by Sree Iyer
CHAPTER 24.
An impending disaster
The terror attacks in neighbouring Sri Lanka had rattled India’s intelligence establishment. The new NSA had to hit the ground running. His decades-long experience told him that terrorists had to be successful just once while the agencies had to be on alert all the time.
With India, terrorists had been successful many more times and their audacity grew with every attack that they successfully perpetrated. Over the years, especially during the Freedom Party’s rule, there had been several violations across the Line of Control, resulting in the loss of a great number of security personnel and innocent civilians. New Delhi could have toughened its stand considerably after the 26/11 attacks and with the international community in India’s favour, but the Dhillon regime had developed cold feet. Terrorists and the country that patronised them were now confident that they could strike at will.
The new government had promised a more muscular and decisive approach to terror, and now it was under pressure to keep up the promise. With the media reporting that the terror attack in Sri Lanka had connections that could be traced to India, it became imperative for the security agencies to act. The NSA summoned the chiefs of the IB and R & AW for an urgent meeting. He also invited CK. The multi-talented chartered accountant and policy expert was also known for his sharp insights into the functioning of terror groups, especially their links to the counterfeit currency networks.
The NSA had a chunk of new information to share. He told the three gentlemen gathered in his secure office study that the people who had assembled some of the bombs used in Sri Lanka, were plotting similar attacks within India, and their handlers were sitting across the Line of Control (LoC). He played for them an audio recording in which a handler was heard directing one Rizwan Sheikh based in Mumbai to hasten the execution of attacks in the country. “Inshallah, we shall give a befitting reply to this Hindu nationalist government of Jadeja. God has called upon us to give justice to our Muslim brethren living under the kafir’s rule.” The intelligence chiefs were taken aback but hardly surprised that the NSA had laid his hands on this audio tape. The man was resourceful and had his people in nearly every part of the globe’s troubled spots.
Such militant operations were generally funded by Pakistan, but now there was a new twist. It appeared that money was being raised from within India, and this is where CK’s expertise would be needed. The NSA noted that the intelligence agencies had already gathered information of dozens of ordinary citizens, largely from Kerala, who had suddenly turned millionaires. They had contributed generously to a number of organisations registered as charitable bodies. The list of these trusts was on the NSA’s table. Mysteriously, the trusts had barely utilised the large corps of funds lying with them, despite being actively working in a variety of areas including education, health and environment. The question then was, what was this huge volume of money, running into several hundreds of crores, used for?
Further investigations had revealed deeper information of the actual ownership of these trusts, with a number of disturbing details emerging thereafter. Many of them had surreptitious links with underground organisations. Their telephone conversations, tapped by the intelligence, showed they were in constant contact with dubious people based in Karachi, Islamabad and Dubai. The NSA had come to conclude that the money deposited in the charity trusts was to fund terror activities in the country. Now, this was the trouble. On the face of it, all transfers to the trusts appeared genuine, with the funds used sporadically but used nevertheless, to avoid suspicion. It would need a good amount of digging to get to the real bottom.
A common joke with Indian probe agencies was that India was like a large herbivorous dinosaur, which only stirred when it should be running. It had learned to be content with only reacting to events, and even then it would flatter to deceive. “We lack the killer instinct,” was a common phrase among these circles.
Occasionally India did act tough but backed off when matters came to the crunch. Often, it buckled under pressure from friendly countries that advised restraint — talk that they did not walk when they were attacked. The NSA was determined to change this depressing narrative. He often sought Israel’s example of how the small nation surrounded by hostile neighbours had shown immense courage in countering any threat to its borders. No amount of international pressure worked on past Israeli governments to protect its security and sovereignty. Its intelligence agency, Mossad, holds the reputation of doggedly tracing enemies and effectively eliminating them. Sometimes on foreign soil as well.
The small gathering at the NSA’s office discussed the possible targets the terrorists could have on their list. Of course, there was no way of knowing for sure until more actionable information was dug up. With a view to creating communal discord, it could be places of worship, like the Haji Ali shrine and the Siddhivinayak temple in Mumbai, or the Born Jesus Basilica in Goa. It could be places with movement of large crowds of people such as the Delhi Metro or other railways stations. It could be the Bombay Stock Exchange or the IT hubs in Bengaluru and Hyderabad.
Intelligence agencies had been monitoring chatter across various terror networks and picked up names of the usual targets mentioned. Security could and would be strengthened in all possible spots, but it was very likely that they were red herrings. After all, even the terrorists knew that they were being heard and quite possibly dropping the wrong names to divert attention of security agencies from their real targets.
Besides, something even more sinister could be brewing. The Prime Minister and a few senior leaders of the ruling party were on the hit list. So far, none of the terror groups had dared to target them. How long would it be before they got more audacious? Islamist organisations across the world sat up and took notice of Prime Minister Jadeja’s growing popularity following his bold moves in the recent past. They were also unsettled by the positive response he had received from Islamic countries in West Asia, some of whom had announced their highest civilian awards to honour him with. They had watched with dismay as countries like Iran and Saudi Arabia, at loggerheads with each other, give Prime Minister Jadeja the red-carpet welcome. India’s strengthening relations with the US and Europe was an added trouble for the terror makers. And then there was the India-Israel bonhomie, which caused further anguish.
