15. In order to achieve the greatest possible security Russia will wish to improve her strategic frontiers and to draw the States lying along her borders, and particularly those in Europe, into her strategic system. Provided that the other Great Powers are prepared to accept Russia’s predominance in these border States and provided that they follow a policy designed to prevent any revival of German and Japanese military power, Russia will have achieved the greatest possible measure of security and could not hope to increase it by further territorial expansion. Nor is it easy to see what else Russia could under such conditions hope to gain from a policy of aggression.
16. As a further measure of insurance Russia will at least experiment with collaboration with Great Britain and America in the interest of world security and particularly in removing the danger of German or Japanese aggression. If Russia came to believe that Great Britain and America were not sincerely collaborating along these lines, she would probably push her military frontiers forward into the border States in Europe, try by political intrigue to stir up trouble in Greece, the whole of the Middle East and India, and exploit her influence over the Communist parties in the countries concerned to stimulate opposition to an anti-Russian policy. If war appeared imminent Russia might strike first at the oil resources of the Middle East.
17. While, therefore, Russia will not, in our opinion, follow an aggressive policy of territorial expansion, her suspicion of British and American policy will nevertheless continue to cause difficulty as will also her tactlessness in the handling of international affairs. Accordingly Russia’s relations with the British Empire and the United States will depend very largely on the ability of each side to convince the other of the sincerity of its desire for collaboration. (Signed)
V. CAVENDISH-BENTINCK.
E. G. N. RUSHBROOKE.
J. A. SINCLAIR.
F. INGLIS.
C. G. VICKERS.
Offices of the War Cabinet, S.W.1.
18th December, 1944.
ANNEX.
Economic Background.
Man-power .
1. Owing to the high natural increase in the Russian birthrate and despite the permanent casualties from the present war, military man-power should be greater in five to ten years than it was on the outbreak of the Russo-German war. Even if land operations in any future war were on the scale of the present Russian commitment, shortage of man-power would not prove a limiting factor. The number of men in Russia between the ages of 15 and 34 which is estimated to have numbered about 30 million in 1940, will probably increase to about 37 million in 1955. German man-power between these ages was about 11 million and will slightly decline over the period.
2. In 1940 there were in Russia about 49 million men between the ages of 15 and 64. In 1955 the number will probably increase to about 67 million. Education, both elementary and technical, has made considerable progress during the last few years. Thus, not only is the labour force increasing numerically but individual productive capacity should also increase.
3. The above numerical estimates take no account of the effects of the present war on which statistical information is lacking. We do not think, however, that these will alter the broad trends of population.
Internal Resources of Raw Materials .
4. Russia possesses large resources of foodstuffs and raw materials which should in the long run render her self-supporting in time of war, though some imports of tin, copper, natural rubber and wool are at present necessary. Her resources are widely dispersed and are in the main at a considerable distance from her frontiers. Two exceptions are first the Ukraine, an important source of foodstuffs, iron and manganese ore and coal; and second, the Caucasus, from which Russia gets about 75 per cent of her petroleum supplies.
Fuel and Power .
5. In 1945, production of coal in the U.S.S.R. will approach the 1940 level, that of oil may be as much as 25 per cent above and that of electric power about 10 per cent above. During the next five years a steady expansion of all three (and particularly coal, as the Donbass is restored) may be expected at rates which may amount to 5-10 per cent per annum.
6. It is, however, very difficult to forecast how far these supplies of fuel and power will be adequate to meet requirements. Before the war, the consumption of coal and particularly of power was relatively small by western standards having regard to Russia’s size and population. In coal and oil and possibly in power as well, there was a tendency for production to lag behind plans — pointing to a fuel and power bottleneck. Development of hydro-electric power stations may help to fill the gap but will take a long time.
7. Russia’s post-war fuel and power requirements will naturally depend on the kind of industrial expansion which she plans. If the long term objective is the kind of standard of living enjoyed before the war say in the United Kingdom or Germany, an enormous programme of capital expansion will be required, and this will require large fuel supplies.
8. Coal production may prove to be a brake on industrial expansion unless supplemented by the use of oil in industry on a considerable scale; and much the same consideration applies to power. The oil needs of an expanded road transport plan are unpredictable but may be very large.
9. Russia may therefore wish to import Polish coal at least until the productive capacity of the Donbass is fully restored.
10. Russia’s oil production in 1940 was about 32 million tons and may have risen to about 40 million tons in 1944. About three quarters of this comes from the Caucasus. By 1950 production might be as high as 50 million tons. Such suppiles will probably be sufficient not to constitute a serious limiting factor on Russia’s military and industrial effort in time of war. In peace time it would be sufficient to enable great advances to be made in industrial development and in the standards of life. Further supplies might facilitate more progress in industrial expansion, and would enable a yet higher standard of living to be attained through the development of road traffic. In time of war it would ease the Russian task.
