Spying on the World
Page 5
The fall of Norway was the catalyst. Whitehall had received no forewarning of the invasion and, deeming the issue an intelligence failure, officials wanted to know why. As Maurice Hankey conceded, ‘It is no use crying over spilt milk … nevertheless, it is a good thing to look back on our mistakes – and this is by no means the only one – in order to try and rectify them in the future.’ 1 In a subsequent post-mortem, the speed – or lack thereof – at which intelligence reports were transmitted to planners was identified as one crucial factor. 2 On 10 May 1940, Chamberlain resigned and Churchill took over. One of his first moves was to ask who was in charge of intelligence and this, together with the failure over Norway, gave the JIC a new direction and impetus. Firstly, the sub-committee was instructed to initiate its own assessments when it saw fit (as opposed to waiting for a formal instruction to do so). Secondly, it would move closer (metaphorically, not physically) to those planning the war effort. These efforts coincided with the JPC taking an increased interest in intelligence matters and requesting a JIC input into its planning.
From May 1940, the JIC accordingly began to play a greater role in the war effort. Not only did the planners begin to look to the JIC for advice but so too did the Chiefs of Staff. It was perhaps this factor, more than any other, which allowed the JIC to escape from the creative vacuum that had characterised the pre-war period. Thus, by late 1940 the JIC was producing, in addition to its mainstay long-term assessments, a series of daily and weekly tactical forecasts, including:
1. the daily 1030 summary for the War Cabinet
2. the daily 1600 Situation Report
3. the daily 1630 JIC Intelligence Report
4. the daily 0700 and 1800 War Cabinet Map Room summaries (the former being a summary of information on force dispositions, the latter a more domestic operational summary). 3
The JIC’s efforts, output and significance were assisted greatly by the introduction in late 1941 of the Joint Intelligence Staff (JIS). It comprised two teams of drafters, easing constraints on JIC members’ time, so that the JIS spent their days writing the assessments themselves. An important development in the history of the committee, the JIS remained in place until 1968. The creation of a further subordinate body, the Intelligence Section (Operations), strengthened the JIC’s role in planning, for it was designed to ‘collate intelligence for operational planning’. 4 By 1942, then, not only had the JIC become firmly entrenched in Britain’s war efforts, but the additions of Ultra decrypts and the US entry into the war meant that intelligence was firing on all cylinders.
By 1942 the war had truly become a global conflict. One of the biggest questions facing British military planners concerned the future direction of the war. The German army had become bogged down in Russia, yet Stalin was adamant that a new Allied western front be opened up in order to divert German resources and effort. Many of the American planners were keen to support this in the form of a cross-Channel offensive, but their British counterparts favoured, and eventually had approved, a move into French North Africa.
The JIC had first been involved in plans for an invasion of north Africa in December 1941, then codenamed Operation Gymnast. 5 An assessment of ‘German intentions’ in January 1942 suggested that increased forces were being sent to the Russian front, whilst in north Africa attempts would be made to bolster Rommel’s forces in order to seize and exploit oil reserves. 6 Throughout the first half of 1942 the JIC, and the JIS, continued to produce a torrent of papers for the military planners, covering various aspects of the invasion and predicting what sort of resistance might be expected. 7 The increased pressure and requirement for assessments was such that the JIC was forced to start meeting twice weekly from March. 8 To underline just how crucial the JIC had now become to planning, a new study was begun that concentrated on ‘the probable strength, efficiency, equipment, training, and morale of the Axis forces in 1942, economic factors, morale on the home front, and the bearing which these may have on the Axis plans of campaign for this year’. 9
By the summer of 1942, and after acrimonious discussion, the Americans finally conceded to the British plan to invade north Africa before concentrating on north western Europe. 10 A JIC report in July suggested that if the Germans could be driven out of north Africa that year, then it would seriously hamper their military efforts the following year. This assessment was important for two reasons: firstly, British planners wanted to open the front in 1942, not later, and the JIC paper supported the idea that time was of the essence; and, secondly, it reinforced the belief that a successful attack in north Africa would keep open important shipping and supply routes. 11
As planning continued for the invasion, now codenamed Operation Torch, the JIC continued to issue assessments. One constant throughout was the belief that if the Allies attacked north Africa, then Germany would have to transfer reinforcements from other areas. Furthermore, given the assumption that Germany would need to rest parts of its army for maintenance and recuperation in late 1942, it would be realistic to expect a quick and decisive victory. 12
An example of the sort of assessment produced by the JIC is reproduced below. 13 The paper was originally prepared for the planners but was considered so important that it was also passed to the COS, who approved it unreservedly. The lengthy report covered several crucial aspects: the reaction to an invasion in north African countries; the levels of resistance to be expected; the critical importance of achieving surprise; and the effect if delayed. These were vitally important questions and, unsurprisingly, the paper was well received.
