ments, employment agencies, and labor unions. Employers with fifteen or more employees
were covered beginning July 26, 1994. The ADA prohibits discrimination in all employment
practices, including job application procedures, hiring, firing, advancement, compensation,
training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment. It applies to recruitment,
advertising, tenure, layoff, leave, fringe benefits, and all other employment-related activities.
An employer may not ask or require a job applicant to take a medical examination before
making a job offer. It cannot make any pre-employment inquiry about a disability or the
nature or severity of a disability. An employer may, however, ask questions about the abil-
ity to perform specific job functions and may, with certain limitations, ask an individual
with a disability to describe or demonstrate how she or he would perform these functions.
An employer may condition a job offer on the satisfactory result of a post-offer medical
examination or medical inquiry if this is required of all entering employees in the same
job category. A post-offer examination or inquiry does not have to be job-related and
consistent with business necessity.
An employer is free to select the most qualified applicant available and to make decisions
based on reasons unrelated to a disability. For example, suppose two persons apply for a job
as a typist and an essential function of the job is to type 75 words per minute accurately. One
applicant, an individual with a disability, who is provided with a reasonable accommodation
for a typing test, types 50 words per minute; the other applicant, who has no disability, accu-
rately types 75 words per minute. The employer can hire the applicant with the higher typing
speed, if typing speed is needed for successful performance of the job.
Drug addiction is also protected under the ADA; however, current or casual drug use is
not protected under the ADA. A test for the illegal use of drugs is not considered a medical
examination under the ADA; therefore, employers may conduct such testing of applicants
or employees and make employment decisions based on the results. The ADA does not
encourage, prohibit, or authorize drug tests. If the results of a drug test reveal the presence
of a lawfully prescribed drug or other medical information, such information must be
treated as a confidential medical record.
An alcoholic is considered to have a disability and is protected by the ADA if he or she is
qualified to perform the essential functions of the job. An employer may be required to pro-
vide an accommodation to an alcoholic. However, an employer can discipline, discharge, or
deny employment to an alcoholic whose use of alcohol adversely affects job performance
or conduct. An employer may also prohibit the use of alcohol in the workplace and can
require that employees not be under the influence of alcohol.
If an individual has a known disability that would reasonably appear to interfere with or
prevent performance of job functions, that person may be asked to demonstrate how these
functions will be performed, even if other applicants are not asked to do so [2].
The Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) requires businesses to have employees sign a dis-
closure form granting authorization to perform a background check. The FCRA is not just
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15. PRE-EMPLOYMENT INTERVIEWING
restricted to credit reports but includes all “consumer reports.” Laws will vary from state to
state in how and what information can be used during the pre-employment screening
process.
You will find a copy of the authors’ pre-employment booklet in Appendix C. Using it
will allow you to perform effective pre-employment screening interviews to ensure that
you and your clients or department hire the best applicants applying for the job.
SUMMARY
• The best source of information comes from the applicants themselves.
• To get information the interviewer must:
• Plant seeds for truth and gain rapport
• Ask assumptive questions
• Exaggerate the problem
• Share
• Ask projective questions
References
[1] U.S. Department of Justice, American with Disabilities Home Page. Available at http://www.ada.gov.
[2] National Law Enforcement Recruiters Association, Questions and Answers: The Americans with Disabilities
Act and Hiring Police Officers. Available at http://www.nlera.org/?p 17.
C H A P T E R
16
Passenger Screening with Verbal
and Nonverbal Cues
One of the hottest topics in today’s security-conscious world is how to balance airline
travel convenience with fail-proof passenger safety. Believe us, there is no simple solution
to this problem. In the United States we have seen airline security going from almost none
in the pre-1960s, where passenger safety amounted to no more than the pilot checking the
fuel and “kicking the tires” of the airplane, to today, where full-body back scanning x-ray is
soon to be widespread. How did we get here, and what interviewing and interrogation
techniques can our transportation and security experts employ to make our travel more
convenient but not increase our vulnerability to attack?
Before the airline hijackings of the late 1960s and ’70s, the biggest threat to the flying
public was the “mad bomber” scenario, which surfaced in the 1950s. Two of several
noteworthy incidents back then shocked airline security professionals. Reminiscent of
other family murderers, 31-year-old philanderer John Henry Grant decided to solve all
his financial and social problems by taking out $25,000 in life insurance on his wife and
two children, then planting a bomb in their luggage. The bomb was set to go off in the
air as the plane traveled between Los Angeles and San Diego, California. Fortunately the
device failed and all onboard were spared. Grant was caught in short order and sent to
prison [1].
