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men could breed. The commandery su¤ered a severe blow in 1483 when both Turfan and Hami marauders plundered their grazing site. For the next three decades, Turfan continued to wage skirmishes against this downtrodden Mongol group. In 1513 the Turfan invaders took the Ming seal away from the Chijin chief and e¤ectively sank the commandery.48
After the last Mongol emperor was driven out of China, there had been a marked decline in the confidence of the Mongol people in the ability of their leaders to rebuild the empire of Qubilai Khan. Some were weak and vacillating, and others, like the above-mentioned groups, soberly assessed their chances of survival and chose to forge collusive ties with the new Chinese masters. Mongol chiefs, big and small, fought over one of the most divisive and acrimonious questions in their political life: What did it take for a person to be considered Mongol? What kind of relationship should he establish with the Ming? During Yongle’s early reign, the Oirat, or the western Mongols, seemed more willing to acknowledge Yongle as their overlord. But in the remote region of eastern Outer Mongolia, a di¤erent kind of cold war was simmering between what ethnologists call Mongol “nationalism” and anything that was new and from Ming China. The eastern Mongols consistently refused to recognize Ming suzerainty and often rallied under the banner of whoever had the best means to recover China proper for them. For the first two decades, their undisputed leaders remained members of the family of Toyon Temur. But during the twelve-year span after the death of Toyon Temur’s grandson, Toghus Temur, in 1388, much of the Mongol world was consumed by a power imbroglio, as five “Yuan emperors” were murdered by their own subordinates.49
Finally, in 1403, Guilichi (d. 1408; also known as Ugechi-Khashakha), who was not related to the Yuan imperial family, nor was he a descendant of Chinggis Khan, proclaimed himself the “Great Khan of the Tartars,” and Ming-Mongol relations were strained.50 Approximately eight months after Yongle ascended the throne, he sought some kind of détente with Guilichi and sent him a message, coupled with silk robes: “After the destiny of the Yuan had declined, my father received the mandate from heaven and tamed the whole world. My father first installed me as the Prince of Yan, and as the successor to my father’s dynastic rule, I respectfully continue to receive blessings from heaven.”51 Five months later, Yongle once again sent a guard commander, Ge Lai, with gifts for Guilichi. The emperor’s message read,
Since ancient times, those who had won the world also received the mandate of heaven. Accordingly, the rise or fall of an empire, the success or failure of a plan, the coming and going of a people’s support could not be 165
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controlled by brain power alone. Somewhere in the cosmos, there was someone who controlled destiny. . . . The Yuan empire had lost its territory and power, and the heavens had requested my father to suppress all of the rebels, command both the Chinese and the barbarians, establish rules, and display disciplines. . . . These could not have been accomplished by humans alone; they had to come from the will of heaven. I followed the augur, obeyed the heavens, and became the legitimate ruler.52
In spite of Yongle’s goodwill gestures and his invoking the cosmic mandate, relations with Ming China were still an incendiary issue in Mongolian politics, and the khan could ill a¤ord to alienate hard-line Mongol claimants. On his part, Guilichi was more concerned with mundane a¤airs and political survival. He believed that his Mongol identity was his destiny, and he refused to make amends with Ming China. In order to dissuade Guilichi from turning the cold war into a hot conflict, in the spring of 1406 Yongle once again dispatched a peaceful mission to Outer Mongolia. In his personal message to the Mongol khan, Yongle wrote,
Your Great Khan is both wise and broad-minded. You should respect the will of heaven, sympathize with the poor people. . . . But if you rely upon your petulant nature . . . and resolve to challenge us by force, I cannot help but respond.
