POSITION OF AFFAIRS JULY 6, 9 A. M.
This morning Howard has guns in position commanding the roads leading from the river to Atlanta. The enemy is still on the South bank, but in what force is not known. Woods is now reconnoitering the river, for a point to throw down pontoons preparatory to the passage of this army. Schofield has just arrived from the right, and his Corps is now moving into position on Howard's left, which, for six days, has been covered by Garrard's and McCook's cavalry commands. The enemy has been shelled very vigorously since five this morning, but all is now quiet. Where his next line of defenses will be encountered, it is impossible to say. There is a fair chance of capturing the railway train, and the rebel force in the bend of the river, if our troops push them vigorously and give them no opportunity to escape upon pontoons, as they have on the left.
THE COMMUNICATIONS.
Our line of communications is open in the rear as far as Big Shanty. The road will be open to Marietta in two days. The troops are well rationed and quite jubilant over the prospect of an early arrival at Atlanta. I must close in haste, as a courier is awaiting to carry this North.
It is amusing to witness the demonstration with which our boys receive rebel deserters into the lines on certain occasions. When the armies are lying very close together, as they often are in battle lines, the disaffected rebels contrive to steal out unnoticed for a time, though they are generally discovered and fired on before reaching our lines. As soon as the soldiers see them coming, they appreciate the situation at once, and cannot resist the temptation to jump up from behind their works, though at the imminent risk of their heads, waving their hats and shouting, "Good boy! good boy!" "Come in out of the rain!" "You're our man!" "You're making good time!" &c. The first word of salutation is, "Got any tobacco, reb?" The returned prodigal, just escaped from the husks of the rebellion, is then treated to the fatted calf, the hard tack and coffee, which latter is to him a luxury indeed.
A GOOD EXAMPLE.
I lately met Dr. Lucius Culver, of the 61st Ohio, under circumstances so creditable to himself, and so agreeable, in contrast to those investing the case of another member of the profession, which have been heretofore narrated in this correspondence, that I cannot forbear to mention it. The Doctor had been painfully ill for many days — much more fit to go to the hospital than the field — and yet, because his regiment would be left without medical attendance entirely, by his absence, he persisted in staying with it, sharing all the hardships of inclement weather, bad roads and bad fare, following it in the camp and into the line of battle, and giving personal attention to the wounded men as they were brought in, and before they were taken in the ambulances to the hospital in the rear. Though everyone knows how important it is that a surgeon should have a sound mind in a sound body, in order to give the best energies of both to the relief of the patient, and how depressing an effect the clouded face of a physician — who may be soured with his own ills— often has on a sensitive sufferer; still everyone who has seen, as I have, men bleed to death while being carried from the field to the hospital, from the lack of a surgeon close at hand, to twist a tight bandage around the limb as soon as possible, will be able to appreciate fully the worthy self-denial spoken of above.
All is still quiet along the line; today there is less firing than at any time since the week commenced. Both armies are improving the time by strengthening their works. The troops are still as hopeful as ever, and as anxious to meet the enemy in a general engagement as they were at the opening of the campaign. The weather is very warm, and the soldiers today are bathing in the cool streams that wander down the ravines of these populous old mountains. All is joy and. hilarity today; but what of tomorrow? Many will sleep the final slumber, as all is now ready, and tomorrow will probably see the opening act of the bloodiest struggle of the war.
I have occupied my time in copying from official returns made to Brigade Headquarters, the following very full returns of killed in Ohio, Indiana, and Kentucky regiments, the names of the wounded of which, have been forwarded to you.
I have no returns from the Fourteenth Corps, which in the last week had a total loss of but one hundred and forty-three.
Killed in Wagner's Brigade, Second Division, Fourth Corps, Before Marietta, June 25th.
26th OHIO
Lieutenant Samuel Piatt;Corporal T. J. Simpson, C;H. C. Starrett, D;T. J. Mercer, D; C. E. Ellison, K.
40th INDIANA.
T. Hamlin, C;D. Elvinger, D;John Jordan, D;
George Brant, E;S. Needham, Gr;Sereeant F. M. Fenlinger, I;Corporal Manwaring, I;Henry Wethwold, K;William Miller.
Killed in Gross' Brigade, First Division, Fourth Army Corps, to June 25th
30th INDIANA.
