De Gaulle began his ascent immediately. His speech to the French nation over BBC the next evening is generally regarded as one of his greatest. “This war is not over as a result of the Battle of France,” he said. “This war is a worldwide war…. I, General de Gaulle, currently in London, invite the officers and the French soldiers who are located in British territory or who might end up here… to put themselves in contact with me…. The flame of French resistance must not and shall not die.”8
De Gaulle in London, June 1940
The following day de Gaulle spoke again. “Soldiers of France, wherever you are, rise up.”9 His speech was so strong that the British Foreign Office intervened. The Pétain government had not yet signed the armistice, and the British did not want to provoke them needlessly. Not until the armistice was concluded and its terms revealed was de Gaulle given the go-ahead. It was during this period that both de Gaulle and Churchill hoped to recruit leading French personalities to join the resistance cause, but none came forward. Even those in London who wanted to go on fighting were not interested in attaching themselves to a crusade led by an obscure general. Finally, on June 27, Churchill bit the bullet. “You are alone,” he told de Gaulle. “I shall recognize you alone.”10 The following day, official recognition followed. “His Majesty’s government recognizes General de Gaulle as the leader of all Free Frenchmen, wherever they may be, who rally to him in support of the Allied cause.”11
Six weeks later, on August 7, de Gaulle and Churchill signed a formal agreement in which the British agreed to supply and equip the Free French, and in return de Gaulle would follow the general orders of the British High Command, while retaining “supreme command” of his forces. The agreement “had a considerable importance for Free France,” said de Gaulle, “not only because it got us out of immediate material difficulties, but also because the British authorities… no longer hesitated to make things easier for us.”12
At the same time as de Gaulle was being formally recognized by His Majesty’s government as the supreme commander of the Free French, he was being tried for treason in absentia by court-martial in Vichy. The charges were brought at the insistence of General Weygand, who believed de Gaulle was a traitor. The trial was held in secret, and de Gaulle was found guilty on five of six counts. He was stripped of rank in the French army and sentenced to death, and his property was confiscated. De Gaulle does not refer to the trial in his memoirs, and for practical purposes the conviction was meaningless.
Churchill and de Gaulle, 1940
The British increased their support for de Gaulle quickly. Free French headquarters moved to spacious accommodations on Carlton Gardens overlooking St. James’s Park—the former home of Prime Minister Lord Palmerston—and de Gaulle reached out to French forces throughout the world for support. Once again, the answers were negative. French military commanders in North Africa and the Middle East saw de Gaulle as a tool of the British and preferred to remain loyal to Vichy. The first exceptions were in the Pacific, where the New Hebrides, New Caledonia, and Tahiti came on board. Then, Equatorial and Central Africa followed in late August, the Cameroons, Chad, and the French Congo rallied to de Gaulle, and shortly afterward, Gabon did the same.
This gave de Gaulle a base outside England, and he set up plans to take Dakar, the capital of Senegal and a major French military base on the Atlantic. With de Gaulle on board, a British-French naval force, including a carrier and two battleships, arrived off Dakar on September 23. When de Gaulle addressed the city by radio declaring his “friendly intentions,” Vichy forces fired back. The fighting continued for another day, but it was clear that the forces in Dakar were not going to accept de Gaulle. That evening, the Anglo-French naval force withdrew. One battleship had been badly damaged, and a destroyer and two submarines had been sunk. For de Gaulle, the failure of the mission was a terrible blow to his prestige. “The days which followed were cruel to me,” he said; “however, it very soon became clear to me that in spite of the reverse, the Free French remained unshakable. Among the men of our expedition… not one wished to leave me. On the contrary, all of them had been hardened by the hostile attitude of Vichy.”13
