The JIC had assumed several new roles. It now had responsibility for producing both short-term and long-term intelligence assessments. Furthermore, it was now accountable for overseeing all administrative arrangements relating to the intelligence machinery in its totality, and for taking the lead in highlighting any deficiencies in the existing system. This, then, was the shape that the JIC would take as events in Europe worsened.
Cab 54-3 extraction
(THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY’S GOVERNMENT).
S E C R E T.
D.C.O.S. 4.
(Also paper No: C.O.S. 420 (D.C.).)
COPY NO.17
COMMITTEE OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE.
CHIEFS OF STAFF SUB-COMMITTEE.
SUB-COMMITTEE OF DEPUTY CHIEFS OF STAFF.
CENTRAL MACHINERY FOR CO-ORDINATION OF INTELLIGENCE.
REPORT.
General
We have been instructed by the Chiefs of Staff Sub-Committee to investigate and report on a suggestion that some central machinery is now required for the coordination of certain types of intelligence.
2. The field of intelligence which it is now necessary to cover in time of peace in order to be properly prepared for the eventuality of war with any Great Power has been almost immeasurably extended and complicated by reason of –
(1) The extent to which modern war involves the whole of the resources of the nation; and
(2) The vast extension of the zone of operations that has been brought about by the advance of aviation.
3. As a result of our discussions we have formed the opinion that our intelligence organization requires some modification to cope with modern conditions. There are certain types of intelligence which can neither be comprehensively collected nor intelligently interpreted unless special arrangements are devised to establish direct and permanent liaison between the many departments, military and civil, who are in a position to make contributions to the general stock of information on the subject in question, and to give expert advice, each from its own technical viewpoint and experience, as to the significance of the material thus collected.
Industrial Intelligence
4. The first type of intelligence of this nature relates to industrial resources and, consequently, the potential war capacity of foreign countries. In 1929 the study of this problem necessitated the setting up of the Sub-Committee on Industrial Intelligence in Foreign Countries, composed of representatives of the Treasury, Foreign Office, Board of Trade and the Defence Departments, whose terms of reference are:-
(1) To establish direct liaison for the interchange of information and reports in regard to industrial intelligence in foreign countries between the Board of Trade and the Service Departments;
(2) To deal with all matters arising out of this interchange which may require joint discussion; and
(3) To discuss the significance of the more important information.
In addition a permanent whole-time staff was found to be essential to study this vast and complex problem, and the Industrial Intelligence Centre has been working very satisfactorily since 1931.
Other types of intelligence
5. Industrial Intelligence, however, is not the only type of intelligence calling for special treatment, and for the last two years there has been considerable interdepartmental discussion on the arrangements necessary for the central collection, collation and interpretation of intelligence relating to air targets in foreign countries.
There may also be other types of intelligence which, as a result of further experience, will be found later to need special treatment, but at present we have no recommendations to make on them.
Air targets in foreign countries
6. As regards air targets in foreign countries, we consider that our aim should be to ensure that the Defence Departments are in possession of such information as will enable our Air Forces to obtain the maximum effect on an enemy nation, by means of air attack, against those objectives the destruction or dislocation of which the Government consider would contribute most towards the attainment of the national aim.
7. We consider that this problem opens up a vast field for the collection of intelligence, which cannot be covered by the present intelligence branches of the Defence Departments. Before, however, putting forward any recommendations, we consider it advisable to state what the problem involves.
8. Briefly the problem can be considered under three heads:-
(i) Selection of target groups;
(ii) Collection of information;
(iii) Registration of information.
Registration of information
9. Dealing with the registration of information, we consider that this should be carried out in such a way as to facilitate the selection of suitable targets for the Government’s approval and to have immediately available all information which the Air Forces require to take immediate action against those objectives which the Government may decide are to be attacked. This information must, therefore, be tabulated and filed to conform to Air Staff requirements: the responsibility for selecting the method of registration to be adopted should, therefore, rest with the Air Ministry in discussion with the staffs of the other Defence Departments.
Selection of target groups
10. Air targets may be classified as -
(1) Military objectives (in the accepted sense of the term).
(2) Industrial targets.
(3) Non-military targets.
We attach as Appendix I a list showing the sub-division of targets in the industrial group.
Non-military targets are those which may be attacked in order to produce moral effect, whether the ultimate aim is to break the national will of the enemy or to stop work in particular localities. These targets include:-
(i) Crowded industrial areas where air attack would produce great moral effect.
(ii) Essential services, i.e., water supply, sanitation, fire fighting.
(iii) Centres of Government.
The reference to targets of this nature in this Report is not intended to prejudge the question as to whether or not they would, in the event of war, be attacked. If, however, it is possible that as a measure of reprisal or otherwise it were decided to do so, we must clearly be prepared beforehand by collecting the necessary information.
