by B Krishna
Mountbatten saved the situation for the Nizam by agreeing to reach a standstill agreement with Hyderabad on 25 November. Nehru wrote to Patel: “I have just heard on the radio that the Hyderabad agreement has been signed. Congratulations. Whether this puts an end to the trouble there or not is a matter of doubt.” Patel’s reply was pragmatic: “It gives us breathing time and gives the Nizam plenty of scope to think over and to deal with the Frankenstein which he has created in his Ittehad-ul-Mussalmeen.”20 A year later India had to resort to “Police Action” in Hyderabad. Patel had seen its inevitability from the beginning. He could not carry it out because of Mountbatten’s opposition. By the time the Police Action was taken, Mountbatten had left India. It was now Nehru whose opposition Patel had to encounter.
Earlier, the proposed standstill agreement had given the Nizam time to conspire for his independence through back-door diplomacy. He demanded that India’s newly appointed agent-general to Hyderabad, K. M. Munshi, should be only a trade agent. The Nizam seemed to be planning to have ambassadors between India and Hyderabad, indicating that Hyderabad was an independent country. His second demand was withdrawal of Indian troops and supply of arms and ammunition for the Hyderabad army and police. And further, he wanted Hyderabad to be able to appoint agents in several foreign countries. Hyderabad had already appointed a public relations officer to Pakistan without reference to India.
The Nizam was buying time. He explained this in a cable of 6 January 1948 to Monckton in London: “I agree with your opinion that there is no good of our hurrying up making long-term agreement with the Indian Union at the beginning of the year, but to wait and see what further developments arise before we do it, namely, towards the end of the year. Besides, we must see how Kashmir and Junagadh’s case is going to be settled by UNO. After that we can think about our own affair.”21 The Nizam wanted time to further build his armed strength through acquisition of more arms, completion of new airfields and to initiate “a large-scale programme of converting Harijans to Islam,”22—besides giving the Ittehad-ul-Mussalmeen time “to get Muslims to migrate to Hyderabad” and even “induce ex-army Muslims or those in active service to join the Hyderabad army”.23
Patel had to tell Mountbatten that “the period of two months, which we have agreed to give the State to make up its mind, is being utilised for preparations rather than for negotiations . . . I am convinced that it would neither be proper nor polite for us to agree to any arrangement other than the Instrument of Accession already settled between us and the other States”.24 The Nizam, realising that Patel would “not be bamboozled into a surrender even to the slightest extent”, changed his strategy: to bank on Nehru who was “more accommodating than Sardar Patel”, and to pin his “faith to the chance of having a better reception when CR [Rajagopalachari] becomes Governor-General”.25 The Nizam’s expectations from the latter were due to his having, in 1944, sponsored the Gandhi-Jinnah talks, and subsequently advocated the conceding of Pakistan.
From his sick-bed at Dehra Dun, where he had retired after his heart-attack in March 1948, Patel watched with exasperating helplessness the increasing intransigence of the Nizam, failure of Mountbatten’s efforts, and a growing feeling in Hyderabad that India was “not in dead earnest to take action”. When Laik Ali called on him on 16 April at Dehra Dun, Patel told him with stunning bluntness, “You know as well as I do where power resides and with whom the fate of the negotiations must finally lie in Hyderabad. The gentleman [Kasim Razvi], who seems to dominate Hyderabad, has given his answer. He has categorically stated that, if the Indian Dominion comes to Hyderabad, it will find nothing but the bones and ashes of one and a half crores of Hindus. If that is the position, then it seriously undermines the whole future of the Nizam and his dynasty.”
Patel made it clear:
The Hyderabad problem will have to be settled as has been done in the case of other States. No other way is possible. We cannot agree to the continuance of an isolated spot which would destroy the very Union which we have built up with our blood and toil. At the same time, we do wish to maintain friendly relations and to seek a friendly solution. This does not mean that we shall ever agree to Hyderabad’s independence. If its demand to maintain an independent status is persisted in, it is bound to fail.
