While Yongle was trying to persuade the renegades to lay down their weapons peacefully, he also ordered Vice-Commissioner-in-Chief Han Guan to move his troops quickly to the Luling area. Han had a rather unusual relationship with Yongle because they had fought each other during the civil war.
Yongle, however, was well aware that Han was a competent general who also knew Jiangxi inside and out. Relishing the combat and cherishing his new relationship with Yongle, Han applied his skills as an experienced commander and restored law and order in Luling Subprefecture without even firing a shot.17
Yongle was pleased with Han’s performance and would in 1411 reward his loyalty and competence by making him commander of the Ming troops in Annam. But the troubles in Jiangxi would not go away completely, as new rioting started in several other counties. Ultimately, Yongle had to send three thousand additional soldiers to suppress the Jiangxi rebels. As discussed in the previous chapter, such stark resistance might have caused Yongle to retain the service of a disproportionately large number of Jiangxi scholars in his court.18
In spite of his sometimes bruising, sometimes persuasive pacification 110
the years of rehabilitation
campaign, Yongle could not altogether restore the social system that had been established three decades earlier at the founding of the Ming. In order to control his subjects, the Ming founder had classified them into three functional divisions—peasant, soldier, and artisan—and he decreed that their professions were hereditary, namely, professions were to be passed on from father to son to grandson. Then Emperor Hongwu assigned a ministry to supervise each division of labor, with separate treasury, warehouses, granaries, and arsenals and with administrative autonomy. Under this arrangement, the Ministry of Revenue was in charge of the peasant population, who paid the bulk of land taxes. The Ministry of War was responsible for the army families, who generally resided in the frontier regions and along the coast. And the Ministry of Public Works dealt with the families of artisans, making sure that these skilled workers resided near Nanjing and Beijing and other designated towns and cities. They were expected to provide compulsory service to the government-run workshops. The artisans were further divided into resident ( zhuzuo) families, who were required to work in the workshops year-round, and rotary ( lunban) families, who had to work only a certain number of days annually.
In every community, from Nanjing to local counties, lijia elders rang huge bells daily, calling artisans to work. They also passed wooden tablets from family to family, urging their members to produce more and to honor their lijia collectively.19
Even before the onset of the civil war, this hereditary social system had started to break up from internal causes. Despite Yongle’s manful e¤orts, he could not prevent the gradual, and perhaps inevitable, erosion of the rigid system. There were simply too many changes of status, too many migrant workers moving from one place to another, particularly among the rank and file of the army.
Although the army families declined so quickly that Yongle found it necessary to recruit mercenaries, the number of army families registered during his father’s reign remained on the books of the Ministry of War. In the same vein, many artisans and small working landowners disappeared during the civil war, creating amorphous, rudderless local communities. In the meantime a large number of peasants wandered around the country seeking whatever jobs they could find. Most of these people ended up joining the army as mercenaries or working “illegally” in the mines, while others chose piracy or banditry. Consequently, the censuses of the Yongle period should be taken with a grain of salt. According to Ming o‹cial accounts, there were 10,652,870 households with a total population of 60,545,812 in 1393, but by 1491 these figures had decreased to only 9,103,446 households with a population of 53,281,150.20 Edward Farmer has pointed out that these figures were probably compiled from tax quotas, not a 111
the years of rehabilitation
physical census.21 A recent study by Liang Fangzhong shows that Ming China had a population of 66,590,000 at the time Yongle ascended the throne, but according to statistics listed in The Yongle Veritable Record, the population declined nearly 21 percent during the twenty-two years of Yongle’s reign, as table 6.1 illustrates.22
It is certain that Yongle governed a fairly mobile population of between 52
million and 66 million. Movement accelerated during the reconstruction and rehabilitation period as Yongle systematically transferred people from the more a›uent and populous south to devastated areas along the northern frontier.
