The exigencies of war made it impossible for the Le regime to rebut charges presciently and convincingly. By early May the Les had not only lost the support of their own people but were being hunted down by the Ming invaders.
In desperation, Le Qui-ly burned his palace at Xidu before fleeing southward by sea. It should be noted that while the Ming forces were pushing the Le remnants farther south, Yongle dispatched two eunuch envoys, Ma Bin and Wang Guitong, to coordinate with the Cham, who also wished to share the victory spoils. Caught between a rock and a hard place, Le Qui-ly, his sons, and relatives were all captured on June 16 and 17 and sent in cages to Yongle for punishment.9 The collapse of the Le regime was followed by an exodus of able people toward greener pastures. Some nine thousand talented Annamese left for China and received various Ming appointments, including men who introduced new and more e¤ective firearms into the Ming arsenal.
On October 5, 1407, the prisoners of war were brought before Yongle at 180
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Respect Heaven Hall in Nanjing. During the brief judgment, Yongle—who alone faced the south, while his ministers faced the north—had the charges of high treason (as listed in Zhang Fu’s diatribe) read to members of the Le family one more time. Yongle then asked his Annamese captives if they had killed their king and usurped the throne from the ruling Tran house. There was no demurral, only silence. In the end all but two of the Le entourage were imprisoned or beheaded. In the meantime a bevy of expatriate Annamese o‹cials and elders petitioned the emperor to incorporate their country into the Ming empire, and the irrepressible Yongle immediately accepted the petition. On the first day of the sixth lunar month of 1407, Yongle changed the name of Annam to Jiaozhi—an old Han dynasty designation—and made it a province of China. The annexation process was put in high gear in the ensuing weeks as the governing triad of a province—administrative o‹ce, surveillance o‹ce, and regional military commissioner—was established. Lü Yi (d. 1409) was appointed its military commissioner and Huang Zhong its vice-commissioner. Huang Fu was to serve as both provincial administrator and surveillance commissioner. At this time Jiaozhi had a population of over three million “pacified people” ( anfu renmin) and more than two-and-a-half million “indigenous people” ( manren), with 13.6 million piculs of grain on reserve.
It stretched 830 kilometers from east to west and 1,400 kilometers from north to south. The province was further divided into fifteen prefectures, forty-one subprefectures, and 210 counties.10
Zhang Fu stayed in Jiaozhi until the summer of 1408, when he was ordered to help suppress a riot in Guangxi. Soon after that he traveled to Nanjing and was made the Duke of Ying while his comrade-in-arms Mu Sheng also moved up one notch in the Ming peerage to become the Duke of Qian. But despite the emperor’s mounting optimism that Jiaozhi could be developed into a Ming province like Yunnan or Guizhou and that the Annamese would ultimately be sinicized, Yongle’s expansion into Southeast Asian territory inevitably exposed the Ming to the risk of more military entanglements. In fact, Yongle, once revered as a liberator, was soon reviled by Annamese nationalists as an impe-rialist, as Chinese military control and economic exploitation deeply upset Annamese society. Even before Zhang Fu left Jiaozhi, a number of disturbances had taken place. Tran Nguy (d. 1410), the second son of the former Tran king, led a loosely organized uprising against the Ming occupation and accused Yongle’s agents of being slavers. Tran Nguy proclaimed a new regime called the Great Kingdom of Annam and aroused a heroic resistance. Chinese sources characterize Tran Nguy as a violently jingoistic member of the Miao (Hmong) minority and a minor o‹cial of the Tran dynasty. The Annamese Annals, how-181
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ever, validate Tran as a royal Tran prince.11 Yongle viewed Tran Nguy as a typical rebel and immediately ordered Mu Sheng to mobilize forty thousand troops from Yunnan, Guizhou, and Sichuan to quell the vaunted agitation and disturbance. This time the tables were turned as the Ming forces su¤ered a terrible defeat at the hands of Tran Nguy’s bravehearted guerrillas. Mu Sheng barely escaped, but both Yongle’s minister of war, Liu Zhun, and regional military commissioner, Lü Yi, were killed. At this juncture Yongle was totally occupied with the Mongol problems in the north and once again appointed Zhang Fu to pacify the “rebellious” Annamese in the south.
