* Patel encouraged Mountbatten to go to England: ‘At the present juncture such a visit would be both tactically and politically wise.’
* Mountbatten was to leave India on the conclusion of his governor-generalship at the end of June 1948.
13
The Kashmir Imbroglio II: At the UN
UNTIL THE EARLY PART OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY, INDIANS BELONGING to the Hindu faith, on returning home from journeys abroad, were required to take a dip in the holy Ganga as part of a purification ritual.* If contact with the outside world was shunned to such a great extent, how could they be expected to know much about other people: their customs and cultures, their politics and passions, their strengths and weaknesses? In the nineteenth century, an English observer described the character of the Hindus as a mixture of ‘arrogance, political blindness…and misplaced generosity…. So far as politics goes they were novices and unfit to preserve their liberties’.1 In this respect, those Indians who were converted to Islam gradually acquired a different frame of mind. Islam was a universal faith with a global perspective (every country is our country because it is our God’s country). Even an uneducated Muslim in an Indian village would have heard about Jerusalem, Istanbul, Baghdad, Bokhara, and even Cordoba, besides of course Mecca and Medina. However Islam-centric, and however limited their vision, the Muslims of India were much more the citizens of the world than their Hindu compatriots.
Most Indian leaders in the forefront of the independence movement continued to be victims of the age-old legacy. They did not devote much thought during the freedom struggle to external relations or how the defence of the country would be organized after independence had been achieved. They pursued preconceived ideas. They tended to ignore the reality of power politics in world affairs. They were indeed novices as far as external politics was concerned. There were exceptions. Jawaharlal Nehru was one of the few who was intensely interested in global affairs and kept in touch with world leaders. However, he did not prove knowledgeable on how the United Nations’ Security Council functioned: that its members acted in the context of power pulls and in their own national interests, rather on the basis of merit or the high ideals enshrined in the UN Charter.
Alan Campbell-Johnson, the governor-general’s press attaché and confidant, told me in London in the early 1990s that Mountbatten did pressurize Nehru to take Kashmir to the UN; he was worried about international repercussions if war broke out between India and Pakistan. In his book, Campbell-Johnson has written:
Since returning to Delhi [from London] Mountbatten had seen Gandhi and V.P. [Menon] who were both favourably inclined to the invocation of [the] UNO. And today [11 November 1947] he had a further talk with Nehru whose attitude to the idea is now less inactive than it was at Lahore [at the meeting between Nehru and Liaqat Ali Khan three days earlier].2
Earlier, in September 1947, Gandhiji had approached Mountbatten with the suggestion that Attlee be requested to mediate between India and Pakistan to avert a clash between the two countries as a result of the conflagration in the Punjab. Gandhiji wanted Attlee to ascertain ‘in the best manner he knows who is overwhelmingly in the wrong and then withdraw every British Officer in the service of the wrong party’.3 Attlee had parried the request: ‘When political tragedies occur’, he informed Gandhiji, ‘how seldom it is that, at all events at the time, the blame can be cast, without a shadow of doubt substantially on one party alone’.4 Gandhiji was very disappointed.* Mountbatten, after a while, wrote to him as follows: ‘An alternative means is to ask UNO to undertake this enquiry and you would have no difficulty in getting Pakistan to agree to this.’5 Nothing came of this proposal, but this was how a reference to the UN came to be broached.
Vallabhbhai Patel and Mountbatten had worked together on the division of India and the integration of the princely states into the Indian dominion, but after independence, Mountbatten found him less tractable than Nehru. Mountbatten was aware of the growing rift between Nehru and Patel. When Nehru had submitted to him the list of independent India’s first cabinet in August 1947, according to H.V. Hodson, Patel’s name was missing from it. It was Mountbatten who, on V.P. Menon’s prompting, made Nehru include Patel in the cabinet. V.P. Menon argued that an open clash in the Congress Party Working Committee between the two might result in Nehru’s defeat.6** Nehru’s main misgiving about Patel was that he would oppose a socialistic economic policy.† Morevover, Nehru wanted to be all in all.
