With the majority of his army mustered, Cyrus set off from Sardis towards Phrygia at a slow and deliberate pace, intended to maintain the illusion that his goal was in fact the Pisidians. Tissaphernes had been watching the gathering army with an equal measure of interest and suspicion. In Tissaphernes’ eyes, the size of the force gathered by Cyrus was not commensurate with a campaign to crush Pisidia. Once Cyrus marched, Tissaphernes set off for Susa, the seat of Artaxerxes.8
Upon arriving at Colossae, near the modern town of Hornaz in Turkey, the host was joined by the troops commanded by Menon, although only 1,500 in total, rather than the 4,000 that Cyrus had paid for. Xenophon described Menon as a liar and a cheat, although this view is rather coloured by Menon’s rivalry with Clearchus, the overall commander of the expedition and a good friend of Xenophon. Bias aside, given Menon’s failure to arrive with the required troops, the description may not have been entirely off the mark.
After a seven-day stay in Colossae, Cyrus turned northeast and made for Celaenae (the capital of the satrapy of Greater Phrygia, near the source of the Maeander River) where he attempted to again maintain the subterfuge by remaining in the city for a month.9 He was met there by the contingents of Clearchus and Sosis.10 The reason for such a lengthy delay at Celaenae is not easy to fathom, and it was to cost Cyrus dear in terms of his finances. After this delay, Cyrus turned his army north, heading away from Pisidia and towards the town of Peltae, where he again delayed for three days. From there he turned east towards the town of Cayster Plain. It was here, during a five-day stay, that Cyrus encountered his first real difficulty on the campaign. His resources were far from limitless and were raised from taxation on the cities in Asia Minor under his control. However wealthy some of those cities might have been, there was still a limit on the amount of taxation he could demand in a single year. Cyrus had been very liberal with the distribution of this money to his recruiters, and the pay he offered was more generous than was sometimes the case. Perhaps he felt this necessary because he knew the ultimate goal would be unpopular, or perhaps it was an attempt to hire the very best of the available mercenaries, and higher wages would allow this. Either way, he had basically run out of money. The mercenaries in the army, and presumably the regular soldiers too (although this is not specified), demanded the immediate payment of their wages and of all back pay. Cyrus was already three months behind by this point, which makes the one-month delay in Celaenae, during which time he simply cannot have been paying the men, look even more suspect strategically. Xenophon tells us only that:11
. . . more than three months’ pay was due to the soldiers, they often went up to his tent and demanded it. He had to keep putting them off with promises and was obviously upset about it; indeed it was not like Cyrus to hold back pay if he had it.
Xenophon implies that this discontent had been growing for some time, and one wonders how Cyrus had managed to develop a reputation for paying men if he had the money, given that these mercenaries were all newly recruited and did not have a lengthy history with the would-be Great King.
Perhaps Cyrus’ slow and deliberate pace was connected with the arrival of Epyaxa, wife of Syennesis, king of Cilicia, who offered to pay the mercenaries’ back pay and to ensure that they did not fall behind again. At this time the army received four months’ pay and the immediate financial difficulty passed. It is a reasonable assumption that Cyrus had been in secret negotiations with Syennesis for some time, and the arrival of Epyaxa with a large amount of money was the culmination of those discussions. Syennesis was a man who was not entirely to be trusted, however, and his subjective loyalties were something that Cyrus had exploited brilliantly. Syennesis was determined to maintain his position as king, and during a potential civil war the only way to do that was to be on the winning side. Syennesis’ decision was to play both sides: to send his wife with the money Cyrus needed, and to occupy the mountain passes that Cyrus would have to cross in order to reach the Persian heartlands. To say the least, this was a dangerous game to play, but for now it kept Cyrus’ army intact.