In November 1955, when John Graham sent his mother off to visit relatives in Alaska
with a suitcase bomb consisting of twenty-six sticks of dynamite he had “thoughtfully”
packed for her, neither law enforcement nor airline security were expecting that someone
would blow up an airplane with forty-four passengers to collect his mother’s life insurance.
Ten minutes after the DC-6 left Denver’s Stapleton Airport, it crashed in flames, leaving all
onboard dead. Graham became a suspect when a witness reported that prior to the flight he
had nervously purchased flight insurance for his mother. Investigation by the FBI found
bomb-making materials in Graham’s home. He was subsequently convicted and was exe-
cuted 2 years later [1].
These events as well as the rash of airplane hijackings of the 1960s and 1970s resulted in
the airlines x-raying baggage and having passengers pass through metal detectors. These
passenger screening procedures caused minimal inconvenience to the flying public and
Effective Interviewing and Interrogation Techniques
239
# 2011, Elsevier Ltd.
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16. PASSENGER SCREENING WITH VERBAL AND NONVERBAL CUES
were quickly accepted as necessary and unobtrusive. As for enhancing airline security, for
the most part, the airline sc
reening procedures were disjointed and nonuniform with many
potential threats slipping through the cracks. Each domestic airport and airline interpreted
the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)’s directives relating to security slightly differ-
ently. At some foreign airports, security screening was cursory or nonexistent. The private
contract security companies that staffed most security checkpoints were for the most part
atrocious. More alarmingly, the flying public’s safety was in the hands of minimum-wage
employees with little or no formal training. Many of these private contractor screeners were
subsequently found to have criminal records, which in some instances were covered up by
their employers.
On September 11, 2001, things changed dramatically. There is no need to rehash here
those tragic events. However, the world suddenly woke up to the need for proper airline
passenger screening. Those nineteen assassins shook the country and the airline industry
to its core. Airline safety became an international priority. Tighter ticketing procedures
were put in place. No one could fly without proper government-issued picture identifica-
tion. Each passenger was asked if they had packed their own bags and if they were carrying
a package for anyone else. Pen-knives, nail clippers, and other sharp objects were banned
from carry-on luggage.
Passenger screening procedures were further refined, and security screening became the
responsibility of the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), which was formed
under the new Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Various “red-flag” indicators
were developed. Did the passenger buy the ticket with cash? Was it a one-way ticket?
Was the passenger flying alone? Did the passenger’s trip originate from, or pass through,
a high-risk country? Did the passenger have check-in luggage? However, the main focus
appeared to be cockpit safety – reinforcing the cockpit doors and restricting access. Some
pilots who were willing, “on their own dime,” could volunteer for DHS training to carry
firearms while in flight. A “Sky Marshal” program was reactivated, and new officers were
trained to fly undercover on high-risk flights.
Everything seemed to be right on track with airline security when, in December 2001, the
28-year-old, British-born, self-admitted Al Qaeda member Richard Colvin Reid tried to
blow up his shoes, which contained an explosive, aboard American Airlines Flight 63. What
was the government’s response to this development? From then on, all passengers were
required to remove their shoes for x-ray screening.
To add insult to injury, on December 25, 2009, Christmas Day, Umar Farouk Abdulmu-
tallab, a 23-year-old Nigerian who had been co-opted by Yemeni Al Qaeda members, while
a passenger aboard a Delta flight from Amsterdam to Detroit, attempted to set off a bomb
concealed in, of all places, his underwear. If the security procedures already in effect had
functioned as designed, Abdulmutallab would have never been allowed to board that
flight. In fact, had the persons responsible for screening passengers “connected the dots,”
as many of our leaders like to say, Abdulmutallab would have never even have been issued
a visa to enter the United States in the first place.
Unfortunately the system failed, and now passengers will be subject to a full-body
back-scanning x-ray to board a plane. In addition, while in flight passengers must now
remain in their seats 1 hour before landing. Again, all our security reactions seem to be
“knee-jerk” reactions. We should be proactive in airline security.
16. PASSENGER SCREENING WITH VERBAL AND NONVERBAL CUES
241
For the past six decades one airline has gotten it right – Israel’s national airline, El Al
(El Al is Hebrew for “to the skies”). Widely recognized worldwide, El Al passenger security
screening is the toughest and most effective in the world, and they do not apologize for it.
Although there have been many attempts against the carrier, only one hijacking, in 1968,
was successful [2].
