The function of the Committee is to co-ordinate Censorship action on all counter-Espionage matters.
The function of the Section is to ensure that all information concerning Counter-Espionage which would assist in the detection or interception of communications of enemy agents is made available to those Overseas or Allied Stations handling the material in which these communications may occur.
There is a special Censorship Liaison Officer in Section V, M.I.6 and, in addition, the Officer-in-Charge maintains close contact with M.I.5, the Trade and General Liaison Sections in I.R.B., and with specially appointed Counter-Espionage Officers at certain agreed Overseas Stations.
Through the office of the Director, Western Area, New York, it is in close touch with its opposite number in United States Censorship, known as the Technical Operations Division.
FLOW OF MATERIAL THROUGH I.R.B.
I.—Submissions, Information Slips, Reports .
United Kingdom submissions by-pass Liaison and go direct to the Users allocated by Postal Censorship. They are, however, seen by Reports. Information Slips go only to Reports where they are collated and embodied in reports on special topics. Overseas and D.R.W. submissions are allocated by Trade and General Liaison Sections and are seen by Reports.
II. —Telegrams .
W.T.s are Wireless intercepts; C.S.s are W.T.s selected, decoded and translated by the Foreign Office. Cables Section scrutinises for Listed names, sorts the telegrams into categories, e.g ., Oils and Fats, Metals, Textiles, Chemicals, rejects obviously useless material, translates messages in foreign languages and, as Cables Section, does not allocate, passes the telegrams on to Liaison for allocation. Shipping telegrams go direct to Liaison, by-passing Cables Section so as to save time.
III.—U.K. Telephone Intercepts .
As Telephone intercepts are used for Operational security only, they are allocated by Liaison in collaboration with the Services.
IV.—Requirements .
The Users inform Liaison of any change they wish to be made, or Liaison suggest changes to the users. Liaison passes the new requirements or amendment to the Requirements Officer, who studies them from the Censorship angle. As Chairman of the Allocations Committee he submits them to that body for discussion by the members, who include representatives of the C.P.C. (and of the C.T.C. and Overseas if necessary), and representatives of Liaison and Control Sections. A version agreed unanimously by the Committee and the User is finally arrived at and this is issued by H.Q., I.R.B., to the C.P.C., the C.T.C. and Overseas, who transmit it to their officers in the form best adapted to their needs. In postal Censorship it appears as an amendment to the Allocation List. If Control, in its Reviews of U.K. submissions, finds weaknesses in the A.L., it passes the information to the Requirements Officer who takes appropriate action to have the A.L. amended if necessary.
V.—Watch Lists .
Users fill in a form giving all the relevant particulars of the firm or person to be watch-listed. This is vetted by H.Q. and Liaison and passed back to H.Q. for the Central Watch List Section which again checks up and incorporates the names in the appropriate List.
VI.—Action .
A submission “For action” is returned by the User to Liaison with the former’s recommendation for disposal. This recommendation is vetted by Liaison who pass the slip to Release Point which works in contact with an A.C. at Holborn representing the C.P.C. who is alone ultimately responsible for the final disposal of all postal matter. If the original has been retained in I.R.B., Release Point obtains it from Held Office; if the original has been submitted, it has come into Release Point with the submission slip. Release Point then carry out the action recommended and approved.
VII.—U.S. Liaison Mission in I.R.B .
I.R.B. Liaison sends all the material allocated by them to D.R.W. — telegrams, telephone intercepts, overseas submissions and reports — direct to U.S. Liaison, whilst Distribution sends all the U.K. submissions allocated to D.R.W. The U.S. Liaison Officers screen this material, send copies direct to the U.S. Agencies in the U.K., e.g ., O.S.S. and O.W.I., whilst the master copies go to D.R.W., Washington, via Distribution. For D.R.W. Requirements, the U.S. Liaison Officer concerned contacts the Requirements Officer I.R.B. and an agreed version is issued by H.Q., I.R.B., as in Diagram IV above.
VIII.—Control Section .
Control Section, whose function is to examine objectively, statistically and critically all censorship material, is sited in I.R.B. because it can examine the material at any point in its flow: as it reaches Distribution; as it arrives at or leaves Cable Section or Liaison Section; as it lies in Records. It can thus work on current material, allocated or unallocated, or on past material allocated or unallocated. It is divided into four sub-sections: U.K.; Western Hemisphere; Eastern Hemisphere; Foreign Censorship. Each sub-section looks after and analyses from time to time the quality and quantity of the material produced in its own area, in the case of Foreign Censorship, collates its special material.
* * *
JIC(44)86
The circulation of this paper has been strictly
limited.
It is issued for the personal use of file
MOST SECRET.
Copy No. 14
J.I.C.(44)86(0)
3RD MARCH, 1944
WAR CABINET
JOINT INTELLIGENCE SUB-COMMITTEE
THE BRITISH INTELLIGENCE ORGANISATION
Note by the Secretary
With reference to item 9 of the minutes of the 8th Meeting of the Sub-Committee, held on 22nd February, 1944, I circulate for purposes of record the attached memorandum which was prepared in response to a request from the Assistance Chief of Staff, G-2, in the United States.
