Spying on the World
Page 32
Interestingly, the JIC’s assessments of Soviet and Chinese intentions were echoed in Foreign Office planning documents just weeks later. The committee accurately forecast that the Soviets would seek to avoid direct involvement in the conflict. Meanwhile, it argued that the Chinese were unlikely to intervene should American activity be limited to South Vietnam, but perhaps overestimated the Chinese threat should the Americans interfere in North Vietnam. The assessment drew on MI6 and Foreign Office analysis, where it was argued that although China would take advantage of troubles in any adjacent area, Peking would be unlikely to intervene decisively. Shortly afterwards, diplomats in the Foreign Office repeated the JIC’s view when planning policy. They wrote that ‘the Russians do not welcome a war in Indo China and we do not believe that the Chinese would intervene unless they felt the security of North Vietnam was directly threatened’. 6
The JIC returned to the issue in February 1964. The Chiefs of Staff requested an intelligence assessment of the consequences of deeper American involvement in Vietnam and of American withdrawal from South Vietnam. Despite the JIC’s transition into the Cabinet Office in 1957, the Chiefs of Staff continued to request all-source intelligence assessments on military matters. They remained keen consumers. Regarding Vietnam, however, the Foreign Office also sought information. Diplomats therefore supported the military’s request. Indeed, Douglas-Home’s government as a whole was concerned about Soviet or Chinese intervention in the conflict should it escalate. This would have turned the conflict into a major, and potentially devastating, Cold War confrontation. Douglas-Home’s successor, Harold Wilson, shared these concerns. 7 The JIC’s assessment was issued around two weeks later, on 12 March. Marked ‘Top Secret’ and ‘UK Eyes Only’, it is reproduced below.
The assessment was similar to that of 1962. Echoing its earlier concern, the JIC warned about the disastrous consequences of withdrawal. It must be remembered that the UK’s primary focus at this point was the confrontation between Indonesia and Malaysia. An American retreat from Vietnam would have had disastrous effects on the British position in Malaysia. Indeed, Douglas-Home was busy discussing these various scenarios with Washington in early 1964 whilst the JIC assessment was being prepared. Britain sought to link the two conflicts in the hope of being able to influence American policy in the region. 8
Meanwhile, the committee remained realistic that a military victory would be long and difficult. In fact, the JIC judged that deeper US intervention might not lead to victory at all. This was an important assessment given the context of imminent American escalation. Once more the JIC predicted embarrassment. The British government was torn between its Cold War and ‘special relationship’ commitments on the one hand, and fears, on the other, that deeper military engagement was not working. 9 Indeed, the JIC concluded that conflict inside Vietnam would place severe strains on SEATO.
This proved to be prophetic. As the report was being prepared, Douglas-Home reported to the House of Commons that he had recently met with President Lyndon Johnson and that his government supported American policy, which was intended to ‘help the Republic of South Vietnam to protect its people and to preserve its independence’. 10 Shortly after the report was disseminated, Foreign Secretary Rab Butler told US National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy that ‘an incursion into North Vietnamese territory would … create difficulties for us’. Echoing JIC conclusions, he feared that US plans would ‘probably provoke the Soviet Union and China into action’. 11 And yet the following August, the US Congress authorised Johnson to engage in military activity against North Vietnam. This essentially allowed a dramatic escalation of the Vietnam War. Johnson’s advisers stressed to him that America would win if more pressure was applied and, from February 1965, bombing of North Vietnamese targets began. Increased military action served only to intensify the British government’s dilemma. Moreover, the election of Harold Wilson in October 1964 complicated matters further. Unlike his predecessor, Wilson not only had to balance American pressures but had to factor in the left-wing views of the Labour Party. 12
In contrast to its American equivalent, the JIC had acquired around twenty years’ experience of assessing counterinsurgency by the time of Vietnam. Unlike the United States, the UK maintained a consulate in Hanoi with MI6 representation for most of the Vietnam War, which was a continued source of excellent reporting for both London and Washington. 13 Although the JIC learnt its lessons slowly, it was well equipped to issue realistic appreciations of the situation in the 1960s. As a result, its conclusions were highly relevant to government policy deliberations.
SECRET
(THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY’S GOVERNMENT)
J.I.C. (64) 26 (Terms of Reference) COPY NO. 26
27th February, 1964 IMMEDIATE
U.K. EYES ONLY
CABINET
JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE
THE CONSEQUENCES OF DEEPER UNITED STATES INVOLVEMENT IN VIETNAM OR UNITED STATES WITHDRAWAL FROM SOUTH VIETNAM
Note by the Secretary
The Chiefs of Staff (C.O.S. 17th Meeting/64 Item 9) have invited the J.I.C. to examine the consequences of deeper United States involvement in Vietnam and of United States withdrawal from South Vietnam. An up to date report on this subject is also required urgently by the Foreign Office, and Departments mainly concerned have been asked to send contributions by 10 a.m. on MONDAY, 2nd MARCH to the J.I.S. (2nd Team) who will prepare a Preliminary Draft for early circulation.