With the army now satisfied, financially at least, Cyrus set off southwest on a four-day march through Thymbrion to Tyriaeon, where he stayed for three days. If his earlier delays and slow pace were connected with the negotiations with Syennesis and the arrival of Epyaxa, then why he continued to delay here is far less clear. At Tyriaeon, Xenophon recounts a very interesting tale of parade ground drill and martial discipline from the Greek mercenaries, and it is particularly interesting that the main part of the drill was conducted only by the mercenaries, although the native troops were also on display. 12
After this display, which greatly encouraged Cyrus, he marched for three days to Iconium, where he again inexplicably delayed for three days. From here, Cyrus left Phrygia and entered Lycaonia; from now on the army was in hostile territory: ‘This being hostile territory he handed it over to the Greeks to plunder.’13 This act would also have served to keep the mercenaries happy and distracted from the fact that it must now have been obvious the target could not have been Pisidia. Cyrus’ host then marched through Cappadocia towards Dana, where he delayed for three days, perhaps because of an unspecified plot that was uncovered involving at least two high-ranking Persians. 14
Some time before the arrival of the army at Dana, Menon’s mercenaries set off to look for a route through the mountains, taking Epyaxa to act as a guide. The intention was to turn the position occupied by her husband, Syennesis, undoubtedly with his knowledge and approval.15 Once the main body of the army approached the Cilician Gates where Syennesis had been stationed, he realized his position had been compromised by Menon and his own wife (as previously arranged), who had passed through the mountains. He abandoned the pass without a fight.
By this mechanism he could claim to Artaxerxes that abandoning the pass, and thus allowing Cyrus into Cilicia, was his only option once his position had been turned. After turning the pass, Cyrus headed for Tarsus, the seat of Syennesis and Epyaxa, where he met up again with Menon’s mercenary contingents, less two lochoi that had been killed whilst on a plundering raid. Xenophon tells us that these mercenaries then sacked Tarsus, including the royal palace, in vengeance for the loss of their comrades. 16 As an interesting counterpoint to the display of parade ground drill and discipline that the Greek mercenaries had demonstrated a couple of short weeks before their arrival at Tarsus, their actions there demonstrated exactly the opposite qualities. Tarsus also saw the second rebellious action by the Greek mercenaries in regard to their pay. They refused to go any further into Persian territory. 17
They already suspected that they were marching against the king and said that this was not the job for which they had been engaged.
Contractual disputes of this kind between mercenaries and their employers were rare. It was not uncommon for them to demand payment of what they were due if their employer had been recalcitrant in his duties for any reason, but to rebel in this fashion because the mission was different from what they signed up for was unusual. However, it was perhaps understandable, given that they had signed up for a campaign in western Asia Minor (they believed), and were now being taken into Mesopotamia.
Clearchus first attempted to persuade them by force, but he was met by a volley of rocks and other missiles directed at him and his mount that almost killed him. One can only imagine the shock this would have engendered in both Clearchus and Cyrus, and was a worrying development indeed amongst the latter’s prized troops. We hear nothing of the native troops at this time, but they were presumably loyal to Cyrus and would have fought anywhere.
After the shocking and violent reaction from the troops, Clearchus tried another tack. Instead of force, he next attempted persuasion. Xenophon records the speech: 18
Fellow-soldiers, do not wonder that I am distressed at the present situation. For Cyrus became my friend and not only honoured me, an exile from my fatherland, in various ways, but gave me ten thousand darics. And I, receiving this money, did not lay i
t up for my own personal use or squander it in pleasure, but I proceeded to expend it on you. First I went to war with the Thracians, and for the sake of Greece I inflicted punishment upon them with your aid, driving them out of the Chersonese when they wanted to deprive the Greeks who dwelt there of their land. Then when Cyrus’ summons came, I took you with me and set out, in order that, if he had need of me, I might give him aid in return for the benefits I had received from him. But you now do not wish to continue the march with me; so it seems that I must either desert you and continue to enjoy Cyrus’ friendship, or prove false to him and remain with you. Whether I shall be doing what is right, I know not, but at any rate I shall choose you and with you shall suffer whatever I must. And never shall any man say that I, after leading Greeks into the land of the barbarians, betrayed the Greeks and chose the friendship of the barbarians; nay, since you do not care to obey me, I shall follow with you and suffer whatever I must. For I consider that you are to me both fatherland and friends and allies; with you I think I shall be honoured wherever I may be, bereft of you I do not think I shall be able either to aid a friend or to ward off a foe. Be sure, therefore, that wherever you go, I shall go also.