Records of conversations between Mountbatten and Gandhiji will bear recapitulation as they reveal the fissures appearing in the Indian leadership that naturally had an impact on India’s handling of J&K. On 16 September 1947 Mountbatten and Gandhiji discussed the communal situation. Mountbatten records:
I told Mr Gandhi that it was not a bit of good preaching to the people unless he had converted the leaders and I urged him to devote his full energy towards keeping the leaders, and particularly the Deputy Prime Minister [Patel], as straight as possible…. Mr Gandhi said he entirely agreed with every word I had spoken that he already knew it but that he was interested to see that I had summed up the position so correctly. He [Gandhiji] promised to do his very best and that never to mention my name in this matter or that he had had these conversations.7
After the Pakistani invasion of J&K in October 1947, Mountbatten had arranged for Nehru to fly to Lahore in order to meet Jinnah. Nehru avoided going. ‘Why was it’, Mountbatten asked Gandhiji on 29 October 1947, ‘that Sardar Patel and the rest of the Indian Cabinet had been against the Governor-General and Pandit Nehru going to Lahore?’ (Ismay was present on this occasion and recorded the conversation.)
Mr Gandhi replied: It was wrong for him [Nehru] to plead illness as an excuse for not going.… When again pressed by Lord Mountbatten to answer his question as to why the Indian Cabinet was against Nehru’s visit to Lahore, Mr Gandhi (rather coyly) said that Sardar Patel, and indeed the whole of the Cabinet, except the Prime Minister, could never forget that they had been the underdogs for so long. Nor could they rid their minds of the suspicion that all the British in India, including Field Marshal Auchinleck and (this still more coyly) Lord Ismay, were anti-Hindu and pro-Muslim.
This did not however apply in any way to Lord Mountbatten who enjoyed the complete confidence of all of them, including Sardar Patel. When further questioned as to how this alleged pro-Pakistan attitude affected the question of the Governor-General going to Lahore, Mr Gandhi said that this visit would increase the prestige of Mr Jinnah and was therefore encouraged by Lord Mountbatten’s British advisers.8*
There was another problem at that time over which British policy and Patel clashed. This problem concerned the division of the assets of undivided India between the two dominions. The crux of the issue was one of transferring the second instalment of Rs 550 million (equal to about half a billion US dollars today) to Pakistan. (Until then only the first instalment of Rs 200 million had been transferred.) Nehru had told C. Rajagopalachari** on 26 October 1947: ‘It would be foolish to make this payment until this Kashmir business had been settled.’9 However, Mountbatten knew that it was Patel who was influencing the other ministers to hold back on the transfer. ‘Why should we give them the money to buy the arms to shoot our soldiers?’10 was the refrain in Delhi, according to Campbell-Johnson. Pakistan was hard up for cash. It had obtained a loan of Rs 20 crore from the Nizam of Hyderabad only the previous month.† To the Indians, delaying the payment appeared to be a non-belligerent way of restraining Pakistan in Kashmir. The other view was that an agreement reached before independence had to be honoured, despite the subsequent fighting in Kashmir.
Mountbatten has recorded how he convinced Gandhiji of the validity of the Pakistani claim:
I told him that I considered it to be unstatesmanlike and unwise (not to pay) and that it was the only conscientious act which I was aware of that the Government of India had taken which I regarded as dishonourable. The Mahatma expressed regret that he had not appreciated earlier the significance of th
is act as he should have done something about it.… I made one request that…he should make it clear that it was he who had started this conversation and asked my advice and not I who tried to get him to bring pressure to bear upon the Government. He readily gave this undertaking and asked for more details.… The Mahatma was of the opinion that the only honourable course for India was to pay out the [Rs] 55 crore at once and he now proposed to talk to the Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Minister and the Ministers concerned. “Once my fast has started they may not refuse me.”12
Sardar Baldev Singh, the defence minister, told Mountbatten on 23 January 1948: ‘The sole reason [for Gandhiji’s fast] was to force the Government of India to hand over [Rs] 55 crore to Pakistan.’13 Indeed, it was to save Gandhiji’s life that the Indian cabinet members made this payment against their own better judgement. The payment was also responsible for Gandhiji’s assassination a few days later.