The assessment was symbolic of the papers produced at this time. In addition to specific papers on how an Allied attack would affect Germany’s war efforts more broadly, the JIC also issued tactical analyses, based on Ultra decrypts and for the specific use of the planners and force commanders. 14 Topics included forecasts of German troop dispositions, the nature of the opposition to be expected, and suitable locations for the invasion. As the date for the invasion approached, the JIC’s work took on greater importance, with a series of papers focused on whether or not the Germans were aware of Allied plans. 15 By and large, these various types of assessment have proven to be remarkably accurate.
In the early hours of 8 November 1942, the weeks and months of preparation were put into action when British and American forces launched a multi-pronged attack on the coast of north Africa. In the aftermath General Dwight Eisenhower, responsible for Allied forces in north Africa, personally asked for his gratitude to be conveyed to the JIC. He congratulated the committee on the ‘invaluable help given’, particularly ‘the regular flow of information [which] has enabled planning to be kept up to date’. 16 Operation Torch was the first military plan that involved the JIC in a detailed and central way. Information provided under the JIC umbrella ensured that those responsible for strategic planning were kept abreast of the most detailed intelligence available. Here was a JIC that, for the first time, was properly and effectively integrated with those it was designed to inform.
Circulation of this paper has been strictly limited.
Issued for the personal use of File
TO BE KEPT UNDER LOCK AND KEY
It is requested that special care may be taken to
ensure the secrecy of this document.
Copy No. 39
Circulated for consideration of the Chiefs of Staff
JIC(42)304(0)(FINAL)
AUGUST, 1942.
WAR CABINET
JOINT INTELLIGENCE SUB-COMMITTEE
OPERATION “TORCH” – INTELLIGENCE APPRECIATION
Note by the Secretary
The attached report, which has been forwarded for the consideration of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, is circulated in Final form. Will departments please return all previous drafts to the Secretary.
(Signed) DENIS CAPEL–DUNN.
Great George Street, S.W.1
7TH AUGUST, 1942.
Circulated for the consideration of the Chiefs of Staffs
JIC(4
2)304(0)(FINAL)
AUGUST, 1942.
WAR CABINET
JOINT INTELLIGENCE SUB-COMMITTEE
OPERATION “TORCH” – INTELLIGENCE APPRECIATION
Report by the Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee
NOTE: This paper was prepared in the first instance for the Joint Planning Staff, but we consider that the Chiefs of Staff committee should see it. Its form does not lend itself to a summary of conclusions such as is normally included in appreciations of enemy intentions.
In this report we appreciate the scale of opposition likely to be met by an Allied expedition against French North Africa this year. We would like to draw special attention to the important factors given in Part III (page 11).
PART I – REACTIONS OF COUNTRIES AFFECTED
France
1. The Vichy Government will remain subservient to the Germans and will order resistance in French North Africa and may support that resistance with the French Fleet. It is unlikely that this will lead to a declaration of war on the united Nations by the Vichy Government. They will be reluctant to burn their boats with America. An added deterrent will be their fear of air bombardment.
2. The arrival of the Allies in force in French North Africa and their rapid success must appear to the majority of the French people as the first step in the liberation of their country. The revival of hope inspired by this will increase the embarrassment of the Vichy Government and add to their difficulties of internal security.
French North Africa
3. The civil authorities and the military command in French North Africa will comply with Vichy French orders to resist until they can plead force majeure . Their forces will lack the zest to fight or the means to prolong resistance. Many of them will have an underlying sympathy for the Americans.
4. The French Command in North Africa must have doubts as to the sympathies and will to fight of many under their command. Although discipline may tell in the initial stages, in face of a resolute Allied thrust with powerful forces, resistance is likely to collapse speedily. Once resistance has collapsed the French, even though they may not enthusiastically collaborate, are unlikely, by sabotage or otherwise, seriously to interfere with consolidation by the Allies.
5. It is unlikely that success in Algeria will be immediately followed by the surrender of Tunisia and Morocco. As far as the French are concerned the will to resist is unlikely to vary as between Morocco and Algeria or between specific points in Morocco itself.
6. The native population as a whole may be expected at the outset to welcome the Allied forces as deliverers from the French rulers. Subsequently when hostilities have died down the natives may become disillusioned though this disillusionment may be offset to some extent if economic benefits are forthcoming. This would not extend to native troops.
Spain
7. It has been Spain’s consistent policy to keep out of the war. The predominant influence however would be Germany’s ability to bring military pressure to bear. If in the absence of this pressure the Franco Government wished to react against successful Allied landings in North Africa, there would be powerful influences in Spain which would exercise a restraining influence at least in the early days of the operation. Spain has not yet recovered from the Civil War and is in no position politically, militarily or economically to fight a War of national effort. The Allies have a powerful weapon in Spain’s knowledge of her dependence upon the goodwill of the Allies for supplies of the essentials of life.