The NSA concluded the meeting, asking the intelligence chiefs to step up their intel gathering efforts. An attack on the Prime Minister or senior political leaders was very likely. It really was time to think two steps ahead of the terrorists.
CHAPTER 25.
A Deadly Poison and a Deadlier Plan
Priya Menon was an early riser and trained hard at the gym for an hour a day. The call had come when she was busy kick boxing.
A 2008 batch intrepid IPS officer, she had served in sensitive areas and headed quite a few police stations, where she promptly ruffled feathers with the powerful lot. She had once dragged a local influential politician by the collar all the way to the police station when he refused to come over. On another occasion, she arrested an industrialist following a complaint of sexual assault by his maid.
But perhaps the most celebrated incident she was known for involved a muscleman-politician, who kept AK-47 rifles at home and roamed the streets on a horse, whipping people in his way. After cases were registered against him, he brazenly challenged her to arrest him. She took it to heart and launched a massive manhunt for the accused who had gone underground, eventually closing in on him. Realising that there was no escape, the man fled to Delhi and surrendered himself before the police there. Within 20 hours, Priya got him from Delhi back to Patna and dumped him behind bars.
Not surprisingly, she had received several ‘warning’ calls from ministers in the state government for her exploits that they were unhappy about. Dabang Devi – as she was called by many – bashed on regardless.
They could threaten her but could not get in her way because she was too brilliant to be put down. All they could do
was to get her shunted from one police jurisdiction to another. Priya took these transfers as a validation of her doing the job well. No posting was a punishment; there was always something to be set right wherever she went. She was also gifted with the knack of getting to the root of the issue even in cases that seemed above board. She would persevere till the case was solved. Anybody who came in the way of her investigations in the meanwhile, got a taste of her wrath and unshakeable determination.
These qualities drew the attention of the NSA, who recommended her name to the Intelligence Bureau. Priya had done enough conventional policing, and he reasoned that her talent would be better utilised for matters of graver national importance. He was of the opinion that the Intelligence Bureau needed many more smart and courageous people to tackle the dangerous FICN-terror-betting-racket-Love-Jihad nexus.
It was the IB chief himself on the line. Priya jumped to the offer. Besides a good leap up on her career, it sounded like exciting work. She loved new challenges, after all.
However, she was not too pleased to know that she would be part of a team led by Karan Dixit, her batchmate at the IPS. Since she was his equal in terms of seniority, she saw no reason why she should be reporting to him.
The IB Director, Mike, was quick to notice the undercurrents of friction between them. Among his many strengths was a talent for man management. He had led several teams comprising some of the country’s finest minds, with equally big egos. He had shrewdly drawn the best out of them despite their interpersonal issues. He often steered their attention back to the larger picture and acknowledged each as a star in their own right.
He chatted up with Priya one day over coffee and gradually led the conversation towards Karan. “He has more experience than you do in the organisation, Priya.”
“But Sir-”
“Karan’s success depends on how well you can support him. He is brilliant, Priya. Apart from a knack for drawing out the most difficult intel, his knowledge of Urdu, Persian and Arabic is a big asset to operate in countries that sponsor terrorism. But he would need your expertise in tracing the roots.”
She seemed to soften a bit.
“The country is bigger than all of us, individually and jointly,” Mike said finally. And like in most cases, that did the trick.
In their next meeting, Mike stressed on the importance of her role in the operation, sketching out how counterfeit money becomes legitimate in India through shell companies. He asked Karan to explain this further.
Figure 1. How shell companies layer the money
Karan explained how money is layered to individuals in amounts that are just under the scanner. For instance, the government had passed a law that required Tax Deduction at Source (TDS) for amounts of Rs.1 lakh and more before transfer to the intended recipient. If transfers were below this threshold, they generally went unnoticed by tax authorities. There were several small transactions done below the tax attracting limit for genuine sounding reasons - children’s education, donation for a friend’s medical expenses and so on.
The individuals would draw the money from their bank accounts. “Details of the recipients would be given to a hawala agent, who would contact the recipients to collect the money that they drew from their accounts,” Karan continued, as he illustrated on the board. “The hawala agent for the region would thus get back all the money disbursed.”
Recipients knew better than to spend the money. Anybody who tried to, could have an arm or leg chopped off; a strong message for the others. The collections would normally take place in a mosque, usually before or after prayers. It was difficult for either the police or any other agency to enter the mosque, leave alone conduct operations, since such a thing would turn politically sensitive. Once all the money was collected, the agent notified his handler abroad, either in Dubai, Karachi or even Islamabad.