Mountbatten’s growing caution about Patel had not affected the relationship between the two. ‘I had a long talk with Patel yesterday’, wrote Mountbatten to Ismay on 4 October 1947. (The topic was Pakistan.) Mountbatten added: ‘He [Patel] had also attacked Nehru for the first time saying “I regret our leader has followed his lofty ideas into the skies and has no contact left with earth or reality”.’14
This outburst probably reflected Patel’s frustration with Nehru at the time, for refusing to accept the Maharaja of Kashmir’s accession to India unless and until a government under Sheikh Abdullah was installed. But neither Patel nor Nehru took Mountbatten into confidence with regard to their actual contacts with the maharaja.
The matter of India making a reference to the United Nations on J&K came under serious consideration in mid-December 1947, after Mountbatten’s mediatory efforts between Nehru and Liaqat Ali Khan collapsed and the war hotted up. At the meeting of the Indian Defence Committee on 20 December 1947, Nehru spoke of striking at the invaders’ camps and lines of communication inside Pakistan. Mountbatten immediately intervened to suggest a reference to the UN, as mentioned in Chapter 12. ‘India had a cast-iron case’, he asserted. On 22 December 1947 Nehru handed over a letter to Liaqat Ali Khan formally asking the Government of Pakistan ‘to deny all help to the raiders’.15 This letter created serious concern in London. If an interdominion war broke out, the British Government would be obliged to withdraw all its officers serving in the Indian and Pakistan Armies. Also, Mountbatten’s own retention in India would come into question. With the departure of the 500 British officers manning the top posts in Pakistan, its armed forces would be crippled. The restraining hand of the three British commanders-in-chief of the Indian armed forces on India would be removed.
On Christmas day, Mountbatten wrote a long letter to Nehru. He urged that it was ‘a fatal illusion’ to believe that war between India and Pakistan could be confined to the subcontinent or be finished off quickly in favour of India without further complications. He shrewdly added that ‘embroilment in war with Pakistan would undermine the whole of Nehru’s independent foreign policy and progressive social aspirations’.16 Nehru replied as follows: ‘Under international law we can in self-defence take any military measures to resist it [the invasion], including the sending of our armies across Pakistan to attack their bases near the Kashmir border.’17 Despite this firm posture, the Indian prime minister agreed, in the operative part of his reply, to refer the matter to the United Nations, adding that side by side preparations should be made to enter Pakistan if it refused to pull out. Meanwhile, Attlee also wrote to Nehru:
I am gravely disturbed by your assumption that India would be within her rights in international law if she were to send forces to Pakistan in self-defence…I think you are very optimistic in concluding that your proposed military action would bring about a speedy solution.18
When the Indian Cabinet members agreed to complain about Pakistan’s aggression to the United Nations, they did so under the impression that it was a prelude to India marching towards the invaders’ bases if they did not withdraw within a short time. However, the fact remains that though the complaint to the UN was lodged on 1 January 1948, no military preparations were made by the Indian C-in-C for carrying out any operation. A few days earlier, i.e., on 29 December 1947, Nehru had written to Patel:
Among the consequences [of war] to consider are the possible effect on the British Officers in the Army and also the reaction of the Governor-General (i.e., that he may decide to leave India).19
This suggests that the above factor had started to weigh on the prime minister’s mind. Did the possibility of Mountbatten’s departure weaken his resolve regarding the military option?