8. Immediate Spanish reactions would, therefore, probably be confined to reinforcing Spanish Morocco while waiting to see how the operation progressed. If it were swift and successful and Spanish territory were respected, the Spaniards would be unlikely to take any provocative action. If and when, however, Germany could concentrate on the Spanish frontier powerful land and air forces, she could probably force the Franco Government to accede to her demands for passage of troops. In such circumstances that Government would probably prefer to throw in their lot wholly with the Germans rather than to adopt half measures.
9. In the meantime Spain would be unlikely to risk an open breach with the Allies by allowing the Germans to operate from air bases in the South. Although German pressure upon Spain would no doubt be intensified if the Allies extend their present use of the Gibraltar aerodrome to include offensive operations against North Africa, there is no reason to suppose that this in itself would seriously influence Spanish policy. The Spanish Government would, of course, consider it necessary to fire at British aircraft which flew over Spanish territory.
10. Faced with Allied invasion of North Africa and with increased German pressure, the Franco Government would be in a difficult position. Until the Germans can give military support, and provided our operation is successful, the Allies will be able to put stronger pressure on the Franco Government than the Germans, with German support the Franco Government, Fascist in character and avowedly favourable to the Axis, would, if forced to a decision, side with the Germans. In the opinion of the Foreign Office it is impossible to say whether an alternative government would result in more or less resistance to German pressure. It is impossible to say whether Spanish Morocco and the Canary Islands would follow the lead of the Franco Government.
Italy
11. The Italian Government, although anxious to gain a footing in Tunisia, which they have long coveted, would be doubtful of the effect on the French of the arrival of Italian troops there. For military reasons the Germans are unlikely to use Italian troops.
12. The Italians will be preoccupied with the threat to the homeland. The “Fleet in being” complex will persist. The Italians will not he prepared to denude the Home Front of air force defences in face of the threat of heavy scale bombing of their cities.
13. Italy’s participation is likely, therefore, to be confined to the operation of air forces based on Italy, Sicily and Sardinia, and to naval forces operating within range of their own shore based aircraft. In addition, defences in Sardinia and Sicily would he strengthened.
14. Although the Italian Government and Military Commands will continue to conform to German strategy, there will be some in Italy who will covertly welcome the Allies’ action.
Germany
15. The arrival of Allied forces in strength in French North Africa, particularly if it takes place as early as October, would face the Germans with a difficult strategic situation. They are unlikely by that time to have been able to disengage from the Russian front for immediate action in a new theatre of war any substantial land and air forces. They cannot ignore the possible repercussions of the Allied action in France, Italy, the Balkans and even Spain. They cannot be certain that the Allies will not attempt a landing on the continent of Europe. In short, they cannot afford to weaken garrison troops in occupied territories. On the contrary, they may find it necessary to increase them and to keep a more vigilant eye on unoccupied France and Italy. They might even have to occupy the former and stiffen the latter by garrison troops.
16. Rommel’s position, if he is still operating in Egypt will be difficult. The need to maintain him there will limit the possibilities of a German move into Tunisia.
17. Short though the sea passage to Tunisia is, the Germans will not, in the light of past experience, relish being dependent on sea communications, with Italian convoys manned largely by Italian crews and escorted by the Italian Navy. Recent events have shown that the Germans suffer from delay, hesitancy and even non-cooperation on the part of the Italians.
18. Germany will be most anxious to avoid the additional military commitment of occupying and garrisoning unoccupied France and will therefore wish to avoid acting without official French concurrence. Even with such concurrence, she will anticipate that her troops will not be welcomed by the French in North Africa. Even if, as is probable, she has obtained French agreement in advance to move German troops to Tunisia in the event of an Allied landing in North Africa, the need to rely to some extent on French co-operation will lead to delays, diff
iculties and misunderstandings.
19. Whatever military action the Germans decide upon they will undoubtedly bring all possible pressure to bear on the Vichy Government to put up maximum resistance in North Africa. They will not, however, put demands to the Vichy Government with which even that Government could not comply without risk of losing control of the French people.
20. They will exert such pressure as they can against Spain to interfere with Allied operations and will almost certainly protest violently if the Spaniards allow the Allies to use the aerodrome at Gibraltar as an operational base. They may press the Franco Government to declare war against the Allies and to accept German naval and air co-operation. They would probably, however, not feel confident of being able to persuade the Spaniards to declare war or even to acquiesce in the use by them of air bases in Southern Spain until they were in a position to back such demands by force.
PART II – ENEMY FORCES LIKELY TO BE MET
INTRODUCTION
A – FRENCH
21. Naval
(a) The following are the total forces considered to be normally in full commission:-
MEDITERRANEAN
WEST AFRICA
1 Battlecruiser
4 6” Cruisers
4 8” Cruisers
6 Contre torpilleurs
3 6” Cruisers
5 Destroyers
17 Contre torpilleurs
19 Submarines
9 Destroyers