China has excellent soldiers and strong horses, and if the khan thinks he can penetrate deep into our territory and sweep us under in a hurry, this is indeed wish-ful thinking. Before you act you will give it very careful consideration.53
While Yongle was in frequent communication with Guilichi, he learned by early 1408 that Aruytai, one of Guilichi’s commanders, was secretly plotting to overthrow Guilichi and put a puppet named Bunyashiri (also known as Oljei Temur) on the Mongol throne. A descendant of the Yuan imperial family, Bunyashiri was then residing in Bishbalik. In the summer of 1408 Yongle stepped up his divide-and-rule tactics by dispatching a trusted eunuch, Wang An, to help Bunyashiri make the Guilichi regime a casualty.54
In the meantime, Yongle was preparing for the worst and began deploying his troops for a showdown with the Mongols. On the first day of the eighth lunar month in 1408, he told his sta¤ and all government agencies to prepare for his northern tour and hunting trip to Beijing. Ten days later he appointed his heir apparent to serve as regent if and when he was away from Nanjing.
And within a month, he ordered his chief military commissioners in Shandong, Shaanxi, Liaodong, Huguang, Henan, and Shanxi to begin readiness exercises.55
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Following this series of orders, he requested that Marquis Wang Cong (1356–1409) and Marquis Qoryocin at Xuanfu return to Beijing. In the meantime, Yongle ordered the Grand Canal commander Chen Xuan and others to move grain, clothing, and other provisions to Beijing.56 While Yongle was moving his troops and provisions northward, Guilichi was attacked and killed by a group of Mongols, and Bunyashiri was immediately installed as the new Mongol khan.57 Yongle learned of the coup d’état as early as January 1409, and perhaps it was a coincidence that he left Nanjing on February 23. He wasted no time in dispatching Guo Ji to congratulate the new Mongol khan, as he believed that his policy to contain the enemies until the regime changed organ-ically was indeed working. But when the news reached Beijing that Guo had been killed by the Tartars, a war fever gripped the Yongle court. An entry in The Yongle Veritable Record records the emperor’s reaction: “I treat Bunyashiri with sincerity and return expatriated Mongols to him. But he kills my envoy and plunders my land. How dare he be so wild! He who acts against the destiny of heaven should be eliminated.”58
To eliminate the Tartars, in August 1409 Yongle appointed Qiu Fu, the sixty-six-year-old Duke of Qi, to be the commander-in-chief of the punitive campaign. Qiu led an army of one hundred thousand and was assisted by four marquises—Wang Cong (age 52), Qoryocin (60), Wang Zhong (50), and Li Yuan (45). The Tartars had just su¤ered a terrible defeat at the hands of the Oirat, who were then Yongle’s vassals, and were retreating eastward to the Kerulen River valley. The Ming army seemed like a juggernaut headed for victory. However, the overconfident Qiu Fu took only one thousand cavalry as he recklessly pursued the demoralized Tartars north of the river. On September 23 Bunyashiri and Aruytai ambushed and killed not only Qiu Fu but also all four of the Ming marquises.59 Yongle blamed the defeat squarely on Qiu Fu as he wrote the heir apparent,
Recently I sent the Duke of Qi, Qiu Fu, to lead a punitive campaign against the Tartars. He had had battle experience, and I coached him on how to maneuver and how to take precautions. I was sure he could get the job done.
