There was, however, no unanimity in the British Cabinet on this perception. Some ministers, such as Ernest Bevin (the foreign secretary) and Philip Noel-Baker (appointed the secretary of state for Commonwealth relations), were more influenced by officials who held such views. Sir Strafford Cripps was optimistic about the future of India. Attlee, after the Congress Party agreed to the creation of Pakistan, worked with the next viceroy, Lord Mountbatten, to strengthen India and prevent its Balkanization.
History has proved the above assessment wrong. The authors ignored the importance of deep roots that bind a people together despite their differences and gave too much importance to a revealed religion to hold a country together. In fact, it was Islamic Pakistan that broke with the secession from it of Bangladesh in 1971, whereas the apparently polyglot India survived many serious internal and external challenges.
The US State Department had kept mum while the Cabinet Mission was in Delhi. The US chargé d’affaires, George Merrell, advised that neither the British nor the Indians were eager for US intervention. He quoted Major Wilson Wyatt of the Cabinet Delegation as exclaiming (on seeing a Reuters news item that Washington favoured submitting the Pakistan question to international arbitration): ‘What? Are they going to interfere now?’48 On the Indian attitude, in a subsequent telegram, Merrell pointed out: ‘Our Govt. – through various official channels – “oversold” itself to Indians. Rightly or wrongly many of them gained the impression that the US was going to “liberate” them from British rule. When this hope was not realized Indians were bitterly disappointed and…began to class the US with Britain as an Imperialist Power.’49
The State Department became active after President Harry S. Truman accepted Dean Acheson’s recommendation for the appointment of an American ambassador to the Interim Government in December 1946. It then made several efforts to intervene in order to break the constitutional deadlock and support a unitary solution for India. Acheson had been impressed by what Sir Girja Shanker Bajpai, the Indian agent general in Washington, had told him on 8 November 1946:
Any constitution which would come out of the Constituent Assembly in India would create a relationship between the Government of India and the Government of Great Britain more attenuate [sic] than that of such Dominions as Canada, Australia and New Zealand and more in the nature of Eire [Ireland]. Therefore there would be factors which would result in the Indian Government not leaning heavily upon Great Britain for advice or guidance…while Nehru would not wish to be put in a position of choosing between close relationships with the western powers and with the Soviet Union, nevertheless, the facts were such that ultimately he must choose. In the light of these conditions an American Ambassador might exercise very considerable influence in the direction of friendly or helpful advice – in fact rather more so than might be possible in countries which we might consider more important and whose constitutional structure and foreign policies were more settled.50
There is, however, no record of any Indian effort to carry forward thereafter a dialogue to identify mutual interests or to work with the USA. Asaf Ali, the first Indian ambassador who went over to Washington in February 1947, did not have the experience or the talent for such a task. When Asaf Ali first called on the secretary of state, General George Marshall recorded his surprise that ‘the Ambassador made no reference to unity on which his predecessor Bajpai had laid so much stress or on orderly democratic government’, especially after he (Marshall) had given him a lead by stating that the US aim in China ‘was first unity and second a reasonably democratic system of government’. Marshall was baffled when, instead, Asaf Ali talked of ‘India’s indebtedness to the stand the British had taken on Indian independence’.51
On 30 November 1946 Dean Acheson instructed Waldemar Gallman, the US chargé d’affaires in the UK, to convey to the British authorities the administration’s view in advance of the London conference between the British and Indian leaders that was to begin on 2 December 1946. This view was as follows:
Any halt in the constitutional process there [in India] may cause widespread chaos similar [in] China which would last for many years and would have worldwide repercussions…[the] US looks forward [to] mutual advantageous economic relations with stable powerful united [italics added] India.52
Acheson also instructed Gallman to remain in touch with Jinnah and Nehru in London. Acheson followed these instructions up by addressing a press conference in Washington on 3 December 1946. In this conference, he said: ‘[The] US awaits with deep concern the outcome of the current talks in London.’ On his instructions to contact the Indian leaders, Gallman was smartly sidetracked by the India Office. He wired back that, according to British officers, the leaders had ‘an extremely tight schedule…that this is (exclusively) “Prime Minister’s Party”…and existing tension may cause Nehru, Jinnah or both to interpret whatever is said by [the] Embassy as US interference or taking sides’.53
After the failure of the London conference, Pethick-Lawrence wired its results to the foreign secretary, Ernest Bevin, then in the US, for briefing the Americans:
It is not possible to induce Nehru to modify in any way Congress position as it was already known to us…. If voting is by majorities of representatives of each province (as Nehru insists) grouping constitutions will probably not be formed because of objections by Assam and NWFP…. Fair opportunity to secure the formation of groups is vital to secure Muslim League cooperation and was an essential part of Mission’s proposal…. If therefore [the] US concur in our interpretation of the statement of 16 May 1946 it might be very helpful if a US representative in Delhi were to make approach to Congress leaders…I should be grateful to learn what are reactions of the State Department.54
Acheson thereupon wired Merrell on 11 December 1946 to speak to Nehru as follows:
