Kidnappings and other activities
10. While the evidence is scanty, we continue to believe that there is a significant risk that the extremist groups may attempt kidnappings of Israelis and prominent Jews associated with Israel anywhere in the world, and of prominent American, British and other European individuals such as diplomats in the Middle East or elsewhere. The groups may also continue small scale bomb attacks against Israeli property such as the attack on the El Al office in London last year. In the Middle East itself, it is probably correct that, as the Jordanian authorities are suggesting, the fedayeen groups would now find it less easy than previously to stage such activities and would to some extent be deterred by the thought of counter-measures. Even in the Lebanon, where they enjoy the greatest freedom of action at present, the latter prospect could have this effect.
Conclusion
11. The evidence available to us does not permit us to draw any firm conclusions about the order of priority of the terrorist groups. However it does seem that the PFLP – the largest and most important extremist group – is now less interested in the hijacking of aircraft and the same may be true of the other extremist groups. This appears to be largely the result of the increasing hostility of Arab governments, whose attitude may make it somewhat harder for these groups to carry out other kinds of terrorist activities in most Arab states. However, the terrorists may reckon that circumstances in the Gulf area have not greatly changed and that US and to a lesser extent British oil installations present an attractive target for sabotage. The evidence suggests that terrorist groups may have particular plans for sabotage of oil installations including tankers. While politically Israeli oil installations or tankers would be the best target, these are known to be well guarded, and tankers or other ships belonging to US or British controlled companies may seem a more practicable proposition. Tankers of any nationality carrying oil to or from Israel would be a particularly inviting target. The terrorists are, in our view, more likely to contemplate sabotage than the hijacking of ships, though the latter possibility cannot be discounted. The threats of sabotage/hijacking of ships are by no means confined to the Middle East, though the Gulf may be seen as offering the greatest scope for successful operations at the present time. At the same time we would expect the extremist groups to continue to show interest in other types of terrorist activity, including particularly kidnappings, which will similarly not be limited to the Middle East.
Signed W N ASH
for Secretary,
Joint Intelligence Committees
Cabinet Office, SW1
30 October 1970
Notes
1 . Gérard Chaliand and Arnaud Blin, ‘From 1968 to Radical Islam’, in Gérard Chaliand and Arnaud Blin (eds), The History of Terrorism: From Antiquity to Al Qaeda (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007), pp. 225–41; Ariel Merari, ‘Attacks on Civil Aviation: Trends and Lessons’, Terrorism and Political Violence 10/3 (1998), p. 10; Incident Detail, RAND Database of Worldwide Terrorist Incidents, http://smapp.rand.org/rwtid/incident_detail.php?id=704 (last accessed 31 October 2013).
2 . Christopher Andrew, The Defence of the Realm: The Authorized History of MI5 (London: Allen Lane, 2009), pp. 600, 614.
3 . Richard Aldrich, GCHQ: The Uncensored Story of Britain’s Most Secret Intelligence Agency (London: HarperPress, 2011), p. 299.
4 . For more information on this case study see Rory Cormac, ‘Much Ado about Nothing: Terrorism, Intelligence, and the Mechanics of Threat Exaggeration’, Terrorism and Political Violence 25/3 (2013), pp. 476–93.
5 . Dudgeon (Marine and Transport Dept FCO) to Ritchie (Permanent Under-Secretary’s Department), ‘Guerrilla Threat to Shipping: Intelligence Aspects’, 16th October 1970. TNA: FCO 76/18.
6 . Philip Davies, Intelligence and Government in Britain and the United States: A Comparative Perspective, Vol. 2: Evolution of the UK Intelligence Community (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2012), pp. 40–1.
7 . Sir Michael Dacres Butler, interview, 1 October 1997, Churchill Archives, Cambridge.
8 . Hooper to Trend, ‘Guerrilla Threats to Shipping’, 23 October 1970; handwritten note from Summerscale (Assessments Staff) to Thomson, ‘Guerrilla Threat to Shipping’, 26 October 1970. TNA: CAB 163/196.
9 . Working Party on Acts of Violence Against Civil Aircraft minutes, 2 November 1970, GEN 9(70) 10th Meeting. TNA: CAB 130/475.
10 . Ibid.
11 . Ibid.
16
NORTHERN IRELAND:
DIRECT RULE
S INCE ITS CREATION in 1936, the JIC has overwhelmingly focused on developments overseas. From eastern Europe to the Middle East to Malaysia, the committee has scoured the globe for threats to British security and interests. From the late 1960s, however, the JIC was also forced to concentrate on issues closer to home. An escalation of intercommunal violence in Northern Ireland brought about the lengthy period known as the Troubles. As was often the case regarding irregular and non-Cold War threats, however, the JIC was slow off the mark.