But he abandoned my instructions and stubbornly refused to listen to the advice of his sta¤. He could not wait until the main body of the army arrived before attacking the enemy’s camps. Marquis Li Yuan weepingly tried to stop him, Marquis Qoryocin reluctantly went along, both were killed by the Tartars, and the rank and file retreated as fast as they could. The losses and humiliation were such that if we don’t retaliate and defeat them, they will grow even more fierce and there will be no peace on our borders. At present, 167
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map 4. Yongle’s First Personal Campaign, 1410
I am selecting generals and drilling troops, and have decided to personally lead a new expedition next spring.60
Yongle then posthumously stripped Qoryocin and Qiu Fu of their noble titles and exiled Qiu’s family to Hainan Island.61
To prepare for the campaign, Yongle asked the king of Korea to send him 168
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ten thousand horses, ordered the Ministry of Public Works to make thirty thousand armored carts, and commanded his minister of revenue, Xia Yuanji, to supply two hundred thousand piculs of grain.62 To make sure that his home bases would not get antsy, he also charged Xia Yuanji to assist his grandson Zhu Zhanji, the future Emperor Xuande, in the administration of Beijing. On the eve of his departure he received several elderly dignitaries, prayed to heaven at Following Heaven Gate, and sacrificed to other appropriate deities, displaying an overall ritualistic mix of nationalism, tradition, and morale boost-ing. Yongle’s army of half a million men then left Beijing on March 15, exactly seven weeks before his fiftieth birthday. The grand secretary Jin Youzi, together with two earls and four marquises, accompanied Yongle and put down the first day in his journal as an auspicious start. Even though muddy roads and occasional snows slowed down the march, Yongle took time to appreciate the terrain. Along the northbound trek, he could not help but recall his maiden campaign against a di¤erent kind of Mongol chief, Nayur Buqa, twenty years earlier. Once Yongle crossed the Kerulen River in mid-June, he cast a wider net to catch the Mongols. Finally, at the Onon River, his troops found the enemies, but the net proved to be a sieve as Bunyashiri escaped with seven of his bodyguards. Mindful of what had happened to Qiu Fu, Yongle decided not to pursue the hobbled Mongols too far and too recklessly. He slightly decreased the intensity of his campaign but marched eastward to search for Aruytai.63
On July 10, while the Ming army was encamped in the Green Pine Valley near the Great Khingan Mountains, several thousands of Aruytai’s cavalrymen suddenly attacked the Ming camps. Yongle, however, handled the attack with aplomb as he e¤ectively used his numerical superiority to overwhelm the enemies. The campaign was immediately accelerated as Yongle ordered a hot pursuit. After chasing Aruytai for over one hundred kilometers and killing more than one hundred Tartars, Yongle called o¤ the fight and decided to return home; his troops had used up all of their provisions and were feeling the strain of the summer heat. When he turned southwest across the Great Khingan Mountains, Yongle saw an exceptional hill and named it Fox Hunting Hill. He then wrote the following victory ode and had it chiseled on a stele: The immense desert is my sword;
The celestial mountain my dagger.
Using them I sweep away the filth;
Forever I pacify the Gobi.
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At a location he named Pure Creek Spring, Yongle erected a monument with another celebratory poem on it:
Herald the six imperial armies;
Stop the brutality and end insults.
Within the high mountains and pure waters,
Forever glorify our military might.64
The emperor returned to Beijing in mid-August and, in spite of the fact that Aruytai remained at large, declared the campaign a success. But before he went on to Nanjing in mid-December, he had to tackle the Yellow River floods that had ravaged Kaifeng in September. Since then, there had been a sine-wave regularity to Aruytai’s moves. The Mongol chief sent tribute horses to the Ming court and recognized Yongle’s overlordship—as he did near the end of 1410—
when he felt pinched by his own Mongol rivals. But Aruytai’s promises were made of piecrust, as he unleashed his horde across the Ming border whenever he was o¤ended or felt strong enough to flex his muscles.65 For his part, Yongle played the incentive-and-deterrent game by returning to Aruytai his brother and sister and even investing Aruytai with a Ming title, Prince Hening (Harmony and Tranquility). In the meantime he kept a close watch on the Oirat.
Though Yongle’s first campaign had blunted the military power of the Tartars, who had some twenty thousand remaining cavalrymen, he could not remove the danger of another Mongol group, the Oirat, whose relations with the Tartars had frayed. The Oirat, who claimed to have forty thousand yurts, generally led rough lives rife with poverty and violence. Of the three Oirat chieftains—
Mahmud, Taiping, and Batuboluo—Mahmud had been a vassal of Yongle, with the title of Prince Shunning (Obedience and Tranquility) since 1409. Mahmud first murdered Bunyashiri, then announced his intention to repatriate the Mongols in Gansu and Ningxia.66 Before he launched the campaign against the Tartars, Yongle tilted in favor of the Oirat, but upon hearing this news, he was outraged. On February 26, 1413, he dispatched his eunuch envoy Hai Tong to not only rebuke Mahmud but also to secure the release of all Ming detainees.