Ironically, such a policy may have contributed to the erosion of the Ming’s rigid social system. At the outset Yongle’s population resettlement had only limited success because people did not want to be uprooted, nor did they care to endure the many hardships of resettlement. For example, Yongle recruited three thousand families of substance from Nanjing and Zhejiang and made them lijia elders in two of Beijing’s rural counties. But in spite of compensations such as housing allowances and corvée exemptions, these families soon escaped from their new stations and disappeared from the government registers. The several thousand Southerners simply could not adapt to new local customs or to the cold winter and dusty wind of Beijing and decided to leave. On the other hand, impoverished immigrants from other parts of north China, such as Shanxi, quickly adjusted to the new environment and, willingly or unwillingly, claimed their new land. Other newcomers to Beijing, who took part in agricultural production and in transporting foodstu¤s to feed the troops, included convicted burglars and other criminals.23
In only a short period the area of land reclaimed grew rapidly, and Yongle knew how to utilize every acre and every ounce of strength of his people. In particular, agricultural and textile production were maximized under his reign. He established an iron foundry at Zunhua, in what is now Hebei, for making tools and other implements. His e¤orts were soon reflected in rising tax revenues from improved grain crops and in increasing production of textile goods. In 1393 the income from land taxes reached 32,789,000 piculs (nearly 20,000,000 hun-dredweight), and in 1412, almost a decade after the end of the civil war, taxes from agricultural land were said to have reached an all-time high of 34,612,692
piculs. However, historian Ray Huang maintains that the Yongle government added the taxes from Annam (recently annexed as a new province) to arrive at this total.24 Yongle also reopened loom workshops and recruited highly specialized weavers to splice, spin, and twist bast fibers and silk filaments into fabric. Textile factories with spinning and reeling devices, as well as dyeing mills, which were first set up by his father in the areas where raw materials for textile fibers 112
the years of rehabilitation
table 6.1
China’s Population during Yongle’s Reign
Grain Tax
Year
Households
Population
(piculs)
1403
11,415,829
66,598,337
31,299,704
1404
9,685,020
50,950,470
31,874,371
1405
9,689,260
51,618,500
31,133,993
1406
9,687,859
51,524,656
30,700,569
1407
9,822,912
51,878,572
29,824,436
1408
9,443,876
51,502,077
30,469,293
1409
9,637,261
51,694,769
31,005,458
1410
9,655,755
51,775,255
30,623,138
1411
9,533,692
51,446,834
30,718,814
1412
10,992,432*
65,377,633*
34,612,692*
1413
9,689,052
56,618,209
3
2,574,248
1414
9,687,729
51,524,436
32,640,828
1415
9,687,729
51,524,436
32,640,828
1416
9,882,757
51,878,172
32,511,270
1417
9,443,766
51,501,867
32,695,864
1418
9,637,061
51,694,549
31,804,385
1419
9,605,553
51,794,935
32,248,673
1420
9,533,492
51,446,434
32,399,206
1421
9,703,360
51,774,228
32,421,831
1422
9,665,133
58,688,691
32,426,739
1423
9,972,125
52,763,174
32,373,741
1424
10,066,080
52,468,152
32,601,206
* Figures include those from newly annexed Annam
abounded, were slowly recovered. They included those in Suzhou and Songjiang (today’s Greater Shanghai); Hangzhou and Shaoxing, Zhejiang; Quanzhou, Fujian; and Sichuan. The mills in Suzhou and Hangzhou alone, when worked full-tilt, could produce up to 150,000 bolts of fabric every year. And in order to meet increasing market demands, Yongle established a new dyeing mill at Shexian, in what is now Anhui. In addition, he took advantage of the plentiful wool from sheep, camels, and the like by establishing textile mills in the northwestern province of Shaanxi. These new mills annually produced many thousand bolts of woolen textiles, including winter cloth and carpets.25 As a result of these e¤orts, the total production of silk, cotton, and wool reached a record high.26
113
the years of rehabilitation
Perhaps Yongle’s most remarkable reconstruction e¤ort was to reinforce the lines of defense established in the north and northwest by means of agro-military colonies ( tuntian) and transfer of population. His so-called soldier-peasants became the major force in ameliorating the labor shortages in the frontier regions and kept the Ming economy perking during the first quarter of the fifteenth century. The practice of agro-military colonization was nothing new in China, but Yongle’s father had made sure that all of his soldiers engaged in farming. His reasoning was simple: he did not want his troops to take even an ounce of grain from the people. The total population of the Ming army was 1,800,000 near the end of Hongwu’s reign and increased to approximately two million under Yongle.27 Ming military o‹cers, like their civil counterparts, were classified in grades, from 1a to 6b. The basic military unit, which had 112 soldiers, was called the company ( baihusuo). A military district established within a county was called a battalion ( qianhusuo) and had about 1,120 soldiers under a commander who ranked 5a. A military district covering two counties was known as a guard unit ( weisuo) and ideally had 5,600 soldiers under the command of a commander who ranked 3a. Each unit was required to designate certain amounts of time for both performing garrison duty and farming. During the reigns of Hongwu and Yongle, the soldiers deployed along the frontier spent roughly 30 to 40 percent of their time in drill and defense, and 60 to 70 percent producing food. Units stationed in the interior spent only 10 to 20 percent of their time on military duty and the remaining 80 to 90 percent producing food.28
The lands under the Ming system were divided into two categories—state land ( guantian) and people’s land ( mintian). According to 1393 record, the entire country had 8,507,623 qing (approximately 57.1 million hectares) of cultivated land, of which one-seventh belonged in the state-land category.29 The state lands included plots reserved for educational and religious purposes, royal planta-tions, and farms assigned to military garrisons and special artisan groups. Under the system, the soldier-peasant did not legally own the land but worked the state land like a tenant farmer. He was required to marry and, together with his family and sometimes hired hands, to attend to his assigned land. After Yongle seized the throne, he strongly promoted the system by ensuring a su‹cient supply of necessary implements and tools, mules and oxen, and seeds for the frontier soldier-peasants.He even exempted them in some areas from taxation for the first five years. Ultimately though, in 1405, he standardized the operation of all agro-military colonies by awarding each soldier a small plot of land, from which the recipient had to pay twelve piculs of grain annually to the government’s granary. In addition, he was obligated to pay to his own 114