Wm. Schlanghroff, D; James Durbrow, A;Wm, Huckenburg, Gr; Fred. Freinfruk, H.
36TH INDIANA.
Lieutenant Gr. H. Bowman, I;-—Harrison, I;Vallet, H;Michael Smith, H;Daniel Paul, E;Lieutenant M. Hendricks, C;Sergeant J. A. Kern, D; Lew Allen, H.
9TH INDIANA.
R. F. Lawhorn, Gr;S. McKnight, E;Samuel S. Disbrow, E;Fred D. McNab, F;Hearn Herrold, B;Gus H. Edwards, B;Openshane, E.
Killed in Whittaker's Brigade, First Division, Fourth Army Corps.
40th OHIO.
Isaac Taynor, D;John Crawford, B; J. E. Beckford, F;J. F. Steel, K;W. Q. Austin, B;James Spellman, F;J. S. Mason, F;W. Lucas, F;E. Carmick, K.
5th INDIANA.
Ben Ferrold.
99th OHIO.
Sergeant Buttles, B;Corporal J. Bell, I;Corporal Jehu John, E;Jerry Sullivan, E;Elias Hinton, F;Ben Custed, A;A. Karnly, A.
84th INDIANA.
S. Cripe, C; Ben F. Newcomb, Gr;A. Edwards, B; R. Pittinger, D;Jacob Shrager, D;Michael Young, D;Ed E. Melott, E;J. W. Alle, F;Wm. H. Sheppard, G;J. A. Cross, K.
36th INDIANA.
Major Duffice;Ed Whalen, A;M. Castello, C;Sergeant Carmikle, D;John H. Elder, D;C. Bennett, F;G. N. Shilt, F;Jacob Vanscoyk, H;Lieutenant Wm. O'Donnell, I.
21ST KENTUCKY.
J. H. Peters, C;Pat Welch, C;Wm. H. Lanham, D;W. C. F. Mayo, D;John Montgomery, E;John Aikin, G;I. M. Morton, G;Sergeant C. H. Hayes, H;C. D. Taylor, F.
51ST OHIO.
Captain Samuel Stephens, H; F. Wingenried, H;Samuel Spears, C; N. Landis, C;Levi Williams, D;C. Parker, E;Wm. Hammond, E;L. Stallard, F;W. B. Shannon, G;Lieutenant Wm. C. Workman;Benson Pool, K;T. F. Weimer, H.
My last letter was written from the North side of Nose creek, since which time important changes have taken place in the lines of the whole right wing of the army.
CHAPTER X.
Progress of the Georgia Campaign — The Movement on Atlanta.— Sherman's Marches — The Terrible-Battle of the 22nd of July.— The Signal Victory of the Seventeenth and Fifteenth Corps — The Gallant Conduct of Leggett's and Smith's Divisions — Sketch of General Leggett — Death of General McPherson.
We are now on the eve of great actions. Neither army was willing to delay. A grand, decisive blow, was of infinite importance to each! To Hood, everything! To us, much. General Sherman has had to storm natural positions and intrenched places, in the Switzerland of America, which the rebels boastingly asserted should never be occupied by Federal troops. They have thus far been signally foiled, and now that Sherman has scaled mountain passes, taken eyries at the point of the bayonet, and held most successfully every foot of his advance, in material results and advantages, the possession of Atlanta will prove a greater triumph than the capture of Richmond — this latter city is comparatively desolate, and has to draw its supplies of food from other parts of the Confederacy; but Atlanta is the centre of a vast region, where plenty abounds, from whence the rebel armies have, been supplied with provisions and munitions, and the importance of its occupation can not be exaggerated. Along the lines of the Etowah River are the richest iron works of the South. At Kingston are immense saltpetre works. The occupation of this region tends more to put the rebels hors du combat than the fall of Richmond. Because Sherman has always driven Johnston
before him, it is not to be supposed for a moment that the rebel army is demoralized, and has no fight in it. We think differently, when we remember Buzzard's Roost, Resaca, Adairsville, Cassville, Dallas and Kenesaw Mountain. Never before was the rebel army of the Tennessee so well handled; never was it so well clothed and fed, and under such discipline. The desertions from it, during the present campaign, have not been a tithe of those during the retreat of Bragg, last summer, when he was driven across the Tennessee River, by Rosecrans. The long line of graves that mark the resting place of our own true soldiers, and more of the rebels from here to Tunnel Hill, the wounded in hospital, and thinned ranks of Hood's army, show the severity of the battles between these two armies. One hundred days ago we left Ringgold, and during this time several of the Corps of this army have had at least eighty days of severe skirmish fighting, and all of them have also been engaged in several desperate battles. It may interest our readers to know how this army got so far into the interior of Georgia. An army fighting an offensive battle, in the enemy's country, should have three men to the enemy's one. I doubt whether Sherman's army ever numbered over one-third more than Johnston’s. Hence, the great difficulty he has experienced in following up the modern Fabius in his skillful retreat. Johnston certainly thought that he was drawing Sherman "just where he wanted him," as the rebel press has informed its Southern readers, but it has been anything but a draw game. He has lost what he played for. He has drawn him just a little too far. He had not the courage and