Zhang Fu’s first step, after receiving his order on February 23, 1409, was to build a fleet, using some 8,600 Annamese ships that he had captured in 1407, so that he could gain the upper hand along the coastline and at the river ports of Annam. The prudent Zhang Fu then tactically used the forty-seven thousand troops he had raised from China’s coastal provinces and the fleet he had just built to overwhelm his enemies, who had only twenty thousand troops and six hundred ships. In the meantime internal strife substantially weakened Tran’s strength, and Zhang Fu finally captured Tran in December 1409 and delivered him to China for execution.12 However, Zhang Fu could not altogether scour Jiaozhi, as Tran’s nephew, Tran Qui-khoang (d. 1414), remained at large and the Annamese freedom fighters (or rebels), instead of relapsing into an attitude of bitterness and despair, continued to rally behind their new leader. And when Tran Qui-khoang felt secure enough, he multiplied his tribute o¤erings to the Ming court but also requested that Yongle recognize him as the king of the Great Kingdom of Annam. Since Yongle would o¤er Tran only the title of provincial civil commissioner, fighting was renewed.13 Early in 1411 Yongle asked Zhang Fu to lead yet another expedition into Jiaozhi, instructing him,
Tran Qui-khoang sent a message of repentance and submission, and I believe in him and accept his pleadings. I have already dispatched delegates to pacify and reward him. If he submits and obeys with sincerity, you should pardon him. But if he harbors hostility and deceit, then you should work with your associates and crush him. I trust you will not fail in this mission.14
Yongle’s letter seems to suggest that, in the long run, the Ming colonial administration would prefer peaceful solutions; therefore, China needed to enlist the collaboration of popular Annamese leaders such as Tran Qui-khoang. On the other side of the coin, Tran realized that a popular movement was vigorously progressing and that the drive for independence might be slowed 182
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or derailed, but it could never be entirely stopped. As soon as Zhang Fu returned to Jiaozhi, Zhang ordered the execution of the Ming commander Huang Zhong, in whose hands rested the military control of Jiaozhi. But the scapegoating of one unpopular imperial agent could not remove the resentment that seethed deep in the hearts of the Annamese. Zhang Fu quickly learned that Tran Qui-khoang indeed had high ambitions in that part of the world and would not want the Chinese emperor to dictate the destiny of his people. Zhang knew that he was in for another tough fight, so he utilized his marines—now about twenty-four thousand strong—plus various types of ships to control coastal positions and river ports, while Duke Mu Sheng made a draconian sweep through Annam by land. The Ming forces scored victory after victory, capturing more than 160 vessels and killing hundreds of thousands of unyielding Annamese.15 Nevertheless, Tran Qui-khoang and his partisans continued to fight on for two long years, utilizing Annam’s unique terrain against positional and regular Chinese forces and, when necessary, retreating into Cambodia for temporary shelter.16 However, near the end of 1413, Tran Qui-khoang had lost between 60 and 70 percent of his troops and was forced to steal food from Ming granaries for survival. Finally, on March 30, 1414, Tran, his wife, and his brother were all captured, and the glad tidings reached Beijing as Yongle was getting ready for his second campaign against the Mongols. Chinese sources indicate that Tran was executed in Nanjing on the second day of the eighth lunar month, 1414, but the Annamese Annals claim that he drowned himself on his way to the Ming capital.17
Before returning to China, Zhang Fu aggrandized Jiaozhi’s southern territory (at the expense of Champa) by establishing four new subprefectures and by deploying more troops there. For a while Yongle was relieved that the peac
e he desperately needed in the south had returned. But he had grossly underes-timated the Annamese love for independence. Even though Jiaozhi was once again pacified, the peace and order would not last long, for a hard core of Annamese nationalism still existed. Between 1415 and 1424 there emerged some thirty-one self-styled resistance leaders, among them army o‹cers, aboriginal chieftains, gold diggers, and Buddhist monks. Most of the disturbances and uprisings took place at Lang-giang, Nghe-an, Jiao-chou, Ninh-kieu, Lang-son, Loi-giang, and other prefectural capitals where Ming troops were stationed.18
Tran Qui-khoang, like many martyrs, had engendered enormous patriotic feelings in his country, and his memory inspired his people to more and braver action in the ensuing years.