the years of rehabilitation
military unit six piculs that were used as provisions and awards. If he produced more than eighteen piculs from his plot, he would be rewarded; if he failed to meet the quota, his salary would be reduced. In every agro-military colony there stood a red placard, on which the production quota of each unit together with awards and punishments were recorded.30
Of course, the quality of the state lands di¤ered from region to region; like-wise, the average yield from the standard plot varied. Yongle infused new flexi-bility by using di¤erent norms to tax his soldier-peasants and by encouraging great personal initiatives to increase productivity. He would from time to time praise exemplary colonies and reward the most productive military units. For example, when the average soldier-peasant in a Taiyuan battalion annually produced twenty-three piculs more than the required quota, Yongle gave its commander a handsome reward. General He Fu, who commanded four guard units on the Ningxia frontier, and his 20,413 soldiers worked on 8,337 qing (approximately 50,625 hectares) of land. Because He Fu was able to consistently accumulate a surplus of as much as 300,210 piculs of grain, Yongle cited him as a good example and showered him with accolades. During his early rule, Yongle gave hundreds of thousands of work animals and various types of agricultural tools to farmers in Shaanxi. By 1411 he was pleased to receive a report from the Shaanxi regional commissioner that his army had a ten-year surplus of grain.31
In addition to providing self-su‹ciency, the soldier-peasant system helped bring land under cultivation and strengthen border defense. Liaodong, in what is now eastern Manchuria, was a case in point. For centuries, proto-Manchus called Jurchen had carved out a special way of life on the Ming’s untamed borderlands. Yongle undertook strenuous initiatives to create a stable and friendly atmosphere conducive to good regional ties and to allegiance with the Jurchen.
He o¤ered them trade privileges and organized them into agro-military colonies with the same guard unit distinction. He then asked his vassal state Korea to send more than ten thousand oxen to aid his newly recruited soldier-peasants. As a result, the total land holdings of the colonial farms in Liaodong reached 25,300 qing (approximately 154,710 hectares) by 1419. In part because of Yongle’s initiatives, Ming influence became paramount in Manchuria, and its suzerainty was acknowledged as far away as Nuerkan, near the mouth of the Amur River.32
Similar programs were introduced in other border regions, and by the time of Yongle’s death, in addition to their expansion to the Amur River on the east, the Ming agro-military colonies reached Xuanfu and Datong in the north, Yunnan and Sichuan in south China, and even farther south into Annam.
Such colonies dotted both the southern and northern banks of the Yellow River.
115
the years of rehabilitation
Of the thirty guard units deployed to protect the imperial mausolea, twelve were assigned for garrison duty while the other eighteen were regularly engaged in farming. One account shows the grain from these farms exceeding by one-third the required quota. During Yongle’s reign, a cavalry soldier received two piculs a month, whereas a foot soldier received one picul; thus 40,000 soldier-peasants could sustain the livelihood of 190,000 troops. Indeed, during the first few years of Yongle’s reign, most troops on the frontier were generally self-su‹cient and only rarely asked the government for direct provisi
oning.33
But the soldier-peasants increasingly encountered questions arising from the dizzying array of changing regulations, labor surtaxes, and management irregularities. Who should shepherd the farming projects and decide rewards and punishments? Should it be the company commander, the battalion commander, or someone higher up? Were elderly and disabled soldier-peasants required to work in order to receive their monthly provisions? And how were the military farms to distribute rice, wheat, barley, sorghum, and millet so that each family would receive its fair share of high quality grain? The soldier-peasants were frequently coerced by their superiors to perform labor services such as gathering hay and wood, herding livestock, making charcoal, digging ditches, and repairing walls in addition to their military and farming duties.
And because they were not allowed to serve in their native hometowns, the northern frontiers were primarily settled by Southerners while the southern colonies were inhabited by Northerners. Many could not adjust to the cli-mate and food, consequently becoming sick and withering away. Others took a chance and deserted the army, disappearing from all records.34 And those who died without male heirs had no one to inherit the right to work on their plots.
These and other problems ultimately caused the system to deteriorate during the second half of the Yongle reign. It became more di‹cult every year for the regional commanders to support their soldiers and meet the expenses of the army, let alone to reap a surplus. And because the military profession had become hereditary, o‹cers tended to consider such lands as private property.
Moreover, much of the land of military colonies was occupied by nobles, eunuchs, Daoist priests, and Buddhist monks.35 Even wealthy merchants managed, by chicanery and bribery, to get military commissions and took part in grabbing state lands. Consequently, the tax base shrank, grain production from the military farms declined, and the military establishment gradually ceased to be self-supporting. In fact, as early as 1411 some units began to fall behind in remitting grain taxes to the government. In early 1415 Yongle sent twelve supervising secretaries to investigate the operation of agro-military colonies in Shanxi, 116
Perpetual Happiness Page 17