This speech of Clearchus was well received by the listeners, and some of the mercenaries immediately took up their arms and possessions and made camp alongside Clearchus. It appeared, from the outside at least, that a split was forming between Clearchus and the mercenaries on the one hand and Cyrus on the other. Xenophon tells us that Cyrus was unhappy with this turn of events and he summoned Clearchus to a meeting, but the latter refused to attend; no doubt making his refusal public knowledge too. Whilst refusing the official summons, Clearchus sent a secret message to Cyrus telling him not to worry, and to ask Cyrus to summon him again. This Cyrus did and again Clearchus refused.19 By this time the Greeks were thoroughly convinced that Clearchus was leading them in their best interests, when in fact they were being deceived once again. Upon Clearchus’ refusal of Cyrus’ second summons he again addressed an assembly of the Greeks.20
Fellow-soldiers, it is clear that the relation of Cyrus to us is precisely the same as ours to him; that is, we are no longer his soldiers, since we decline to follow him, and likewise he is no longer our paymaster. I know, however, that he considers himself wronged by us. Therefore, although he keeps sending for me, I decline to go, chiefly, it is true, from a feeling of shame, because I am conscious that I have proved utterly false to him, but, besides that, from fear that he may seize me and inflict punishment upon me for the wrongs he thinks he has suffered at my hands. In my opinion, therefore, it is no time for us to be sleeping or unconcerned about ourselves; we should rather be considering what course we ought to follow under the present circumstances. And so long as we remain here we must consider, I think, how we can remain most safely; or, again, if we count it best to depart at once, how we are to depart most safely and how we shall secure provisions–for without provisions neither general nor private is of any use. And remember that while this Cyrus is a valuable friend when he is your friend, he is a most dangerous foe when he is your enemy; furthermore, he has an armament–infantry and cavalry and fleet–which we all alike see and know about; for I take it that our camp is not very far away from him. It is time, then, to propose whatever plan any one of you deems best.
When he finished his speech, Clearchus simply sat down, inviting others to stand and express their views. A number of soldiers did, but some of these were friends of Clearchus and made speeches that must have been preapproved by the commander. A heated debate ensued in which many (Clearchus-approved) speakers argued that they were better off with Cyrus, whilst others argued for a plundering campaign against Cilicia followed by a return to Greece as wealthy men. At this, Clearchus spoke again and said that he would not lead such a campaign.21
After much debate, the assembled Greeks resolved to approach Cyrus directly and demand to know the truth as to where they were going and the truth of who they would ultimately be fighting. Cyrus received this delegation, but again chose to lie in his response, this time more plausibly. Cyrus told the Greek mercenary delegation that their real target was Abrocomas, the satrap of Syria, whom he believed was stationed twelve days’ march away on the Euphrates.22
The delegates reported this back to the assembled mercenaries and the Greeks were not wholly convinced by the truth of Cyrus’ response:
Upon hearing this reply the deputies reported it to the soldiers, and they, while suspecting that Cyrus was leading them against the King, nevertheless thought it best to follow him. They asked, however, for more pay, and Cyrus promised to give them all half as much again as they had been receiving before, namely, a daric and a half a month to each man instead of a daric; but as regards the suspicion that he was leading them against the King, no one heard it expressed even then–at any rate, not openly.