Figure 2. The integration step
Karan then drew another diagram as Priya looked on fascinated. This was new territory for her and she began to silently admire him for how articulate he was on a complex subject. He explained that the communication that transpires between India and Dubai is encrypted and almost impossible to decipher without the help of specialised software. The handler in Dubai would then transfer an equal amount in some standard currency such as the US dollar or the Euro or pound, into a shell company based in Dubai. The shell company then uses the money to buy equipment and ship it to India. Or the money is directed through a Mauritius-based shell firm to trade in India’s stock exchange and drive up stock prices, thus making handsome profits.
“The cycle of counterfeiting to legit is complete,” Karan ended with a flourish, drawing a fourth figure. “Once this is accomplished, in the eyes of the law, even a Dawood Ibrahim is a legitimate investor. They could keep doing it while all that the agencies could do was watch.”
Mike turned to Priya and said, “Here is a chance for you to help break this cycle. We know for a fact that there are other ways in which these shell companies are spending money. I see several new companies spring up in remote corners, with legitimate-sounding names, but when we look under the hood, the worms show up. For instance, Seed Research Labs Limited. Could you investigate what exactly it is that they research on?”
Figure 3. Legitimising the money
Figure 4. Cycle is complete
Priya pored over the invoices of special equipment that had been ordered by Seed Research Labs Limited (SRL), located in Pachamalai, a nondescript village nestled in the hills spread over Tiruchy and Salem districts of Tamil Nadu. The lab imported centrifugal equipment, purifying/ concentration processors and more. What piqued Priya’s interest was one odd detail. Although the name appeared like that of a public sector undertaking (PSU) involved in seed research, a quick search of the registered PSUs did not reveal anything by that name.
She then tried to look up on the management of the company and locate its website but was running up against a wall. The website was just a single page that revealed nothing about what the firm did. Priya entered the address of the company and tried to get a satellite picture using Google Maps. To her surprise, the address was an open space with no real access road, except something like a walking trail you’d find along a jungle or countryside. What was this company doing in an isolated stretch of arid land, she wondered. All that equipment would need electrical power to run and yet she found no traces of power lines anywhere around. These were questions that bothered her till long after she went back home from work. Her mind raced, as she absently gobbled down her dinner.
The next morning, she called her childhood friend at the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO), Bengaluru, passed on the co-ordinates of SRL and requested her to send pictures of the area taken in half-hour intervals to trace any movement in the vicinity. The satellite could only give snapshots when it hovered over the area in two-hour intervals. The authorisation for the surveillance was routed through the official channels for the half-hour interval frequency feed.
The first batch of pictures revealed nothing. After a few days, she noticed a bullock-cart arriving with some material and unloading in the area. But in the next scan, it was gone. Smelling something fishy, she started back-tracking the path of the bullock-cart, which was proceeding rather slowly. The handoff happened in a small town called Top Sengattupatti, in the foothills of Pachamalai Hills. The nearest airport was Tiruchy or Coimbatore, and one could get to either from Top by road. Guided by her gut, she began researching all the manifests of imported equipment in Coimbatore. And she struck gold.
Several India-based and Dubai-based airlines operated flights from Dubai to Coimbatore. Tucked away in one of the flight manifests was the shipment meant for SRL. The shipper was one Abdul Hameed, resident of Kannur, Kerala, currently employed with a Dubai firm. The shipment seemed to be some kind of chemicals. The penny had dropped. Priya’s thoughts went back to her childhood days.
Growing up in her hometown in Kerala, she used to help her grandfather run his Ayurveda ashram. Ev
ery morning, they would go trekking to pick herbs and her grandfather would describe each plant and its properties, cautioning her against touching the poisonous ones. He would educate her on plants that were both medicinal and deadly.
Castor oil was a laxative commonly used in south Indian homes. Usually, a dose is administered to every member of the family every few months. Coupled with rest and good fluid intake, it proved to be an excellent detox. Priya remembered her grandfather telling her that eating the castor seed, on the other hand, could be fatal.
On a hunch, she searched for the produce grown in and around Pachamalai. Castor seed seemed to be the top pick. Motivated by this, she researched further. Occasionally, Karan would pop into her cubicle to check on her progress. She soon learned about a chemical named Ricin and how it could be extracted from the residual pulp after the castor oil was squeezed out. Ricin, she read, could result in death if ingested or inhaled, but had to be purified over several cycles for it to be an effective killing agent. This is where, she believed, SRL came in.
Priya suggested to the team that SRL be placed under discreet but intense surveillance. But doing that was difficult in a remote place. They decided to use low flying drones to watch the premises from a height, especially after dusk. Drones used infra-red technology to pierce through the darkness. If the SRL premises had people in it, there would surely be telltale signs like smoke from cooking etc.
The toxicity of raw castor beans is due to the presence of Ricin. Although the lethal dose in adults is considered to be four to eight seeds, reports of actual poisoning are relatively rare. According to the Guinness Book of Records, castor is the world's most poisonous common plant. Overdose symptoms include nausea, diarrhea and seizures, among others. They would persist for up to a week. The poison in castor can be extracted by concentrating the seed through a fairly complicated process, which is similar to that used for extracting cyanide from almonds.