Many reasons hardened Patel’s attitude. On 26 March, Laik Ali had told Munshi that “the Nizam was willing to die a martyr and that he and lakhs of Muslims were willing to be killed”. Immediately thereafter, Razvi, in a speech on 31 March, “indulged in a good deal of sabre-rattling and urged the Muslims of Hyderabad not to sheathe their swords until their objective of Islamic supremacy had been achieved”. He exhorted the Muslims “to march forward with the Koran in one hand and the sword in the other to hound out the enemy”. He even declared: “The forty-five million Muslims in the Indian Union would be our fifth columnists in any showdown.” Still worse, he asserted on 12 April: “The day is not far off when the waves of the Bay of Bengal will be washing the feet of our Sovereign”, and that he would “hoist the Asaf Jahi flag on the Red Fort in Delhi.”26
Mountbatten was to say good-bye to India in a month’s time. He felt worried whether, after he had gone, Patel could be restrained from sending troops into Hyderabad. He was anxious “to make one final effort to bring about agreement between Hyderabad and India” so as “to end his fateful career in India in a blaze of glory by presenting an association with Hyderabad whatever form it took”. With a plan for Patel’s acceptance, he flew to Dehra Dun early in June, taking with him Nehru, Rajendra Prasad, Gopalaswami Ayyangar, and Baldev Singh—all of whom were “confident he [Patel] would not agree” to the plan. Monckton, who had drafted it, admitted to Mountbatten that “the terms were now so heavily weighed in Hyderabad’s favour that it would be a miracle if India accepted”.
Mountbatten’s meeting with Patel was momentous. “Soon after arrival,” records Mountbatten, “I gave the paper to Patel to read. He grunted: ‘Impertinence—I will never initial it.’ I then dropped the subject . . . After lunch Sardarji became quite emotional, and spoke of the debt India owed me. ‘How can we prove to you our love and gratitude? Whatever you ask for, if your wish is in my power, it will be granted.’ I hardened my heart, for I too was affected, and replied, ‘If you are sincere, sign this document.’ Sardarji was visibly taken aback. ‘Does agreement with Hyderabad mean so much to you?’ he asked in a low voice. ‘Yes.’ Patel initialed the draft . . . The others, although astonished, accepted this, and I flew to Delhi very elated at my success . . . Monckton could hardly believe his luck and flew back at once to Hyderabad with it . . . Then an astonishing thing happened. The Nizam and his advisers now rejected their own draft.”
Monckton was told by Laik Ali: “We shall fight to the last man.” To this, Monckton retorted: “You will be in the first aeroplane to Karachi.” An unhappy Mountbatten recorded: “The situation was indeed ‘lost’ by Hyderabad through the intervention of Kasim Razvi . . . But for India, it spelt ‘victory’.
Now their conscience would be clear if they had to intervene in Hyderabad.”27
With Mountbatten’s departure, a major roadblock seemed to have been removed from Patel’s path. He did gain a free hand; but not full freedom. Nehru and he differed. Not so much on what India was to do—Police Action—but when to do it. With Patel it was now; with Nehru it was later. Nehru told the chief ministers on 1 July, “We are ready at short notice to invade Hyderabad. But we propose to wait for developments and to avoid such invasion if we can help it, because of the other consequences that it is bound to bring in its train.”28 In contrast, Patel was categorical, unwavering and assertive. In his speech at the inauguration of the Patiala and East Punjab Union on 15 July, he declared: “If Hyderabad did not behave properly, it would have to go the way that Junagadh did. The former Governor-General, Lord Mountbatten, thought that he would be able to secure a peaceful settlement . . . Although I was doubtful whether the efforts would succeed, I let him try.”29
Pa
tel was now in a new mood, buoyant and cheerful. This was reflected by what he told Munshi over the telephone. Munshi records: “Next day [after Mountbatten’s departure] I heard Sardar’s voice over the phone, vibrating with good cheer. ‘Well Munshi! How are you? Is everything all right? What about your Nizam?’ ‘Oh, he is all right,’ I said. Then I told him about Zaheer’s suggestion. ‘Settlement!’—as if he had never heard of any such thing. ‘What settlement?’ His jocose queries were a sure sign of his mood. He now felt himself the master of the game. ‘The Mountbatten settlement,’ I said. ‘Tell him that the settlement has gone to England,’ he replied caustically and laughed.”30
Patel also publicly stated: “The terms and the talks which Lord Mountbatten had have gone with him. Now the settlement with the Nizam will have to be on the lines of other settlements with the States. No help from outside, on which he seems to rest his pathetic hopes, would avail him.”31
Patel’s path was not yet all clear. Mountbatten’s policy seemed to be dominating Nehru’s mind. Four days prior to Mountbatten’s departure, he had stated: “We will pursue an open door policy so far as these proposals [offered by Mountbatten] are concerned, and the Nizam is welcome to accept them any time he chooses.”32 This was not acceptable to Patel. It was a policy of drift, which the Nizam had successfully managed so far with the support of Mountbatten.