2. The report will be based on relevant material in J.I.C. (64) 22 (Final) and J.I.C. (62) 12 (Final), and an examination of the various forms which United States action might possibly take. A list of these is attached at Annex.
(Signed) J.M.C. VIVIAN
for Secretary,
Joint Intelligence Committee
Cabinet Office, S.W.1.
27th February, 1964.
SECRET – U.K. EYES ONLY
ANNEX TO
J..I.C. (64) 26 (Terms of Reference)
POSSIBLE FORMS OF UNITED STATES ACTION
South Vietnam
(a) Stationing of United States forces in Saigon or other population centres.
(b) Participation of United States combat forces in the fighting either individually or in support of South Vietnam forces.
(c) Direct air attacks on Viet Cong targets.
(d) In connection with (b) use of tactical nuclear weapons in the fighting.
(e) Air surveillance of the land and sea frontiers to prevent infiltration by the Viet Cong.
(f) Implementation of SEATO plan 7 (counter insurgency in Vietnam) thereby involving other SEATO countries in the fighting.
North Vietnam
(a) Invasion by United States combat troops.
(b) Support for invasion by South Vietnam combat units.
(c) Support for the establishment of South Vietnamese guerrilla operations including covert sabotage and terrorist activities.
(d) Air attacks on lines of communication or installations used for supplying the Viet Cong.
(e) Bombing of military and population centres with aim of weakening the economy.
(f) Naval blockade or harrassing [sic] by light naval forces.
(g) Bombing of targets in China close to North Vietnam border.
(h) Use of selective nuclear bombing.
THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY’S GOVERNMENT
The circulation of this paper has been strictly limited.
It is issued for the personal use of………………….
TOP SECRET
Copy No. 10
J.I.C. (64) 26 (Final)
12 March, 1964 U.K. EYES ONLY
CABINET
JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE
THE CONSEQUENCES OF DEEPER UNITED STATES INVOLVEMENT IN VIETNAM OR UNITED STATES WITHDRAWAL FROM SOUTH VIETNAM
Report by the Joint Intelligence Committee
SUMMARY OF THE REPORT AND CONCLUSIONS
In Part I of ou
r report at Annex we examine the implications of deeper United States involvement in Vietnam in the form of either a heavier commitment, including combat troops, in South Vietnam or of action against North Vietnam. In Part II we examine the likely consequences of United States withdrawal from South Vietnam.
2. Since 1962 the United States has provided massive military assistance to South Vietnam. Over the same period the rapid expansion of the South Vietnamese forces has inevitably resulted in a number of weaknesses which have been aggravated by the recent coups and the consequent confusion in the military and civil administration. Since January, 1964 Viet Cong military and subversive activities have increased throughout the country. Prospects of any significant improvement in the military situation in the immediate future are not good.
3. We conclude that:-
PART I
(a) Whatever the form of United States action and whatever the degree of South Vietnamese Government/United States military success against the Viet Cong thereby achieved, decisive and final defeat of the Viet Cong cannot be achieved by military means alone. The fundamental task remains that of inducing the South Vietnamese authorities to undertake and persist in a programme of the necessary administrative, social and economic measures, and to winning popular confidence in, and support for such a programme;
(b) a heavier United States military commitment in South Vietnam in the form of the garrisoning of key towns and/or the introduction and use of combat units, might halt the present deterioration in the military situation and give the South Vietnamese Government a breathing space to get new measures under way, but it would raise difficult problems and might in the longer run be counter-productive;
(c) even full-scale intervention would not lead to a lasting solution for a very long time, if at all;
(d) the cutting off of North Vietnamese assistance to the Viet Cong would not ensure a speedy end to the insurrection in South Vietnam;
(e) if the United States took military action confined to South Vietnam the North Vietnamese would probably increase their covert support to the Viet Cong and appeal to the Soviet Union and China for increased material support, the Chinese would give them full diplomatic and propaganda support and probably step up military supplies. The communist countries generally would probably mount a world-wide campaign, in particular demanding the reconvening of Geneva Conference in the interests of maintaining peace;
(f) there is some scope for covert support for guerrilla activity among the tribes of north-west North Vietnam and this if successful could lead to localised disturbances and perhaps to revolts elsewhere in the countryside, the news of which could have some effect on Viet Cong morale, and encourage Government forces in South Vietnam;
(g) if the United States took military action against North Vietnam the Chinese would give direct military support, including “volunteers” and air cover to the North Vietnamese. They might give overt support to the Pathet Lao in Laos, and would step up their subversive effort elsewhere in the area. Unless they expected general war, they would not take military or other decisive action against Hong Kong;
(h) the first Soviet objective would be to avoid the issue if at all possible by seeking to deter the United States from action against North Vietnam. The Soviet Union might also put pressure on North Vietnam to make some temporary concessions, if they thought this would work. If the United States went ahead with action against North Vietnam the Soviet Union would probably supply the North Vietnamese with some arms and ammunition and might well reconsider the possibility of arms supply to China to the same end. Nevertheless the Russians would wish to keep their involvement to a minimum, and in any case would stop short of any action which might lead to their involvement in nuclear war;
(i) it would be difficult for the United States to obtain much support internationally for direct military action against North Vietnam, or to avoid condemnation in the United Nations;
(j) a limited non-nuclear war in Vietnam would probably be protracted and indecisive; it would not spread outside mainland South East Asia and it could lead to severe strains within SEATO;
PART II
(k) if, as the eventual result of United States withdrawal, South Vietnam were to fall under complete or partial communist control, the West would suffer a severe blow in the context of the world–wide struggle against communism; the United States and SEATO would be discredited and the latter would probably disintegrate; communist influence in South East Asia would increase; and the whole Western position in the area would be seriously damaged.