After crushing the Tran-led uprisings, Yongle followed the advice of Huang Fu, his top-ranking civil administrator in Jiaozhi from 1407 to 1424, by imple-183
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menting reform at the grassroots level. Yongle established more schools, medical clinics, and religious registry and transmission o‹ces in Jiaozhi. In addition, he brought Annamese students to the National University at the Ming capital and appointed more natives to minor local o‹ces in Jiaozhi. However, his military continued to ruthlessly suppress any sign of opposition. And in spite of the fact that he had made e¤orts to lessen the Annamese taxes—mainly those paid in summer and autumn grain, salt, commodities, and fish—his appetite for Annamese goods grew even keener. Both Chinese and Vietnamese sources show that he repeatedly exacted from his newly conquered subjects such local specialties as tropical green feathers, gold, paints, fans, silk fabrics, and a special sandalwood called sumu that was used for building doors in the new palace and from whose bark a red dye was extracted. Table 9.1 provides a bird’s-eye view of the insatiable imperial demands.19
But Yongle’s reform was only piecemeal, and unique Annamese traditions, ideas, and desires counted for naught. Under Ming rule the Annamese were required to adopt Chinese dress and hairstyles so as not to expose their ankles, shoulders, and backs in public. Annamese men were not allowed to cut their hair short or to use the colors yellow and purple, even during the festivals. Self-serving Ming chroniclers, as a rule, did not recount the boundless social and economic su¤ering that Yongle’s annexation had caused the native people.20
Instead, they blamed the eunuch Ma Ji (fl. 1410–27)—who had won Yongle’s trust during the civil war and had done all sorts of handiwork for him ever since—for brazenly exacting goods, money, and women from the Annamese.
In the meantime, anti-Chinese activists used the heroic deeds of their martyrs to arouse Annamese dreams, passions, and patriotism and kept up a struggle against their colonial masters. A full-blown uprising broke out again in 1418, and this time the Annamese could finally see the light at the end of the tunnel. The leader of this latest resistance movement was Le Loi (ca. 1385–1433), an agitator who could think and a dreamer who dared to act. A native of Lam-son (Blue Mountain) Village, near the coastal city of Thanh-hoa, Le Loi originally served as the local chief of the Nga-lac district under the Ming colonial administration. He was known for his cunning, good sense of timing, and e¤ective guerrilla tactics, including constantly moving on the wing and using small bands of brigands to ambush the regular Ming army.21
When the so-called Lam-son Uprising took place, the Ming commanding o‹cer was Marquis Li Bin, whose stern attitude toward the people of Jiaozhi and disregard for their sensibilities and political aspirations only intensified their hatred for the Chinese. It was widely reported that when Le Loi’s daughter was only nine years old, Ma Ji had taken her away from her parents and sent her 184
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table 9.1
Tribute Goods Sent by Annam to the Ming Court
Items
Sumu
Silk
Sandalwood
Paints
Gold
Perfumes
Year
(bolt)
(catty)
Feathers
(catty)
(tael)
Fans
(variety)
1410
132
1416
1,668
1, 500
2,000
2,000
10,000
23
1417
1,252
3,000
2,400
10,000
1418
1,288
5,000
2,000
2,400
10,000
1419
1,325
5,000
2,000
10,000
1420
2,265
5,000
3,000
10,000
1421
1,535
4, 520
2, 7 25
2,500
7, 5 3 5
1422
1,390
4,800
2,800
2,800
8,430
1423
1,747
5,000
3,000
3,000
10,000
1 tael = 37.783 grams; 1 catty = 604.53 grams
source: Ming Taizong Shilu, 111, 183, 195, 207, 219, 232, 244, 254B, and 266.
