In the late summer of 2002, Blair’s government grew increasingly concerned about the public debate in the UK. The media presented military action as being imminent. Accordingly, the press and parliamentarians sought answers to why Britain was seemingly planning to invade Iraq. To alleviate the pressure, Blair decided to release more information on Iraqi WMD into the public domain. 8 This decision was almost unprecedented. Although governments had a history of releasing sanitised intelligence to selected media outlets (for example through the Cold War Information Research Department), it was the first time any government had explicitly drawn on JIC material to justify action to the British public. There is one known parallel from the committee’s history, however. In 1964, Britain was under pressure in the United Nations after bombing Yemeni territory in what was perceived as an imperial misadventure. The JIC was commissioned to compile a publishable dossier implicating the Egyptians in the conflict to help justify Britain’s policy stance. It drew on some fairly flimsy intelligence to support this preconceived objective. It is unclear, however, whether the report was issued publicly (at the UN) under the authority of the JIC. 9
Blair’s infamous dossier was commissioned on 3 September. According to Lord Butler, the JIC’s September report ‘exercised considerable influence’ over the government’s dossier. Both were prepared at practically the same time. As Butler has pointed out, the dossier incorporated the precautionary conclusions from the JIC report but omitted the caveats. 10 The September dossier was, and remains, divisive.
A string of government inquiries have dismissed any allegations that intelligence was knowingly embellished by the government. The Intelligence and Security Committee, for example, noted that the dossier had in fact been endorsed by the JIC. 11 Similarly, Butler’s review dismissed accusations that the government misused intelligence to explicitly make a case for war. The JIC Chairman, John Scarlett, believed that the dossier did not make the case for anything. Similarly, Jack Straw, the Foreign Secretary, stated that the dossier was simply designed to meet the public demand for ‘intelligence-based information’. 12 The policymakers did not fabricate or ‘sex up’ intelligence to make a case for an unpopular war. At worst, they pushed the available intelligence to its credible limits by exaggeration, artful selection and ignoring caveats. 13
The problems arose in the foreword to the dossier and Tony Blair’s performance in Parliament on the day of publication. One former defence intelligence official, a particularly forceful critic of this episode, has argued that ‘while the dossier itself was a fair summary of the JIC’s conclusions over the years, the Executive Summary painted an overstark picture, while the Prime Minister’s foreword went completely over the top’. 14 Meanwhile, when addressing MPs on the day of publication, Blair reinforced the impression that there was firmer and fuller intelligence underpinning the dossier. He personally assured Parliament that the intelligence was ‘extensive, detailed, [and] authoritative’. 15 Lord Butler has since acknowledged that the British public ‘have “every right” to feel misled by their Prime Minister.’ 16 With hindsight, Tony Blair regrets writing the foreword. He should have just published the sanitised intelligence. 17
Of course, it has since been revealed that both JIC intelligence and the dossier were wrong. No WMD have been found in the Iraqi desert. In December 2004, the JIC reviewed the extent to which its intelligence underpinned the dossier. The results were published by the ISC and are worth quoting at length:
a. Nuclear weapons – The 2002 JIC judgement that ‘Iraq is pursuing a nuclear weapons programme. But it will not be able to indigenously produce a nuclear weapon while sanctions remain in place’ was wrong in that Iraq was not pursuing a nuclear weapons programme, but correct on Iraq’s nuclear ambitions and its inability to produce a nuclear weapon under sanctions.
b. Ballistic weapons – In 2002, the JIC judged that ‘Iraq retains up to 20 Al-Hussein ballistic missiles’. This has not been substantiated. The 2002 JIC judgement that ‘Iraq has begun development of medium-range ballistic missiles over 1,000km’ has been partially substantiated: the ISG 18 found that Iraq had authorised its scientists to develop missiles with ranges in excess of the 150km UNSC [United Nations Security Council] limit (a number of which were destroyed under UNMOVIC [United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission] supervision before the war), and had designs for missiles with ranges up to 1,000km.
c. Chemical weapons (CW) – In 2002, the JIC judged that ‘Iraq may retain some stocks of chemical agents … Iraq could produce significant quantities of mustard within weeks, significant quantities of Sarin and VX [nerve agents] within months, and in the case of VX may already have done so.’ Although a capability to produce some agents probably existed, this judgement has not been substantiated. The ISG found that Saddam intended to resume a CW effort once sanctions were lifted.
d. Biological weapons (BW) – In 2002, the JIC judged that ‘Iraq currently has available, either from pre-Gulf War, or more recent production, a number of biological agents … Iraq could produce more of these biological agents within days.’ The ISG found that Iraq had dual-use facilities which could have allowed BW production to resume, but not within the timeframes judged by the JIC, and found no evidence that production had been activated. The ISG found that Saddam probably intended to resume a BW programme if and when the opportunity arose.