The JIC began to consider Ireland in the months leading up to April 1966, when officials grew concerned about security during the fiftieth anniversary of the Easter Rising. As the historian Eunan O’Halpin has revealed, however, the JIC then proceeded to ignore the deteriorating political and security conditions in Northern Ireland over the following couple of years. The JIC did not revisit the situation until 1968 in the aftermath of unrest following the civil rights marches. At this point, the committee established an Ulster Working Group. Although the JIC was initially surprised by the extent of the unfolding crisis, Northern Ireland featured fairly regularly on the JIC agenda by the summer of 1969. 1
Demonstrating interesting similarities with the committee’s response to earlier unrest in the British colonies, the JIC’s role was twofold. Firstly, it sought to improve the intelligence system in Northern Ireland. Given the initial flaws in the machinery, this proved to be an important function. Indeed, the Prime Minister himself, Edward Heath, read and annotated the JIC Secretary’s valedictory thoughts on the topic in 1972, and in fact called for action to implement some of the points made. 2 The committee’s input into the intelligence and security machinery raises interesting questions about its role in setting the parameters of intelligence operations, from internment to sanctioning the infamous five interrogation techniques (including stress positions and sleep deprivation). Secondly, the JIC maintained its traditional role of intelligence assessment to aid policy formulation. This chapter focuses on the latter role.
As the Troubles became a regular fixture on the JIC agenda, the committee began to update policymakers on the security situation as well as the strength and intentions of the paramilitary groups. 3 Perhaps owing to the complexity, sensitivity and proximity of the violence, the JIC felt compelled to issue both a warning and a reminder to its consumers in 1971. The assessment opened by stating that ‘the summary below only highlights some of the major points in the paper and cannot by its very nature convey the nuances of the Irish situation’. Such a statement is highly unusual and perhaps represents JIC caution given the contentious issues involved. The committee was apparently more conscious of political misuse of its intelligence with regard to Ireland than to other irregular threats in more far-flung places. The same report also included a reminder to the government of the importance of policy in shaping the landscape of the conflict, including that such matters lay beyond the jurisdiction of the JIC. The committee, of course, does not recommend policy but it seems strange that, again when it came to Ireland, a reminder was necessary. 4
JIC intelligence assessments did, however, influence policy debates. The imposition of direct rule in March 1972 instructively demonstrates the interaction between the JIC and the policy community. Military planners and the most senior policymakers needed intelligence to inform contingency planning. Heath’s strategy was based on the assumption that in circumstances of direct rule ‘we could continue to rely on the loyalty of the Royal Ulster Constab
ulary (RUC) and the public service in Northern Ireland’. But the Prime Minister had concerns. He asked his Home Secretary, Reginald Maudling: ‘Suppose that that assumption proved to be invalid. Have we alternative plans ready?’ 5 Maudling reassured Heath that there was no reason to assume that ‘the vast majority [of NI civil service] would not remain basically loyal’. He believed that the RUC would remain faithful but would be ‘likely to need a good deal of stiffening’. Maudling informed Heath that JIC reports on intelligence requirements remained valid but that the issue was being looked at again. 6
New evidence began to question this optimistic outlook. Lord Carrington, the Defence Secretary, had recently visited Northern Ireland and warned of a real risk of mass withdrawal of labour from all public services, including not only the civil service but also the police. Summarising the new information, which also included other reports and a recent JIC paper, Burke Trend, the Cabinet Secretary, warned that ‘direct rule would represent an even more appalling strain on our resources than we have hitherto been prepared to contemplate’. If Carrington was correct, according to Trend, ministers needed to abandon the concept of direct rule as had hitherto been conceived, and instead be prepared to consider ‘something like military government and martial law administration’. 7
Ministers needed a fresh intelligence assessment of the implications of direct rule. So too did the military. Indeed, the Chiefs of Staff emphasised the ‘urgent need’ for an assessment upon which planning could be based. This was particularly the case given that word was beginning to reach the military that ministers now feared direct rule would have a much more serious effect on the police and civil service than had previously been assumed. Despite the urgency and to the frustration of the military, intelligence was not immediately forthcoming. The JIC had been provided with a list of questions to consider, but, for reasons that remain unclear, the committee had not actually started the assessment. The Chiefs of Staff were forced to ask the Permanent Under-Secretary at the MoD to pressure Trend to get the ball rolling. 8
The JIC’s report was eventually issued on 6 January 1972 and is reproduced below. Acknowledging the highly speculative nature of the assessment, the JIC broadly concluded that reactions to direct rule would depend principally on the circumstances of its introduction. 9 Trend later summarised the conclusions for the Prime Minister:
A recent JIC assessment of reactions to direct rule suggests that the majority of the RUC and the Civil Service would remain loyal but that for the bulk of the Protestant population (and to some extent for the RUC) much would depend on the circumstances in which measures were taken, the way in which they were presented, and what they appeared to be leading to. Assurances regarding the border would be important; the reaction to the possibility of minor boundary adjustments is difficult to assess. 10
Trend explicitly drew on the JIC’s conclusions when briefing Heath on policy options. The Cabinet Secretary’s advice, offered in January 1972, is worth quoting in full:
We must accept that we have really reached the end of the road as regards solutions which do not carry a serious risk of direct rule as the inevitable outcome; and we can perhaps extract some comfort from the latest JIC assessment which, in assessing probable reactions to the introduction of direct rule, says that ‘the Protestant reaction would probably be calmest if direct rule were introduced at a time when IRA violence had ceased but their capacity for violence remained unimpaired and there seemed a high risk of its resurgence in the not too distant future. In these circumstances the Protestants would probably be ready to wait and see what occurred.’ We may not be far from the point at which these conditions could be said, broadly, to have been realised. If so, we are perhaps approaching the juncture at which the Home Secretary’s plan could be launched with the least risk of provoking an uncontrollable situation. 11 If we let that moment pass, it may not recur – if only because attitudes will tend to harden once again as the Protestants believe that they have ‘won’ and the Catholics retreat into sullen opposition. This suggests that, in principle, we should perhaps be prepared to give the plan a run at the right moment, even if only faute de mieux . 12
Trend’s plan was overtaken by events. Bloody Sunday, the killing of fourteen unarmed civilians by the British army, occurred ten days later. The republican backlash clearly negated Trend’s belief that the JIC’s aforementioned criteria were close to being met. Despite this, something needed to be done. Violence had escalated too far.