In a letter of 21 June to N. V. Gadgil, Patel wrote: “I am rather worried about Hyderabad. This is the time when we should take firm and definite action. There should be no vacillation; and the more public the action is the greater effect it will have on the morale of our people, both here and in Hyderabad, and will convince our opponents that we mean business . . . If, even now, we relax, we shall not only be doing a disservice to the country, but would be digging our own grave.”33
The situation was climaxing towards confrontation. On 2 August, Laik Ali told the State Legislature: “Hyderabad has decided to refer its case to the United Nations . . . The Indians may coerce us. They may subject us to any ordeals. They may overrun us by their military strength. We cannot give up our stand. We shall not give up our freedom.” Earlier he had told a Muslim deputation that “if the Union Government takes any action against Hyderabad, a hundred thousand men are ready to join our army. We also have a hundred bombers in Saudi Arabia ready to bomb Bombay.”34 Munshi reported to Patel on 3 August: “During the last fortnight, the atrocities of the Razakars have become utterly irresponsible, and loot, murder and rape are going on in more than one district.”35
By early July, Hyderabad “bore the appearance of a war camp”. Gun-running from Goa by land and from Karachi by air had been accelerated. On 6 July, India’s secretary-general, Girija Shankar Bajpai, informed India’s high commissioner in London, Krishna Menon, “of gun-running by air into Hyderabad from airfields near Karachi”. Engaged in these operations was an Australian, Sidney Cotton, who smuggled arms and ammunition into Hyderabad by night, landing his aircraft either at Bidar or Warangal. Thomas Elmhirst, the commander-in-chief of the Indian Air Force, warned the defence minister, Baldev Singh, that “if these gun-running aircraft (six Lancasters) were loaded up with bombs, he could be powerless to intercept them with the aircraft at his disposal”.36
Pakistan’s complicity was clear from what Pakistan’s General Gracey told India’s General Bucher on 30 August: “Any coercion of Hyderabad would put Pakistan in an impossible position, should civil disorder breaks out in India.”37 Pakistan’s hostility was seen in her cashing a portion of the Rs. 20 crore government of India securities which the Nizam had offered Pakistan as a loan. Further, the Nizam’s UN delegation had first visited Karachi prior to proceeding to the USA. Reference to the UNO had been made on Monckton’s advice in the expectation that it would delay Police Action; and that even “the UNO might get India to accept the modifications to the rejected Mountbatten drafts”.38
Patel called to Dehra Dun, Major-General J. N. Chaudhuri, who was to lead the operations, and subjected him to a cross-examination for his personal assurance before giving the army the go-ahead. Chaudhuri records what Patel told him: “If I did well, I would take the credit; but if things went wrong, I would be blamed. But whatever I did, I would be supported. This was the wonderful thing about working with Sardar Patel.
He gave a feeling of intimacy.”39 His wholehearted backing and unflinching faith in men under him not only spurred them into action but helped them to attain final victory; never to retreat, as he himself had never done.
In a democratic set-up, cabinet sanction was essential for Police Action. Patel faced a formidable task in overcoming Nehru’s reluctance. At one of the meetings of the defence committee, of which Nehru was the chairman, “there was so much bitterness that Sardar Patel walked out. Seeing his seat vacant,” V. P. Menon told a Rotary meeting in Bombay, “I too walked out five minutes later.” This seemed to have shaken Nehru out of his complacent mood, and mellowed his opposition. Later, at a meeting attended by the governor-general (Rajagopalachari), the prime minister, the home minister (Patel), and secretary to the states ministry (Menon), “it was decided to order troops into Hyderabad”.40
Patel had yet to face the Hamlet in Nehru. The British commander-in-chief of the Indian Army, General Roy Bucher, persuaded Nehru that “even at that late stage the campaign should be called off, as militarily risky and hazardous on grounds of internal security in the whole country”.41 About midnight on 12 September, after he had spoken to Nehru, Bucher attempted “a rare feat” in pulling Patel “out of bed at that hour” and advised him to at least postpone action for fear of air attacks on Bombay and Ahmedabad. Patel reminded Bucher “how London had suffered during the Great War, and coolly assured him that Ahmedabad and Bombay both could stand up to an attack if it came”.