dash, and his soldiers were not of the right sort to stop the encroaching Yankees. Had Hood been in command of the rebel army, and had he taken advantage of our many embarrassing situations, during the march after the fugacious Johnston, he would, in all probability, have struck a blow that would have stopped the army some way back of this point, or sent it back to Chattanooga to recruit. Now, it is too late for any such game. It is impossible for any army, the size of Sherman's, with its immense trains and paraphernalia, to move on one road, and the different Corps have been obliged to move on parallel, cross and converging roads, and through the woods and open fields. Their movements, also, had to be so regulated that they might arrive at certain points at given times. There was always great danger of Johnston's turning and striking one or more Corps of this army while so moving, and before other Corps could come to their support, and, if possible, then to whip us in detail. On several occasions he made feeble attempts to carry such tactics into execution, but he was always in too great a hurry to reach his new line of rifle-pits, to make a serious attack. He feared that some part of our army might move around him and first reach his defensive works. Often, the enemy has tried to drive our troops out of these, after they have been so captured, but they have always failed, sometimes with heavy loss. It is our deliberate opinion, as expressed above, that it was impossible for Sherman's army to have taken at any time, by direct assault, any of the rebel works. They have all been laid out by skillful engineers and are so arranged as to give the enemy a direct and cross artillery fire. In front of these works, carefully prepared abatis, chevaux de frise and entanglements, and before a column of attack could get through such obstructions, it could be destroyed in toto.
The English press, in its criticisms on Sherman's march through Northern Georgia, pronounced him slow in his movements. These trans-Atlantic gentlemen ought to remember, that their great, Wellington, took six years to drive Napoleon out of Spain, a country as large as Virginia, and then he was forced to retire because of disasters elsewhere.
Four of the most powerful nations of Europe consumed two years in occupying the Crimea, a country not as large as New Jersey. England, herself, required thirty months to squelch the Sepoy rebellion, an undertaking as great as to put down the uprising of the Negroes of any of our Southern States. France has, in more than two years, succeeded in getting only about two hundred miles into Mexico.
On the 20th inst., the Army of the Tennessee advanced towards Atlanta, from near Decatur. The Fifteenth Army Corps, commanded by General Logan, on the line of the Augusta Railroad; the Seventeenth, commanded by General Blair, on the left of the railroad, and the Sixteenth, commanded by Dodge, in reserve. When the day closed, Logan's Corps, the Fifteenth, was near the enemy's main works, at Atlanta, Blair's was in front of a high hill, strongly occupied by the enemy. From citizens it was learned that the hill overlooked Atlanta, and was in short range of that much coveted city. The noble McPherson said: "We must have that hill." General Blair directed General M. D. Leggett, commanding Third Division, Seventeenth Army Corps, to adjust his troops so as to charge and take the hill in the morning. General Leggett did as commanded. At about six o'clock A. M., of the 21st, he made a magnificent charge in the face of a deadly fire of musketry and artillery, and took the hill with many prisoners. In a few minutes he had artillery in position, and was, playing vigorously upon Atlanta. The rebels made several vigorous charges to retake the hill during the day but without success. General Leggett lost between three and four hundred men in the charge, and inflicted a still greater loss upon the enemy. The Fourth Division, commanded by General Giles A Smith, attempted also to advance with General Leggett, but met such a murderous fire of musketry and artillery as to compel it to fall back under a sheltering ridge, after leaving many men in killed and wounded. During the day of the 21st, General Smith's Division was placed in position to the left of General Leggett, and both divisions thoroughly entrenched themselves, facing toward Atlanta. The enemy was discovered moving toward our extreme left, and the Sixteenth Army Corps, General Dodge, was directed to take up position so as to protect our left flank. The Sixteenth Corps was moving to their position, on the 22nd, but had not reached the left of General Smith by about three-fourths of a mile, when the enemy fell upon it, from the rear, in heavy force. General Dodge met this unexpected onslaught with a resistance so vigorous and persistent as to cause the rebels soon to retire.