As Hai Tong was unable to accomplish his mission, Yongle decided to lead another campaign, this time aiming to teach Mahmud a lesson.67
Yongle’s second personal campaign, begun on April 30, 1414, took four months to complete. Once again the emperor followed the routine readiness procedures: he gathered 150,000 piculs of grain and stored them at Xuanfu, mobilized over half a million troops, performed on-the-eve-of-campaign rituals, then marched several hundred kilometers beyond the Great Wall, all the 170
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way to the Kerulen River. This time, however, he brought along his grandson, Zhu Zhanji, who reviewed the troops with him at Xinghe. The young prince was supposed to be under the constant care of Grand Secretaries Hu Guang and Yang Rong, but at the battle of the Nine Dragon Pass, a eunuch named Li Qian took him in a rash pursuit of the Mongols and almost got him killed.
Another change of procedure was Yongle’s issuance of a set of rules for scout-ing the enemies. He wanted his o‹cers and soldiers to report to him immediately if they saw (1) wild animals (such as deer) or livestock (such as goats or horses) in the camps or around the troops; (2) dust swirling in the distance; (3) dead animals, hoofprints, or horse dung along the trek; (4) deserted goods, dresses and jewelry, or objects with written words on them; or (5) smoke or fire.68
Finally, Yongle made use of prototype cannons and also blunderbusses against the Mongols. There were two types of blunderbuss: a small type weighing only twelve kilograms that could shoot iron arrows to a distance of six hundred paces, and the larger type weighing about forty-two kilograms that could shoot as far as three kilometers. Marquis Liu Sheng commanded the artillery regiment that engaged the Oirat on June 23 and ultimately broke the Oirat’s defensive resistance along the Tula River. Even though the approximately thirty thousand Oirat cavalrymen were scattered, they continued to harass the Ming troops near what is now Ulan Bator, in particular at Shuanquanhai, the home-land of Chinggis Khan. Once again the Ming troops used cannons to fight them o¤. On August 15 Yongle finally returned to Beijing, where, in spite of having sustained heavy casualties, he celebrated victory at a banquet in Respect Heaven Hall. The bruised Mahmud then reached a new rapprochement with Yongle, agreeing not only to release all of the Ming detainees but also to regularly send tribute horses to the Ming court.69 After this campaign, the Ming’s northern borders enjoyed peace and tranquility for more than seven years.
Better still, détente with the Oirat Mongols would last for more than thirty-five years.
However, the baseness of Mongol politics persisted and the fratricidal feuds between the Oirat and the Tartars continued, resulting in the assassination of Mahmud in 1416.
Although Yongle was now preoccupied with the construction of his new capital in Beijing, he did not give short shrift to the Mongol problem. The maintenance of peace on the northern border was turned over to his eunuch envoy Hai Tong and to his Mongol vassals, who, in order to preserve trade privileges, refused to join the more hostile Mongols beyond the Gobi. All told, Hai Tong made a total of nine missions to execute Ming policy on the steppe. For example, during the spring and summer of 1417, Hai Tong made two trips to 171
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the loessial frontier to win over the Oirat chiefs, who had been beaten by the Tartars and were eager to curry favor with Yongle in hopes of retaliation. One year later Hai Tong accompanied a special Oirat embassy to China, requesting and receiving for Toyon, Mahmud’s son, the title Prince Shunning.70 But while the truce between the Ming and the Oirat prevailed, that with the unre-pentant Tartars remained fragile. By 1421 the Tartar chief Aruytai had expressed his displeasure with the Ming government and had decided to toss the olive branch to the winds and renew raids into Chinese territory. But when Yongle proposed to lead another punitive expedition into the desert, almost all of his ministers, including the most strident Mongolphobics, opposed such a move on the ground that the country could not a¤ord another costly campaign.
Perpetual Happiness Page 25