Collection of information
11. It is essential to collect as much information as possible regarding the groups of targets referred to in the preceding paragraph. Whilst purely military targets can be dealt with by the Defence Departments in consultation, each industrial target presents a specialist study of which the Intelligence Branches of the Defence Departments have little or no experience, and it is necessary to mobilize as much technical data as possible regarding them. The lines of investigation concerning them must follow similar channels in each group and the information produced so as to comply with registration requirements. In order that this may be done effectively, certain definitions have been evolved in the Air Ministry which we attach as Appendix II , and which should be applied when necessary.
Suggested organization
12. We are of opinion that the problem goes far beyond the bounds of the Defence Departments and includes questions which can only be dealt with in association with industrial experts and those connected with the public services. We suggest that it is undesirable, if it can be avoided, to set up any fresh organization if the needs can be met by adaptation of existing machinery. We believe that the Sub-Committee on Industrial Intelligence in Foreign Countries is a suitable body to which the work might be referred, though that Committee and such sub-committees as it may form may require to co-opt additional members to deal with specific subjects.
13. If our proposal is adopted we are of opinion that the suggestions regarding the future composition of the Sub-Committee on Industrial Intelligence in Foreign Countries should emanate from that Committee itself, but we put forward the following suggestions for their consideration:-
(a) A
primary need will be to decide whether the target groups mentioned in paragraph 4 are generally suitable or whether amendment is needed.
(b) Having settled the target groups to be studied, the next step is to obtain the Information required for registration. Since expert knowledge of each group is essential it would appear to be desirable to set up a number of sub-committees each charged with the study of one or more of the target groups enumerated in paragraph 9 and Appendix I , under chairmen nominated by the main committee, with the power to co-opt experts either from the Services or civil life.
(c) Each sub-committee should be in the closest possible touch with the registration branch at the Air Ministry, in order to ensure that the information which is being obtained is in the form required for registration and in order that the registration staff may indicate where gaps lie in the information provided. To ensure that this is done it is suggested that the Secretaries of the Sub-Committees should be provided by the Air Ministry and the Committee of Imperial Defence and organized on the lines adopted for the Supply Committees of the Principal Supply Officers Committee Organization, viz., Permanent Secretary or Secretaries to the Sub-Committees provided by the Air Ministry working with a Joint Secretary from the Committee of Imperial Defence, the latter being responsible for co-ordination.
14. We have not referred to the question of co-ordinating Service intelligence, but it would seem that the necessary co-ordination can be effected by an inter-Service Intelligence Committee composed of representatives of the three Service Intelligence Staffs, meeting at the request of one of the members. It is suggested that the Committee should be composed of
Admiralty – Deputy Director of Naval Intelligence.
War Office – Head of M.I. (1) General Staff.
Air Ministry – Deputy Director of Intelligence.
15. Close liaison will, no doubt, be required between the Sub-Committee on Industrial Intelligence in Foreign Countries and the Air Raid Precautions Department of the Home Office. That Department should be in a position to give valuable information on the question of air targets and should be represented on any new organization.
Recommendations
16. Our recommendations therefore are:-
(1) That the scope of the Sub-Committee on Industrial Intelligence in Foreign Countries should be enlarged to include “Air Targets Intelligence”; it being understood that other types of intelligence may subsequently be added.
(2) That in view of (l) above, the Sub-Committee should have the power to co-opt additional members or call on such persons as they considered necessary to deal with specific problems.
(3) That as a first step its terms of reference should be altered to read as follows:-
(a) To supervise co-ordinated interchange of information and reports between the Defence Departments and other departments concerned in regard to:-
(i) Industrial Intelligence in Foreign Countries.
(ii) Air Targets Intelligence.
(b) To deal with all matters arising out of this interchange which may require joint discussion; and
(c) To discuss the significance of the more important information.
(4) That the Sub-Committee on Industrial Intelligence in Foreign Countries should themselves put forward proposals as to any alterations which their additional responsibilities may necessitate in the composition of the Sub-committee.
(5) That the above proposals should be regarded as provisional and experimental.
(6) That the co-ordination of Service Intelligence should be carried out by an inter Service Intelligence Committee, composed as under, meeting at the request of one of the members–
Admiralty – Deputy Director of Naval Intelligence.
War Office – Head of H.I. (1) General Staff.
Air Ministry – Deputy Director of Intelligence.
(Signed) M.P.A. HANKEY (Chairman).
“ W.M. JAMES, Vice-Admiral
D.C.N.S.
“ J.G. DILL, D.M.O. & I.
“ C.L. COURTNEY, D.C.A.S.
2, Whitehall Gardens, S.W.1.
1st January, 1936.
APPENDIX I
INDUSTRIAL TARGETS
So far as the investigations by the Air Staff have progressed, the following groups appear to be essential: they are not placed in order of priority nor are they likely to be final:
(i) Electricity supply, i.e., power stations, grid system, etc.