In London, Churchill defended the operation in the House of Commons. “All that has happened has only strengthened His Majesty’s Government in the confidence it extended to General de Gaulle.”14 Nevertheless, many British leaders became skeptical. Lord Halifax, who was still foreign minister, believed Vichy should not be written off. And in the United States, the defeat at Dakar intensified FDR’s hostility to de Gaulle. Roosevelt believed the future of France lay with Pétain and Vichy, and in this belief he was strongly supported by Secretary of State Cordell Hull and the State Department. As Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles put it: “De Gaulle’s authority is based upon a small group of followers who sometimes fight each other, and on some overseas territories…. Eighty-five percent of the French living in the United States are not for de Gaulle.”15 The initial role of the French in the United States in support of Vichy was important in shaping FDR’s view. Alexis Léger, former French ambassador to the United States and then secretary general in the French Foreign Office, had retired and come to the United States just before the armistice. He was held in high esteem by Roosevelt and the State Department, and from the beginning was highly critical of General de Gaulle and the Free French movement. These views he shared repeatedly with the U.S. government, and they had an effect.16
De Gaulle spent the next six weeks in Equatorial Africa. He received a tumultuous welcome in Douala, the capital of the Cameroons, and on October 27 at Brazzaville in the Congo, he announced the creation of a Committee of Imperial Defence to direct French forces in the war. The British had not been consulted beforehand, and the Committee of Imperial Defence was de Gaulle’s first step toward acquiring the status of head of a provisional government. The British Foreign Office was not pleased, but Churchill stood by him. De Gaulle had to be assertive, said the prime minister, “to prove to French eyes that he was not a British puppet.”I
De Gaulle returned to England in mid-November. He continued to have warm personal relations with Churchill, often spending the weekend at Chequers, Churchill’s country estate. On January 15 he signed an agreement with Anthony Eden, minister of war, defining the status of the Free French on British territory. With British help he also established a bank, the Caisse Centrale de la France Libre, to handle financial affairs for the Free French movement, further solidifying his base.
As summer approached, de Gaulle advanced a proposal to retake the French territories of Syria and Lebanon from Vichy. The outbreak of an anti-British revolt in Iraq, which was a British protectorate, suggested that Germany might take over Syria as a base for helping the Iraqi rebels, and Churchill quickly saw the benefits of de Gaulle’s suggestion. The prime minister pressed both the Foreign Office and the military to take action. They were reluctant, but complied. Churchill ordered General Archibald Wavell, the area commander, to supply support for the Free French and cabled de Gaulle of his decision. De Gaulle was amazed that Churchill was acting so quickly. For the first and only time, he wrote his reply to Churchill in English:
1) Thank you.
2) [General] Castroux will remain in Palestine.
3) I shall go to Cairo soon.
4) You will win the war.17
On June 8, 1941, Anglo-French forces, comprised of mostly Free French troops, attacked Syria. As at Dakar, the Vichy forces fought back, but this time the Free French held on, and after four weeks the garrison surrendered. But instead of surrendering to the Free French, the Vichy commander signed an armistice with the British commander, General Maitland Wilson. The Free French were not mentioned. De Gaulle was furious. When he threatened to withdraw his troops from British command, the armistice was amended.
But friction with the British continued. In Brazzaville on August 27, de Gaulle gave an interview to George Weller of the Chicago Daily News in which he said England “is carrying on a wartime deal wit
h Hitler in which Vichy serves as a go-between.”18 When the interview was published, Churchill hit the roof. “If de Gaulle’s interview with the American press at Brazzaville is authentic,” he wrote Anthony Eden, who had succeeded Halifax as foreign minister, “he has clearly gone off his head. This would be a very good riddance and will simplify our further course.”19 Eden, who was one of de Gaulle’s major supporters in the government, pointed out the general’s importance as a rallying point in France against Vichy, and told Churchill that “if he shows indications of repentance, I hope you will not underestimate your power to complete the cure.”20
When de Gaulle returned to London at the beginning of September, he was held at arm’s length by British officials. After two weeks, Churchill agreed to see him. The meeting began in a frosty tone but quickly became businesslike. The situation in the Middle East was discussed, and Churchill assured de Gaulle that the British had no interest in occupying Syria and that the Free French were in charge. The alliance was back in place. Churchill suggested that de Gaulle establish a formal council to lead the Free French politically, and de Gaulle agreed. The two men ended the meeting with much of their previous warmth restored. Churchill greatly respected de Gaulle’s determination to liberate France, and de Gaulle understood that Churchill was one of the few who understood his sense of mission and could help him deliver on it.21
