements, and men were being taken away from the front of the wood to strengthen the left, which was being attacked. All that day and the following night we were being heavily shelled.
“During the night there were six counter-attacks on our left of the wood, and they were still calling for reinforcements from the front side. Orders would come along that they were coming on us, and then that they were advancing in four columns in front. Sure enough, we could just see four
dark masses but these later turned out to be trees in the distance.”
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Of the three assault parties sent out in Longueval, that under Lieut Edwin Burgess returned to report that the position was clear. Lieuts Walter Henry and Cron Bate of C Coy searched the houses on both sides of North Street until they came under very heavy machine-gun fire from a house. Bombs were also thrown at them and Very lights sent up. They established themselves in the house opposite and attempted to snipe the machine-gunner, but without success. They withdrew without incurring any casualties and returned to the headquarters by daylight.
That afternoon arrangements were made for a trench mortar to bombard the house. Altogether seven houses were destroyed, four of which were burnt. One of the enemy was blown up into the air.
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Private Charles Dunn was horrified by the dead of Longueval and Delville Wood.
“The following day we happened to walk through the same part of the wood as the night before. The same hedge that we had crouched under — what should we see but a Tommy lying dead with his head smashed to atoms, he was covered over with a water-proof sheet. The sight of him sent a shudder through me. On the left (west) of the wood was a large village and cemetery. This of course was nothing but a mass of ruins.
“Dead men were lying all about. At some parts one was obliged to step over the dead bodies of Germans, Britishers, South Africans and Highlanders. And some awful sights they were. Some men with half bodies, heads off, some were really in an awful state. All the time that I spent in Delville Wood in one large shell-hole a dead Jock was sitting upright, he had evidently died from loss of blood. On his left lay only half a man — he was a Jock too. All that could be seen of him was his kilt and two legs. Yes, there were some awful sights to see in Delville Wood.
“Then there was one night that I still remember when myself and three other pals set to make ourselves beds for the night in a shell-hole. It was a large hole and we made our beds side by side on the side of the shell-hole. It was a very dark night; it was also raining. All we had for covering was our waterproofs, no overcoats, as they were taken from us before coming to the front line.