11. The output of the Caucasus oilfields will probably increase somewhat during the next ten years, and will probably continue to be a major source of oil for Russia during the foreseeable future. At present the Caucasus is believed to account for nearly three-quarters of the proved reserves of oil in Russia. There are believed to be considerable reserves in other parts of Russia, and as these are developed the reserves in the Caucasus will represent a smaller proportion of the total than is the case now. While the Russians can hardly fear that there is early danger of reserves being exhausted, it is possible that, with the large prospective increase in her requirements, Russia may consider it desirable to conserve some of her own supplies and to secure a share in supplies elsewhere. This line of throught has arisen in the United States which has much larger proved reserves than Russia.
12. We, therefore, think that Russia will wish to import oil from Roumania and possibly elsewhere and to develop oilfields in North Persia.
Industrial Areas .
13. Russia’s long-dated industrial plans have been based on defence and strategic considerations. Industry has in consequence been developed as much as possible in areas remote from her frontiers, especially in the Volga-Urals and Kuzbas (Western Siberia) industrial regions. Important exceptions are, of course, the Moscow-Leningrad industrial region and that of the Ukraine.
14. Broadly speaking, within a period of say 10–15 years, Russia’s industrial capacity should suffice to enable her in time of war to be independent of imports, and this capacity will naturally increase with the reconstruction of Ukrainian industry and with the completion of long-term projects for the development of communications and industrialisation of outlying areas such as the South Caucasus, Central Asia and the Far East. Russia east of Lake Baikal, however, lacks the population and resources required to make this area independent of imports from the rest of Russia or overseas. There is accordingly a need to add to the economic resources of Russia’s Far Eastern territories.
Merc
antile Marine .
15. To carry the imports needed for the rapid completion of her programme of reconstruction and development, Russia may greatly expand her mercantile marine. It would be in keeping with her general policy to use her own ships so far as possible rather than to rely on foreign vessels. After the period of reconstruction foreign trade will not be so necessary for Russian economy, but it is probable she will continue to trade wherever she thinks it to her advantage to do so. We think, however, that she will so plan her economy that the continuance of her foreign trade for the maintenance of her economy in time of war will not be essential.
16. It is against this general background that we examine below in greater detail Russia’s economic situation and her strategic interests and policy in Europe, the Middle East and the Far East.
Russia’s Strategic Interests in Certain Areas.
Norway, Sweden and the Far North .
17. Russia’s principal interests in this area requiring protection will be the mines of Petsamo, which will be an important source of nickel, the ports on the Murman coast and the sea route round the North Cape; this is the shortest route for supplies from Western Europe and America, if the Baltic and Black Sea routes are closed, as they have been in this war.
18. All the above and her Northern sea route to the Far East are vulnerable to attack by any Power with naval and air forces based on North Norway. Russia’s security would therefore be increased if she were in occupation of North Norway or had bases there; but we do not think that this need dictate a Russian occupation of this area in time of peace, as it could so easily be occupied when the need arose. It would, however, be in Russia’s strategic interest that Norway and Sweden should at least not fall under the exclusive influence of any potentially hostile Power or group of Powers.
19. So far as concerns Russia’s policy in this area, present evidence suggests that she would regard it as natural that Norway should be closely associated with Great Britain. The Russian Government, indeed, stated in December 1941 that they would be prepared to support arrangements whereby Great Britain would have the right to maintain naval bases in Norway. We therefore think that, so long as Russia is satisfied with the collaboration she is receiving from Great Britain, she will see no need herself to secure bases in Norway. Russia is likely, however, to consider the maintenance of an ocean-going fleet in Far Northern waters desirable for the protection of her interests.
20. In the immediate post-war period Russia is not likely to be well disposed towards Sweden, and she will be particularly suspicious of Sweden’s relations with Finland. If there is any sign that Sweden is intriguing with the anti-Russian parties in Finland, Russia will bring pressure to bear to put an end to this. Russia will similarly try to prevent Swedish collaboration with Germany. Russia would also view with suspicion signs that Sweden was aligning herself politically with Great Britain.
Finland and the Baltic .
21. Russia’s principal strategic interests in the Baltic are the defence of the industrial area of Leningrad, of her coast-line in the Eastern Baltic and sea communications in the Baltic.
22. The defence of Leningrad would be greatly improved by the occupation of South Finland; but so long as Finland follows a policy friendly towards Russia and is not closely associated with any potentially hostile Power or group of Powers the defence of Leningrad would be adequately assured by Russia’s possesion of the Baltic States and by the base at Porkkalla which she has obtained in the armistice with Finland.