(ii) Gas supply, including gas grid and coke ovens.
(iii) Oil supply, including depots, hydrogenation plants, etc.
(iv) Steel industry, including special steels required for armaments.
(v) Factories for and reserves of explosives, incendiary material, poison gas and their keys, e.g., nitric acid, chlorine, ammonia, etc.
(vi) Factories for and reserves of munitions, including projectiles, torpedoes, mines, bombs, S.A.A. guns, rifles, machine guns.
(vii) Factories for and reserves of motor vehicles, including tanks and tractors.
(viii) Factories for and reserves of special alloys, machine tools.
(ix) Transportation, i.e., railways, roads; water-ways. Transportation is common to targets in all three groups so that the key points in the various transportation systems, though remaining constant, will be applicable to the majority of industrial groups.
(x) Shipyards, shipping in harbour and shipbuilding establishments.
APPENDIX II
DEFINITIONS
(i) “Key” industries are contributory industries which are more profitable for air attack than the industry which they supply. For instance, the whole output of the aircraft engine industry of a country might depend upon the output of one magneto factory. This factory would, therefore, be the “key” industry to the aircraft engine industry.
(ii) Basic industries. These include coal and steel production on which the industry as a whole of a country largely depends. They cannot be classified as “keys” as defined above.
(iii) “Key” services are public services, such as electricity, gas, transportation, on which industry depends and which may present more profitable targets for air attack than the industry itself. For instance, the destruction of one power station might cause the output of a group of factories to cease.
* * *
The War Office
Whitehall
S.W.1
Colonel L.C. Hollis,
Committee of Imperial Defence,
Richmond Terrace,
WHITEHALL, S.W.l.
21st December, 1938.
Dear Hollis,
As promised on the telephone last night I am sending you herewith a copy of my Paper, which for want of a better title I have called “The Organization of Intelligence”. It does not pretend to cover all the ground or to deal in detail with every aspect of the problem. It will, however, give you I hope sufficient indication of the lines on which I suggest we might organize. I am convinced that something of this nature is required; we here in the War Office – and to a great extent at the Air Ministry and Admiralty – spend a great deal of our time in dealing with material which more rightly should be handled by the Foreign Office. Equally, at the Foreign Office they must have to cope with a number of Reports that are not strictly speaking political. What I mean is the type of Report which would have a bearing on Government policy, or preparations, for war. What I suggest we want, therefore, is a small organization, whose task is to handle this very considerable mass of information which falls between the true political and the military. I would describe it as Military/Political. I cannot see that my proposals would infringe in any way, either on the Service Departments or on the Foreign Office – rather should they lighten the burden of all of them.
I would emphasise, as I have done in my Paper, that the proposed Bureau would be solely advisory. It would have no executive power whatsoever. I emphasise this as I feel certain otherwise we shall meet great opposition from vested interests, who will be frightened that an organization of this nature will become too
powerful. That is also the reason why I suggest that the Foreign Office representative should act as Chairman.
The reception of my proposals up to date – the Paper has only gone to D.M.O. & I., D.D.M.O., M.I.2., M.I.3. and S.I.S. – has been on the whole very encouraging. The D.M.O. and D.D.M.O. both agree on broad lines, though the D.M.O. suggests that “salt will have to be put on the tail of many people in Whitehall ere it goes through”. I have not had D.D.M.O.’s final comments, but hope to get them after Christmas. Nor have I seen the comments of M.I.2. and M.I.3.; but Dennys tells me that having discussed it very fully with his three sub-sections, they have come to the conclusion that it is a practical proposition and would mean, in their case, a reduction of some four officers. Menzies, who I believe discussed it with his Chief, is also in agreement, while insisting that a representative of S.I.S. should be part of the permanent body, since so much of the material that they would deal with would be supplied by his organization.
I should be most grateful if you and Ismay would now consider these proposals, and let me have your views in due course. I should also much value your advice as to how we should then proceed. Possibly the most diplomatic method might be to endeavour privately to enlist the sympathetic support of the Foreign Office before giving any wider circulation.
As you said last night this proposal, if proved acceptable, might considerably modify our present ideas with regard to the Middle East Bureau. For the moment, therefore, I feel that the latter should be left where it now is, in a state of suspended animation. Nevertheless, I think that at an early date after Christmas we must decide what we are going to do about this M.E. Bureau.
There is one other point on which the J.I.C. will also have to adjudicate, and that is to decide which Service should be responsible for the collection and collation of Air Defence Intelligence. At the moment this is not done satisfactorily, chiefly because in several foreign countries air defence comes under the control of the Air Ministry concerned, whereas in others this is not the case. The result is that for some countries Military Attachés are collecting this information and passing it home, in others this duty falls on the Air Attaché. It is not going to be very easy to find a satisfactory solution without overlapping, but the matter cannot be allowed to remain in its present state.
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