The enemy were as much surprised to find Dodge where he was, as was Dodge at being attacked. The rebels expected to meet no obstruction from the rear, excepting the pickets of the Seventeenth Corps, and did not meet anything else in the gap of three-fourths of a mile between the left of the Seventeenth and right of the Sixteenth Corps. Through this gap the whole of Cleburne's Division, of Hardee's Corps, passed undiscovered; the ground being covered with a dense forest. The pickets, many of whom were killed or captured, and the balance followed so closely as to be able to give little alarm. The enemy rapidly advanced upon the rear of General Smith and Leggett. It was the advance of this force that shot the gallant and greatly beloved McPherson. The enemy first struck General Smith's Division on his extreme left, but very soon were upon the rear of both Third and Fourth Divisions. Generals Leggett and Smith both put their men over their works, and met the enemy's mad charge with a terrible volley of musketry. The enemy pushed, however, up to within a few feet of our works, but was finally repulsed with a slaughter almost unparalleled.
They fell back, reformed their lines and soon came up again in the same direction, and the conflict for some time was a hand to hand combat, the bayonet and the clubbed muskets were freely used, and the enemy again repulsed, leaving the ground literally carpeted with the dead and wounded. After a quiet of a few minutes, the enemy, a part of Hood's old Corps, was discovered moving upon us from the front. Generals Smith and Leggett placed their men to the rear of their works, and met the charge with the same determined spirit that had characterized them in meeting the former onslaught. The enemy came with deafening yells, and were met with murderous volleys, and again successfully driven back. Again they rallied and forced their way up to our works, and again were repulsed with great slaughter. In the several attacks from the front and rear, the enemy seemed fully impressed with the belief that they would not only repossess themselves of Leggett's hill, but would capture both his and Smith's Divisions, and thus wipe out the Seventeenth Corps. After the fourth repulse, the rebels seem to have concluded that Blair's command could not be captured, and so turned their att
ention to retaking the hill. For this purpose they brought on a fresh division, (Cheatham's) of Hardee's Corps, and massed on General Smith's left flank. This of course compelled General Smith to change his front. General Blair several times sent word to General Leggett, that it was all important to hold the hill, and General Leggett as often replied: "That if the Third Division were driven trom the hill, there would not be enough of it left to fight another battle." He was constantly passing up and down his line, cheering his men, and exhorting them to hold that hill at all hazzards. He was always greeted with loud cheers, and had thousands of promises that the hill should be held. General Smith was no less vigilant, and though almost a stranger in his command, having been with the Division but two days, had already won the admiration of his officers and men, by his skill and bravery.
In the change of front it was necessary to take the whole of the Fourth Division and the Second Brigade of the Third Division out of their works, and though greatly fatigued with the previous fighting, they were obliged to meet the advancing column of the enemy's fresh troops.
All who witnessed the fighting at this time, pronounce it the most desperate they ever saw. The fight almost immediately became a hand to hand conflict. The officers became engaged with their swords, and the men with their bayonets, and in many cases even with their fists. The heaviest part of this engagement fell on the 68th, 78th, and 20th Ohio, and 17th Wisconsin, but they stood like rocks, determined to die or conquer. In the midst of this engagement, while to all others the fate of the day seemed to hang in the balance, General Blair sent a messenger to General Leggett, to enquire whether he thought he could hold the hill; to which General Leggett coolly replied: "Tell General Blair, the hill is just as safe as if there was not a rebel within a thousand miles of it."
Personal Recollections of Sherman's Campaigns in Georgia and the Carolinas Page 13