De Gaulle’s relations with the United States, however, continued to be negative. President Roosevelt considered him “just another French general,” and continued to pursue relations with Vichy. The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor changed nothing. This became evident in late December 1941, when de Gaulle, with Churchill’s approval, mounted a takeover of the islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon, just off the coast of Newfoundland. On Christmas Eve, Free French Marines landed at St. Pierre and were received enthusiastically by the local population. A plebiscite in the islands immediately afterward gave the Free French 95 percent support. The Canadian government was pleased and so was Churchill. But in Washington, a storm broke. Roosevelt opposed anything that would alienate the Pétain government, and Secretary of State Hull was livid. Hull issued an immediate communiqué condemning “the arbitrary action” taken by the “so-called Free French,” and asking Canada to intervene.22 Canadian Prime Minister Mackenzie King dismissed Hull’s plea, and public opinion in the United States strongly supported de Gaulle’s action. Hull received an avalanche of mail addressed to the “so-called Secretary of State,” and the affair clearly showed that public opinion in the United States was on de Gaulle’s side. At a White House luncheon on New Year’s Day, 1942, Churchill joked to FDR, “You’re being nice to Vichy, we’ve been nice to de Gaulle. It’s a fair division of labour.”23
While de Gaulle’s relations with Washington continued on a downward slope, Moscow became supportive. On September 26, 1941, with German troops advancing eastward in Russia, the Soviets recognized de Gaulle as the “Leader of all the Free French.”24 At that point the Russians withdrew their ambassador from Vichy and assigned him to de Gaulle in London, and de Gaulle posted an emissary in Moscow. When Soviet foreign minister Vyacheslav Molotov visited London in May 1942, he and de Gaulle had several lengthy discussions. Molotov said that his government was an ally of London and Washington, “but with France, Russia desires to have an independent alliance.”25 The support of the Soviet Union greatly improved de Gaulle’s relations with the French Communist Party.
Additional momentum was provided by the Free French troops at Bir Hakeim in Libya in early June. Under the command of General Pierre Koenig, the 5,500 troops of the First Light Division held up Erwin Rommel’s much larger Afrika Korps for almost two weeks, allowing the British Eighth Army time to regroup. It was an outstanding performance, made even more so by Koenig’s ability to break out after the battle and save his troops from destruction. “To the whole world the guns of Bir Hakeim announced the beginning of the recovery of France,” said de Gaulle.26 Churchill was equally expressive, calling Bir Hakeim “one of the finest feats of arms in this war.”27
De Gaulle was also moving to solidify his base. Following Churchill’s suggestion, he formed an eight-member National Committee with himself as chairman. That gave the Free French the appearance of a national government. The National Committee claimed to be “the sole representative of France and the empire,” although it was not yet recognized by either Britain or the United States.28 The Committee met weekly at Free French headquarters on Carlton Gardens, and as de Gaulle said, “No important step was ever taken without the Committee having deliberated it first.”29
General Pierre Koenig at Bir Hakeim
But de Gaulle was still very much in the wilderness. When American troops landed in the French territories of Morocco and Algeria in November 1942, de Gaulle was not informed beforehand. This was Roosevelt’s personal decision. FDR despised de Gaulle and believed he was a phony. Roosevelt also insisted that the landing be made initially by American troops, believing that the presence of British forces would encourage the Vichy troops to resist. To encourage their cooperation, the Americans enlisted General Henri Giraud, a four-star French general with a distinguished combat record who had escaped German captivity and was living quietly in the Loire. A supporter of the Pétain government, he became FDR’s choice as an alternative to de Gaulle, and someone who could win over the Vichy garrisons in Algeria and Morocco without a fight.30 But it was a bad choice. Giraud was over his head. He was totally unfamiliar with the situation in North Africa. As Eisenhower said later, Giraud “wanted to be a big shot, a bright and shining light, and the acclaimed savior of France, but turned out to be a terrible blow to our expectations.”31
When the Americans encountered stiff resistance from Vichy’s forces, they turned to Admiral Jean Darlan, Pétain’s deputy, who was in Algiers visiting his son, who was ill with polio. The American high command quickly reached an agreement with Darlan. Vichy forces would stop fighting in Morocco and Algeria, and in return Darlan would become high commissioner of North Africa and Giraud the commander of all French forces there. Once again, de Gaulle was excluded.