What are the techniques employed by El Al that have protected it so well?
The answer is actually very simple. Having been a target of terrorists for so long, El Al
takes a total security approach. They developed, constantly refine, and enforce strict secu-
rity procedures at the airports as well as in flight.
Security at the airport begins at the curb and relies on armed security officers and
plain-clothes operatives in and around the passenger areas, luggage, and airplanes. We will
not discuss the physical security measures on the ground or in the air, which are substan-
tial, but will focus on what interviewing techniques are used with the passengers.
Passengers are asked to arrive to the airport 3 hours before the flight. This is to allow
ample time for El Al security professionals to do their job. Each and every passenger, adult
or child, is interviewed by highly trained security specialist teams. Before being allowed to
even approach the ticket counter, every passenger is stopped by El Al security officers. The
security officers ask the passenger open-ended and assumptive questions similar to those
mentioned before in this book: “Where are you coming from?” “What is the purpose of
your trip?” “Who do you know in Israel?” “What is your occupation?” “Who asked you
to take something on this trip with you?” “Tell me how your bags got packed?” “Where
did you get your last name?” “Can you speak Hebrew?” “How long do you plan to stay
in Israel?” “What are you going to do there?” The interviewer is looking for verbal and non-
verbal cues of deception. El Al security and ticketing staff have been extensively trained to
listen for pitch, cadence, and answering changes in the voice.
These security officers will use follow-up questions to clarify answers and to increase or
decrease the tension. If the passenger’s answers are nonresponsive, illogical, or generally do
not make sense, the passenger is red-flagged. Body language is expertly observed. Body
posture, eye contact, face blanching or blushing, and profuse perspiration are all being
assessed. The security officers use comparison-type questions as discussed in Chapter 6
of this book.
Political correctness is not a consideration here; El Al security officers ask questions in a
somewhat authoritarian manner, not unlike the high school assistant principal questioning
the tenth-grader walking in the hallways during class time. This approach is deliberate and
matter of fact. The purpose is to maintain psychological control and place stress on any pas-
senger who is up to no good. Remember, the student caught in the hallway with a hall pass
feels nowhere near the stress of one without a pass.
If the passenger gets through the first phase of questioning, El Al ticket counter person-
nel again question them. Although it may not be as extensive questioning as by the first
team, the passenger will be again asked assumptive-type questions such as, “What are
you carrying in your baggage given to you to carry by someone else?” “Who did you let
pack your bags?” In fact, the passenger may be again questioned at the gate. This multilayer
approach allows behavior assessment to be made by more than one questioner, sub
stan-
tially increasing the chances that a high-risk passenger will not make it through all the
checkpoints without being identified.
242
16. PASSENGER SCREENING WITH VERBAL AND NONVERBAL CUES
FIGURE 16.1
In April 1986, it was just such interview screening by El Al security officers that pre-
vented the death of 387 passengers on an El Al flight from Heathrow to Tel Aviv’s Ben Gur-
ion Airport. An unwitting, pregnant 32-year-old Anne Mary Murphy was traveling to Israel
to meet her Jordanian fianceé’s family when El Al security officers stopped and questioned
her. It was determined that her Jordanian boyfriend, Nezar Hindawi, had told her he
wanted to marry her, but she would have to go meet his parents in Israel before he could
do so. In preparation for her trip, Nezar Hindawi packed the 10-pound bag of explosives
into her suitcase without her knowledge. The disaster was averted and Hindawi still sits
in a British prison. It was determined that the bomb had been prepared by Syria and
provided to Hindawi [3].
Keep in mind that anxiousness or nervousness may be a normal reaction for some pas-
sengers who are fearful of flying, or just put off by being asked seemingly personal ques-
tions by a stranger. El Al security officers expertly observe these passengers and quickly
sort out those who are not a risk. The critical thing about the interviewing process is that
unless the security officer is satisfied that the passenger does not pose a threat to the secu-
rity of the airplane and other passengers, that passenger does not get onto that airplane,
period! El Al does not rely on any other country’s security systems and procedures. El Al
takes full responsibility for all of its own security measures.
The 2004 report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States
[4], commonly referred to as the “9/11 Commission Report,” clearly identified the problem facing the United States as a result of terrorist aggression against American people and
property worldwide. The Commission made several recommendations that, had they been
implemented, most likely would have prevented Abdulmutallab from even boarding the
Delta flight in Amsterdam: for example, moving forward with the use of biometric identifi-
Nathan J Gordon, William L Fleisher Page 35