e. Intentions and scenarios – In 2002, the JIC judged that ‘Saddam … might use CBW … against coalition forces, neighbouring states and his own people. Israel could be his first target.’ Although reporting which informed this judgement was subsequently withdrawn, based on Iraq’s actions pre-1991 and during the first Gulf War this would have remained a reasonable judgement. 19
The Iraq WMD story also sheds light on the JIC’s friends and allies. The intelligence communities in Australia, Denmark, France, Germany, Israel and many other countries got it wrong, triggering waves of inquiries in parallel to the Butler review. Like Britain, many countries were influenced by the fact they had underestimated Iraqi WMD stocks in 1990–1. Determined not to be wrong a second time they too overcorrected. Only the Canadians called it right – perhaps the finest moment in the history of Ottawa’s intelligence assessments machine. 20
Although flawed, the dossier episode represented a remarkable effort to put JIC material into the public domain. Intended to explain, by drawing on intelligence, why the government was treating Iraq as a policy priority, the plan backfired. The most infamous event in the committee’s history, Iraq has come to define public perceptions of the JIC. Indeed, yet another inquiry into the decisions underpinning the invasion of Iraq began in 2009. Iraqi WMD form an important case study in producer–consumer relations and mistakes were undoubtedly made. Using declassified documents, readers can make up their own minds about the levels of politicisation or misuse. It is important, however, not to allow this episode to cloud judgements of the committee’s long and (generally) impressive history.
TOP SECRET Declassified 2004
JIC Assessment, 9 September 2002
IRAQI USE OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS – POSSIBLE SCENARIOS
Key Judgements
I. Iraq has a chemical and biological weapons capability and Saddam is prepared to use it.
II. Faced with the likelihood of military defeat and being removed from power, Saddam is unlikely to be deterred from using chemical and biological weapons by any diplomatic or military means.
III. The use of chemical and biological weapons prior to any military attack would boost support for US-led action and is unlikely.
IV. Saddam is prepared to order missile strikes against Israel, with chemical or biological warheads, in order to widen the war once hostilities begin.
V. Saddam could order the use of CBW weapons in order to deny space and territory to Coalition forces, or to cause casualties, slow any advance, and sap US morale.
VI. If not previously employed, Saddam will order the indiscriminate use of whatever CBW wea
pons remain available late in a ground campaign or as a final act of vengeance. But such an order would depend on the availability of delivery means and the willingness of commanders to obey.
IRAQI USE OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS – POSSIBLE SCENARIOS
This paper assesses possible scenarios for Iraqi use of chemical and biological weapons and takes account of new intelligence that has recently become available on Iraq’s intentions. It has an intelligence cut off point of 4 September.
1. Recent intelligence casts light on Iraq’s holdings of weapons of mass destruction and on its doctrine for using them. Intelligence remains limited and Saddam’s own unpredictability complicates judgements about Iraqi use of these weapons. Much of this paper is necessarily based on judgement and assessment.
2. Iraq used chemical weapons on a large scale during the Iran/Iraq War. Use on the same scale now would require large quantities of chemical weapons and survivable delivery means in the face of overwhelming US air superiority. Iraq did not use chemical weapons during the Gulf War. Intelligence suggests that Iraq may have used the biological agent, aflatoxin, against the Shia population in 1991. We do not believe that Iraq possesses nuclear weapons and there is no intelligence that Iraq is currently interested in radiological dispersal devices.
Chemical and biological capabilities
3. Based on intelligence on the nature of Iraqi CBW weapons, known delivery means, continuing procurement activity, and experience from previous conflicts, we judge that:
• Iraq currently has available, either from pre Gulf War stocks or more recent production, a number of biological warfare (BW) and chemical warfare (CW) agents and weapons;
• following a decision to do so, Iraq could produce significant quantities of mustard agent within weeks; significant quantities of the nerve agents sarin and VX within months (and in the case of VX Iraq may have already done so). Production of sarin and VX would be heavily dependent on hidden stocks of precursors, the size of which are unknown;
• Iraq could produce more biological agents within days. At the time of the Gulf War Iraq had developed the lethal BW agents anthrax, botulinum toxin and aflatoxin. Iraq was also researching a number of other agents including some non-lethal (incapacitating) agents;
• […];
• even if stocks of chemical and biological weapons are limited, they would allow for focused strikes against key military targets or for strategic purposes (such as a strike against Israel or Kuwait);
• Iraq could deliver CW and BW agents by a variety of means including free fall bombs, airborne sprays, artillery shells, mortar bombs and battlefield rockets;
• Iraq told UNSCOM in the 1990s that it filled 25 warheads with anthrax, botulinum toxin and aflatoxin for its Al Hussein ballistic missile (range 650km). Iraq also admitted it had developed 50 chemical warheads for Al Hussein. We judge Iraq retains up to 20 Al Husseins and a limited number of launchers;
• Iraq is also developing short-range systems Al Samoud/Ababil 100 ballistic missiles (range 150km plus) – One intelligence report suggests that Iraq has ‘lost’ the capability to develop warheads capable of effectively disseminating chemical and biological agent and that it would take six months to overcome the ‘technical difficulties’. However, both these missile systems are currently being deployed with military units and an emergency operational capability with conventional warheads is probably available;
• Iraq may have other toxins, chemical and biological agents that we do not know about;
• the effectiveness of any CBW attack would depend on the method of delivery, concentration of the target, dissemination efficiency, meteorological conditions and the availability of suitable defensive counter measures.