(Signed) DENIS CAPEL-DUNN
Officer of the War Cabinet,
S.W.1.
3RD MARCH, 1944.
MOST SECRET
THE BRITISH INTELLIGENCE ORGANISATION
The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, in the United States has asked for a memorandum describing British Intelligence organisations both military and civil and indicating the way in which in this country military and civil intelligence is integrated.
2. To understand the organisation as it exists to-day it is necessary to have some knowledge of the roots from which it has grown.
3. In peace time intelligence reached the centre in London through the following channels.
Military
Through the Naval, Military and Air Attaches accredited to Foreign States and also through Naval staff officers (Intelligence) in certain ports.
Political
Through His Majesty’s Embassies, Legations and Consular Offices.
Commercial and Industrial
Through Commercial – Diplomatic and Consular officers.
The Secret Service
The Security Service
4. While the task of Service attaches was primarily to report on military affairs and developments in the countries in which they resided, they of course reported to their departments also on other matters. Many of them, particularly in Eastern countries acquired a profound knowledge of the language, topography and people on matters other than strictly military. The same applies to the other channels through which intelligence reached London. The frontiers between political, military and economic intelligence are ill defined. The reports coming through these different service, diplomatic and other channels were collated in the departments at which the channels ended. While until a few years before the war there was little in the way of fixed machinery for the interchange of foreign intelligence between the different departments, in practice the more important telegrams and despatches were generally circulated to all interested departments so that each could make a cross check on the information reaching it direct.
5. In 1936 the Committee of Imperial Defence established the Joint Intelligence Committee. The Committee in those days had the task of preparing for the Committee of Imperial Defence long term appreciations
on the trends of the policy, strategy and military preparedness of foreign countries. It was composed of representatives of the intelligence divisions of the three Service Departments and, latterly of the Foreign Office. Experts were called in from other interested departments and organisations such as the Industrial Intelligence Centre, the forerunner of the Enemy Branch of the Ministry of Economic Warfare.
6. It is unnecessary in this memorandum to give an account of the stages through which the Joint Intelligence Committee acquired its present responsibilities, but it is desirable at the outset to mention the Committee since it has developed in wartime into the focal point at which all intelligence, military and civil is discussed and the final deductions from it are made.
7. In wartime many of the peace time channels through which intelligence flows dry up, but new ones are opened. The conquest and domination of a large part of Europe by Germany and of much of the Far East by Japan has closed very many of the diplomatic and consular sources of information which were previously available to us. On the other hand the activities of the Secret Service are in wartime greatly intensified. The establishment of the Special Operations Executive, though not itself a body responsible for the collection of intelligence, does provide a valuable contribution as will be seen below. Fighting the war itself provides our armed forces with many means of obtaining information about the enemy. Prisoners of War are captured and interrogated. Our own Prisoners of War who manage to make their escape from enemy hands have often much of value to relate. Refugees from occupied territory have their story to tell. A source of intelligence of the greatest value is available to us in wartime which is denied to us in peace time, that of photographic aerial reconnaissance. In addition we have in wartime the great benefit of receiving intelligence from our Allies and of discussion of it with them. Another source only available in wartime is provided by the censorship organisation which is administered by our Ministry of Information. Connected with the Ministry of Information also are the Monitoring services of the British Broadcasting Corporation and the Press Reading Bureaux that we have established for watching the enemy and neutral press.
8. There are two organisations whose function is primarily operational but which in carrying out their functions are enabled to collect a certain amount of useful intelligence. They are the Special Operations Executive and the Political Warfare Executive. The Special Operations Executive is charged, under the general direction of the Chiefs of Staff, with fostering, directing and helping resistance and subversive movements in enemy and enemy occupied territory, and in organising and carrying out direct sabotage of plant, communications etc., of value to the enemy. Some of the agents of this organisation are in a position to obtain information of value to us. Since, however, the primary function of these agents is not the collection of intelligence, intelligence received through them is not sent direct to the service departments and other “consumers” of intelligence but is sent to the “consumer” through the Secret Intelligence Service. This is in order to ensure that all intelligence is canalised and the danger of crossing agents’ lines is thus avoided or reduced. Reports from S.O.E. agents can under this arrangement be checked against other intelligence received through Secret means and the proper value placed upon it. In localities where organised guerrilla warfare is taking place missions under British liaison officers are sent, and their operational information is passed direct to the nearest Allied Commander in the field.
9. The Political Warfare Executive, as its name implies, is charged with assisting the war effort by propaganda, and the dissemination of information along lines of policy laid down by His Majesty’s Government to fit in with the general military policy in force. The agents of the Political Warfare Executive abroad are also in a position to acquire useful information. This also, when it reaches London, is checked against the information reaching here by other means.