(Signed) BERNARD BURROWS
of [sic] behalf of the
Joint Intelligence Committee
Cabinet Office, S.W.1.
12th March, 1964
ANNEX TO
J.I.C. (64) 26 (Final)
the consequences oF deeper united states involvement in VIETNAM OR UNITED STATES WITHDRAWAL FROM SOUTH VIETNAM
In this report we examine in Part I the consequences of deeper United States involvement in Vietnam and in Part II the consequences of United States withdrawal from South Vietnam. We set out an introduction to both parts of the paper in a single section immediately below.
INTRODUCTION
The Viet Cong
2. We believe that the strength of the Viet Cong regular forces has now risen to about 25,000 men. In addition there is a large reservoir of at least 100,000 partly armed and trained supporters in South Vietnam, the number may even be as high as 200,000. The population of South Vietnam is about 15 million and that of North Vietnam about 18 million.
3. The Government of North Vietnam exercises general direction over the Viet Cong. Some equipment, mainly small arms and light support weapons and medical items, from North Vietnam reaches the Viet Cong in the hands of the infiltrators, who numbered about 3,000 in 1963. But in the main the guerillas [sic] rely on obtaining weapons, about 6,000 in 1963, by capture from South Vietnamese Government forces, and recruits by local “recruiting”. The hard core of the Viet Cong are by now so well indoctrinated and trained that even if it were possible to cut off their ties with North Vietnam this would probably have little or no immediate effect on their ability to continue their operations, although it might have some effect on their morale and it would force them to rely entirely on local sources for expansion. It would not significantly reduce the problem of defeating the Viet Cong for a very considerable time.
4. Although it might be possible to seal off the frontier between North and South Vietnam, large stretches of the South Vietnamese frontier with Laos and Cambodia are controlled by the Viet Cong, and the terrain is such that interdiction of supply routes across it would be virtually impossible. Furthermore the long coastline offers considerable scope for the smuggling of arms by sea.
5. Civil Administrative Activities . The broad Viet Cong aim has been to weaken and ultimately supplant the Government by controlling as much countryside as possible and isolating the urban centres remaining under Government control. Starting in relatively inaccessible areas the Viet Cong’s plan was to establish zones whose original main purpose was to train and re-group military cadres, serve as a launching area for attacks, and to provide reception centres for infiltrators and arms. These areas have been progressively increased. Certain of them have become completely communist-controlled and strong enough to resist attack by government forces. In these areas the Viet Cong levy and collect taxes, finance and direct agricultural programmes, engage in multifarious economic and commercial enterprises, conscript cadres and indoctrinate the populace. Though coercion and extortion are used in many cases, the Viet Cong are under strict orders to respect the peasant and his property. All this presupposes some sort of administrative machinery. Whilst the broad co-ordination of policy appears to be carried out by the Liberation Front presumably in Hanoi, the Viet Cong war zones and organisations in South Vietnam appear to have a very large measure of local autonomy probably with overt party organisations in the controlled areas, and also provisional local government units simi
lar to those established in the war against the French. If it is true, as reported recently, that civil administrative specialists are infiltrating from North Vietnam and dispersing to various areas in the communist-held south, this could mark an important stage in the consolidation of the Viet Cong foothold. The United States, and South Vietnamese Forces
6. Following the United States decision to increase military aid to South Vietnam, a United States Military Assistance Command M.A.C.(V) was set up in Saigon in January, 1962 and was completely formed by May, 1962. This Command replaced the United States M.A.A.G. which had operated in South Vietnam for some years, and which remains in the country, subordinate to M.A.C.(V). The clear determination on the part of the Americans to give massive aid overtly to the South Vietnamese had an immediate result. At practically all levels of the official South Vietnamese civil and military hierarchy, morale began to rise and the defeatist sentiment, which had been widespread in 1961, began to dissipate. However, any hopes that there might have been for a quick solution to the problem have been dissolved by the drawn out and bitter 1962/1963 campaigns.
7. The United States build-up was impressive. In late 1961 barely a thousand United States servicemen were stationed in South Vietnam. There are now about 15,000 in the country. These do not include combat troops but in practice American supporting units are frequently closely involved in actual operations.