Heath hesitated. The JIC had warned him that both sides would see direct rule as the first step towards reunification. However, the head of the army in Northern Ireland assured him that any Protestant backlash would develop slowly, allowing reinforcements to be sent. 13 Accordingly, direct rule was implemented in late March 1972. Interestingly, the civil service of Northern Ireland adapted to direct rule remarkably well. In line with JIC predictions, it remained loyal. Indeed, the civil service helped provide continuity and stability in the administration of key services. 14 Although seen as a temporary measure, direct rule would last until 1999.
U.K. EYES ONLY
SECRET
PERIMETER
THIS DOCUMEMT IS THE PROPERTY OF HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY’S GOVERNMENT
JIC(A)(71) 54 COPY NO 152
6 January 1972 PERIMETER
UK EYES ONLY
CABINET NOT FOR INTEGRATED OR EXCHANGE POST OFFICERS
JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE (A)
…
THE PROBABLE REACTIONS TO THE INTRODUCTION OF DIRECT RULE IN NORTHERN IRELAND
…
Report by the Joint Intelligence Committee (A)
PART I – SUMMARY
1. Predictions can at this stage only be highly speculative. Reactions to Direct Rule would depend principally on the circumstances of its introduction, particularly in relation to the security situation, and on what the two Communities believed would follow it. The current belief among both Catholics and Protestants is that Direct Rule would be the first step towards reunification. Opinions in Northern Ireland are changeable, particularly on the Protestant side and this paper will need to be kept under constant review.
2. There is a degree of general recognition among Protestants that it is now impossible to return to the system that has prevailed hitherto. They would, if Direct Rule were introduced, attach the highest importance to a pledge that the consent of the majority would be needed before reunification could take place, although it might be difficult to dispel doubts about Her Majesty’s Government’s ability or willingness to keep the pledge for any length of time. If such a pledge were not believed, they might oppose the measure with violence. But even in this case the violence would probably be of manageable proportions unless Protestants believed they were in danger of being handed over to the South at an early stage without their consent.
3. A majority of the Civil Services, Judiciary and RUC would be likely to co-operate. The attitude of the RUC would be critical for the continued flow of intelligence. The essential point for them would be their confidence in Her Majesty’s Government’s intentions on the border.
4. The Catholics would see the measure as ending the Unionist monopoly of power and expect it to be used to introduce radical changes. The Brady IRA would probably step up violence against the Army and RUC if they could, while the Gouldingites would be likely to concentrate on the Civil Disobedience campaign. Both would use intimidation where necessary. Direct Rule would be welcomed in the Republic if it seemed likely to be the prelude to radical change in the North.
5. Even if IRA violence were to be suppressed now, it could be expected to break out again before very long and Catholics would not acquiesce in permanent Unionist rule. Direct Rule would not by itself make much difference to the situation. Neither Community has full trust in Westminster. Most would see Direct Rule as providing at best a breathing space, perhaps a short one, in which Her Majesty’s Government could introduce new policies. If early proposals for radical change were not made by Westmins
ter, continued action against the IRA could persuade Catholics that Her Majesty’s Government’s purpose was to ensure Protestant domination.
Signed STEWART CRAWFORD Chairman, on
behalf of the Joint Intelligence
Committee (A)
Cabinet Office
6 January 1972
THE PROBABLE REACTIONS TO THE INTRODUCTION
OF DIRECT RULE IN NORTHERN IRELAND
PART II: MAIN REPORT
INTRODUCTION
Predicting the effects of Direct Rule in Northern Ireland is highly speculative. It is important to bear this in mind from the outset, for in January 1972 the Committee cannot be sure of the circumstances in which the measure might be introduced, the immediate policies Her Majesty’s Government might adopt, or even the long-term purpose of Direct Rule. Opinions in Northern Ireland are changeable, particularly on the Protestant side, and this paper will need to be kept under constant review.
2. We therefore begin this paper by setting out some of the major considerations which might govern the timing of the measure and the reasons for its introduction, together with some of the assumptions which seem likely to govern Her Majesty’s Government’s policy. With these points in mind we then describe probable first reactions to Direct Rule. The likely reactions of people in Northern Ireland to various constitutional arrangements which might be considered following the imposition of Direct Rule are discussed in the Annex.
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