Thus assured of a generous pay increase, they agreed to continue with Cyrus towards the Euphrates River. After the mercenaries had finally agreed, the army moved to Issus, where the army rendezvoused with a fleet from the Peloponnese. The reasons for this were two-fold: the first was to supply the army; the second was connected with the next obstacle in his path, the pass between Cilicia and Syria. Cyrus knew that he would be unable to capture the two fortresses guarding the gates by frontal assault alone. To turn the gates, Cyrus first marched to Myriandrus, where he paused to rendezvous again with the fleet, his intention being to land a number of hoplites behind the pass and attack the enemy positions from both sides simultaneously. This would have been the first large-sale test for Cyrus’ mercenary army, but it did not materialize. Once the commander of the Persian forces, Abrocomas, received news that Cyrus was approaching in force, he abandoned his very defensible position and marched east to join with the host of the Great King.
Myriandrus saw the first desertions from the army. Two of the mercenary commanders, Xenias the Arcadian and Pasion the Megarian, boarded a ship, stowed away their most valuable property and sailed off.23 They were apparently upset that the troops that had moved their tents next to Clearchus were allowed to join his contingent, weakening their troop strength and perhaps their influence also. Cyrus made a show of allowing them to leave and not pursuing them; given that some in the army probably felt sympathy with their desire to return home, and few still fully trusted the Persian, it was a wise decision not to hunt them down.
Cyrus left Myriandrus and Cilicia and made for the Euphrates. Once reaching the city of Thapsacus on the Euphrates, Cyrus summoned his senior commanders and informed them of the true purpose of the expedition; it cannot have been a great shock given their route. Xenophon tells us that, of the assembled commanders, only Clearchus knew the truth previously.24 We do not know how the generals reacted to the news, but when they told their soldiers they were less than happy and again demanded an increase in their rate of pay. Cyrus evidently did not argue much about this demand and agreed the pay rise the mercenaries demanded. The Persian was in no position to refuse their demand as his plan was so far advanced he could no longer hide his objective from Artaxerxes. If a major part of his army disintegrated then Artaxerxes would surely hunt him down. Besides this, Cyrus would have reasoned several things. First, that he was spending Syennesis’ money rather than his own. Second, that if he were to lose then spending too much on the army would be the least of his problems. Finally, if he were to be victorious, he would inherit the treasuries of the Persian Empire and become richer than he could possibly imagine. Refusing the mercenaries’ demands was not an option for Cyrus. One of the interesting things that we do not know is whether the native troops’ pay rates were altered at all during the campaign; the sources tell us nothing either way.
Almost immediately after this new financial agreement had been made, Menon, one of the mercenary commanders, left the main body of the army, crossed the Euphrates and headed for Babylon. By doing this, he hoped to win special favour for himself and his men with Cyrus, and apparently the ploy worked, since they
received both praise and the promise of rewards from the would-be Great King.
This is a very interesting and enlightening passage. It tells us quite clearly that this was not a coherent army. The Persian troops would have been consistently loyal to Cyrus alone, and would have acted as we would expect. The Greek mercenaries, on the other hand, were a loose confederation of individual armies with individual commanders who felt no compunction to act within an overall leadership structure if they felt it beneficial to themselves to act otherwise. It also speaks of the indiscipline of the Greeks; such a small force as was commanded by Menon would have been slaughtered if it had run into the advancing army of the Great King, and yet they had no compunction in advancing blindly into enemy territory. This did change after the death of Cyrus, at which point the army became much more cohesive; they had little choice but to cooperate by that time if any of them were to see their homes again.
Whatever the motivation, and whatever it tells us about indiscipline and a lack of coordination in the mercenary army, Menon’s act did have an impact upon those he left behind. As quickly as he could, Cyrus gathered together the remainder of the army, crossed the Euphrates and followed Menon with not a man being left behind.
Once across the river, the army marched south for eighteen days, all the while keeping the Euphrates on their right. 25 Much of this march was through desert and the army suffered as a result; particularly the baggage train: ‘... many of the baggage animals died of hunger, for there was no fodder and, in fact, no growing thing of any kind, but the land was absolutely bare.’26 The slow rate of march with regular pauses was now a thing of the past; Cyrus pushed the army hard in order to come to grips with Artaxerxes, apparently feeling that the sooner he reached the Great King the less prepared the latter would be.
Mercenaries in the Classical World- To the Death of Alexander Page 10