into Yongle’s harem. Yongle’s grand secretary Yang Shiqi noted that Huang Fu time and again criticized Ma Ji’s wanton behavior in Jiaozhi.22 Although Ma Ji did the bidding of His Majesty, his conduct probably provided the catalyst that brought about the new uprising. The high-handed Li Bin found out that the more he tried to suppress the Annamese resistance, the more buoyant it became. It is possible that Yongle, who was generally preoccupied with the Mongol problem, had only a feeble understanding of the realities of Jiaozhi’s situation. It is even more likely that his agents were fearful of reporting anything that might challenge Yongle’s current opinion. For example, there were divergent views of Le Loi’s competence as a military commander and political leader. Ming reports even contradicted Annamese records on the issue of Le Loi’s relationships with Cambodia and Laos—the Chinese said he escaped to his neighbors several times, whereas the Annamese denied the stories. However, one fact is certain: by 1419 insurrections had broken out from the south to the northeast, and Li Bin was totally frustrated by his elusive, hit-and-run enemies.
When Li died in 1422, Earl Chen Zhi became the new Chinese commander, but the Ming pacification burden was becoming increasingly onerous. The dithering and delays of supplies from China made the protracted campaign even more di‹cult, even though at one point, in 1423, Le Loi was forced to dis-band his partisans because of exhaustion and lack of food. In the summer of 1424, when the news reached Jiaozhi that Yongle had died on his campaign 185
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against the Mongols, euphoria swept the Annamese camps as Le Loi’s followers took heart. They reassembled and resumed their deadly guerrilla attacks.
Soon after Yongle’s son ascended the throne, Huang Fu was replaced by Chen Qia. The Ming court then o¤ered Le Loi the position of prefect of Thanh-hoa.
Le Loi viewed the o¤er as a signal that the Chinese resolve was faltering, and naturally turned it down. This o¤er showed that the Chinese still did not appreciate the fact that the Annamese had been independent from China for more than four centuries. Nor did the Ming rulers understand that their Southeast Asian subjects had never lost their love of liberty and of the Annamese way of life. Because the menace was so constant and the casualties were running ever so high, in 1427 Emperor Xuande, Yongle’s grandson, concluded that the Annamese were ungovernable and that the enormous cost of maintaining a provincial administration there was not worthwhile. After the Ming troops were withdrawn, the triumphant Le Loi established the Later Le Dynasty (1428–1789) and proclaimed himself emperor of Dai Viet (Great Vietnam). After two decades of Chinese rule, the Annamese had finally achieved their independence, in expression of Le Loi’s sta
tement “We have our own mountains and rivers, our own customs and traditions.”23 In the ensuing years, the Annamese resumed their traditional southward expansion. In 1470 their troops invaded and captured the city of Hui and imprisoned the Champan king and his family. When the Chinese did nothing to help the Cham, the specter of a Ming reconquest was buried in the jungle of a new nation called Vietnam.
While his penetration into the Vietnamese jungle was emasculated to the point of ine¤ectiveness, Yongle remained a perennially active player in international politics. He was not a creature, but the creator, of his time, and his time was one of imperialism and expansion for China. At the beginning of the fifteenth century, as Yongle got the urge to expand his influence into the known world, he began frenetic diplomatic activities in neighboring states and churned his overseas explorations into a frenzy. Between 1402 and 1424 he sent at least seventy-five eunuch missions to execute his foreign policy. As he continued to be haunted by the ghost of Jianwen, the primary assignment of his eunuch-envoys was to seek information about Jianwen and Jianwen’s partisans. Yongle also sent his envoys to reward rulers of lesser states and to invest into o‹ce new kings and crown princes. In addition, he used his diplomatic missions to escort statues of the Buddha, attend royal weddings and funerals in vassal states, and to command punitive expeditions. China’s nearby neighbors—such as Korea, Champa, Mongolia, and the Ryukyu Islands—were most frequently visited by Yongle’s envoys. Other close vassals included Tibet, Nepal, Turfan, and Hami. States that had a lesser degree of acculturation with and geographic prox-186
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