23. Since, as stated above, the maintenance of overseas trade is not likely to be of major importance for the maintenance of Russia’s economy in time of war, it will not be essential for the protection of Russian security to undertake the large commitments involved in an attempt to control the sea routes out of the Baltic. It will, however, be strategically advantageous for her to control sea communications in the Eastern Baltic, which would enable Russia to deny to Germany a large proportion of her supplies of iron ore from Sweden. In this connexion it would be to her advantage to occupy the Aland Islands, but she has hitherto showed no signs of wishing to do so.
24. Russia’s policy in defence of these interests may be as follows. It is just possible that the Russians may after the war try to stage a plebiscite in Finland such as would lead to a Finnish application for incorporation in the Soviet Union. On the whole we think such a move unlikely, since it would not be easy to fake a plebiscite in Finland unless the whole country was under Russian occupation and possibly not even then. It seems more probable that Russia will be content with the degree of military control allowed her under the armistice terms. In addition, she will require that the Government in power in Finland should follow a policy of friendship and close collaboration with Russia. If any Finnish Government showed signs of breaking away from this policy the Russians would either seek to overthrow it by intriguing with the opposition parties in Finland or in the last resort would use force to secure the overthrow of the Government.
25. Russia would wish to annex Königsberg and probably also Tilsit in order to increase her security in the Eastern Baltic. Königsberg would also be an additional port for Lithuania and White Russia.
26. Russia will probably insist on some form of international control over the Kiel Canal, even though she will be aware that no international agreement is likely to keep the Canal or, for that matter the exit from the Baltic, open for the passage of Russian ships in time of war. Russia is unlikely to have any particular political interest in Denmark and, indeed, she stated in December 1941 that she would agree to the establishment of British naval bases there.
RUSSIA ’S WESTERN FRONTIER .
27. For reasons of geography and communications a serious threat to the security of Russia as a whole can only be mounted across her Western frontier between the Baltic and the Carpathians. In this area Russia’s frontier is geographically ill-defined and has no strong natural defences. Russia therefore requires considerable depth of defence to ensure that the enemy cannot by surprise-attack overrun Moscow and the industrial areas and sources of raw materials in the Ukraine. Russia also needs depth for the deployment of her air defences of these centres.
28. South of the Carpathians the poor communications of South-East Europe would make it very difficult to mount a major-attack on the Ukraine.
29. Russia’s western frontier can in practice only be seriously threatened by Germany or by other Powers acting in concert with Germany. A threat might in theory develop from a combination of Poland with other Powers, but to be a serious menace this would also require the use of German territory. Accordingly the security of Russia’s western frontier will depend above all else on the solution of the German problem.
30. In order to ensure that the menace of German aggression shall be eliminated for the longest possible period, Russia will wish, first to keep Germany weak, secondly to build up along her own frontiers a system of buffer States designed to take the first shock of aggression and to give added depth to her own defence, and thirdly to ensure that the Western Powers continue to act as the other side of the ring around Germany. We examine below the policy that Russia is likely to pursue towards the countries concerned in order to secure these objectives.
Germany
31. It is not possible to forecast the precise lines of Russian policy towards Germany. Stalin appears to favour the breaking up of Germany into a number of independent states; on the other hand, the Russian representative on the European Advisory Commission has strongly advocated the retention or creation of a central German Government. Though these proposals are not mutually exclusive, they suggest that Russian views on territorial questions have not yet crystallised. In general, however, Russia’s main preoccupation in her policy towards Germany will be to ensure as far as possible that she does not again threaten Russian security. In the economic field it seems likely from her armistice terms with the satellites, that she will make heavy demands for reparation and satisfy the claim by the wholesale removal of industrial p
lant and equipment, transport facilities and the raw material surpluses from her zone of occupation; and by the use of several million German prisoners of war in the rebuilding of her devastated areas. Further, Russia is likely to exercise her political influence over her Western neighbours in the direction of dissociating their economies from that of Germany and perhaps of depriving Germany even in peace time of imports of strategic materials from these sources. Though Russia might not be prepared to submit her own trade in raw materials to any form of international control, even if it were designed primarily to control German imports of such materials, she would probably be willing to give her general support to such a system so long as it served to keep Germany weak. She would be likely to intensify the violence of her economic measures against Germany if she regarded Anglo-American policy as being coloured by the desire to conserve the industrial potential of Western Germany, none the less if it were advocated in the interest of general European or world prosperity.
32. If Germany is kept dismembered, the complexion of the Governments of the resulting States would be a matter of secondary importance to Russia. No doubt she would support any Left-wing parties prepared to collaborate with her; but she would be equally ready to work with any other parties that were similarly disposed. If Germany were not dismembered, or having been dismembered were reunited, Russia would not necessarily welcome the development of a unified Communist Germany such as might become a dangerous rival to Communist Russia.
Poland.
33. While Poland by herself cannot be a menace to Russia, an attack between the Baltic and the Carpathians must come through Polish territory and it will therefore be in Russia’s strategic interest to ensure that Poland’s foreign policy is based on co-operation with Russia.
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