When you see Nehru, suggest you stress…recent expressions of US interest in Indian political impasse and dispel any Indian belief US actions inspired at instance Brit. Although the limited powers of Union Centre in British Plan are open to honest and objective criticism…US historical experience in federalism indicates…Central Government initially with limited powers gradually acquired…additional authority which it must have to meet problems of the federal union [e.g., over NWFP and Assam, which were border states, because defence was a federal subject]…. Congress attitude at this point would rest on reciprocal understanding by Muslim League to work loyally within framework [of] Indian federal union subject only to reopening constitutional issues after ten years of experiment.55
Merrell reported Nehru’s reaction to Acheson on 14 December 1946 as follows: ‘The Congress realized thoroughly the necessity of starting union with weak centre…. But League members had announced publicly that they joined Cabinet in order to fight. Now they were saying privately that if they entered Constituent Assembly it would be with purpose of wrecking it…Nehru blamed London for throwing spanner into works by encouraging Jinnah in his intransigence by their statement of 6 December 1946 after the London conference.’56
On 19 December the State Department instructed Merrell to
…inform Jinnah and Liaqat Ali Khan or both, our doubt that Congress attitude re. Provincial groupings can be modified unless accompanied by public declaration or other tangible evidence of Muslim League willingness to cooperate loyally within framework of Indian federal union to be established in accordance with Cabinet Mission Plan…necessary safeguards can never be achieved unless the concept of union itself is generally accepted by the principal parties.57
On the approach to Liaqat Ali Khan, Merrell wired back on 27 December 1946 that Jinnah’s deputy had argued that the Congress had not accepted the British Government’s statement of 6 December 1946 on groupings, a fundamental point of the Cabinet Mission plan. Liaqat had then gone on to refer to ‘communal warfare’ in Bihar in which he claimed 30,000 Muslims had been killed, not 5000 as officially declared. Liaqat Ali Khan then said: ‘If chaos developed in India, [the] USSR would move in.’58 Th
us, he tried to broadly hint that the Muslim League would be willing to cooperate with the West on strategic issues, believing that this stand was more likely to influence the Americans than any arguments on the merits of the case. Merrell followed this two days later by cabling that Liaqat had confirmed that Jinnah could not be persuaded to offer assurances of any sort until such time as Congress accepted the British grouping plan. The US State Department then chased Jinnah to Karachi, where the American vice-consul, Joseph S. Spark, was able to catch up with him. ‘Tell your government…for God’s sake not to be chloroformed by meaningless Congress gestures for purely propaganda effect’ was the Quaid-i-Azam’s response.*59
The Muslim League had been exploring the US attitude by sending delegations to that country. M.A.H. Isfahani, a prominent Calcutta businessman close to Jinnah (and soon to be appointed Pakistan’s first ambassador to the US) after one such visit in November 1946, wrote to Jinnah: ‘I have learnt that sweet words and first impressions count a lot with Americans’ and advised Jinnah that the Time-Life South Asia correspondent should be cultivated.60 The previous summer Time had put Jinnah on its cover and, in a three-page article, described the political rise of Jinnah as ‘a story of lust for power, a story that twists and turns like a bullock-cart track in the hills’. In this context, Dennis Kux has commented: ‘If the State Department was cool towards the idea of Pakistan, some US media commentary was positively hostile.’61
On 7 February 1947, the Congress Party and minority members of the Interim Government presented the viceroy a petition demanding the resignation of the Muslim League representatives from that body. Their argument was that, despite the fact that the Congress Party had (on 6 February 1947) accepted the grouping formula as contained in the British declaration of 6 December 1946, Jinnah (on 31 January 1947) had refused to enter the Constituent Assembly, terming the aforementioned declaration a ‘dishonest trick’. The fact was that the Congress Party had not accepted the 6 December formula unreservedly, which had enabled Jinnah to cry foul. But the Muslim League’s strong words could suggest that, during his stay in London after the conference, Jinnah had received assurances that continued intransigence was in order.
The US again stepped in on 11 February 1947. On that day, General Marshall, the new secretary of state, instructed the US chargé d’affaires in London as follows:
If you have opportunity we hope you will endeavor to ascertain whether or not Brit are disposed to instruct Viceroy dismiss Muslim League Ministers from the Council [and] whether they are planning to bring pressure on princes to reach definitely agreement with Congress.62
Before the American chargé d’affaires could deliver this pointed démarche, the British ambassador in Washington called on Marshall on 20 February 1947 and handed over to him the statement that Attlee was going to make on India in the House of Commons the same day, which would change the entire format of the negotiations.
Attlee’s statement of 20 February 1947 fixed ‘not later than June 1948’ as final for British departure from India:
Should it appear that…a constitution will not have been worked out by a fully representative Assembly before the time mentioned [June 1948], HMG will have to consider to whom the powers of the Central Government in British India should be handed over, on the due date, whether as a whole to some form of Central Government of British India or in some areas to the existing Provincial governments or in such other way as may seem most reasonable and in the best interests of the Indian people…[as far as the princely states were concerned] HMG’s powers and obligations under Paramountcy would not be handed over to any government of British India [and thus they would be free to make independent arrangements, even declare independence].63
Attlee also announced the replacement of Wavell by Mountbatten as the viceroy of India.