10. The co-ordination of the intelligence received through all these different channels is effected in two ways. In the first place there is a horizontal link between the diiferent collectors. Telegrams and reports received are circulated by collectors including the Service Departments, the Foreign Office, the Secret Service, and the Security Service to all customers who may be interested – primarily the Foreign Office, the Service Departments and the Ministry of Economic Warfare.
11. Secondly there is a vertical link between the collectors direct and also between the customers and the central organisation which in wartime advises the Chiefs of Staff and through them His Majesty’s Government on the intentions of the enemy and on enemy activities throughout the world. That central organisation is the Joint Intelligence Committee which today consists of representatives of the three Service Departments, the Foreign Office, who provide the chairman, the Secret Intelligence Service, the Security Service and the Ministry of Economic Warfare. The Joint Intelligence Committee is served by a whole time staff (the “Joint Intelligence Staff”) which did not exist in peace, and whose function it is to help in the drafting of J.I.C. strategic appreciations and memoranda and to co-ordinate the views of the departments represented in the Committee.
12. It has been found that some bodies organised on an inter-service basis are required to fulfil certain special intelligence functions. These inter-service organisations staffed by experts from all the services and from other interested departments are controlled as to policy by the Joint Intelligence Committee itself direct. Such organisations are:-
(a) The Inter-Service Topographical Department whose function It is to prepare long terrn reports on the topography, communications, airfields, docks, beaches, industries, economic resources etc., of areas which may become of military interest.
(b) The organisation which deals both with the collection of information from enemy Prisoners of War in our hands and from British Prisoners of War in the hands of the enemy.
(c) The organisation responsible for the collation and interpretation of the product of aerial photographic reconnaissance.
(d) The Intelligence Section (Operations). This is a clearing house for factual intelligence required by Force Commanders and the Planning Staffs. This organisation does not evaluate intelligence or make appreciations. It is designed to prevent the sections in the Service and other Departments having to answer questions on the same subject from different enquirers.
13. The complement of a good intelligence organisation is a strong counter-intelligence system to prevent enemy penetration and to make it as difficult as possible for the enemy to collect intelligence. Security measures often require full co-operation from many Government Departments and in order to achieve this such matters are discussed by a permanent Committee known as the Security Executive. As has been stated above the Security Service is represented on the Joint Intelligence Committee. Thus intelligence obtained by that organisation is made available to the Committee as a whole.
14. The Joint Intelligence Committee works under directions from the Chiefs of Staff Committee and in close and constant collaboration with the Joint Planning Staffs. It is thus enabled to direct the spot-light of intelligence upon those areas in which the operational staffs are most interested. A continuous process of revision goes on of the priorities of intelligence work. It is perhaps worth mentioning that the Chiefs of Staff Committee, the Joint Intelligence Committee and the Joint Planning Staff all meet in the same building and are served by a common Secretariat.
15. The Joint Intelligence Committee in addition to its responsibility for co-ordinating the product of the various collectors of intelligence into the form of agreed advice on enemy intentions, has the additional responsibility of watching, directing and to some extent controlling the British Intelligence organisation throughout the world, so as to ensure that intelligence is received at the most economical cost in time, effort and manpower, and so as to prevent overlapping. During the course of the war subordinate Joint Intelligence Committees have been established in many parts of the world. In commands abroad these committees are of co
urse under the direct control of the local commanders. In some theatres, however, such as the Middle East where there exists a committee or organisation responsible for co-ordinating political and military affairs, the local Joint Intelligence Committee with full representation of the services, the Foreign Office and other interested authorities reports to that committee. All these local Joint Intelligence Committees, however, maintain constant touch with the London Committee. Acting under the direct control of the Joint Intelligence Committee in London is a British Joint Intelligence Committee in Washington which works in with a similarly organised United States Committee and together with it forms the “Combined Intelligence Committee”. Reports produced by the “Commbined Intelligence Committee” to the Combined Chiefs of Staff represent the agreed Anglo-American view upon the subjects with which they deal.
16. To sum up the British intelligence organisation is a loose-knit system under which it has been possible to provide to a remarkably successful degree for the information required by any authority for its own purpose to reach it rapidly, and also for co-ordination at the centre, so that there is now little reason for mistakes of military policy to be caused by the failure of any authority to receive information which is available.
* Manual of Combined Operations, 1938 (Amendment 3, 1942).
Notes
1 . JIC(44)86(0), ‘The British Intelligence Organisation’, 3 March 1944, TNA: CAB 81/121.
2 . ‘The Intelligence Machine’, 10 January 1945 (emphasis added), TNA: CAB 163/6. For a more detailed examination of this paper see Michael Herman, ‘The Post-War Organization of Intelligence: The January 1945 Report to the Joint Intelligence Committee on “The Intelligence Machine”’, in Robert Dover & Michael S. Goodman (eds), Learning from the Secret Past: Cases in British Intelligence History (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2011).
Spying on the World Page 14