Bucher, Munshi writes, “was hesitant throughout. He overestimated the capacity of the Hyderabad army, underestimated that of his own troops, and knew not the ability of the Sardar . . . to deal with the problems of internal law and order. Like most Englishmen, he was unable to realise that no price was too high to be paid for eliminating the Razakar menace which threatened the very existence of India”.42 In H. V. R. Iengar’s view, “the verdict of history will be that the Sardar was right”43—a verdict with which Nehru wholeheartedly agreed later.
Indian troops marched into Hyderabad on 13 September. The campaign was named “Operation Polo”. It lasted barely 108 hours! Patel replied to the Jamsaheb’s congratulations: “The whole operation went through like a machine.”44
The army earned a handsome tribute from Patel, who wrote to Bucher:
I should like to send you and officers and men under your command my sincerest felicitations on the successful conclusion of the Hyderabad operations. The speed and the skill of these operations cannot fail to extort admiration even from our severest critics, and I have no doubt that history will record these operations as a masterpiece of efficiency, organisation and all-round cooperation. The Indian Army has added one more chapter to its glorious record of achievements, and I should like to convey to you and through you to all those who have had a hand in these operations my personal thanks for the part which each one has played in it. We are really proud of them all.45
Bucher had admitted to his sister in a letter of 4 April 1948: “The real trouble there [Hyderabad] seems to be that the Nizam has become bound hand and foot to the Ittehad-ul-Mussalmeen . . . The Indian policy is one of reasonableness insofar as this is practicable.”46
Congratulatory messages poured in. From Switzerland, the Jamsaheb wrote to Patel: “Here I am just rejoicing on your splendid success over Hyderabad, and in fact over the Security Council.” Muslim Leaguer H. S. Suhrawardy, who was responsible for the “Great Calcutta Killing”, congratulated Patel: “I take the liberty of offering you most sincerely my very best thanks and congratulations on the speech that you made just before the Hyderabad surrender. It has been widely appreciated by the Muslims in India.”
Even Monckton couldn’t
help writing to Nehru: “I want to tell you how relieved I am that the action which you were eventually driven to take did not result in large-scale communal troubles. I know how anxious you were not to take the action at all, and how hard you struggled to avoid it . . . everyone who wants to see a peaceful and prosperous India will rejoice, as I do, that the episode is quietly finished.”47
Nehru was most happy with the outcome. His fears and doubts had been set at rest. He wrote to the chief ministers on 21 September: “What has happened in Hyderabad has created a situation which should lead to a stabilisation of the communal situation in India, or rather to a progressive elimination of the communal sentiment.” He again wrote on 4 October: “I have a feeling that India has turned the corner more specially since these Hyderabad operations. We are on the upgrade now. The atmosphere is different and better.”48
Patel visited Hyderabad in the last week of February 1949. His courteous treatment of the defeated Nizam not only dispelled the latter’s fears, but cemented a friendship between the two. The Nizam wrote to Patel: “I was glad to get an opportunity of making my acquaintance with you . . . and hope that this will prove to be a happy augury for the future of the premier State of Hyderabad.” Patel’s large-hearted reply was: “I was happy to learn that Your Exalted Highness had adapted yourself so readily to changed conditions. As I told Your Exalted Highness, while error is a human failing and divine injunctions all point to forgetting and forgiving, it is the duty of human beings to contribute their share to this process by sincere repentance and by employing the period that is left in discharging their duties to their people and to their God.” A grateful Nizam again wrote to Patel on 12 May: “Your great personality is a valuable asset for India at this critical period when the whole world is in turmoil.”49