The foregoing statement was momentous in the sense that it had fixed the date for British departure from India. Considering the vital role the man on the spot played in the British dispensation, the change of viceroy was also a major development. However, on the main issue of a united versus a divided India, the old British policy was to continue. If the Muslim League did not join the Constituent Assembly, it would not become ‘fully representative’ and the constitution that it would work out would not be applicable to the whole of India but only to those parts the representatives of which had taken part in the assembly’s proceedings. Thus, Indian unity remained, as ever since 1940, a hostage to Jinnah’s agreement to it; in reality, dependent on British discretion. This was because, as Linlithgow had pointed out to Zetland way back: ‘He [Jinnah] represents a minority that can only hold its own with our assurance.’
Since everyone knew that Jinnah would never yield, especially so after this latest British pronouncement, Attlee’s statement of 20 February was once again a recipe for the creation of Pakistan presented in yet another form. And the only questions that really remained as far as the British were concerned were: Which areas of India were to be ceded to Pakistan and what was to be done with the princely states?
Mountbatten was being sent out to use his well-known charm and negotiating skills to get the Congress Party to agree to the secession from India of the strategic North West Frontier Province – a Muslim-inhabited province, but in Congress Party hands. And to get Jinnah’s agreement to the ‘truncated’ Pakistan that Wavell had recommended the previous year.
Wavell wired Pethick-Lawrence on 26 February 1947 the Indian political parties’ reactions to HMG’s statement: ‘The Congress welcome the fixing of date and hope that the statement means that if they did not get an agreement with the Muslim League, they can establish a strong unitary government based not on the Cabinet Mission’s Plan [that envisaged a weak Centre] but on their own estimates of India’s requirement.’ The Muslim League reaction was, Wavell said, ‘based on the assumption that if the League refused to cooperate with the Constituent Assembly, they will receive not the small Pakistan but the large Pakistan’. Wavell then added: ‘It may turn out all right.’64 Although Wavell was being dismissed from the viceroyalty, his policy was emerging triumphant!
Khaliq-uz-Zaman, the number three in the Muslim League hierarchy, has written in his memoirs: ‘This [Attlee’s] statement gave great relief to the League as it had no intention of entering the Constituent Assembly or framing the Central Constitution, thus keeping the door open for the partition of India…’ He added: ‘Strange as it may seem Pt. Jawaharlal Nehru characterized the statement as wise and courageous.’65
The British gave the following slant to Attlee’s announcement of 20 February 1947 when their ambassador called on Secretary Marshall the same day:
The statement is designed to avoid on the one hand a commitment to create Pakistan [which would encourage the League to be obstructive], and on the other hand any indication that we should, whatever happens, hand over to one authority only [and encourage the Congress Party to be uncompromising].66
The Americans’ impulse continued to be to resist a possible fragmentation of India, as discernible from Acheson’s wire to the American Embassy in London dated 4 April 1947:
Our political and economic interest in that part of the world would best be served by the continued integrity of India.67
Acheson sent this message in the context of reports regarding purported plans of the Hyderabad (princely) state to establish a ‘direct relation’ with the British and presumably maintain a status completely separate from that of the rest of India. ‘We are assuming’, he added, ‘that the British Government would not lend encouragement to [such plans]…a separatist move by Hyderabad may be a prelude to a fragmentation process which might have far-reaching effects on any plan for ultimate Indian unity’ [italics added].68
Before Mountbatten arrived to replace Wavell on 22 March 1947, the Congress Party Working Committee had adopted a resolution (on 8 March) with far-reaching implications. The resolution accepted
a division of Punjab into two provinces so that the predominantly Muslim part
may be separated from the predominantly non-Muslim part.
Many Congress Party leaders had convinced themselves that since the North West Frontier Province was in their hands, the division of the Punjab (or even the attachment of Sind to the Muslim areas of the Punjab) would merely result in a predominantly Muslim enclave within the boundaries of India, which could not last forever. However, by accepting the division of the Punjab they had impliedly accepted the principle of the division of India on the basis of Jinnah’s two-nation theory. If the Congress Party was willing for the aforementioned principle to be applied to the Punjab, why not elsewhere? Indeed, Nehru wrote to Wavell on 9 March 1947, while forwarding the Congress Party resolution, in a covering letter that:
This principle [of communal division in the Punjab] would, of course, apply to Bengal also.69
Patel’s experience in the Interim Government – and perhaps the talk (or talks) he had had with V.P. Menon – had brought home to him that it was absolutely important for India’s future to have a strong Centre, even if some parts of the country had to be ‘amputated’.
The US chargé d’affaires in India, George Merrell, analysing the Congress Party’s resolution to the State Department, wired on 22 April 1947:
The Congress efforts to make Pakistan as unattractive as possible – by demanding partition of the Punjab and Bengal – Congress leaders have in effect abandoned the tenets which they supported for so many years in their campaign for united India. They have also agreed by implication [to] Mr Jinnah’s allegation that Hindus and Muslims cannot live together, a charge which in the past Congress has – quite rightly I believe – denied.70
The Shadow of the Great Game Page 28