On the same day, i.e., 29 December 1947, Sir Paul Patrick of the Commonwealth Relations Office in London sent for the US chargé d’affaires to the UK and brought to his notice Nehru’s letter to Liaqat Ali Khan (written on 22 December 1947). The US official reported to Washington that Patrick had described the situation as follows:
An ultimatum…the seriousness of which can hardly be exaggerated. India was likely to attack Pakistan simultaneously with filing the complaint with the Security Council…. Government of India [GOI]…is driven to its rash course by Nehru’s “Brahmin logic”, which argues that now Kashmir has adhered to GOI it is part of India.20
The next day (30 December) the US chargé d’affaires was again summoned to the Commonwealth Relations Office. Sir Archibald Carter, the permanent undersecretary of the CRO, with Patrick present, received him. Carter said:
Prime Minister [Attlee] is disturbed by GOI assumption [that] GOI will be within its rights in international law…to move forces into Pakistan in self-defence. Prime Minister doubts whether it is in fact juridically correct and is afraid that it would be fatal from every other point of view. Carter and Patrick then came to the operative part of the démarche [they enquired] whether the US Government would be willing to instruct the US Embassy in Delhi to approach Nehru immediately, and without reference to the Nehru–Attlee correspondence, advise him “not to take any rash action such as invading Pakistan territory which would also prejudice irretrievably world opinion against India’s case”.21
The US chargé d’affaires asked whether there was a recourse other than a reference to the Security Council. The Englishmen replied, ‘…afraid not’.
British diplomacy recorded its first success – though a partial one – when, the next day (31 December), the US Embassy in India was instructed by the State Department to deliver a formal note to India. The US Embassy in Karachi was intimated to address a similar note to Pakistan. The identical notes stated that the US hoped that India and Pakistan would restrain ‘irresponsible elements’ – this was aimed at Pakistan – and that precipitous action by either government would seriously jeopardize international goodwill and prestige – this was directed at India.22 The US, while disposed to work with Britain ‘in glorious harness’ (Dennis Kux’s phrase), wanted to maintain its neutrality between the two countries at that stage.
The beginning of the new year (1948) saw Lord Ismay being transferred from Delhi and installed as the principal adviser to the Commonwealth secretary, Noel-Baker, no doubt to guide the latter through the Kashmir thicket at the United Nations. Attlee had great confidence in Ismay, as had had his predecessor, Winston Churchill. We are aware of the position that Ismay took on Kashmir from his days in Delhi. This was that the international community should recognize the presence of the Pakistani raiders in Kashmir, thus establishing Pakistan’s locus standi in the state; the Abdullah administration should be replaced; and an UN-supervised plebiscite should be organized. Alternatively, the Indian troops should withdraw to the Hindu-majority areas of Jammu and the Pakistani troops should be given control of the western and northern areas, with a ‘neutral’ force in the Kashmir Valley (Ladakh on Tibet’s border was ignored). These were, by and large, the very propositions put forward by Noel-Baker at the UN in New York. Ernest Bevin, the influential secretary of state for foreign affairs, meanwhile, warned Attlee t
hat ‘we should be very careful to guard against the danger of aligning the whole of Islam against us’.23
The other officer in the thick of things was General Sir Geoffrey Scoones, the principal staff officer of Noel-Baker, who, along with Lord Ismay, accompanied his chief to New York. It may be recalled that we met him briefly in Chapter 12, expressing doubts about the viability of a polyglot India as against a cohesive Islamic Pakistan. He was an influential officer who attended the cabinet meetings when India was discussed. Records show that, on 16 October 1947, a top-secret appreciation was prepared in the Commonwealth Relations Office that was signed by Scoones. This was done a week before the Pakistani invasion of J&K and soon after Carter had paid a visit to Karachi. Carter marked a copy of the appreciation to Ismay in Delhi:
If war developed (and even Gandhi has hinted at this possibility)…it is likely to unite India and to bring about the downfall of Pakistan. Before Pakistan was finally liquidated it seems probable that frontier tribes of Afghanistan would enter the struggle and it is not impossible that Soviet Russia might play a part. The effect of the disappearance of Pakistan on the Middle East would be very considerable.… In neither case would the object of HMG be achieved.
One of the root causes of this dangerous and unfortunate situation seems to be the weakness of Pakistan. It invites attack…if Pakistan were strong or showed signs of strong backing her potential enemies would probably hesitate before thinking in terms of offensive action. The first problem, therefore, seems to be to stabilize the newly set up Pakistan, with the object of removing, or at any rate reducing, one of the main causes of danger in the situation.… Up to the present HMG’s policy has been one of strict impartiality towards each of the new Dominions. Can this achieve the object?… Any change from a purely impartial policy to a more defined one may result in India leaving the Commonwealth. This may happen in any case. The decision is a political matter.24
The Shadow of the Great Game Page 40