Other recent intelligence indicates that:
• production of chemical and biological weapons is taking place;
• Saddam attaches great importance to having CBW, is committed to using CBW if he can and is aware of the implications of doing so. Saddam wants it to dominate his neighbours and deter his enemies who he considers are unimpressed by his weakened conventional military capability;
• Iraq has learned from the Gulf War the importance of mobile systems that are much harder to hit than large static sites. Consequently Iraq has developed for the military, fermentation systems which are capable of being mounted on road-trailers or rail cars. These could produce BW agent;
• Iraq has probably dispersed its special weapons, including its CBW weapons. Intelligence also indicates that chemical and biological munitions could be with military units and ready for firing within 20-45 minutes.
Intentions for use
4. Intelligence indicates that Saddam has already taken the decision that all resources, including CBW, be used to defend the regime from attack. One report states that Saddam would not use CBW during the initial air phase of any military campaign but would use CBW once a ground invasion of Iraq has begun. Faced with the likelihood of military defeat and being removed from power, we judge that it is unlikely there would be any way to deter Saddam from using CBW.
5. We judge that several factors could influence the timing of a decision by Saddam to authorise the use of CBW weapons:
• the availability of stocks of CW and BW agents;
• the survivability of his delivery means. Many are vulnerable. Once a military campaign is underway the pressure will increase to use certain assets before they are destroyed;
• the survivability of command and control mechanisms. The method and timing of such decision making is unknown. Intelligence indicates that Saddam’s son Qusai may already have been given authority to order the use of CBW. Authorising front line units to use chemical and biological weapons could become more difficult once fighting begins. Saddam may therefore specify in advance of a war the specific conditions in which unit commanders should use these weapons e.g. once Coalition forces have crossed a particular geographical line;
• the reliability of the units in question. Late in any military campaign commanders may not be prepared to use CBW weapons if they judge that Saddam is about to fall.
Possible scenarios: pre-emptive use before a conflict begins
6. The aim of a pre-emptive strike would be to incapacitate or kill Coalition troops in their concentration areas. Intelligence indicates that Saddam has identified Bahrain, Jordan, Qatar, Israel and Kuwait as targets. Turkey could also be at risk. Both chemical and biological weapons could be used; biological agents could be particularly effective against such force concentrations. But the use of CBW weapons carries serious risks and Saddam will weigh up their military utility against the political costs. Use of CBW weapons would expose the lies and deception about Iraq’s WMD capabilities, undermining Iraqi diplomatic efforts and helping build support for rapid and effective US action. Saddam might also consider using non-lethal agents in a deniable manner; whilst it would be difficult to quickly establish a clear attribution of responsibility, Saddam could not be sure of the US reaction to an outbreak of a non-lethal disease.
7. The early, widespread use of CBW or non-lethal agents would affect Coalition military planning; disruption of the build-up of personnel and material could delay operations. On balance however we judge that the political cost of using CBW weapons would outweigh the military advantages and that Saddam would probably not use CBW weapons pre-emptively.
Possible scenarios: use during the ground phase of a conflict
8. There is no intelligence on specific Iraqi plans for how CBW would be used in a conflict. Large numbers of chemical munitions would need to be used to make a major battlefield impact. BW could also be used although it is less effective as a tactical weapon against Coalition units than CW. But the use of even small quantities of chemical weapons would cause significant degradation in Coalition progress and might contribute to redressing Coalition conventional superiority on the battlefield. Iraq could make effective use of persistent chemical agents to shape the battlefield to Iraq’s advantage by denyin
g space and territory to Coalition forces. Booby-traps and improvised explosive devices could be used as chemical and biological weapons to inflict local losses in urban areas. It is also possible that Saddam would seek to use chemical and biological munitions against any internal uprising; intelligence indicates that he is prepared to deliberately target the Shia population. One report indicates that he would be more likely to use CBW against Western forces than on Arab countries.
Drawing Israel into the conflict
9. Launching a CBW attack against Israel could allow Saddam to present Iraq as the champion of the Palestinian cause and to undermine Arab support for the Coalition by sowing a wider Middle East conflict. [...] One intelligence report suggests that if Saddam were to use CBW, his first target would be Israel. Another intelligence report suggests that Iraq believes Israel will respond with nuclear weapons if attacked with CBW or conventional warheads. It is not clear if Saddam is deterred by this threat or judges it to be unlikely [...].
Unconventional use of CBW
10. Although there is no intelligence to indicate that Iraq has considered using chemical and biological agents in terrorist attacks, we cannot rule out the possibility. [...] Saddam could also remove his existing constraints on dealing with Al Qaida (extremists are conducting low-level work on toxins in an area of northern Iraq outside Saddam’s control). Al Qaida could carry out proxy attacks and would require little encouragement to do so. Saddam’s intelligence agencies have some experience in the use of poisons and even small-scale attacks could have a significant psychological impact. Intelligence indicates that Saddam has specifically commissioned a team of scientists to devise novel means of deploying CBW.
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