Churchill did his best to reassure de Gaulle, and placed the blame for his exclusion on the United States. “We have been obliged to go along with this,” said the prime minister, but “rest assured, we are not revoking any of our agreements with you…. You have been with us during the worst moments of the war. We shall not abandon you now that the horizon is brightening.”32
To Roosevelt, Churchill cabled, “I ought to let you know that very deep currents of feeling are stirred by the arrangement with Darlan. The more I reflect upon it the more convinced I become that it can only be a temporary expedient, justifiable solely by the stress of battle.”33
The American decision to install Darlan as high commissioner in North Africa may have saved a few American lives, but it kept in place the most despicable aspects of the Vichy regime. Pétain was still recognized as leader, Nazi sympathizers remained in office, Jews continued to be persecuted, and the Gaullist symbol, the Cross of Lorraine, continued to be banned. The situation changed dramatically on Christmas Eve 1942, when Darlan was assassinated. Exactly who organized his killing has never been determined. White House officials insisted the assassin was a Gaullist, but numerous investigations have shown that the weapon used was provided by a member of the OSS.II Roosevelt insisted that Darlan be replaced by General Giraud. De Gaulle did not protest. But the tide was turning. Giraud was obviously not capable of managing the political situation. As historian Antony Beevor has pointed out, Roosevelt’s policy in North Africa may have worked to de Gaulle’s advantage. “American support for Darlan and then Giraud provided the stepping stones from Vichy to Free France, thus averting the danger of civil war in French North Africa.”34
But the path was not easy. The Casablanca Conference between Roosevelt and Churchill in January 1943 looked initially like another setback. Both leaders were eager to bring de Gaulle and Giraud together and put the Free French under
Giraud’s control. They therefore invited both men to Casablanca. “We’ll call Giraud the bridegroom, and I bring him from Algeria,” FDR cabled Churchill, “and you bring the bride, de Gaulle, down from London, and we will have a shotgun wedding.”35 De Gaulle reluctantly came to the conference, but he did not agree to put the Free French under Giraud’s control. He and Giraud met, and de Gaulle agreed to pose for pictures with FDR, Churchill, and Giraud, but he did not agree to sign a document prepared by Roosevelt and Churchill that would have effectively eliminated the Free French as the repository of France’s sovereignty. Churchill was furious. “Of all our encounters during the war,” said de Gaulle, “this was the most ungracious.” De Gaulle also saw Roosevelt. “My reception at his hands was a skillful one—that is, kind of sorrowful.”36
Before leaving the conference, de Gaulle drafted a short communiqué that he and Giraud signed, in which they said, “We have seen each other. We have spoken together.” The communiqué went on to affirm their belief in the ultimate victory of France, and most importantly established a permanent liaison group.37 The establishment of the liaison group turned out to be a great victory for de Gaulle because it began the process of bringing Free France to North Africa.
The next four months may have been de Gaulle’s most difficult. Roosevelt and the State Department intensified their campaign against him, and Churchill—always eager to ingratiate himself with FDR—went along. In Washington for a conference with the president, Churchill cabled Eden on May 22 telling him to ask the cabinet to revoke the 1940 agreement with de Gaulle. “He hates England and has left a trail of Anglophobia behind him everywhere…. I beg that you will bring this before the Cabinet at the earliest moment.”38 Eden submitted Churchill’s request to the cabinet that evening and it was unanimously rejected. As Eden wrote in his diary, “Cabinet at 9 p.m. re de Gaulle and Winston’s proposed to break with him now. Everyone against and very brave about it in his absence.”39
Liberation of Paris : How Eisenhower, De Gaulle, and Von Choltitz Saved the City of Light (9781501164941) Page 3